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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on aspects of change in German strategic culture, i.e. on 
the changes in ways of thinking about and pursuing security and defence pol-
icy and the views on the questions of peace, war and the use of military force, 
in particular after the end of the Cold War. The overarching aim of the study 
is to provide a novel reading on German strategic culture, and this has been 
done by shifting the focus of research on strategic culture from the study of 
continuity to the study of change. This enables us to tell better stories about 
strategic cultures – both in terms of how internal and external challenges – 
leading to questions about the continuity of strategic cultural patterns and 
how strategic culture is shaped by the social and political reality of the strate-
gic actors.  
The first main contribution of the study is to question the mantra of con-
tinuity that has been the primary object of study in the existing strategic cul-
ture research. This mantra has ultimately led to a rather stale and static state 
of affairs in terms of the contributions that strategic culture research is able 
to make in the field of International Relations. Instead, the study argues for a 
research agenda that identifies the nature, mechanisms and outcomes of 
strategic cultural change. The study achieves this by critically assessing the 
existing accounts of strategic cultural change and creating an analytical 
framework that stresses both the processes and outcomes of strategic cultural 
change. This framework is informed by critical realist metatheory since it 
enables us to move ahead of the epistemological impasse of the existing stud-
ies by focusing on the ontological aspects of strategic culture. This framework 
identifies the ‘experience of warfare’ as the primary mechanism of change in 
strategic cultures.  
The second key contribution of the study is to apply this analytical frame-
work in the study of German strategic culture. The empirical case studies 
cover the German strategic cultural track record since the end of World War 
II, with a clear focus on the developments after the end of the Cold War. 
These case studies show, firstly, how shifts within the normative structure of 
German strategic culture have shaped German views on the use of military 
force, and, subsequently, how they led to shifts and changes in German stra-
tegic practices. Secondly, the case studies underline the role of external 
shocks (e.g. the massacre at Srebrenica) in triggering change within German 
strategic culture. Thirdly, the case studies also provide a basis for a critique 
of some of the more widely accepted claims regarding German security and 
defence policy, such as the notion of ‘normalisation’ or ‘Sonderweg’ (special 
path). Finally, the analysis also suggests that counterfactual argumentation 
can be a useful analytical tool in assessing the importance of some of these 
developments in the evolution of German strategic culture.      
vi 
The third primary contribution of the study is a critical assessment of the 
process of coming to terms with the German past and how this affects Ger-
man strategic culture. The study stresses the importance of socio-cognitive 
factors in the evolution of strategic cultures and identifies the shift from guilt 
to responsibility as one of the key changes in post-Cold War German strate-
gic culture. Furthermore, the study recognizes the continuing impact and 
relevance of the German past on the further development of German strate-
gic culture, even though the focus of the German debate has partly shifted 
from whether Germany can use military force to a discussion on the means 
and ends of the use of military force. 
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was funded by the The Finnish Cultural Foundation and the 
Oskar Öflund Foundation. Also, The Finnish Graduate School in Political 
Studies (Politu) assisted the research by providing travel grants. I am grateful 
for their support without which this thesis would never have seen light of 
day. 
Assistant Professor Kai Oppermann (Sussex University) and Professor 
Pekka Visuri acted as the premilinary examiners for the dissertation. I wish 
to thank them for a thorough and careful reading of the manuscript and the 
constructive comments and criticism they have provided. 
I am mostly indebted to Professor Tuomas Forsberg whose support 
throughout the years has been invaluable. The thesis has greatly benefited 
from his in-depth knowledge on Germany and German foreign and security 
policy. Tuomas has not only been the supervisor of my thesis, but a boss, a 
colleague and a friend. Tuomas is, indeed, one of the good guys out there and 
I consider myself lucky for having been supervised by him. 
Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs Teija Tiilikainen 
and Professor Henri Vogt have also had a considerable impact on the way 
things turned out for me. I wish to thank Teija for giving me the opportunity 
to work in her EU research project for a couple of years and hone my skills as 
a researcher under her guidance. I also wish to thank Henri, who is really 
skilful at listening to your rants and incomplete ideas regarding the disserta-
tion and giving you really useful advice. I am also grateful to the custos of the 
public examination, Professor Heikki Patomäki, who has provided steadfast 
support, guidance and critical commentary especially in the final stages of 
the process. In addition, I wish to express my gratitude to Dr Juha Vuori and 
university lecturer Riikka Kuusisto for their insightful commentary on the 
manuscript. Dr Bastian Giegerich and Dr Heiko Biehl have also been invalu-
able contacts during my PhD studies, and provided me with the opportunity 
to be part of an international research group on strategic cultures in Europe.   
More generally, I am grateful to the staff of the Department of Translation 
Studies for providing some of the most useful courses I have attended during 
my studies at the University of Helsinki and keeping my German at a reason-
ably understandable level. Similarly, I am thankful to the staff of the De-
partment of Political and Economic Studies for providing me the conceptual 
and analytical skills to engage in social scientific research. I want especially 
to thank Education Planning Officer Marjukka Laakso for her benevolent 
attitude towards an MA student who, while being in Germany, had her print 
out the whole MA thesis and deliver it for examination! 
The Network for European Studies, also known as the ‘corridor’, deserves 
a special commendation. The corridor provided ‘the scientific bedrock’ for 
me especially early on in my PhD studies. I wish to express my warm thanks 
viii 
to everyone with whom I had the pleasure to share the experience. I want 
especially to mention Mikko Tyrväinen with whom we tried to figure out 
the intricacies of how the EU uses its power and Marie-Louise Hindsberg, 
whose presence in the corridor was indispensable for all of us. I also want to 
flag the role of the corridor’s directors (Teija, Henri and Research Director 
Juhana Aunesluoma) during those years. All three were incredibly skilled at 
crafting an academic atmosphere in which a particular accent was put on 
the fruitful and constructive interaction between junior and senior 
researchers. I have especially fond memories of the monthly ‘in-doors 
picnics’ that provided a nice platform for catching-up and chatting about all 
things related to the PhD process and beyond. 
Apart from colleagues I am lucky to have been blessed with friends, who 
have stood by me through the whole PhD endeavour. While it is not 
possible to thank them all here, a few words need to be said. Dr Iain 
Ferguson shared with me the ups and downs of the life of a PhD student. 
Iain is a great conversationist and there is nothing better than to chat 
about politics, science and life with Iain in the sauna heat. Henri Purje 
and Tommi Wallenius, whom I got to know during the early stages of my 
MA studies, are a couple of cool dudes whose cultivated company I’ve 
enjoyed immensily. I hope the feeling is mutual. I’ve been friends with 
Juhani Horelli as long as I can remember. We’ve shared so much during 
the past 20 years that capturing all of it would require a book of its own. 
I’m sure it would become a best-seller. I want to thank all my friends for 
their support, humor and understanding throughout the years. 
Last but not least, there is my family. I want to thank my big sister for 
being generous with her time and designing the ????????? covers for 
this?? thesis. I??want to thank my big brother for donating me all his 
unused clothes and shoes over the years. I’ve managed to acquire a lot 
of books thanks to him. I want to thank my dear parents, Pirkko Seppo 
and Juha Seppo for their unconditional support and love. This thesis is 
dedicated to them.  
?????????????? ???????
?????????????
???????????
ix 
CONTENTS 
1? Germany and strategic culture: the prophecy of 
continuity .................................................................................................... 1?
1.1.    The initial theoretical premise: German strategic culture as a 
culture of strategic continuity ................................................................... 5?
1.2.   Origins of strategic cultural studies ........................................................ 19?
1.3.   Brief theoretical overview: strategic culture in International 
Relations theory ?...................................................................................... 25
1.4.   The Gray-Johnston debate and its ramifications for the study of 
strategic culture ....................................................................................... 32?
1.5.   Summary .................................................................................................. 41?
2? Understanding strategic cultural change ......................................... 42?
2.1.   Taking stock: methodological considerations, critical realism and 
the study of strategic culture ................................................................... 43?
2.2.  Existing accounts of strategic cultural change ........................................ 52?
2.2.1. Mechanisms of strategic cultural change .......................................... 53?
2.2.2. Fine-tuned change vs. fundamental change .................................... 60?
2.2.3. Change on the level of recurring policy practices ............................. 62?
2.3.   Constructing an analytical framework for the study of strategic 
cultural change ........................................................................................ 66?
2.4.   Wendtian cultures of anarchy and the study of strategic cultural 
change ...................................................................................................... 72?
2.5.   Summary ................................................................................................. 78?
3? The evolution of German foreign and security policy and 
strategic culture from 1945 to the war in Kosovo .......................... 81?
3.1.   Beginnings of a new strategic culture: From ‘Stunde Null’ to 
rearmament and ‘Westbindung’ ............................................................. 81?
3.2.  ?The legacy of Westbindung: from Ostpolitik to the ?onference o? 
?ecurity and ?o-operation in Europe (CSCE) ........................................?87?
3.3.   Towards the end of the Cold War: NATO rearmament and 
Genscherism ........................................................................................... 90?
3.4.   The German reunification, the Gulf War and strategic culture 
after 1990 ................................................................................................. 95?
3.5.   The Balkan wars: from Bosnia to Kosovo – civilian power in war .......  100?
3.6.   Summary ? strategic cultural change from 1945 to the war in 
Kosovo ................................................................................................... 123?
x 
4? ‘Im Einsatz’ – German Strategic Culture from 
Afghanistan to Libya and Beyond ..................................................... 131?
4.1.   The war on terror: from Afghanistan to Iraq – A new German 
‘Sonderweg’? .......................................................................................... 131?
4.2.   Post-Iraq: Europeanization instead of Transatlanticism? ...................   150?
4.3.   From Lebanon to Libya and beyond: back to the future? ....................  154?
4.4.   Post-Cold War Germany – still a civilian power? .................................  182?
4.5.   Summary: strategic cultural change from Afghanistan to Libya 
and beyond ............................................................................................ 193?
5? Re-interpretation of the Past and German Strategic 
Culture ..................................................................................................... 199?
5.1.   Coming to terms with the German past – from individual guilt to 
collective responsibility ........................................................................??206
5.1.1????Karl Jaspers and the four categories of guilt .................................??207
5.1.2????Germans, guilt and the Cold War ................................................... 210
5.1.3.?  From Bitburg to Historians’ Controversy and beyond: 
reframing the issue of guilt, responsibility and victimhood .......... 213?
5.1.4.  The mixed legacy of Nazism: Germans as perpetrators and 
victims ............................................................................................ 220?
5.2.   German strategic culture, guilt and responsibility .............................. 22??
5.2.1.   Consequences of German guilt ....................................................... 225?
5.2.2.  From guilt to responsibility: Germany and the 
Comprehensive Approach on security........................................... 229?
5.3?   ‘Sonderweg? as the dominant historical-strategic narrative for
Germany ...............................................................................................  235?
5.3.1.  Positive and negative approaches on ‘Sonderweg’ ........................ 236?
5.3.2? ?Normality and the different dimensions of strategic culture .......? 240?
5.3.3.  ‘Bundeswehr im Wandel’ – has the German army become 
‘normal’ ?........................................................................................  245?
5.4.   The aspect of change from a counterfactual perspective: what if 
Srebrenica had not taken place? ........................................................... 253?
5.5.   Summary ................................................................................................261?
6 Conclusions ........................................................................................... 263?
          References .................................................................................................. 271?
xi 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACTORDS
AWACS 
BRIC 
CDU/CSU
CFE 
CFSP 
COIN
EMP
ENP 
ESDP
ESS
EC
EU 
EUFOR
FAZ
FDP 
FPA
GDP 
GDR 
IR
ISAF
KdB 
KFOR 
KLA 
MBFR 
MENA 
NATO
NPT
NSDAP 
OEF
OSCE 
PDS
PRT 
R2P
RoE
SALT 
SFOR 
SED
SPD 
Activation Orders (NATO)
Airborne Warning and Control System 
Brazil, Russia, India, China 
The Christian Democratic Union of Germany/ The 
Christian Social Union in Bavaria 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Counterinsurgency
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
European Security and Defence Policy 
European Security Strategy
The European Community
The European Union 
European Union Force
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
The Free Democratic Party 
Foreign Policy Analysis
Gross Domestic Product 
The German Democratic Republic 
International Relations
International Security Assistance Force 
Conception of Bundeswehr 
The Kosovo Force 
The Kosovo Liberation Army 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
The Middle East and North Africa region 
North Atlantic Alliance
Non-Proliferation Treaty
National Socialist German Workers Party 
Operation Enduring Freedom
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe 
The Party of Democratic Socialism 
Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Responsibility to Protect
Rules of Engagement
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
The Stabilization Force 
The Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
The Social Democratic Party of Germany 
xii 
UN 
UNIFIL 
UNOSOM 
UNPROFOR 
UNSC 
USSR 
VPR
WEU
WMD 
The United Nations 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
United Nations Operation in Somalia 
The United Nations Protection Force 
The United Nations Security Council 
The Soviet Union 
Defence Political Guidelines
Western European Union
Weapon of mass destruction 
1 
1 GERMANY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE:
THE PROPHECY OF CONTINUITY 
In general, strategic culture refers to the ways of thinking about and pursuing 
security and defence policy. It conveys a picture of how a country’s political 
elite approaches questions of peace and war, in particular the question of the 
use of military force and the responses that can be found to these 
questions given the specifics of the national past(s) and lessons learned 
therefrom. It is important to stress, however, that strategic culture is 
not some randomly emergent collection of ideas, beliefs and practices but 
a social and political entity that has developed over time. In global 
international politics, the issues of peace and war have always been 
fundamental in terms of not only state survival, but also what comes or 
should come thereafter. Hence, they touch upon the very conditions of 
sustainable political life that is either possible or desirable in a given 
historical context. Therefore, the ability of strategic culture to provide 
answers (which implies that there is a strong normative aspect to 
strategic culture) is not only connected to the set-up of its inner structure 
(societally transmitted ideas, beliefs and related practices) but also to its 
ability to adapt to emerging challenges and security threats. Adaptation, 
in turn, might require considerable changes in strategic culture, depending 
on the nature of the external challenges. 
This thesis focuses on the aspect of change in strategic cultures in general, 
and in German strategic culture, in particular. It attempts to draw a compre-
hensive picture of German strategic cultural change after the end of the Cold 
War by devising an analytical framework that is based on an understanding 
of strategic cultural change as a causally non-linear process and a synthesis 
of the arguments on change within strategic cultural studies. This is an im-
portant aspect, one which has hitherto been largely ignored in scholarship on 
strategic culture. By underlining the aspect of non-linearity in the process of 
change, this thesis attempts to go beyond an understanding of strategic cul-
tural change as a fixed, linear and unidimensional process.1 This is necessary 
because strategic cultural change and continuity often co-exist to some de-
gree (at least in the ‘world out there’) and that it is therefore hardly tenable 
to describe the processes of continuity and change solely in terms of 
linear causal functions.  
In order to be able to grasp strategic cultural change as a causally non-
linear process, this study utilizes
 
critical realist metatheory, particularly the
 
1 Linearity, which in itself is a theoretical construct, can be expressed as a situation where a dependent 
variable has a linear relationship with one or more independent variables. Thus, linearity can be un-
derstood as the linear function of independent variables. An example would be that of a ‘plot’ following 
a simple linear structure, which involves ideas and events that are always directly connected and follow 
one after the other.  
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arguments relating to the causal properties/powers of directly unobservable, 
yet detectable entities.2  By so doing, the thesis seeks to question the well-
established assumptions regarding the theoretical and analytical importance 
and prevalence of the aspect of strategic cultural continuity in strategic cul-
tures that inevitably lead to a rather static view of strategic culture. It also 
seeks to offer a better way of looking at strategic cultures as inherently dy-
namic social and political entities that may draw upon specific socio-
cognitive features embedded in the national past(s) and its reinterpretations, 
exhibiting an important causal role in terms of explaining strategic cultural 
change. Accordingly, if we accept the notion that strategic cultures are essen-
tially dynamic social and political entities, it can be argued that the principal 
aim of German strategic culture has been not only to adjust to but also to 
shape the emerging post-Cold War political reality ever since the fall of the 
Berlin wall. 
The definition of strategic culture used in this study can be outlined as fol-
lows: strategic culture consists of specific strategic thinking and strategic 
practices the purpose of which is to establish clarity regarding the potential 
policy outcomes of questions and choices related to peace and war and the 
use of military force. Strategic thinking and practices, in turn, are embedded 
within the normative framework of strategic culture that draws from lessons 
from the past. In the German case, this framework evolved after the end of 
World War II and culminated in the lessons of ‘never again’.3 It is important 
to point out, however, that norms do not necessarily determine the outcomes 
of any strategic culture or policies pursued; they are better understood as 
‘reasons for action’, enabling or constraining the realm of options for political 
actors in their strategic contemplation.4 
In terms of methodology, this thesis proceeds as follows. The overall aim 
of the thesis is to contribute to general understanding regarding the concept 
of strategic culture via theoretical reflection on the existing scholarly debate. 
Another aim of the thesis is to reinvigorate the debate on strategic culture by 
digging deep into the processes of strategic cultural change by introducing an 
analytical framework that builds on insights from critical realist metatheory 
and existing accounts on strategic cultural change. This is supported by an 
analytical empirical analysis on the evolution of German strategic culture 
since the end of World War II. However, it needs to be noted that since the 
scope of the analysis covers developments that reach from the aftermath of 
World War II to the conflict in Ukraine, an in-depth analysis of each turn of 
events, debate or related specifics is beyond this thesis. Therefore, the empir-
ical focus is specifically on post-Cold War developments. The thesis provides 
a rich and varied account in terms of the evolution of German strategic cul-
ture by elaborating primarily but not only on the questions of peace and war 
2 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2. 
3 See Chapter 3. 
4 See Chapter 1.3. 
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and the use of military force (the core of strategic culture). Indeed, another 
purpose of the analysis is to pit the introduced analytical framework against 
theoretical claims that operate on the level of the international system. In-
stead of attempting to cover a multitude of theoretical claims that operate at 
the system level, this thesis focuses especially on Alexander Wendt’s account 
of cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian culture)5 since it can 
be argued that it provides interesting contrasts to the theory of strategic cul-
ture and can hence be treated either as a critique on some of the claims that 
this thesis puts forward or as a supplementary account that highlights inter-
national and global dynamics in explaining strategic cultural change.  
The research proceeds as follows: Chapter 1 discusses in depth why it is 
necessary to shift the focus of research from strategic cultural continuity to 
strategic cultural change. It will delve into the scholarly debates and existing 
theoretical frameworks on strategic culture and assess their impact on the 
study of German strategic culture. Chapter 2 discusses the existing accounts 
of strategic cultural change and constructs an analytical framework for the 
study of strategic cultural change. It also discusses Wendtian cultures of an-
archy that provide alternative/supplementary accounts in terms of strategic 
cultural change. Chapters 3 and 4 portray the evolution of German strategic 
culture since the end World War II and Cold War, respectively. This is pro-
vided in the form of an analytical historical narrative that focuses particular-
ly, but not exclusively, on the question of the use of military force and the 
German debate in terms of so-called out-of-area operations (Auslandsein- 
sätze der Bundeswehr)6. Chapter 5 shifts the discussion to re-interpretations 
of the German past, because they play a pivotal role in grasping the essence 
of strategic cultural change. In Chapter 5, the thesis also elaborates on and 
provides a critical analysis of some of the ‘grand’ schemes or claims on Ger-
man strategic culture, such as that of a German special path (Sonderweg) 
and the debate on ‘normality’, because they play an important role in terms 
of strategic cultural evolution in Germany. It is also suggested in this thesis 
that counterfactual argumentation can prove to be useful in not only stress-
ing the aspect of causal non-linearity instead of linearity in the evolution of 
strategic culture, but also the inherent contingency in terms of external 
shocks such as wars, conflicts and crises, which all pose a challenge to strate-
gic cultures. Chapter 5 concludes with a counterfactual thought experiment 
on the case of the Srebrenica massacre. 
The empirical material used in thesis consists mainly of a selection of 
Bundestag debates in the form of plenary protocols that provide not only a 
comprehensive picture of the process of how German strategic thought is 
5 See Wendt, Alexander 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
1999, (Chapter 6). 
6 Out-of-area operations refer to those military operations conducted under the auspices of collective 
systems of security of which Germany is a part, such as those of NATO which go beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the member states of these systems. 
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constructed at the level of the German political elite, but also of how Ger-
mans respond to the emerging issues of peace, war and the use of military 
force in terms of particular Bundeswehr (German armed forces) out-of-area 
operations. In addition, this thesis utilizes a wide range of other textual ma-
terial, defence and security policy related documents such as White Books 
(Weissbuch) and Defence Political Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische 
Richtlinien), a wide selection of media and press coverage mainly on the de-
ployment of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations but also more widely 
on security and defence policy. It also utilizes other literary sources and ex-
isting research on strategic culture and international relations, security and 
defence policy.  
The argument put forward in this thesis is that strategic cultural change 
needs to be grasped in terms of social and political processes, as well as out-
comes at the level of policy practices in order to do justice to the complex cul-
tural and social reality ‘out there’. This view allows us to move from an un-
derstanding of strategic cultural change in terms of historical evolution that 
is rooted in essentialism and guided by strict path-dependency to an under-
standing of strategic cultural change as a causally non-linear process which 
may become empirically observable as verifiable outcomes, such as in terms 
of institutionalized patterns of behaviour. Perhaps more importantly, this 
thesis also suggests that the debate on strategic cultural change needs to go 
beyond the notion of observable, verifiable outcomes because strategic cul-
tures possess significant socio-cognitive qualities that do not always become 
empirically observable the way we might expect them to.7 
As will be discussed in detail in the empirical analysis, in the German case 
this pertains particularly to the process of coming to terms with the German 
past and the evolving perceptions thereof, the understanding of which is im-
perative if we want to understand and explain the changes that took place in 
German strategic culture after the end of the Cold War.   
However, the importance of studying the aspect of change in strategic cul-
tures should not be underestimated from either a more policy-oriented view, 
or from a popular view, for that matter. For instance, regardless of how the 
changes that took place within the US strategic culture that led to the war 
against terrorism during the Bush administration in the early 2000s were 
evaluated within the research community, these changes have had a consid-
erable impact not only on the functioning and purpose of NATO and the 
transatlantic security community, but also on the way as individuals and 
7 This is not to say that processes are essentially ‘unobservable’ (which they are not) but merely to high-
light the fact that research on strategic culture needs to shift its focus from clearly observable and de-
tectable ‘outcomes’ to entities such as ‘processes’ which may not always become empirically manifest to 
the degree that ‘outcomes’ do. According to Heikki Patomäki, what is observable and what is not is 
essentially a complex and relative question. For more on observation, see e.g. Patomaki, Heikki 2014, 
‘On the Reality of Causes: A Response to Ned Lebow’, Qualitative & Multi-Method Research, Fall 2014, 
Vol. 12, No.2, pp. 11-16. 
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peoples we contemplate the issues of peace and war and the use of military 
force. Hence, by attempting a systematic look at the process of strategic cul-
tural change, we might be in a better position to understand how and why we 
wage war against terrorism the way we do. Similarly, an in-depth look at the 
process of change in German strategic culture not only provides us with an 
account of why and how German strategic culture has changed, but also it 
offers an explanation of why Germany might often seem reluctant to take the 
lead in terms of issues regarding international security (for instance). Hence, 
the observations we draw from studying the process of strategic cultural 
change can have important social and political implications that go beyond 
the notion of interest shown among the professional circles in the field of In-
ternational Relations (IR). 
1.1.  THE INITIAL THEORETICAL PREMISE: GERMAN 
STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A CULTURE OF 
STRATEGIC CONTINUITY 
In his seminal work on German and Japanese post-World War II foreign and 
security policy cultures, Thomas U. Berger admits that he was surprised that 
Germany and Japan had not begun to act more assertively in military terms 
since the end of the Cold War. This was contrary to all the expectations of 
students of international relations, as Berger says.  He claims to have had 
trouble in facing an empirical reality in such disarray and at odds with his 
theoretical premises: “I felt like Sherlock Holmes in the Hound of Basker-
villes: The puzzle was not that the dog barked, but rather that it did not.”8 
Berger was not alone in his bafflement. Indeed, this seemed to be one of the 
more perplexing topics among the observers of German politics after the end 
of the Cold War: why did Germany not choose to act more aggressively?9 
Berger argued that this was because of a deeply rooted anti-militarism and 
pacifism in German society and politics. Others claimed it was due to Ger-
many’s internalized role as a civilian power that underlined the traditional 
practice of restraint in issues regarding the use of military force.10 This was 
8 Berger, Thomas U. 1998, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. 
Johns Hopkings University Press 1998, (preface). 
9 This seemed to be a question particularly bothering the realist camp of IR scholars, see Duffield, John 
1998, World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Poli-
cy After Unification, Stanford University Press, 1998; Waltz, Kenneth 1993, ‘The Emerging Structure 
of International Politics’, International Security 18:2 (Fall), 1993.  
10 See e.g. Berger 1998; Maull, Hanns W. 1990, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, For-
eign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 91-106; Maull, Hanns W. 1992, ‘Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land. Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik’, Europa Archiv, Vol. 47, No. 10, pp. 269-
278; Kirste, Knut & Maull, Hanns W. 1996, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, Zeitschrift für Internationa-
le Beziehungen, 3:2, 1996, pp. 283-312. 
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the prevalent situation in the field of IR regarding the study of German poli-
tics at the end of the bipolar era and well into the 1990s. However, challenges 
in terms of security policy that appeared due to the outbreak of crisis and 
conflicts in Europe and beyond put Germany under constant external pres-
sure that revealed the degree to which German strategic culture was at odds 
with the emerging post-Cold War political reality. The puzzling thing about 
this, however, is not that we have witnessed considerable change in German 
strategic culture since the end of the Cold War, but the fact that there have 
been few serious studies which would have focused on the aspect of change in 
German strategic culture.11  
Indeed, the following assumptions have dominated studies on German 
strategic culture ever since German re-unification: 1) German strategic cul-
ture functions according to strong continuity in the underlying ideation-
al/normative structure; 2) this continuity translates into equivalent, pattern-
oriented state behaviour in terms of foreign, security and defence policy; 3) 
German strategic culture is especially resistant to change due to the troubled 
German past, its strong inclination towards multilateral frameworks and 
global governance, its deeply-rooted antimilitaristic political identity and its 
preference for status quo security and defence policy and finally its reluc-
tance to take lead in issues of international/global security 4) all the above 
points contribute to the understanding of Germany’s international foreign 
and security policy role as a normative civilian power.12 
The puzzling thing is that the overwhelming majority of these assump-
tions are still taken for granted despite the track record of Germany’s foreign 
and security policy since the Balkan wars in the mid-1990s and 
especially since the war in Kosovo at the end of the 1990s telling a rather 
different story. Taken together, the above assumptions essentially lead to a 
line of argumentation which posits that German strategic culture remains 
largely immune to pressures towards change in an international security 
environment that has undergone a major transformation since the end of the 
Cold War. As this study will show, this is simply not the case. German 
strategic culture may be resilient but it is not immune to change. Its major 
tenets have undergone a more comprehensive change as proposed by the 
above assumptions. In essence, this study scrutinizes the existing mantra of 
cultural ?continuity ?by dig?????????????????????????????????????????????????
11 Hilpert’s case-study of German strategic culture in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom/ISAF) is a wel-
come exception. See Hilpert, Carolin 2014,  Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security 
Policy. Germany and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
12 See Maull, 1990; Kirste & Maull, 1996; Maull, Hanns W. 2000, ‘German foreign policy, PostKosovo: 
Still a ‘civilian power?’, German Politics, Vol.9, No. 2, pp.1-24; Berger, 1998; Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja 
2005, ‘The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes’, Security Dialogue 
Vol. 36 (3), pp. 339-359; Malici, Akan 2006, ‘Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign 
Policy Behaviour, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 37-62; See also Schmitt, Olivier 2012, 
‘Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions For Military Action’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol, 
33:1, pp. 59-81. 
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ral change as well as by questioning some of the convenient truths about 
German strategic culture that are so well represented by the above 
assumptions.  
There is almost unanimous scholarly consensus that Kosovo marked a 
watershed in German foreign and security policy because it was the first time 
that Germany took part militarily in an international conflict management 
operation under the auspices of the NATO Allied Force –operation, meaning 
that it was directly involved in the fighting itself (albeit without deploying 
any ground troops).13 Yet perhaps even more importantly, the experiences 
from Kosovo did not set up a specific strategic pattern – neither ideational 
nor behavioural for that matter – in German security and defence policy. 
Because there was no hard evidence to the contrary, scholars such as Maull 
argued that in terms of German strategic culture after Kosovo, very little had 
changed.14 However, the general conclusion was that Kosovo did set an im-
portant precedent for Germany to be able and at least remotely willing to use 
military force in defence of human rights (hence building on the legacy of the 
Bosnian war and the massacre at Srebrenica in particular) but it was far from 
the milestone of a wholesale change towards more interventionist policies in 
terms of peace-enforcement via the use of military force.15  
The terrorist strikes against the US in September 2001 culminated in an-
other puzzle for the existing accounts of German strategic culture. At first, 
these events seemed to confirm both Germany’s stance towards antimilita-
rism and the notion of Germany as a civilian power and, hence, they support 
the assumption of continuity in German strategic culture. Yet by declining to 
abide by ‘American adventurism’ Germany was perceived as parting from 
one of its most important foreign and security policy principles since the end 
of World War II – the alliance with the US.16 Furthermore, although Germa-
ny participated in and contributed to the war effort against international ter-
rorism in Afghanistan for 14 years, there existed a clear gap between the dis-
13 During NATO’s 78-day air campaign over Kosovo in early 1999, the purpose of which was to compel 
the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to accept the terms of the Rambouillet agreement, Germany 
deployed 10 Tornados which played an important part in shutting down Serb radar systems. The Ger-
mans, together with the Italians, delivered over 35% of the munitions expended in suppression of Serb 
air defence missions. See Peters, John E. 2001, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand, pp. 32-33.  
14 See Maull, 2000.  
15 See Berger, Thomas U. 2002, ‘A Perfectly Normal Abnormality: German Foreign Policy after Kosovo 
and Afghanistan’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Nov. 2002), pp. 175-177; 
Leithner, Anika 2009, Shaping German Foreign Policy. History, Memory and National Interest, 
FirstForumPress, Boulder, London 2009, pp.45-47; Rudolf, Peter 2005, ‘The Myth of the 'German 
Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations’, Survival, Spring 2005, Vol. 47, Issue 1, p. 
140. 
16 Forsberg, Tuomas 2005, ‘German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism 
or Emancipation?’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36 (2), pp. 213-231. 
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cursive formulation of the political elite about the operation and the reality of 
the Bundeswehr deployment on the ground. This meant that the elite dis-
course about ‘defending German security at the Hindukusch’ – a famous 
quote by the former German defence minister Peter Struck17 that signalled a 
normalization of German foreign and security policy and Germany’s credibil-
ity as a partner in NATO. However, this did not overlap with the reflections 
of German soldiers and the general public, who became increasingly con-
fused and perplexed about the purpose of German deployment there on the 
whole. Similarly, if we look at more recent examples, the assumptions re-
garding German strategic cultural continuity led to inconsistent argumenta-
tion about German security and defence policy. In the wake of the Arab 
Spring in 2011 and the conflict in Libya, Germany chose not to take part in 
the NATO Unified Protector military operation, although it can be argued 
that the more crucial preconditions for German military participation since 
the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 were fulfilled in Libya, namely, the possi-
bility of ethnic cleansing, possibly even genocide.18 Therefore, to explain 
Germany’s recent security and defence policy by the professed continuity of 
its strategic culture is – in the light of the given examples – rather contradic-
tory because in this assessment, cultural continuity becomes an all-
encompassing explanatory ‘repository’ that can explain anything by stretch-
ing the argument. One could argue in favour of the culture of restraint and 
civilian power -concept by stating that exceptions confirm the rule or that 
Germany tends to favour a civilian approach to conflict resolution whenever 
possible or feasible. However, it would only contribute to the already waning 
explanatory power that the civilian power approach still wields and, most 
importantly, actually delegitimizes the original idea of the ‘civilianness’ of the 
approach in its normative understanding.  
In the mainstream strategic cultural scholarship it is more often than not 
taken for granted that strategic culture culminates with the premise of cul-
tural continuity. First, this claim is often backed by the fact that we have very 
little evidence on actual strategic cultural change and that scholars regularly 
agree that strategic cultural change is not worth studying because it takes 
place only after a long period of time, if at all.19 Moreover, it could be stated 
that this line of argument leads to the conclusion that strategic cultural 
change is simply something that cannot be directly observed and/or can only 
17 Declaration of the German Federal Government, issued by Defense Minister Peter Struck, 11.3.2004. 
Available at: (http://www.bmvg.de). 
18 See Bellamy, Alex. J 2011, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm’, 
Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 2011), pp. 263-269. The massacre of Srebrenica 
refers to the events in the UN safe-enclave of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 
1995, when Serb forces, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, committed a massacre of around 
8000 Muslim boys and men.    
19 This seems to be the general conclusion of the most influential writings within the strategic culture 
scholarship, see Chapter 1.4. 
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be grasped in retrospect or via theoretical reflection. However, regardless of 
whether something is essentially observable or not, most social phenomena 
do not show themselves to us the way we expect them to (either by conform-
ing with our senses or with our theories), and this is no different in case of 
strategic culture. Second, the problem often lies with the definition of strate-
gic culture, or, rather, in its ambivalent delineation from concepts such as 
foreign and security policy identity or role. In constructivist analyses, identi-
ties are usually treated as being more malleable than cultures even though at 
the same time, identities are thought to be the expressions of the underlying 
culture. Hence, change is often detected on the level of identity or role yet it 
remains unclear how changed identities or roles affect the very culture within 
which they operate. Wendt, for instance, solves this dilemma by arguing that 
identity essentially defines the contents of culture because if identities don’t 
change, neither do cultures. This corresponds with Wendt’s conception of 
culture as a self-fulfilling prophecy (once in place, culture tends to reproduce 
itself).20 This position is vulnerable to post-structuralist critique which main-
tains that Wendtian constructivism takes identities as given (which would 
hence indicate that cultures are given, too), which can be argued to be prob-
lematic if constructivism is about trying to seize the middle-ground between 
rationalism and interpretivism.21 
In any case, this state of affairs in strategic culture research is unsatisfac-
tory not only because of the lamentations about the relative scarcity of empir-
ical evidence, but even more so because it endorses a view of strategic culture 
that is inherently static within, regardless of whether the point is to argue for 
continuity, change or some other aspect of (strategic) culture. Consequently, 
the accounts of strategic culture usually lack a systematic assessment on the 
preconditions for strategic cultural change.  As a result, they are unable to 
provide accurate descriptions or explanations as to why states with similar 
strategic cultural backgrounds opt for different strategies or policy choices, 
or why state behaviour seems to go beyond what is considered ‘appropriate’ 
in the given strategic cultural circumstances that underlie the normative 
structure of strategic culture.22 To stress this point, although all of this is 
connected to the crucial matter of whether cultures are considered to matter 
at all in terms of policy or strategy or whether they function only as some ab-
stract points of reference or as secondary explanations to approaches high-
lighting the role of power, the fact remains that by underlining the aspect of 
20 See Wendt 1999. 
21 For a poststructuralist critique, see e.g. Zehfuss, Maja 2001, ‘Constructivism and Identity: A Danger-
ous Liaison’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 315-348. 
22 Christoph O. Meyer’s study (2006) on the convergence of European norms about security and de-
fense provides a welcome exception. Meyer addresses the question of causal mechanisms for normative 
change referring to the proclivity to use military force among the EU member states. Meyer’s account 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.    
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continuity at the cost of a more nuanced assessment on the aspect of cultural 
change, strategic culture falls short of much of its explanatory potential. 
Hence, the idea of continuity is integral to the way strategic culture is of-
ten conceived. For one, the very idea (or any idea) of culture requires social 
patterns which imply continuity in some form in order to be able to under-
stand culture as a constant, substantial relationship between institutions, 
principles, actions and ideas. This is highlighted in the traditional usage of 
culture in anthropology, for instance, as ‘a category of social life’ that is ex-
pressed i.e. in an understanding of culture as ‘learned behaviour’ or as a ‘sys-
tem of symbols and meanings’, both of which build on the idea of cultural 
continuity.23 
And yet, this in-built necessity of continuity actually tells us very little 
about how particular cultures work and how they shape social and political 
reality. Indeed, if we opt for this kind of simple definition for political (or 
any) culture, then the analytical value of culture becomes redundant for it is 
overly deterministic. For instance, if we understand a political culture as a 
continuation of given social, political and historical patterns promoting cer-
tain policies then we make the assumption that the sole existence of a politi-
cal culture leads to certain kind of policies which originate in these given pat-
terns, even if we entrusted the notion of culture with the smallest amount of 
explanatory power. This is a problem with essentialist accounts that build on 
the idea of path-dependent historical progress based on historical institu-
tionalism that is traditionally at odds with ideational change24 and it seems 
to form the basis of an understanding of history in the mainstream accounts 
of strategic culture. However, we could also argue that precisely since culture 
is often defined as a continuation of social, political and historical patterns, 
we cannot entirely escape the notion of causal relations as something more 
than just effective causes between the ideational structure and observed be-
haviour. Indeed, the overall argument about cultural continuity can hardly 
mean that the evolution of culture occurs in a socially linear fashion or as a 
result of some deterministic historical and social forces only. Instead, this 
study suggests that we adopt a more non-linear view on the evolution of cul-
ture, because it enables us to make more advanced arguments regarding both 
strategic cultural continuity and change. 
23 For a conceptual history of culture in human sciences, see e.g. Sewell Jr., William H. 2005, ‘The 
Concept(s) of Culture’, Spiegel, M. Gabrielle (ed.) Practicing history: New directions in historical 
writing after the linguistic turn, Routledge 2005, pp.76-95. Sewell argues that two conceptions of 
culture are currently vying for dominance: ‘culture as a system of symbols and meanings’, which???? 
hegemonic in the 1960s and 1970s and ‘culture as practice’, ?which has become increasingly prominent? 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
24 See Sayer, Andrew 1997, ‘Essentialism, social constructionism and beyond’, The Sociological Review, 
Vol.45, No. 3, pp. 453-487;  Peters-Pierre-King 2005, ‘The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Con-
flict in Historical Institutionalism’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Nov. 2005), pp.1275-1300. 
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As Beverly Crawford observed a few years ago, “(t)he debate over continu-
ity and change in foreign policy emerged because of Germany’s rise in the 
traditional sources of power that caught the world’s attention when unity and 
full sovereignty were restored in 1990. This particular debate emerged be-
cause the paradigm of power politics is still dominant in both analytic and 
policy circles.”25 However, while military power is the central credo of all the 
different strands of realism, there are clear differences between the classical 
realist and neorealist research on German foreign and security policy. Visuri, 
for instance, has argued that military-geopolitical factors were indispensable 
in an explanatory framework aimed at a long-term view on German security 
policy and in particular military strategy during the Cold War. This stemmed 
from Germany’s central geopolitical status as a frontline state as well as the 
fact that for the most part of the Cold War, NATO military doctrine consid-
ered the West-German state territory as the primary defensive operational 
area vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact.26 Geopolitical considerations reappeared in 
the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in particular in the writings of 
conservative German historians and publicists in terms of the linkage be-
tween geographical space and political development (space as fate) and the 
role of geography in defining state’s a priori national interests. Indeed, this 
was premised on a classical realist view that the highest level of ‘normality’ 
for a state was to rise to its ‘natural’ position vis-à-vis other states. In particu-
lar, this was in relation to the concept of Germany’s central position (Mit-
tellage) in Europe. The concept of Mittellage was accompanied by the idea of 
a new geopolitical assessment of Germany in post-Soviet Europe, where the 
interests revolved not around territorial annexation but around the condi-
tions necessary for Germany to act as a benign, stabilizing hegemonic pow-
er.27 However, these views were clearly in the minority in Germany, as the 
general view on Germany’s Western orientation that was supplanted by Eu-
ropean integration after the end of the Cold War was considered not to be 
instrumental in managing the question of Mittellage (as some of the con-
servatives claimed) but a fundamental prerequisite for a transcendence from 
Mittellage to a Europe sharing a common fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft).28      
Neorealists, in turn, predicted that Germany would presume a more as-
sertive stance in its foreign and security policy and pursue dominance over 
its European partners after it had been granted full state sovereignty and that 
other European states would again seek to balance against a resurgent Ger-
25 Crawford, Beverly 2007, Power and German Foreign Policy. Embedded Hegemony in Europe, Pal-
grave MacMillan 2007, p. 179. 
26 Visuri, Pekka 1989, Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan. Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys läntises-
sä Keski-Euroopassa ja Suomessa vuosina 1945-1989, Otava 1989.  
27 See e.g. Bach, J & Peters, S 2002, ‘The New Spirit of German Geopolitics’, Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No.3, 
pp. 1-18. 
28 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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man military power.29  However, German policies after the end of the Cold 
War and German reunification seemed to go against every key (neo)realist 
premise of state behaviour and support the constructivist approach on stra-
tegic culture.30  Firstly, and most importantly, Germany did not aspire to be-
come a ‘normal’ state in terms of military power. The concept of Germany as 
a civilian power, which had taken firm root in German strategic culture dur-
ing the 1980s, remained very strong in German strategic thought in the early 
years of the reunited Federal Republic, and reified the notion of Germany 
acting under a ‘culture of military restraint’.31 Secondly, compared to the ar-
mies of its European peers, German armed forces were fairly modest and re-
mained firmly embedded within NATO command structures. Thirdly, if 
measured solely based on Kenneth Waltz’s classic categorization of power, 
which covers the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, eco-
nomic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”32, it 
might seem plausible to assume that a reunified Germany had every reason 
to begin acting according to the neorealist understanding of states as ration-
al, egoistic actors steered by the notions of national interest and power max-
imization as their raison d’état.33 Yet this was a bold assumption that had 
more to do with the realist fixation about the aspect of military power, bal-
ancing and dominance than the actual situation and political reality in Ger-
many at the end of the bipolar era. Indeed, what one might call the then ‘re-
unification euphoria’, not uncommon within academia at the time, ensured 
that there was barely any reflection on the fact that the Germans did not ac-
tually have a meaningful and comprehensive debate on what the national 
interests of the reunified nation entailed, let alone reach some definite state 
of political normality. This was also reflected in the fact that a constitutional 
debate did not take place in Germany after the end of the Cold War. Moreo-
ver, the famous Historians’ Controversy (Historikerstreit) in the mid-1980s34 
ultimately echoed the different attitudes within the German society towards 
29 See Waltz, Kenneth 1993, ‘The Emerging Structure of International System’, International Security, 
Vol.18, No.2 (Autumn 1993), p. 50 ; Mearsheimer, J. John 1990, ‘Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold 
War’, Atlantic Monthly, Vol.266, No.2, p. 39? 
30 (Neo)realism or structural realism and (neo)liberalism as well as constructivism are considered the 
three ‘grand’ theories in International Relations. 
31 See Maull, W. Hanns 1990, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, 
Nr. 5, pp. 91-106; Kirste, Knut & Maull, Hanns W. 1996, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Beziehungen, 3:2, 1996, pp. 283-312; Harnisch, Sebastian & Maull, Hanns W. (eds.) 
2001, Germany as a civilian power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester University 
Press, 2001.  
32 Waltz, Kenneth 1979, Theory of International Politics, Mc-Graw Hill, 1979, p. 131. 
33 See Baumann, Rainer, Rittberger, Volker & Wagner, Wolfgang 2001, ‘Neorealist foreign policy theo-
ry’, Rittberger, Volker (ed.), German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, 
Manchester University Press, 2001, pp. 37-67. 
34 For more detail, see Chapter 5.1.3. 
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questions pertaining to the lessons of the Nazi past – attitudes, which quite 
astutely revealed the problematic nature of the argument that the reunified 
Germany had firmly defined ‘national interests’ which it egoistically followed 
according to some ultimate rationalist logic.  
Neorealist predictions didn’t hold much water elsewhere, either. In a tell-
ing example from correspondence between realists and their critics in Inter-
national Security (1990-91), J.J. Mearsheimer argued that  
“(i)f the Germans cause trouble in the new Europe, it will not be a 
consequence of peculiar aggressive traits. Germans are not born to 
aggress. An acute sense of insecurity is instead likely to be the source 
of trouble. The root causes of it will be Germany’s exposed location in 
the center of the Continent and its non-nuclear status. Telling the 
Germans they cannot ameliorate their security concerns with nuclear 
weapons because they are not trustworthy is certain to infuriate 
them and will only serve to worsen relations between Germany and 
its neighbors. It is time to face up to the fact that permitting the Ger-
mans to acquire nuclear weapons is better than the alternative.”35 
The above passage is a prime example of neorealist logic according to which 
possessing nuclear weapons automatically makes the world a safer place be-
cause they decrease the sense of insecurity. The story has been told as if the 
process of European integration did not exist before the Treaty of Maastricht 
or as if the Cuban Missile Crisis had never taken place in 1962, when the 
world stood at the brink of an all-out nuclear war. Mearsheimer’s notion is 
based on the realist premise that systemic shifts cause irregularities in the 
relative power between states; irregularities, which will be brought to balance 
through war. This was the reason why Cold War order was regarded as being 
more stable than what came thereafter. However, the Paris protocol to the 
Treaty of Brussels from 1954 already forbade Germany from possessing nu-
clear, biological and chemical weapons.36 While Germany had a vital security 
interest in the nuclear balance during the Cold War, it can hardly be taken as 
evidence that this was somehow a preferred state of affairs for Germany, 
which, quite literally, stood at the frontline of potential nuclear escalation 
despite not having a nuclear arsenal of its own. In fact, the fear of nuclear 
war was a lot higher than the trust German policymakers put in nuclear arse-
nals and their ability to provide security, which is reflected in very strong 
criticism from Germany towards its allies’ nuclear plans as well as the regular 
and popular peace marches in West-Germany during the 1980s. In addition, 
both German states signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) before Ger-
35 Russett, Bruce M,  Risse-Kappen, Thomas and Mearsheimer, John J. 1990, ‘Back to the Future, Part 
III: Realism and the Realities of European Security’, International Security,  Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter, 
1990-1991), p.222. 
36 Müller, Harald 2000, ‘Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition?, 
PRIF-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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man re-unification in 1990. Contemporarily, Germany remains one of the 
more skeptical countries towards nuclear energy in general. Indeed, the Fed-
eral Republic has been the forerunner in nuclear phase-out (to be completed 
in 2022) since the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in 2011.37  
If the desire to acquire nuclear weapons is to be considered an essential 
feature of a ‘normal’ (Hobbesian) state, then it is safe to say that post World 
War II Germany never abided by the realist logic of military power in the 
sense of attempting to acquire a status of a great power.38 Realists would ar-
gue that this occurred because German power was curtailed during the Cold 
War, but, as we have witnessed, the developments after the end of the Cold 
War did not lead to a Teutonic shift in the middle of Europe understood in 
crude realist terms. Essentially, acceleration in the process of European inte-
gration after the end of the Cold War seemed to indicate that the neorealist 
model of a normal state would have very little room among the EU member 
states. This can further be witnessed in the development of common foreign 
and security policy (of which defence policy was to be a part after the West-
ern European Union (WEU) had been incorporated into the Maastricht 
framework) at the European level, traditionally the domain of normal nation 
states. While the approach on strategic culture can be argued to be diametri-
cally opposed to crude realism in the sense of questioning the validity of the 
argument regarding the normal state and its aspiration for the accumulation 
of military power, there is no a priori reason to assume that the issue of mili-
tary power would be foreign to a cultural view on security and defence. In-
stead, the way this thesis grasps the approach on strategic culture in terms of 
military power is that it matters but that the way it matters is defined largely 
by the specifics of the strategic cultural tenets in question, not by unmallea-
ble systemic traits of an anarchic international structure imposed on state 
actors. Hence, and even though this study does not share Wendt’s position 
on cultures as “self-fulfilling prophecies that tend to reproduce them-
selves”39, it seems to be principally in line with Wendt’s formulation of differ-
ent ‘cultures of anarchy’ where the realization of any one form of anarchy 
(Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian) depends not on the existence of either en-
mity, rivalry or friendship but rather on the level of how deep the respective 
cultural internalization of these traits is thought to be.40 While neorealism’s 
structural foundation is ill-suited for contemplating the significance of unit-
level variables and therefore strategic culture, other forms of realism such as 
neoclassical realism might be more promising in this regard. While neoclas-
37 ?Deutschland beim Atomausstieg allein auf weiter Flur‘, Die Welt,??????????????????????????
(http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/energie/article138288809/Deutschland-beim-Atomausstieg-allein-
auf-weiter-Flur.html). 
38 A good example is the so-called NATO double-track decision; see Chapter 3. 
39 Wendt, Alexander 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press 1999, 
p. 309. 
40 See ibid., Chapter 6. 
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sical realism has not abandoned the realist roots in terms of power (increase 
in relative power leads to a more ambitious foreign policy and vice versa) it 
does highlight the decisive role played by policy-makers’ perceptions on the 
external, structural constraints as well as the political elites’ constrained abil-
ity to harness the national power resources.41    
Yet realists were not the only ones to argue strongly about Germany and 
her politics. Liberalist and institutionalist accounts considered Germany to 
be firmly embedded in the multilateral and global framework of institutions 
based on interdependence, which was portrayed first and foremost as a con-
straint on the expansion of German power.42  Constructivists, in turn, were 
more interested in how German national identity was constructed based on 
commonly shared ideas, norms and principles and how it affected the foreign 
and security policies Germany aimed to pursue.43 Indeed, general scholarly 
interest towards strategic culture studies partly increased because of the so-
called constructivist turn in social sciences and International Relations stud-
ies in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The most influential writings on cul-
ture in the field of security have undoubtedly come from IR constructivist 
scholarship, since constructivists have mostly had an interest in the workings 
of culture and the link between culture, security and identity. For instance, 
Peter Katzenstein’s seminal volume Culture of National Security (1996) takes 
issue on how norms – rather than strict material conditions – shape state 
identity, interests and policy action.44  However, the focus of strategic culture 
studies – in contrast to the plethora of security studies conducted under the 
constructivist label – lies in how strategic thought and practices shape and 
are shaped by the alliance policies of states, threat assessment, images of war 
and peace, the form and content of military doctrines, grand strategy, civil-
military relations and perhaps most importantly, the inclination to use or 
abstain from the use of military force in solving international crises and con-
flicts. Hence, strategic culture scholarship is primarily interested in the ques-
tion of how cultural attributes such as interpretations of the past and the spe-
cific normative framework related to the fundamental question of peace and 
war affect the practices regarding the use of military force and how these 
41 See e.g. Rose, Gideon 1998, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 
Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172. 
42 See  Anderson, Jeffrey J & Goodman John B. 1993, ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-
Cold War Europe’, Keohane. Robert, Nye, Joseph & Hoffmann, Stanley (eds.) (1993), After the Cold 
War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 1998-1991, Harvard University Press, 
1993, pp. 23-62; Duffield, John 1998, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institu-
tions and German Foreign Policy after Unification, Stanford University Press, 1998. 
43 Boekle, Henning, Rittberger, Rainer & Wagner, Wolfgang  2001, ‘Constructivist foreign policy theo-
ry’, Rittberger, Rainer (ed.) 2001, German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Stud-
ies. Manchester University Press, 2001, pp. 105-140. 
44 See Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) 1996, The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, Columbia University Press, 1996. 
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practices, in turn, affect the functioning of strategic culture. However, while 
this study embraces the constructivist ontology in general, this does not 
mean, in turn, that there would not be anything to criticize about the con-
structivist take on strategic culture – in particular with regard to the aspect 
of change – as will be discussed later in this chapter.     
In any case, since the mid-1990s, cultural approaches to German foreign 
and security policy have become increasingly popular and influential. This 
has mostly had to do with the fact of constructivism becoming a valid alter-
native for realism/liberalism in the study of foreign and security policy in the 
field of IR but also with the fact that German foreign and security policy has 
been considered fertile empirical ground for testing and comparing the 
claims of different IR theories. This is because German unification and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, together with the collapse of the Soviet Union, marked 
an end to the existing world order of bipolarity and balance of power and, 
therefore, seemed to hint at the deficiencies of rational theories in explaining 
some critical aspects of state behaviour and the functioning of the interna-
tional system. Critical approaches have also made their mark in the study of 
German foreign and security policy in the form of post-structuralism and 
pragmatism based on the ideas of scholars such as Jacques Derrida, John 
Dewey and Richard Rorty, but rather surprisingly, have dealt less directly 
with the question of continuity and change.45 
Now, importantly, this is not to say that the aspect of continuity in Ger-
man strategic culture is devoid of any explanatory merit. It is merely to argue 
that there is something missing when we discuss continuity and change sole-
ly in the historically linear, essentialist fashion, when these are portrayed as 
the two opposing poles of social reality. In fact, continuity and change often 
coexist in strategic (or any) culture in one form or the other – and this is a 
precondition of social and political life, not social or political theory – an as-
pect which is not very clear if one looks at the state of the existing research. 
Crucially, as much as it is important to understand cultural ‘continuity’ and 
‘change’ in terms of outcomes (for how else could we draw any meaningful 
distinction between them), it is also necessary to understand them as some-
times complementary, sometimes contradictory social and political process-
es, that have socio-cognitive qualities that do not always reveal themselves in 
the form of empirically verifiable outcomes. Therefore, throughout this 
study, I will also stress the processual nature of both continuity and change, 
albeit without the claim that these processes are always guided by linear, 
path-dependent historical forces. As we shall discuss in detail in Chapter 5, 
history matters greatly in terms of strategic culture, but as interpretations of 
the past evolve, so does the way in which history matters.  
45 Here I refer to accounts critically posed to both mainstream constructivism and rationalism. See e.g. 
Zehfuss 2001; Hellmann 2009, ‘Fatal attraction? German foreign policy and IR/foreign policy theory’, 
Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 257-292. 
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Essentially, the line of argumentation presented above maintains that the 
initial, almost taken-for-granted theoretical premise of cultural continuity 
within the strategic culture studies does not live up to its promise against the 
backdrop of the empirical track record of German security and defence policy 
after the end of the Cold War as this study will show in detail. Hence, for in-
stance, there is a plausible case to be made that the famous notion of Germa-
ny as a civilian power – which stands as the ideal typical characterization of 
German strategic cultural continuity – has not been able to evolve into a con-
cept that could incorporate the aspect of change but rather, as mentioned, 
remains a borderline tautological ideal type because of its foundation in the 
idea of cultural continuity. Importantly, this can be quite astutely observed in 
terms of evolving German security and defence policy within the EU institu-
tional framework and the shifting expectations thereof. Germany has actually 
come a long way in this regard, even though it was commonplace – at least 
during much of the 1990s – to compare the ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ EU foreign and 
security policy identity and the notion of Germany as a civilian power, high-
lighting the similarities between the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the German 
stance in terms of stressing the civilian approach to hard security issues such 
as military conflict management and the related policy practices. The ensuing 
problem, as Adrian Hyde-Price framed it more than ten years ago, was that 
“European strategic culture reflects the experience and security environment 
of the second half of the 20th century” and that “(t)he preference of most Eu-
ropeans since the end of the Cold War for deterrence, containment and soft 
power has increasingly proven inadequate in the face of new security chal-
lenges”.46 This has led to “a pressing need for new thinking about the use of 
military force as an instrument of statecraft within a comprehensive ap-
proach to the evolving international security agenda”47 that can be argued to 
be as relevant in the age of war against terror as it ever was. However, as the 
developments in international security policy since the Georgian War in 
2008 and the conflict in Libya in 2010 over to the current crises in Ukraine 
and Syria indicate, the issue of ‘the use of military force as an instrument of 
statecraft’ cannot simply be coined as a matter of  Cold War vs. post-Cold 
War strategic practices, because military and security threats posed by states 
or regimes have not vanished but rather have been supplemented by asym-
metric threats to our security, such as terrorism or climate change. Further-
more, if we look at the current strategic cultures of the EU member states, 
there is neither a consensus regarding the purpose of the use of military force 
nor agreement as to what really constitutes strategic culture at the EU level.48 
46 Hyde-Price, Adrian 2004, ‘European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use Of Force’, European 
Security, 13(4) 2004, p. 324? 
47 Ibid. 
48 See e.g. Biehl-Giegerich-Jonas (ed.) (2013), Strategic Cultures in Europe. Security and Defence 
Policies Across the Continent, Springer VS. 2013. 
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While Hyde-Price’s above argument regarding the legacy of the Cold War 
strategic culture in Europe is convincing, we have also witnessed tangible 
change both in terms of a broadening and a deepening of the scope of securi-
ty itself as well as the ways in which and the purpose for which the use of mil-
itary force has been applied since the end of the Cold War. 
Indeed, current accounts about Germany as a civilian power – a concept 
which is still quite popular within some circles of the research community – 
should at least try to answer the question about why civilian power is still a 
fitting description of the Federal Republic.  Indeed, while one can still detect 
a certain red line in terms of German reluctance to participate directly in any 
kind of combat, German soldiers fought and died for their country in Afghan-
istan, the longest NATO operation in its history, spanning the period from 
2001 to 2014. Perhaps the popularity of the civilian power –concept has 
more to do with the fact that it took years for German politicians to 
acknowledge the fact that the German forces were operating under ‘warlike’ 
circumstances in Afghanistan, as German soldiers were engaged in ground 
combat and actually labelled as ‘soldiers’ instead of ‘aid-workers’ or ‘well-
diggers’.49 Indeed, as the example of Afghanistan and the German participa-
tion in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led ISAF (In-
ternational Security Assistance Force) show, the German army was trans-
formed from a static, conscript army to a professional armed force ‘in action’ 
(Bundeswehr im Einsatz).50 As a broader European phenomenon, the spe-
cialization and professionalization of the armed forces does not limit itself to 
Germany, but the change is particularly pertinent in the Federal Republic, 
where conscription ended in 2010. Overall, the case of Afghanistan illustrates 
not only the sometimes relatively wide gap between strategic discourse and 
strategic practice but also the extent of the attempts of the German political 
elite to preserve the status quo (i.e. the notion of civilian power) in German 
strategic culture. Indeed, the case of Afghanistan is a prime example of how 
continuity and change co-exist in German strategic culture.  
To sum up the discussion so far, in this thesis it has been argued that we 
need an account of strategic culture that takes the study of change in strate-
gic culture seriously since, as indicated above, the existing accounts culmi-
nating almost entirely in the idea of cultural continuity are rather ambivalent 
in terms of their explanatory power. These approaches are facing the same 
problem as faced by Berger with his study, namely, that reality often strikes 
back at our conceptualizations of it. The study at hand has no immediate 
remedy for facing an utterly complex social reality, other than the claim that 
it will paint a more comprehensive picture of the dynamics of strategic cul-
49 For more detail, see Chapter ?.3.3. 
50 The German term ‘Bundeswehr im Einsatz’, which literally means ‘in deployment’ is broadly used in 
German and it captures well the change of Bundeswehr from a static, conscript army the purpose of 
which was territorial defence to a dynamic armed force, deployable in crisis and conflicts around the 
globe. For more detail on Bundeswehr and change, see Chapter 5.3.3.  
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ture, including an attempt to identify and discuss the changes in post-Cold 
War German strategic culture some of which, as we shall see, had actually 
been under way long before the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
As this study seeks to illustrate with the example of the changes in Ger-
man strategic culture after the end of the Cold War, Germany was slowly but 
surely coming to terms with the fact that the world had not been transformed 
into a Garden of Eden as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and that the 
emerging post-Cold War global order would pose difficult questions for a 
country whose historical experience in particular with regard to the issue of 
the use of military force was deeply problematic. Indeed, ever since the first 
Gulf War (1990-1991), the post-Cold War Federal Republic was discovering 
the new political reality in terms which had been deemed a thing of the Ger-
man past. As will be discussed in detail later in this study, it was precisely the 
combination of the nature of emerging external challenges, the ever-
changing internal constraints and windows of political opportunity that ini-
tially set the pace for the evolution of German strategic culture after the end 
of the Cold War. This study focuses particularly on the issue of how and why 
the German past continues to exert influence on contemporary German stra-
tegic culture. The impact of this issue is more often than not taken for grant-
ed given the traditionally strong assumptions regarding continuity in Ger-
man strategic culture. A detailed study of the interpretations of the German 
past is imperative for an understanding of German strategic culture, because 
they are part of the German ‘experience of warfare’, which is one of the main 
mechanisms that can bring about change. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
1.2. ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC CULTURAL STUDIES
In terms of strategy and military history, the classic works of Sun Tzu and 
Thucydides stand out as major influences on the development of Western 
strategic thought.51 Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War, written in the 6th centu-
ry B.C., has influenced studies of war and strategy for the past 2500 years. 
Sun Tzu lived during a time of great conflict in China called The Age of the 
Warring States in which a number of major states vied for control of the 
country. Sun Tzu served as a general in the army of the state of Ch’i and 
51 However, it needs to be noted that these are by no means the only influential classical texts on cul-
ture and strategy. Consider e.g. Xenophon’s The Persian Expedition (400 B.C), a detailed narrative of 
Greeks confronting a ‘barbarian’ world or Miyamoto Musashi’s The Book of Five Rings (1643), an anal-
ysis of a master Japanese swordsman and the process of struggle and mastery over conflict that under-
lies every level of human interaction. Sun Tsu’s essay is the only one that is widely known in the West 
among the early texts on the matters of state governance and politics, leadership, peace, war, military 
and tactics in ancient China. The rest are well known in Asia, however. See e.g. Sawyer, Ralph D. 1993, 
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, West View Press, Colorado 1993.     
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wrote down his strategic principles in The Art of War. It provided detailed 
instructions on how to win the battle of wits and leverage tactical advantages 
on the battlefield. For Tzu, the art of war was of vital importance to the state 
hence making it a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or ruin.52 
The oldest literary connection between culture and strategy originates to the 
writings of Thucydides who was an Athenian historian and general in the 4th 
century B.C. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides described 
in detail the conflict between Athens and Sparta, the key insight being that 
the respective cultures of these city-states influenced their ways of war.53 One 
of the most cited works on strategy is Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege (On 
War), published in 1832, in which the Prussian general and military theorist 
specifically stressed the moral and political aspects of warfare. For Clause-
witz, war was nothing but ‘a duel on an extensive scale’ (erweiterter 
Zweikampf), which meant that there were rules in war that needed to be ad-
hered to. Clausewitz argued that ‘war is a continuation of politics with other 
means’ because wars could always be traced back to political motives: “ […] 
die politische Absicht ist der Zweck, der Krieg das Mittel, und niemals kann 
das Mittel ohne Zweck gedacht werden.”54 The most prominent 20th century 
author on the links between strategy and culture was British military histori-
an and Captain Basil Liddell Hart, who in The British Way of Warfare 
(1932), argued that the British traditionally avoided continental warfare and 
used their navy instead to exert economic pressure on their enemies, a par-
ticular strategic cultural feat of the British way of war. Hart, who argued that 
Britain had deviated from this strategic principle at its peril, deemed this as 
one of the causes for the First World War.55  
Perhaps the most detailed classification of strategic culture has been pro-
vided by John Glenn as he sought to identify the differences between the 
post-positivist approaches to strategic culture. He identifies four different 
dimensions of strategic cultural research: 1) epiphenomenal; 2) conventional 
constructivist; 3) post-structuralist and 4) interpretivist.56   Epiphenomenal 
research treats strategic culture as a supplementary explanatory tool mostly 
found in realist accounts, “(e)xplaining deviations of state behaviour from 
general patterns  predicted by neorealism”.57 Conventional constructivism 
generates “contingent generalizations of state behaviour with norms and cul-
ture as alternative explanatory factors”, whereas post-structuralism takes a 
step further and aims to explain “each event as a unique concatenation of 
causal mechanisms eschewing any search for generalized explanations of so-
52 Tzu, Sun 2009, The Art of War, Thrifty Books, 2009 (translated and commented on by Lionel Giles). 
53 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, (ed.) Rhodes, P.J, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
54 Von Clausewitz, Carl 2015, Vom Kriege, Null Papier Verlag 2012, (First chapter). 
55 Hart, B.H. Liddell 1932, The British Way of Warfare, New York, NY: Macmillan, 1932. 
56 Glenn, John 2009,  ’Realism vs. Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?’, International 
Studies Review, Vol.11, No. 3 (Sept. 2009), p. 524. 
57 Ibid., p. 530. 
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cial behaviour”.58 Interpretivism, in turn, focuses on “(i)mmersion of the re-
searcher in other cultural groups in order to understand their worldviews”.59  
Glenn purposively opts for the definitional middle-ground to highlight the 
flexibility of the concept of strategic culture: “Strategic culture is […] a set of 
shared beliefs, and assumptions derived from common experiences and ac-
cepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and 
relationships to other groups, and which influence the appropriate ends and 
means chosen for achieving security objectives.”60 Hence, the core concept – 
as defined here – may be flexible enough to be fitted into different research 
designs. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 1.4, scholars mostly agree 
on the ontology of strategic culture but disagree in terms of epistemology. 
Hence, they operate with very similar concepts of strategic culture but differ 
in how knowledge about it can be produced. 
Strategic culture research is usually divided into three separate historical 
phases, or research ‘generations’. The first generation scholarship emerged 
from a perceived lack of explanatory power of game-theoretical models and 
systemic and material variables in interpreting variance in Soviet strategic 
behaviour towards the end of the 1970’s.  The first published study on strate-
gic culture was written by Jack Snyder (RAND Corporation) as the US Air 
Force requested a study of the factors affecting Soviet reactions to potential 
US nuclear operations. Snyder sought to 1) provide a context for a better un-
derstanding of the intellectual, institutional, and strategic-cultural determi-
nants that would bound Soviet decision-making process in a crisis, and 2) 
speculate on the dominant behavioural propensities that would motivate – 
and constrain – the Soviet leaders during their efforts to cope with a situa-
tion where limited nuclear use by either side loomed as a possibility.61 Snyder 
acknowledged that it was difficult to assess reliably the Soviet leaders’ atti-
tudes towards nuclear escalation because (luckily) there were no comparative 
data or previous case studies on the matter. However, he argued that “(i)t is 
enlightening to think of Soviet leaders not just as generic strategists who 
happen to be playing for the Red team, but as politicians and bureaucrats 
who have developed and been socialized into a strategic culture that is in 
many ways unique and who have exhibited distinctive stylistic predisposi-
tions in their past crisis behaviour.”62 Snyder’s conclusion was that, indeed, 
the differences in deeply-rooted strategic beliefs between American and Sovi-
et strategic thought were able to account for the differences in preference for 
actual nuclear strategy in case the deterrence failed: the USSR favoured a 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Snyder, Jack L. 1977, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, A 
Project AIR FORCE Report prepared for the United States Air Force, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 
1977, preface. 
62 Ibid., p. 4. 
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retaliatory counterstrike strategy whereas the US was inclined towards co-
operative strategy of mutual restraint.63  
The majority of texts on strategic culture published during the 1970s and 
the early 1980s focused on the cultural differences in superpower relations 
related to the question of US and Soviet strategic style.64 However, during the 
1980s, a number of works emerged that formed the core of what came to be 
known the second generation of strategic culture studies.65 According to 
Johnston, this generation of scholarship “begins from the notion that there is 
potentially a vast difference between what leaders think and say they do and 
the deeper motives for doing what they in fact do.”66 Hence, it mostly draws 
on “Gramscian notions of strategic culture as a tool of political hegemony in 
the realm of peace and war”.67 Johnston criticized the second generation 
scholars for being too instrumental regarding the relationship between dis-
course and behaviour. He claimed that political actors were not as free as the 
2nd generation scholars claimed them to be; strategic culture had a socializing 
effect which did constrain the actors’ ability to manipulate the strategic cul-
tural context and raised strategic culture beyond the status of a mere myth 
utilized in the legitimization of non-strategic policies.68 The so-called third 
generation, then, epitomized in Johnston’s own work, emerged after the end 
of the Cold War and according to Johnston, it “tends to be both more rigor-
ous and more eclectic in its conceptualization of ideational independent vari-
ables and more narrowly focused on particular strategic decisions as depend-
ent variables.”69 Although the proponents of the third generation operate 
with slightly differing concepts of strategic culture (military culture/ politi-
cal-military culture/ organizational culture) they all share a deep skepticism 
of realist explanations relying on systemic variables in explaining state be-
haviour.70  
63 Ibid., pp. 38-40. 
64 See Gray, Colin 1981, ‘National Styles in Strategy: The American Example’, International Security, 
6:2, 1981, pp. 21-47; Gray, Colin 1986, Nuclear Strategy and National Styles, Lanham, Md.: Hamilton 
Press, 1986; Lord, Carnes 1985, ‘American Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, 5:3, 1985, pp. 269-
93. 
65 See Klein, Bradley 1988, ‘Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance 
Defence Politics’, Review of International Studies, 14 (1988), pp. 133–48; Stuart, C. Reginald 1982, 
War and American Thought: From the Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine, Kent State University 
Press, 1982; Luckham, Robin 1984, ‘Armament Culture’, Alternatives, 10:1 (1984), pp. 1–44. 
66 Johnston, Alastair Iain 1995, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese 
History, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 15. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
69 Ibid., p. 18. 
70 See Kier, Elizabeth 1997, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997; Legro, Jeffrey W, 1995, Cooperation Under Fire: 
Anglo-German Restraint during World War II, Cornell University Press, 1995. 
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Some scholars, such as Richard Desch, refer to ‘culturalism’ when identi-
fying three distinct waves of cultural theories ranging from the World War II 
wave to Cold War wave and to the present, post-Cold War wave. He argues 
that “the post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies is a broad 
research program with a wide range of research focuses, embracing a range 
of epistemologies (from the avowedly positivistic to the explicitly anti-
positivistic) and utilizing a broad range of explanatory variables. Four 
strands of cultural theorizing dominate the current wave: organizational, po-
litical, strategic and global.”71  However, it should be kept in mind that these 
different strands are often distinctive analytical categories not representative 
of the complexity of social reality as such, in which all of these different ele-
ments are interwoven in a ‘cultural web’ including political, strategic and 
global aspects of culture and security.  
In general, it can be argued that strategic cultural studies do not form a 
distinct cultural theory of security or defence policy as an explanatory 
framework for state behaviour in the way how neorealism does. Rather they 
consist of theoretical propositions that are supposed to explain 1) the nation-
ally and historically embedded nature of strategic culture (the first genera-
tion); 2) the instrumental nature of strategic culture (the second generation); 
3) variance in strategic choice by conceptualizing strategic behaviour as the
dependent variable and strategic thought the independent variable in strate-
gic culture (the third generation). Whereas the first and third generation
scholars agree that culture affects behaviour by constraining it, they disagree
about how this occurs. However, second generation scholarship disagrees
with this fundamental point in arguing that agency shapes strategic culture,
not the other way around. Hence, the only theoretical aspect which can be
argued to be distinctive and formative to all three of these research genera-
tions is the argument that strategic culture matters in terms of security and
defence policy. Recently, strategic culture studies (which some refer to as the
fourth generation scholarship) have begun to reformulate strategic culture as
an entity that consists of competing subcultures. In these studies, strategic
culture is defined as a social mechanism, entailing epistemic communities
which constitute the subcultures competing over hegemony in foreign and
security policy.72
This thesis does not embrace any of these positions at face value. While 
they all share a constructivist ontology of strategic culture, they also entail 
rather entrenched epistemological claims that rest either on holistic (the first 
generation), instrumental (the second generation) or deterministic (the third 
generation) line of argumentation. While the pitfalls of holism and determin-
ism become evident when discussing the differences in the accounts of John-
71 Desch, Michael J. 1998, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, Inter-
national Security, Vol., 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), pp. 141-170. 
72 See e.g. Libel, Tamir 2016, ‘Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture, epistemic com-
munities, and Israel’s changing national security policy’, Defense Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 138. 
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ston and Gray in Chapter 1.4, the instrumental view on culture is a crude 
simplification of the subject matter of strategic culture, because it assumes 
that cultural actors are ‘free-standing agents’ to the degree that they can ac-
tually manipulate the tenets of strategic culture without being affected by 
that very same culture they seek to manipulate. Moreover, the issue that 
there might be a potentially vast difference in what political elites think and 
say they do and what their deeper motivations for action are, is just pure 
speculation unless consistently proven otherwise in empirical fashion. 
Hence, there is no a priori reason to assume that the deeper motivations of 
politicians would more often than not contradict with what the politicians 
say or do. To claim that strategic culture can be reduced to a function of the 
actors’ whims and wishes does not take into account that politicians may 
speak differently to different audiences, hence rendering the claim of dis-
crepancy between deeper motives and actual utterances problematic from 
the outset.  
Indeed, while the fourth generation’s interest in strategic subcultures as 
the key sites for political struggle over hegemony provides a fresh take on 
strategic culture, it is not without its own problems. The shifting of research 
focus into sub-cultures within strategic culture does not sufficiently alleviate 
the problem of determinism, because while multiple epistemic communities 
may exist within strategic culture, it does not necessarily amount to the ar-
gument that they would form distinct ‘sub-cultures’ within strategic culture 
just because they possess differing political interests. Indeed, the treatment 
of epistemic communities as constituting the core of strategic sub-cultures 
runs the danger of instrumentalism, because in these accounts strategic cul-
ture is often reduced to the conflict of interests, which resembles the 2nd gen-
eration’s instrumental treatment of strategic culture as a ‘resource’ for politi-
cal actors.73 Instead, what this thesis will argue is that we need an account of 
strategic culture that is able to incorporate the notion of strategic cultural 
change to the study of strategic culture without succumbing to holism, de-
terminism or instrumentality in order to be able to tell better stories about 
the evolution of strategic culture.  
The thesis has hitherto discussed the similarities and differences between 
a plethora of concepts involving culture and security in order to shed light on 
the heterogeneity of strategic cultural approaches in IR. Next, it will discuss 
some of the key constructivist claims regarding strategic culture and address 
the problematic nature of epistemology within strategic culture studies by 
revisiting the debate between the two most best-known and cited scholars on 
strategic culture, Iain Johnston and Colin Gray.   
The following table provides a summary of the key differences within the 
main approaches on strategic culture: 
73 I will elaborate more on the 4th generation’s position and the subject of strategic sub-culture in 1.4 in 
the context of the Gray-Johnston debate, since it is the? ???????generation scholarship that claims to 
have the best solutions to the problems that this debate poses for strategic culture research. 
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Table 1. Strategic culture in the study of IR 
1.3.  BRIEF THEORETICAL OVERVIEW: STRATEGIC 
CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
When discussing strategic culture in IR theory in more detail, it is necessary 
to elaborate on two interrelated issues on constructivism and strategic cul-
ture: 1) IR constructivist understanding of causality and norms, and 2) the 
so-called Gray-Johnston debate, which concerns the connection between 
strategic culture and state behaviour (discussed in 1.4.). Firstly, it is impera-
tive to consider the understanding of norms within IR constructivism, be-
cause this discussion by and large forms the essence of the ontological foun-
dation upon which the most influential accounts of strategic culture rest. 
Secondly, the Gray-Johnston debate best illustrates the strengths and weak-
What does strategic culture do? 
What is    
strategic  
culture? 
1st generation: 
strategic style, a 
context for   
evaluation 
Strategic culture functions as the context for strategic       
decision-making in that it contains the attitudes and ways in 
which strategic beliefs and attitudes convey a picture of how a 
polity would act when faced with a certain crisis situation.  
These attitudes and strategic beliefs reveal the nationally and         
historically embedded nature of strategic culture. 
2nd generation: 
domain of    
political    
instrumentality 
Strategic culture is essentially a myth, at best it functions as a 
resource in security and defence policy issues that can be       
instrumentally harnessed by policy actors. These actors are 
not ‘encultured’ to the degree that they actually have a hidden    
agenda beyond what they actually think and say. 
3rd generation: 
explanatory 
concept that is 
falsifiable 
Strategic culture is a set of specific, ranked security and defence 
policy preferences expressed in strategic ideas and beliefs      
established over time, which have a direct impact on actual  
policy choice. Hence, strategic culture is the explanandum and 
policy choice is the explanans.  
4th generation: 
site of struggle 
over political 
hegemony 
Strategic culture is a social mechanism, which consists of   
epistemic communities that constitute the core of strategic      
sub-cultures within strategic culture, which strive for 
hegemony in security and defence policy. 
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nesses of various accounts that deal with strategic culture. The interrelated 
factor between these two points is also important, since what Colin Gray and 
Iain Johnston are actually arguing about is whether culture can actually ex-
plain anything in causal terms.  
To begin with, the IR constructivist position provides more questions 
than answers – a position not uncommon to ‘grand’ IR theories in general. IR 
constructivism consists of a vast and epistemologically varied pool of re-
search in which the interest concerns international phenomena. Epistemo-
logically, constructivism has aimed to seize what IR scholars refer to as the 
‘middle-ground’, meaning a position between rationalism and interpretivism 
that is based on social ontology and scientific epistemology.74 There are many 
different strands of constructivism ranging from so-called ‘thin’ Wendtian 
constructivism to more ‘thick’ approaches that favour post-positivism instead 
of positivism. According to Hay, both positions see the relationship between 
the material and the ideational as dialectical, but the thick constructivism 
prioritizes ideational factors and constitutive logics and thin constructivism 
prioritizes material factors and causal logics.75 Despite these differences, 
however, common ground for all is found in an understanding of a socially 
constructed world that is fundamentally shaped by human action. For the 
purposes of this study, I have concentrated on a few commonly accepted po-
sitions on norms in IR constructivism, because these positions are regularly 
adopted in the study of strategic culture. It needs to be noted, however, that 
the two pivotally important scholars on norms among the constructivist 
scholarship, Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf, are largely absent from 
the discussion regarding norms in the accounts on strategic culture.76 
First of all, norms are accepted as some sort of ‘carriers of identity’, epit-
omizing the socially and culturally agreed form of behaviour in some shape 
or form. This is something the bulk of IR constructivist scholarship would 
agree on. For example, Onuf would talk about the regulative and constitutive 
effects of norms understood as informal rules. Following on from this, the 
primary question for a student of strategic culture is this: Can norms func-
tion as causes or is their role solely constitutive? Can the compliance/non-
compliance of norms explain policy decisions or even patterns of state behav-
iour? Some constructivists argue that they can while others claim they do 
74 See Checkel, Jeffrey 1998, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Poli-
tics, Vol. 50, No.2, pp.324-348; Hopf, Ted 1998, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Rela-
tions Theory’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 171-200; Wendt, Alexander 2000, ‘The Con-
structivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, International Security, Vol. 25, No.2, pp. 187-212. 
75 Hay, Colin 2002, Political Analysis, Basingstoke, Macmillan 2002, p.206 (Table 6.1); see also 
Wendt, Alexander 2001, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2001.   
76 See e.g. Onuf, Nicholas 1989, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and Interna-
tional Relations, University of South Carolina Press, 1989; Kratochwil, Friedrich 1991, Rules, Norms, 
and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and 
Domestic Affairs, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
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not. The pro-argument, here advocated by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, for example, is based on the idea that as norms create expectations 
towards appropriate behaviour (i.e. norms constitute behaviour), they can be 
seen as reasons for certain type of action or policy behaviour.77 Hence, this 
view represents those constructivists that fall under the conventional label 
for which it can be argued that they “subscribe to a notion of causality that 
takes reasons as causes”.78 The contra-argument presented by Kratochwil 
and Ruggie in short, is that “unlike the initial conditions in positivist expla-
nations, norms can be thought of only with great difficulty as ‘causing’ occur-
rences. Norms may ‘guide’ behaviour, they may ‘inspire’ behaviour, they may 
‘rationalize’ or ‘justify’ behaviour, they may express ‘mutual expectation 
about behaviour’, or they may be ignored. But they do not effect cause in the 
sense that a bullet through the heart causes death or an uncontrolled surge in 
the money supply causes inflations.”79 This argument is more in line with the 
writings of Nicholas Onuf, whose main argument remains that norms (as 
informal rules) simultaneously fulfil a regulative and a constitutive function 
because just as norms regulate conduct, they also constitute the social ar-
rangements within which they function.80  
However, even though constructivists such as Onuf and Kratochwil talk 
about ‘causal explanation’ as having something going about it, it is not clear 
why their preferred mode of ‘constitutive’ argumentation is not identified as 
causal as both seem to reject Humean empiricism and strict positivism on 
the basis of determinism and materialism.81 Kurki has criticized this, and 
suggests that IR scholars should instead adopt an acceptance of ‘philosophi-
cal realism’ that operates with a deeper conception of cause (Aristotelian 
cause) that broadens the view of causality by departing from an understand-
ing of cause as effective ‘pushing and pulling’.82 As Kurki argues, philosophi-
cal realism (or critical realism in terms of social inquiry) is an anti-Humean 
philosophy that maintains that causes are ontologically real independent of 
our knowledge or conception of them. What this implies is a move away from 
attempting to grasp cause in terms of observable regularities between objects 
in the material world: “(t)o grasp the real underlying causes (why something 
77 Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn 2005, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, Vol. 52, Issue 04 (September 2005), pp. 887–917. 
78 Adler, Emanuel 1997, ?Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.3, p. 329. 
79 Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John G.  1986, ‘International organization: a state of the art on an 
art of the state’, Vol. 40, No. 4, p. 767. 
80 See Onuf, Nicholas 2014, ‘Rule and Rules in International Relations’, Erik Castrén Institute of Inter-
national Law and Human Rights University of Helsinki, 24 April 2014. Available at: 
(http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Events/Nicholas%20Onuf_Rule%20and%20Rules%20%204-2-14.pdf). 
81 Kurki, Milja 2006, ?Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International 
Relations theory’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 199-200. 
82 Ibid. 
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happens), realists argue, we need knowledge based on various types of evi-
dence and, importantly, a conceptual framework that allows us to conceptu-
alise the real (ontological) unobservable causal powers that are behind ob-
servable events (or regularities of events).”83 Hence, “causation is defined 
much more openly, or common-sensically, by the philosophical realists. 
Causes are defined rather loosely as all those things that bring about, pro-
duce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or changes in the world.”84  
Moreover, this view on causality seems to be in line with the sociological 
notion of culture often conceived of as a metaconcept that goes beyond rep-
resenting a singular process of cause and effect, reflects a national identity 
(‘who  we  are’)  and  provides a normative basis for our actions (‘what  it  is  
that  we  do’)  or  (‘should  do’).85  Importantly, if taken seriously, this philo-
sophical realist notion of cause also has far-reaching implications for the 
conduct of strategic culture research. In particular, it will enable us to break 
out of the epistemological impasse of determinism vs. holism that currently 
prevails in the mainstream accounts on strategic culture.  
The stance taken on norms in this thesis is that they are the essential car-
riers of a country’s strategic culture because they embody the societally ac-
cepted forms of strategic behaviour in terms of the use of military force. Fol-
lowing the discussion above, then, norms can be regarded as causes, because 
as ‘reasons for action’ they establish meaningful responses to the questions of 
peace and war and function as the regulative link between strategic ideas and 
strategic action. In this sense, I understand norms primarily in their regula-
tive function which either constrains or enables certain kind of strategic be-
haviour. However, there is more to norms than treating them simply as ‘road 
signs’ or ‘traffic rules’. They differ in one crucial respect: it is important to 
keep in mind that all norms are prescriptive or evaluative to the degree that 
they entail or express a moral stance of what acceptable behaviour is.  More-
over, and importantly, the treatment of norms as reasons for action does not 
translate into a positivist argument ‘if norm X, then behaviour Y’ precisely 
because 1) the relationship between strategic thinking and strategic action 
cannot be grasped in form of a natural law and that therefore, and following 
Kurki’s line of thinking, we can argue that 2) norms may possess various 
causal properties which need to be understood beyond the notion of ‘inde-
pendent variables’ or ‘effective causes’. 
Indeed, there are different causal mechanisms which make norms as rea-
sons for action either a) constrain behaviour or b) enable behaviour.86  In this 
study, I identify the re-interpretations of the German past as one of the pri-
mary mechanisms, because they involve a re-assessment of the historical ex-
83 Ibid., p. 202. 
84 Ibid. 
85 See Jepperson, Ronald L. and Swidler, Ann 1994, ‘What Properties of Culture do we Measure?’ 
Poetics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), p. 360. 
86 These mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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perience in terms of warfare – the foundation of the ideational and norma-
tive structure of any strategic culture. The notions of strategic cultural conti-
nuity and change, then, are inextricably tied to the question of how the cau-
sality of norms is conceived in constructivist theorizing, functioning either as 
the causal or the constitutive link between strategic discourse and strategic 
behaviour, depending on where one stands on the issue. As discussed earlier, 
the equivalent argument in which norms translate into policy in the context 
of German foreign and security policy is well known. Hanns Maull has de-
fined Germany as a civilian power that acts according to its deeply rooted 
antimilitaristic norms that are then transformed into policies, whereby Ger-
many abstains from the use of force and unilateral military action.87 (Maull 
hence treats norms as causes of certain type of behaviour).  
However, constructivists are inevitably puzzled here, because, although 
they are often able to show why states do not always act on behalf of their 
material interests based on strict rational decision-making, pursuit of power 
or economic calculations, they struggle with cases where a professed identity 
(such as that of a civilian power) seems to contradict with the policies pur-
sued. As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, German security policy 
behaviour after the end of the Cold War provides a case in point.  Construc-
tivists could argue that this occurred because of a potential conflict on the 
level of norms but in case of frequent deviation, the argument falls short be-
cause it seems to suggest a change or at least a significant shift on either the 
level of state identity or the level of norms. The problem here is that these 
assessments often lack a systematic analytical basis and empirical evidence 
for changes on the level of identity. This point brings us back to the debatable 
question about causality understood as a co-constitutive relationship be-
tween identity, interests and action where norms are supposed to function as 
carriers of identity and expressed in policy choices. I agree with constructiv-
ists who claim that a concept such as identity is difficult to pin down in ana-
lytical terms, let alone argue that it would cause a certain type of actions per 
se. This is also the case with the concept of (strategic) culture if we opt for a 
rigorous positivist understanding of cause (Humean cause) that endorses the 
study of social and political phenomena as strict law-like patterns or pre-
conceived mechanisms for social and political behaviour – the thing which 
Kratochwil and Ruggie were lamenting. 
Even though many scholars identifying themselves as constructivists 
would probably deny having argued about identity causing anything if ap-
plied under the strictest rules of positivism, the fact remains that identity is 
still often considered to be a first-order explanans of state action/behaviour 
in the constructivist analyses, which in turn becomes the main explanandum, 
although Wendt specifically argued against any such attempt in his Social 
87 Maull, W. Hanns 1990, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, Nr. 
5, pp. 91-106. 
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Theory of International Politics.88 However, and in contrast, the common 
constructivist understanding of the co-constitutive relationship between 
identity, interests and action also warrants an analytical framework in which 
the distinction of explanantia from explananda is rather arbitrary. IR con-
structivism is therefore perhaps better geared to answering ‘how’ instead of 
‘why’ questions – as Wendt has famously argued “anarchy is what states 
make of it”89. 
Another option for the constructivist would be to adopt a post-
structuralist position and argue that identity is an (inter)subjective matter 
since it is about the use of language which goes ‘all the way down’ and that it 
is inherently built around the eternal conflict about power.90 Yet with this 
position it becomes even more problematic for the constructivist to attempt 
to explain (and understand) those policies which do not sit well with, or seem 
to be diametrically opposed to, what a given identity would suggest since 
shifts in elite power and interests would then explain what identity cannot 
explain, which is a contradiction in terms if, as constructivists claim, identity 
and interests co-constitute one another. 91 Although identities can be consid-
ered to be relatively stable and shared cognitive and social entities, they do 
not cause certain policies in the way bullet goes through the heart and causes 
death.  
If there was no detectable pattern of German foreign and security policy 
behaviour, the post-structuralist critique that ‘all events are unique’ would 
apply to some extent.92 In contrast, many constructivists would claim the 
opposite since in their assessment, state identity is a relatively stable social 
entity and numerous studies on German foreign and security policy are a tes-
tament of this argument.93 Yet, at least since the end of the Cold War, the 
pattern is anything but consistent. However, this does not mean that we 
should not try to attempt to explain why there is none or why it is incon-
sistent. This thesis suggests that the solution to this will not be found in rein-
venting the concept of cultural continuity but in a more nuanced understand-
ing of how cultural norms function and how they are conditioned by other 
88 Wendt 2001.   
89 Wendt, Alexander 1992, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Poli-
tics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. 
90 For similarities and differences between constructivism and post-structuralism, see e.g. Palan, Ro-
nen 2000, ‘A world of their making: an evaluation of the constructivist critique in International Rela-
tions’, Review of International Studies, Volume 26, Issue 4 (October 2000), pp. 575-598. 
91 See Katzenstein 1996. 
92 See e.g. Hansen, Lene 2006, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 
Routledge, New York 2006.  
93 See  Boekle, Henning, Rittberger, Rainer & Wagner, Wolfgang 2001; Rittberger, Volker (ed.) 2001, 
German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester University Press, 
2001; Harnisch, Sebastian 2001, ‘Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy’, 
German Politics, Vol.10, No.1, pp.35-60. 
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social factors. This will also allow us to make better arguments about the pos-
sibility and preconditions for strategic cultural change when the functioning, 
meaning and purpose of norms is not taken as ‘given’ and that there is indeed 
more to norms than conventional constructivist wisdom on national security 
would suggest.  
There is also a growing literature of pragmatist studies on German foreign 
and security policy that actually suggests a move away from the ‘logic of ap-
propriateness’ – in this sense meaning the functioning of the cultural norms 
in constructivist thinking towards a more situational understanding of for-
eign and security policy-making, something which also has implications for 
constructivist research.94 These studies are also critical of the conventional 
constructivist position albeit for different reasons. Through the philosophical 
lens of pragmatism95 , strategic culture could be coined as the sum total of 
social interactions and practices of the strategic actors. From this point of 
view, strategic culture can be considered both a context and an epiphenome-
non since what actually counts is the situational awareness of the strategic 
actors. Overall, pragmatist approaches highlight the fact that political deci-
sion makers face problematic situations where the logic of appropriateness 
fails to account for the possible solutions that rest on a re-interpretation of 
existing cultural variables. IR scholars that utilize some of the insights of 
pragmatism regarding agency offer some interesting insights into the study 
of German foreign and security policy96 yet the arguments are not directly 
applicable in terms of strategic culture research; i.e. the notion of change 
would rather be limited to a focus in changes in actors’ beliefs. I will briefly 
come back to discuss this in the next chapter.   
94 See Wagner, Wolfgang, Baumann, Rainer & Hellmann, Gunther 2001, ‘Agents, Structures, and Ger-
man Foreign Policy after Unification. From Metatheory to Empirical Enquiry’, Paper Prepared for 
Presentation at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Chicago, 20-24 
February 2001; Hellmann, Gunther 2009, ‘Fatal attraction? German foreign policy and IR/foreign 
policy theory’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 257-292; Zeh-
fuss, Maja 2002, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002. 
95 The philosophy of pragmatism (American Pragmatism) focuses on the notion of human agency and 
how we attain our beliefs and change them. Most accounts that discuss pragmatism in IR refer to Rich-
ard Rorty and John Dewey as their philosophical inspiration.  
96 See e.g. Hellmann, Gunther (ed.) 2006, Germany’s EU Policy on Asylum and Defense. De-
Europeanization by Default? Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
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1.4.  THE GRAY-JOHNSTON DEBATE AND ITS 
RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF STRATEGIC 
CULTURE 
The theoretical debate on strategic culture evolved as the so-called Gray-
Johnston debate that has been taking place since the mid-1990s in various 
publications, culminating in two issues of the Review of International Studies 
(RIS) in 1999.97 The primary purpose of this sub-chapter is not to reiterate or 
reassess everything that has already been said in this debate but rather to 
highlight some of the important aspects of it, which are of value for the con-
duct of this study. In short, this debate can be seen as an intra-constructivist 
divide at the heart of which lies the dilemma of how to deal with causality 
and therefore the question: what does strategic culture explain, if anything, 
and how can we expect it to affect strategic behaviour? 
In his early critique of the first generation of strategic culture scholarship, 
Johnston argues that “if strategic culture is said to be the product of nearly 
all relevant explanatory variables, then there is little conceptual space for 
non-strategic culture explanation of strategic choice.”98 He further asks “how 
does one evaluate a strategic culture where thought and action seem incon-
sistent with each other? Or, alternatively, is it always the case that one type of 
behaviour reveals one set of distinct patterns of strategic assumptions?”99  
This critique continues in his piece in RIS in which he laments the all-
encompassing nature and determinism of Gray’s approach.100 Gray, in turn, 
rejects Johnston’s positivism on the basis that there is no conceptual space 
for the separation of behaviour from culture if all actors are ‘cultural actors’. 
Therefore, according to Gray, culture is best understood as providing the 
context for strategic behaviour which is a constitutive part of that very cul-
ture. As a result, Gray concludes that “strategic culture provides a context for 
understanding, rather than explanatory causality.”101  
Despite his hands-down positivist approach on strategic culture, John-
ston’s critique of the first generation has its merits. When this debate is as-
sessed in scholarly works, the attention regularly tends to be focused almost 
entirely on the link between strategic culture and state behaviour. But there 
are other important aspects about Johnston’s critique that are often ignored 
which need to be discussed since they reveal important aspects about how 
the option for strategic cultural change has been conceived. Even though 
97 See Review of International Studies, 25:1 (January 1999) and Review of International Studies, 25:3 
(July 1999). 
98 Johnston 1995, p. 37. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Johnston, Alastair Iain 1999, ‘Strategic cultures revisited: reply to Colin Gray’, Review of Interna-
tional Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 3 (July 1999), pp. 519-523. 
101 Colin, Gray S. 1999, ‘Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review 
of International Studies, Volume 25, Issue 1, January 1999, p. 49. 
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Johnston makes clear that for a strategic culture to exist, certain strategic 
preferences need to be consistent across time; there are some points in his 
threefold critique of the first generation that problematize the question about 
the continuity of strategic culture. First, Johnston laments the first genera-
tion’s view on the homogeneity of strategic culture. He argues that it is prob-
lematic to assume (as the first generation does) that “a single strategic cul-
ture emerges from its multiple inputs when each of these inputs could argua-
bly produce an alternative, even contradictory strategic culture.”102 Second, 
he criticizes Gray and others for not allowing space for instrumentality of 
strategic culture and therefore the lack of conceptualizing agency within stra-
tegic culture. Third, as he rejects the first generation’s view of strategic cul-
ture as “the monolithic, independent, and observable constraint on all actors 
behaviour”, he is puzzled why the first generation has not attempted to ask 
and answer the following questions: what is the source or repository of stra-
tegic culture? Which time period is the most important in this regard? Why 
are certain historical sources considered formative sources of strategic cul-
ture and others not? How is strategic culture transmitted through time and 
does it change through its transmission?103 In connection with the question 
about the homogeneity of strategic culture, Johnston asks the important 
question “how does one evaluate a strategic culture where thought and action 
seem inconsistent with each other? Or, alternatively, is it always the case that 
one type of behaviour reveals one set of distinct patterns of strategic assump-
tions?”104  
This point is important because it not only reflects the issue regarding 
norms and their functions but it also raises the question of whether specific 
strategic ideas and thinking translate into certain strategic practices but not 
others. Part of this can be explained by how Johnston presents the issue. He 
presumes that strategic cultures are either homogenous or that there is con-
siderable variation within and/or between different states. This becomes evi-
dent when he presents his analytical model. Johnston talks about ‘the central 
paradigm of strategic culture’ – the role of war in human affairs (frequency of 
conflict in human affairs); the nature of adversary and the threat it poses (ze-
ro-sum nature of conflict); and the efficacy of the use of force. He argues that 
this paradigm “reduces uncertainty about the strategic environment; but it is 
shared information that comes from deeply historical sources, not from cur-
rent environment.”105 On a more operational level, Johnston argues, the 
question becomes “what strategic options are the most efficacious ones for 
dealing with the threat environment, as defined by the answers to the first 
three questions”, and continues that “depending on where along these con-
tinua particular political decision makers are based, their strategic decision 
102 Johnston 1995, p. 38. 
103 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
104 Ibid., p. 49. 
105 Ibid., p. 46. 
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preferences ought to vary accordingly.”106 Importantly, Johnston argues that 
“it is at this level of preferences over actions where strategic culture begins to 
affect behavioural choices directly. Thus the essential empirical referent of a 
strategic culture is a limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences that is 
consistent across the objects of analysis (e.g. textual sources for potential an-
swers to the central paradigm) and persistent across time.”107  
Hence, the existence of enough internal variation between states along 
these continua becomes the necessary prerequisite for Johnston to argue that 
the strategic choice is different among a number of states because he as-
sumes that different groups sharing different strategic preferences naturally 
align themselves differently along these dimensions. However, this model 
does not explain variation in strategic behaviour within one particular state 
very well, such as Germany, since participation in military crisis management 
operations would then be explained by decisions of a group in power that has 
a strategic preference for this sort of action. As strategic decisions of German 
governments have to be approved by the majority of member of the German 
Bundestag, this model becomes redundant because it cannot explain why 
German decision makers, who arguably do not have a consistent strategic 
preference in offensive strategy over time, have at times opted for one (how-
ever, this would not qualify as offensive in the sense of Johnston’s layout of 
strategic preferences). Johnston’s analytical model is too linear as it assumes 
that all the dimensions of this central paradigm – the role of war in human 
affairs, the nature of threat and the efficacy of the use of force are equally 
important in determining strategic choice across time. Moreover, the ap-
proach assumes that strategic culture is a collective endeavour – yet it does 
not tackle this with the question of the agents of change – such as powerful 
key politicians in the German cabinet.  
On the second point, however, Johnston is right in criticizing the first 
generation for not conceptualizing agency within strategic culture. However, 
Johnston’s own treatment of agency is not very convincing. In his account, 
strategic culture is “an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation 
structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish perva-
sive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role 
and efficacy of military force in international affairs, and by clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences 
seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”108  
First, as was already touched upon, Johnston presumes that possessing 
certain grand-strategic preferences will lead a group of political decision 
makers to opt automatically for a certain kind of strategic policies. Here, one 
could accuse Johnston of committing the same crime of mechanistic deter-
minism as he attributes to the first generation. Second, Johnston hints to a 
106 Ibid., p. 42. 
107 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
108 Ibid., 46. 
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manufactured ‘aura of factuality’ thereby referring to the possibility that stra-
tegic culture can be used in an instrumental fashion. But this argument does 
not provide any added value given Johnston’s definition of strategic culture 
which presumes that grand strategic preferences have to be consistent across 
time and therefore Johnston overstates the importance of instrumental usage 
of strategic culture. If we understand instrumentality as a political effort to 
legitimize certain viewpoints, back up specific interests or as the aim to ma-
nipulate the strategic agenda, then it is more or less business as usual for po-
litical actors so it is hard to imagine why it would be any different in terms of 
strategic culture in the first place. However, as discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter, the views expressed in the second generation scholarship high-
lighting the role of instrumental agency, i.e. the usage of strategic culture as a 
political resource, is not as straightforward as Johnston would have it. 
There is one further perplexing issue about Johnston’s definition. John-
ston seems to assume that strategic choices indeed ‘flow logically’ from this 
‘strategic culture paradigm’ without giving further thought to the possibility 
that something else could cause them. What makes this view problematic is 
not that it takes something as ‘given’ but the fact that this ‘logical flow’ is the 
assumption behind Johnston’s claim about the distinction between culture 
and strategy and what makes him argue for a definition of culture that can be 
falsifiable. This assumption more or less requires Johnston to treat strategic 
preferences as stable over time and not as ones that can be considered to 
change or even vary. For Johnston, every state has a certain range of strategic 
preferences to choose from, and the strategic decisions then flow logically 
from the pool of these preferences. More importantly, he makes the assump-
tion that the use of force is in any case a viable option if the outcome can be 
controlled – but this raises a rather instrumental point about the use of mili-
tary force and completely overlooks any issues that have to do with the politi-
cal process of legitimating such a decision in the first place.  
In contrast to Johnston, Colin Gray argues that “strategic culture should 
be approached both as a shaping context for behaviour and itself as a con-
stituent of that behaviour”.109 For Gray, “(c)ulture or cultures comprises the 
persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, tradi-
tions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or 
less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has 
had a necessarily unique historical experience.”110 Hence, for Gray, strategic 
culture is a constitutive concept that is informed by sociological and anthro-
pological writings about culture. Gray argues that Johnston’s critique is mis-
conceived and that he does not grasp the nature of strategic culture by trying 
to approach it as falsifiable. In his words, “anyone who seeks a falsifiable the-
109 Gray 1999, p. 50. 
110 Ibid. 
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ory of strategic culture in the school of Johnston, commits the same error as 
a doctor who sees people as having entirely separable bodies and minds.”111  
For Gray, strategic culture is “a context, something that surrounds and 
something that weaves together”.112 Importantly, Gray’s overall thinking is 
that strategic culture cannot explain the strategic behaviour of strategic ac-
tors but it can explain the meaning of the content of that action. Gray gives 
an example of British warfare during World War II. He argues that strategic 
culture cannot explain why Britain embarked upon a long continental mili-
tary campaign but it can explain why the continental role was so different for 
Britain than for the other major European powers. Moreover, “the idea of 
strategic culture does not imply that there is a simple one-for-one relation-
ship between culturally traceable preferences and actual operational choices. 
The claim rather, is that culture shapes the process of strategy-making and 
influences the execution of strategy, no matter how close actual choice may 
be to some abstract or idealized cultural preference.”113 According to Gray, we 
cannot make falsifiable arguments about strategic culture because “the unity 
of cultural influence and policy action denies the existence for the study of 
cause and effect.”114 Hence, instead, we should ask questions such as ‘what 
does the observed behaviour mean’? 
Gray makes a couple of important remarks about the study of strategic 
culture. First of all, we can talk about strategic culture because it is some-
thing that is distinctive in every security community. It seems that for Gray, 
strategic culture is a tendency to implement strategy in a certain way which 
then produces traceable patterns of behaviour – regardless how the cultural 
preferences equate with the outcomes. If we adopted Gray’s thinking in this 
study per se, strategic culture could then explain why the question of partici-
pation in out-of-area military operations is more difficult for Germany than it 
is for France, for example. Following Gray, then, it cannot explain why Ger-
many chooses to actually participate, or not. This makes sense when strategic 
culture is constructed along the lines of traceable patterns of behaviour, in 
other words, patterns of continuity. However, it becomes more complicated 
when we take the possibility of change in strategic culture more seriously 
when, for instance, we encounter situations or in Gray’s words ‘contexts’ 
where there is no definite pattern that could be traced. Of course, this is a 
non-issue for Gray who believes that “(s)cholars who prefer to look only to 
recent history as the determining influence upon contemporary strategic cul-
ture, would be well advised to change concepts. If strategic culture is held to 
be significantly reshapeable on a year by year, or even on a decade by decade, 
111 Ibid., p. 53. 
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basis, then culture probably is unduly dignified, even pretentious, a term to 
characterize the phenomena at issue.”115  
The difficulty with Gray’s account is that he constantly treats strategic cul-
ture more as a tendency to think or act in a certain fashion rather than as a 
response to emerging policy problems or security issues. For Gray, strategic 
culture cannot change other than as the result of reinterpreting new experi-
ences. Yet he forgets that sometimes political decision makers have to make 
quick decisions based on scarce knowledge of what is actually going on or 
when they encounter situations that require novel policy responses. If these 
decisions deviate drastically from the given cultural preferences (say, certain 
culturally defined principles) then it is hard to argue that strategic culture 
constitutes strategic behaviour no matter what. Gray would argue that this 
does not matter since “human beings cannot help but be encultured into cer-
tain cultures”.116 Hence, it becomes impossible to discern the influence of 
strategic culture on strategic behaviour because it is somehow omnipresent. 
As a critique of Gray’s position one could posit that it is difficult to conceive 
of strategic actors as actually being the ‘context’ of strategic behaviour be-
cause context does not implement anything, it just exists or does not and, 
strategic behaviour is strategic behaviour even if it does not produce any 
traceable patterns. This leads to inconsistencies in argument on Gray’s part. 
Consider for example Gray’s argument regarding British strategic culture 
that “(s)trategic culture explains why the continental role was, certainly psy-
chologically was, so different for Britain, as contrasted with some other great 
powers, it does not explain why Britain chose to wage war as a continental 
power in those years. In other words, strategic culture provides context, even 
where the ?nal choice is all but counter-cultural.”117 However, if what Gray 
claims is correct, then strategic culture cannot explain either why Britain 
chose not to participate in continental warfare for a hundred years.  
Gray’s argument makes perfect sense but only to a certain extent. If we 
are intent on pursuing a research design from which we can say something 
new about the functioning of strategic culture, then applying Gray’s approach 
is not very helpful. I am making this argument not for the sake of the analysis 
but because of conceptual clarity. Gray’s definition of strategic culture is just 
too all-encompassing. If, as Gray claims, we are the context of strategic cul-
ture, then there certainly is no way of separating the structure from the 
agents that operate within. Whereas Johnston’s treatment of the term leaves 
much to be desired, it succeeds in framing one possible avenue of how to ap-
proach strategic culture in analytical terms even though many would disre-
gard it for being too rigorous in its positivist stance. Indeed, while Johnston’s 
approach has its proponents, it can be argued that the majority of strategic 
cultural accounts have either ascribed to Gray’s interpretivism or some modi-
115 Ibid., p. 52. 
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fied variant of it that attempts to avoid the pitfalls of its holism. For instance, 
Neumann and Heikka have argued for a concept of strategic culture under-
stood as ‘the dynamic interplay between discourse and practice’. According to 
them, “(t) he point is to follow [Ann] Swidler’s shift of attention ‘down’ from 
conscious ideas and values — such as the idea of a grand strategy — to the 
physical and the habitual, and also ‘up’ from ideas located in individual con-
sciousness to the impersonal arena of ‘discourse’.”118 Neumann and Heikka 
also argue that “such a re-conceptualization is dynamic both in the sense that 
it introduces an understanding of change rather than stasis as the ‘normal’ 
state of affairs, and in the sense that it focuses on empirical change.”119 How-
ever, as I will discuss in more detail in the next sub-chapter in conjunction 
with critical realist metatheory, the discussion about strategic cultural 
change is not and cannot be limited to the realm of ‘empirically verifiable 
outcomes’, because these outcomes are the empirical manifestations of un-
derlying causal processes. Indeed, it is unclear how a focus on practices is 
able to dig deep into the aspect of strategic cultural change, because the focus 
is solely on that which is empirically observable. Finally, Neumann and 
Heikka’s deliberate exclusion of norms, ideas and values from their analytical 
framework is highly questionable, because this would exclude the whole 
realm of motivations behind the practices which their model claims to ac-
count for.   
According to Bloomberg, the preference of interpretivism instead of posi-
tivism can also be understood as a move towards a concept of culture which 
has contradictory elements, various strains or traditions, or as the fourth 
generation scholarship generally claims, strategic sub-cultures.120 The fourth 
generation scholarship – contra both Gray and Johnston – claims to be able 
to explain strategic cultural change via the notion of hegemonic epistemic 
communities.  Consider Bloomberg’s assertion that “(a)ccepting that there 
are two or more subcultures within a strategic culture can not only retrospec-
tively explain why strategic policy changed but, arguably, if we become famil-
iar with a particular state’s strategic debates we may be able to predict that a 
‘change is coming’ – and possibly even determine which of the currently sub-
ordinate subcultures may become dominant for a time. Such a model begins 
solving the too-much-continuity problem by allowing scholars to explain 
medium- to long-term strategic policy changes.”121 In a similar vein, Libel 
posits that “[…] competing strategic subcultures can be associated with the 
groups that promote them within a political system. By identifying the exact 
contents of competing ideas as well as their creators and those that advocate 
118 Neumann, Iver B. & Heikka, Henrikki 2005, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice. The Social 
Roots of Nordic Defence’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 12. 
119 Ibid., p.11. 
120 Bloomberg, Alan 2012, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing Strategic Culture Debate’, Contempo-
rary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No.2, p. 451. 
121 Ibid., p. 454. 
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for them, one can accurately describe how strategic culture influences policy 
change.”122 
The fourth generation, then, takes a seemingly different approach to stra-
tegic culture than either Johnston or Gray by highlighting the role of strate-
gic sub-cultures in explaining change. However, these views seem problemat-
ic in terms of explaining change for a number of reasons. First, it is evident 
that the aim of the 4th generation is to promote the notion and importance of 
strategic cultural agency in order to move beyond determinism and holism of 
the mainstream accounts. Yet it is unclear what the ‘identification of the crea-
tors of competing ideas’ – i.e. the identification of different epistemic com-
munities tells us about how strategic cultures change. Libel, for instance, ap-
plies the framework of policy change by Adler and Haas, which basically 
evolves in four steps: first, there is a policy crisis as a triggering event which 
leads to a collapse of a hegemonic sub-culture. This leads then to policy inno-
vation and re-positioning of the epistemic communities. Next follows policy 
diffusion through which epistemic communities compete over influence in 
the policy debate which is followed by choice on behalf of the policymakers 
among the available options presented to them by epistemic communities.  
Further, the chosen policy becomes ‘persistent’ as policy-makers adopt the 
strategic sub-culture of one epistemic community. Finally, a new equilibrium 
is attained, which results in the emergence of a new hegemonic sub-
culture.123 Importantly, however, and as Yee has pointed out, the epistemic 
community approach, which highlights the bureaucratic role and power of 
policy experts, neglects the ideational qualities that differentiate between 
persuasive and less persuasive ideas and enable the more persuasive ones to 
affect policies themselves. Instead, as Yee criticizes, “the causal effects of ide-
as on policies are displaced onto the political effects of experts”.124 The ele-
vated role of sub-cultures also suggests – wrongly, in my view – that the pri-
mary cause for policy change within strategic culture is basically reducible to 
the differences in worldviews between these epistemic communities; i.e. 
change is dependent on the interests of the domestic political hegemon that 
is presumed to be ideationally firmly attached to certain epistemic communi-
ty. This amounts to an epistemic fallacy at best, because it assumes by defini-
tion that policy experts are causally significant actors within strategic cul-
tures. Indeed, the link between policy experts and policy makers is treated as 
unproblematic, almost as a self-evident feature of strategic culture. However, 
there are crucial differences between strategic cultures in how this link is es-
122 Libel 2016, p. 153. 
123 Ibid., p. 141-2. See also Adler, Emanuel & Haas, Peter 1992, ‘Conclusion: epistemic communities, 
world order, and the creation of a reflective research program’, International organization, Vol. 46, 
No.1, p. 373.  
124 Yee, Albert S. 1996, ‘The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies’, International Organization, Vol. 50, 
No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 69-108. 
40 
tablished and maintained, and more importantly, how it is evaluated as being 
causally relevant in terms of policy making.  
Haas has claimed that epistemic communities exhibit a considerable de-
gree of commonality among their members, amounting to a ‘shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs’, ‘shared causal beliefs’, ‘shared notions of 
validity’ and a ‘set of common practices associated with a set of problems’125 
which would also indicate that these experts share a consensual understand-
ing of the objective merits of ideas, i.e. of their persuasiveness. Yet critics 
have argued that such a consensus among these experts might not occur and 
is rather the exception than the rule in security policy.126  This would seem to 
indicate that the existence of political conflict between epistemic communi-
ties is an a priori condition for the fourth generation scholarship’s explana-
tory framework actually to have any explanatory merit.  Moreover, it is ques-
tionable whether there really exists a multitude of ‘shared sets of normative 
and principled beliefs’ regarding the issue of the use of military force within 
a single strategic cultural entity – an important delineation which is not dis-
cussed in the fourth generation scholarship. For instance, as will be argued 
later in detail in this study, in German strategic culture the principled beliefs 
regarding the use of military force are traditionally aligned according to the 
lessons learned from the German past, known as the so-called ‘never again’ 
(nie wieder) principles. While it is one thing, for the argument’s sake, to posit 
that different sub-cultures have emerged as a result of the different interpre-
tations of the German past (i.e. ethical pacifists, antimilitarists, Euro-
centrists or Atlanticists)127, it is quite another to argue that the interpreta-
tions within these subcultures would differ to the degree proposed by Haas. 
Because the crux of the explanatory power of this model lies in its ability to 
account for the differences between these subcultures and the conflict among 
them, scholars operating with subcultures rarely discuss commonalities be-
tween subcultures within the same strategic cultural frame, which cannot be 
argued to be any less significant from the outset. It seems that the fourth 
generation scholarship may have over interpreted the significance of conflict 
within strategic cultures, at least if this is mirrored against the example of 
German strategic culture.  
125 Haas, Peter 1992, ‘Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, 
International Organization, Vol. 46, p. 3. 
126 See e.g. Levy, Jack 1994, ‘Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield’, Interna-
tional Organization, Vol, 48, pp. 279-312; Jacobsen, Kurt 1995, ‘Much ado about ideas: The cognitive 
factor in economic policy’, World Politics, Vol. 47, pp. 317-349. 
127 This category of subcultures is my own take of how one could conceptualize the notion of subcul-
tures within German strategic culture based on the traditional lines of thought on security and defense 
that rest on different interpretations of the German past. Henning Tewes has labelled German security 
sub-cultures in terms of foreign policy orientation as Atlanticists, Gaullists and Muscovites. See Tewes, 
Henning 2002, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and European Un-
ion, Palgrave Macmillan 2002. 
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In addition, what makes it hard to argue for the prominence of strategic 
subcultures in German strategic culture is the fact that besides the leftist Die 
Linke, which most strongly represents the tradition of ethical pacifism and 
antimilitarism in contemporary German politics, neither of the major peo-
ples’ parties in Germany, the SPD (The Social Democratic Party) and the 
CDU/CSU (The Christian Democratic Union in Germany / The Christian So-
cial Union in Bavaria) conform to any one particular lesson from the German 
past, even though conservatives are traditionally more Atlanticist and Social 
Democrats more Euro-centrist in their views on security and defence. Rather, 
these different traditions, or traits as Bloomberg would have it, are spread 
across the German party-political spectrum (with the exception of Die Lin-
ke). Indeed, to make predictions regarding strategic cultural change based on 
these traits in the German case the way Bloomberg would, is nonsensical; it 
would indicate that some interpretation of the German past would have to be 
in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis the rest at all times (before it becomes se-
verely contested). The further one follows this logic, the more it seems to re-
semble Johnston’s positivist account which sought to distinguish between the 
causal power of individual ideas by way of falsifiable hypotheses except that 
in this logic it is the policy experts, not ideas, that possess that causal power. 
If one insists on an account of change that relies solely on agency, a shift of 
focus to the role of specific actors, such as the Chancellor, the foreign minis-
ter or the defence minister functioning as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ seems more 
promising in this regard, because it does not neglect the persuasiveness (i.e. 
the causal properties) of ideas themselves.  
1.5. SUMMARY 
In this opening chapter, I have laid out the conceptual and theoretical prem-
ises for the study of strategic culture. I have also argued why it is imperative 
that we move from a stale conception of strategic culture as a static entity 
underscoring the aspect of continuity to an understanding of strategic culture 
which underlines its dynamic nature and the possibility of strategic cultural 
change. What is more, I have shown how the mantra of continuity leads to 
inconsistent argumentation regarding the evolution of German strategic cul-
ture after the end of the Cold War. 
As argued, the mainstream approaches to strategic culture are too invest-
ed in the epistemological debate on strategic culture to actually be in a posi-
tion to make an analytical shift towards the study of strategic cultural change. 
As already hinted in this chapter and as will be argued in detail in the next 
chapter in conjunction with a discussion on methodology and strategic cul-
ture, critical realist metatheory presents one avenue which enables us to 
move beyond the Gray-Johnston debate and commence with a serious dis-
cussion on the aspect of strategic cultural change. 
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2 UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC 
CULTURAL CHANGE 
This chapter contemplates the question of strategic cultural change in gen-
eral, in the context of German strategic culture in particular. The aim is to 
provide a solid methodological basis for the rest of this study. First, the chap-
ter discusses the state of methodology in strategic culture research and ar-
gues that critical realist metatheory, particularly its focus on ontology and its 
discussion of causality may be helpful in reclaiming strategic culture research 
back from the epistemological impasse it has been driven into. Second, the 
chapter discusses the few existing accounts on strategic cultural change as 
well as their added value to the study of strategic culture. Third, a refined 
analytical framework is introduced, that, as will be argued, is better suited for 
the analysis of strategic cultural change because it deviates from an essential-
ist understanding of the evolution of strategic culture that has been the hith-
erto philosophical fundament of the existing theory on strategic culture. Fi-
nally, the chapter seeks to paint a comprehensive picture of the issue of stra-
tegic cultural change understood both in terms of social and political pro-
cesses and policy outcomes, which are shaped but not determined by the spe-
cifics of the strategic culture in question.  
The discussion of strategic cultural change is ultimately tied to the ques-
tion of what strategic culture is expected to do, and this brings us briefly back 
to Gray and Johnston. Even though neither scholar focused particularly on 
the question of change, it is useful to elaborate briefly on what change would 
look like given their theoretical and analytical premises that were discussed 
in Chapter 1.  On one hand, if we argue in the vein of Johnston that strategic 
culture is the frame of reference we apply when we seek to explain the impact 
of cultural factors on some specific policy choices, then strategic cultural 
change refers to those factors and conditions that make decision makers 
choose differently or deviate from a certain existing policy pattern. Hence, to 
explain strategic cultural change would equate to an explanation of variance 
in strategic choice. Gray, in turn, has argued that this is nonsensical because 
ideas do not necessarily result in action as in if idea (X) then action (Y).128  
On the other hand, if we embrace Gray’s framework and argue that culture is 
the context, the ‘thing that weaves together’, then strategic cultural change 
refers to the changes within and of that same context and, hence, make an 
inquiry into strategic cultural change an immensely complex analytical task. 
This is so because ‘context’ is not something which can be pinned down very 
accurately in empirical or analytical terms, especially if that context is sup-
posed to contain strategic actors as well. Gray’s account ultimately implies 
for the study of strategic culture that regardless of how rigorous its theoreti-
128 See Chapter 1.4. for more detail. 
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cal, methodological and empirical design has been, every attempt at discover-
ing strategic culture is bound to be an interpretation of the cultural context at 
best. As Gray often mentions, explaining strategic culture is inevitably a vain 
attempt due to the nature of the beast itself.129 Hence, both Johnston and 
Gray fall short in grasping the crux of the matter with strategic cultural 
change because of their rather entrenched theoretical and analytical posi-
tions.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, change is not something which 
would have attracted the attention of many scholars, due to reasons that have 
both theoretical and empirical origins. The possibility of change has been 
recognized, but rarely considered a worthwhile object of study in its own 
right. As we shall see, however, ‘continuity’ and ‘change’ are not necessarily 
some definite states of being, becoming or existing that we could always 
clearly empirically refer to. For instance, German policies did not fundamen-
tally change at first as a result of the changes within the normative frame-
work underlying German strategic culture in the mid-1990s. Yet the long-
term impact of this normative change was crucial in facilitating the possibil-
ity for future changes in security and defence policy practices.130 Hence, the 
empirical study of strategic cultural change needs to go beyond the notion of 
‘observable policy outcomes’, because outcomes always lock down change in 
spatial and temporal terms. Importantly, however, observable outcomes are 
by necessity the products of the underlying social and political processes. In-
deed, as is discussed in detail in this thesis, the question of change in German 
strategic culture is inextricably tied to the social and political process related 
to the re-interpretation of the German past (Aufarbeitung der Vergangen-
heit). This is a crucial notion in the attempt to move beyond the empirical, 
‘observable’ realm of strategic culture. 
2.1.  TAKING STOCK: METHODOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS, CRITICAL REALISM AND THE 
STUDY OF STRATEGIC CULTURE 
The Gray-Johnston debate, apart from setting the stage in terms of episte-
mology, has not contributed much to the methodological discussion in stra-
tegic culture studies. Part of the reason for the lack of methodological debate 
lies in the relative scarcity of comparative accounts on strategic culture: most 
studies concentrate on single country studies or studies of single strategic 
cultural entities, such as the culture of the military. This relates to the con-
sensus in the field of strategic culture studies that the (national) political 
elites are the most important strategic cultural actors and that the primary 
objective of study is the strategic culture of the (nation) state. Exceptions to 
129 See Gray 1999; 2007. 
130 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 3.5?  
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this include recent studies that have focused on the premises of EU strategic 
culture, which have inquired into the possibility of strategic cultural conver-
gence among the EU member states as well as on the level of EU institu-
tions.131 While these comparative studies offer valuable theoretical and em-
pirical insights in terms of strategic cultural convergence and divergence on a 
transnational level, the point of departure for any study on strategic culture 
usually begins from within the (single) state (which should not be an excuse 
for a stale epistemology or methodology). 
As was portrayed in the previous chapter, there are widely differing views 
in IR scholarship about the utility of cultural approaches in the study of for-
eign and security policy of states. These approaches differ in their under-
standing of strategic culture and in their accounts of international politics 
and, as a consequence, several colliding ontological and epistemological as-
sumptions within strategic cultural studies exist. Despite the fact that there 
are many ways to approach the subject, cultural approaches are more often 
than not associated with ideational views towards security (ideational vs. ma-
terial), which often situates these approaches within the constructivist/post-
positivist camp vis-à-vis rationalist/positivist views. 
That being said, the view presented in this thesis maintains that the cur-
rent problems existing in strategic culture research can only partly be traced 
back to the material/ideational, positivist/post-positivist i.e. the different 
ontological and epistemological divisions. Consequently, they cannot simply 
be explained away by claiming that the analytical value of strategic culture is 
diminished by the fact that it cannot explain anything about social reality. 
This becomes all the more evident if we do not take at face value the famous 
division of explaining and understanding international phenomena by Hollis 
& Smith.132  The question then, becomes: what implications do these differ-
ent ontological and epistemological positions entail for the study of strategic 
cultures in general, and strategic cultural continuity and change, in particu-
lar. Analytical and empirical questions are indispensable for any account of 
strategic culture precisely because the ontological and epistemological 
grounds are muddled enough to make the choice between analytical frame-
work a and b more than just a question of method. Rather, it is a question of 
methodology. Hence, all these questions partly depend on the ontological 
and epistemological choices we make in our research on strategic culture, but 
it is important to keep in mind why it matters to study a particular strategic 
culture or a set of cultures from one and not the other point of view, even 
though all strategic cultural approaches share a common interest in the idea-
tional and normative structure underlying any strategic culture. 
131 See e.g. Giegerich et al. 2013; Schmidt-Zula (ed.) 2013, European Security Policy and Strategic 
Culture, Routledge 2013; Matlary, Janne Haaland 2006, ‘When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Stra-
tegic Culture Possible?’ Security Dialogue, March 2006, vol. 37, No.1, pp 105-121. 
132 Hollis, Martin & Smith, Steve 1990, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Ox-
ford University Press, 1990. 
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For the methodological purposes of this study, it seems imperative to 
make the attempt to avoid the pitfalls of determinism (Johnston), which 
builds on a positivist understanding of strategic culture as well as of holism 
(Gray), which makes it difficult to pursue an explanatory account of strategic 
culture.  What we need instead is an account which makes it possible to grasp 
strategic culture as an explanatory concept without reducing our understand-
ing of ‘explanation’ to the rather narrowly defined interplay between inde-
pendent (strategic culture) and dependent (behaviour) variables. Here, as 
was hinted earlier, we can utilize the critical realist notion of cause and argue 
that as an explanatory concept, there are causal powers at work in the con-
text of strategic culture that are real but not necessarily always empirically 
observable the way we expect them to be.133 Positivists would argue that 
these entities do not matter unless we can directly sense or experience them, 
and many post-positivists would claim that these do not matter because there 
is no external reality beyond of what we can comprehend about the world. 
These two epistemological positions basically determine how Johnston and 
Gray, (i.e. the mainstream strategic culture literature) actually define ‘what 
there is to know’ about strategic culture. Hence, what there is to know about 
strategic culture is reduced to the epistemological question ‘how can we know 
about the interplay between strategic thinking and strategic behaviour?’ 
These views are flawed in the sense that they subject ontology to epistemo-
logical claims even though one could think that ‘what there is to know about 
strategic culture’ would have methodological primacy before any questions of 
epistemology. The general claim that social scientific concepts are ‘problem-
atic’ because their definitions are contested does not provide any grounds for 
epistemological primacy, quite the contrary. Indeed, this does not mean that 
we should not make realistic claims about strategic culture that exists as a 
real social and political entity even as scholars differ in how they refer to it 
empirically. Importantly, and because of their epistemological entrenchment, 
these mainstream views are unable to look beyond the surface of strategic 
culture – what critical realists would call ‘depth reality’ or ‘deep reality’ of 
strategic culture.134 To put it simply, what this depth reality view means in 
the conduct of this study is that we need to take those causal implications of 
strategic culture seriously, which goes beyond our immediate senses or per-
ceptions as well as our social constructions of strategic culture.  
Indeed, the existence of a deeper layer of reality and the claim that we on-
ly have access to part of reality (stratification of reality) is one of the core on-
tological claims that critical realism makes. As Patomäki and Wight have put 
it, “the world is composed not only of events, states of affairs, experiences, 
133 For a discussion on ‘observable’ and ‘non-observable’ entities, see e.g. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus 
2011, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations. Philosophy of Science and its Implications 
for the Study of World Politics. Routledge, 2011, pp. 84-91. 
134 See e.g. Patomäki, Heikki & Wight, Colin 2000, ‘After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Real-
ism’, International Studies Quarterly (2000), vol, 44, p. 218. 
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impressions, and discourses, but also of underlying structures, powers, 
tendencies, that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience 
and/or discourse.”135 However, “although the underlying level may possess 
certain powers and tendencies, these are not always manifest in experience, 
or even for that matter realized. A nuclear arsenal has the power to bring 
about vast destruction and this power exists irrespective of being actual-
ized.”136 As I will argue in a similar vein in this chapter, experience of warfare 
– the existence of which cannot be reduced to the idea of ‘discourse of war-
fare’ nor to a neo-positivist notion of ‘experience’ – is causally emergent in
the sense that it has the capacity to bring about change in strategic culture.
Hence, critical realism is both ‘intransitive’ and ‘transfactual’137 in that it pre-
supposes emergent causal powers that may or may not become empirically
manifest regardless of their discursive inferences in a social world which is
open and more complex than what the mainstream approaches of strategic
culture would have us believe. This is the way critical realism is able to by-
pass the epistemological impasse of the mainstream accounts methodologi-
cally – i.e. by redefining ‘what there is to know’ about strategic culture and
shifting the focus from epistemology to ontology.
A serious empiricist skeptic would pose the epistemologically legitimate 
and necessary question of ‘how do I know that these unobservable entities or 
causal powers actually exist if I cannot sense them or if no discursive refer-
ence is readily available’? As Jackson has presented it, these entities might 
serve either instrumentally “as not truly referring to anything but instead as 
playing important roles in enabling theories to cohere and to generate sensi-
ble explanations and predictions” or as “provisional place holders, destined 
to be replaced as science advances.”138  However, those embracing critical 
realism (as opposed to Jackson) would say that that these unobservable enti-
ties are real precisely because they represent the best explanation we have for 
something we cannot otherwise (sufficiently) explain.139 Furthermore, as 
Patomäki and Wight have argued,  
“(…) if objects are constructed in discourses then there is simply nothing 
more to discover. Everything that is an object of discourse would be said to 
exist, that which is not an object of discourse would not exist. Science, at 
least as currently practiced, would come to an end.”140 Similarly, as they ar-
gue, an explanation of things ‘as if’ they existed without an inquiry into 
whether they actually exist, is a guaranteed way to end scientific practice.141 
135 Ibid., p. 223. 
136 Ibid. 
137 For more on ‘intransitivity’ and ‘transfactualism’, see e.g. Archer, Margaret et al. (ed.) 1998, Critical 
Realism: Essential Readings, Routledge, London and New York 1998, pp. ix (general introduction). 
138 Jackson 2011, pp. 79-80. 
139 See e.g. Jackson’s discussion on the ‘invisible dragon’, ibid., pp. 78-81.   
140 Patomäki & Wight 2000, p. 218. 
141 Ibid. 
47 
Hence, for a critical realist, the existence of a real world independent of our 
minds is a crucial precondition for scientific argumentation. From a critical 
realist point of view, then, the skeptical critic is asking the wrong question, 
because the question is based on an epistemological, not ontological founda-
tion. 
The significance of these unobservable entities is related to the perhaps 
most fundamental methodological claim this study makes. As mentioned ear-
lier, strategic cultural change needs to be grasped in terms of both processes 
and outcomes, for reasons that have actually more to do with trying to do 
justice to the complexity of social and political reality than theory. This is 
crucial for an understanding of strategic culture developed in this study. 
Hence, we can directly detect change in terms of outcomes in the form of re-
curring strategic practices or institutionalized forms of behaviour. However, 
changes that take place in strategic cultures do not simply materialize out of 
thin air, but are the products of social and political processes that evolve over 
time, which are not necessarily directly observable the way the outcomes of 
these processes may be. Indeed, as will be argued in the upcoming chapters, 
the process of coming to terms with the German past has played a pivotal 
role in terms of strategic cultural evolution in Germany ever since the end of 
World War II. The argument advocated in this study is that we cannot truly 
claim to grasp what strategic cultural change is all about if we only focus on 
observable outcomes and neglect study of the processes that underlie these 
outcomes.  
Ontologically, socio-cognitive components of strategic culture are what 
critical realists would call ‘detectable unobservables’.142 What this means is 
that they are not directly observable but that there are detectable signs of 
these components along the historical trajectory of the process of coming to 
terms with the German past, expressed for instance in the substance and 
meaning of past events and occurrences. Again, the point here is that even if 
changes in strategic cultures are observable in terms of outcomes, we need to 
dig deep into the underlying social and political processes without which 
some of these changes would not have come to pass. Hence, in order for our 
explanatory framework to function we need to embrace the critical realist 
notion of stratified reality and pay attention to the ‘depth reality’ of strategic 
culture (processes) as well as the surface of it (outcomes).   
One of the ways in which we can evaluate the causal significance of these 
underlying processes and hence argue scientifically what is ‘real’ about stra-
tegic culture is by conducting a series of counterfactual thought experiments. 
As Richard Ned Lebow has argued, the use of counterfactuals in the study of 
history or international relations is a useful research tool in contemplating 
about the possibility of “alternate worlds” and non-linear causation.143  In 
142 See e.g. Jackson 2011, p.86.  
143 See Lebow, Richard Ned 2010, Forbidden Fruit. Counterfactuals and International Relations. 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
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general, counterfactual arguments can be grasped in form of ‘what if’ state-
ments. As Lebow illustrates, they are widely used in everyday life situations, 
when we contemplate the choices we have made or what we are about to 
make. Most importantly, though, counterfactual thought experiments prob-
lematize what Lebow calls ‘the hindsight bias’ of science, i.e. the faith in the 
over-determination of historical outcomes once they have occurred.144 What 
this means is that we should think twice about the inevitability of historical 
outcomes, but not only that; there is no a priori reason why counterfactual 
reasoning could not be used in the analysis of events that may not be regard-
ed as major historical shifts.  
Moreover, as counterfactual claims embrace the idea of social and politi-
cal reality as fundamentally contingent, they seem to fit rather well with criti-
cal realist metatheory. The notion of contingency connects to the critical real-
ist conceptions of emergent ‘causal powers’ or ‘causal properties’ of social 
and physical objects in that the emergence of these properties is not some-
how cosmically preordained or brought about by any form of logical deter-
minism. Rather, the emergence of these properties is contingent upon how 
the ‘deep’ reality connects with the ‘surface’ in different social and political 
contexts. In this study, I will conduct a counterfactual thought experiment on 
the case of the massacre of Srebrenica in Chapter 5 to illustrate the causal 
significance of the event for the evolution of German strategic culture. 
Before we conclude with the theoretical and methodological premises, let 
me briefly return to the discussion of ‘causal powers’ or ‘causal properties’ as 
understood by critical realists, because it is imperative to elucidate what that 
means in order to pave the way for the introduction of the analytical frame-
work for strategic cultural change. First of all, one of the most crucial claims 
critical realism makes in terms of causes, which are ontologically social, is 
that they are very different from those causal powers studied by natural sci-
ences. Indeed, as Kurki has argued, “(i)n the social sciences, causal factors 
include a variety of ontological forces: material resources, social structures, 
social rules and norms, discourses and, controversially for the interpretivists, 
also ‘reasons’ that agents have for their actions. Engaging with these sorts of 
causal factors – and the causal complexes that they form – entails non-
empiricist epistemological tools: it entails interpretation and recognition of 
the ‘double hermeneutic’ relations between the inquirer and their objects of 
study.”145 Importantly, instead of the ‘if X, then Y’ way of conceptualizing 
cause, for critical realists, causes are “those things that produce, generate, 
144 Ibid., p. 8. 
145 Kurki, Milja 2007, ?Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations’? Millennium, 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No.2, p. 366. ‘Double hermeneutic’ is, according to Anthony 
Giddens, a principal feature of social sciences in contrast to natural sciences, i.e. social sciences are 
reflective; they study not only social actors but the perceptions of these actors, for more see Giddens, 
Anthony 1987, Social Theory and Modern Sociology, Cambridge, Polity Press 1987. 
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create, constrain, enable, influence or condition”.146 Hence, the way causes 
are conceptualized in critical realism is based on an ontological appreciation 
of the complexity of relations between social and physical objects. In effect, 
this view of causality captures nicely what is at stake when we take the philo-
sophical leap out of the laboratory into “the world out there”, because it op-
poses the explanatory logic of the DN-model.147  Indeed, the methodological 
implication of critical realism is that the search for constant conjunctions of 
natural laws (as in neopositivist approaches) is an insufficient basis for ex-
planatory science. Instead of making deductive or inductive arguments, i.e. 
logically constructing conclusions by moving from general observations to 
particular conclusions (deduction) or from particular observations to general 
conclusions (induction), critical realism’s logic of scientific discovery is 
retroductive, meaning that the researcher’s task is to ask questions such as 
‘what the real world must be like for a specific explanandum to be actual-
ized’, i.e. for it to become empirically manifest. Or, to put it more specifically, 
critical realists ask ‘what the sufficient or necessary conditions for the actual-
ization of the explanandum are’.148 As Mahoney has argued, the logic of nec-
essary cause postulates that “a cause is something that – when counterfactu-
ally taken away under ceteris paribus conditions – postulates a different out-
come” while in contrast, the logic of sufficient cause maintains that “the 
counterfactual absence of the cause may not change the outcome in an indi-
vidual case and thus could be interpreted as not exerting an effect under the 
necessary cause definition”.149 Mahoney argues further that the problem with 
these logics is that individual causes do not take the form of only necessary 
and/or sufficient causes.150 Consider e.g. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s famous 
argument regarding ‘a culture of German anti-Semitism’ which he considered 
to be a sufficient cause to provide for the motivational basis for the Holo-
caust.151 Indeed, it is not difficult to think of examples of causes related to 
146 Kurki 2007, pp. 366-7. 
147 DN-model (deductive-nomological model) is the explanatory model favored by positivist and empir-
icist science. It is usually affiliated with Carl Hempel, Paul Oppenheim and Karl Popper. The model is 
based on deductive inference, according to which the explanandum is a deductive consequence of the 
explanans. According to the DN-model, the truth of the premises of the phenomenon under study 
entails the truth of its conclusion, which, in turn, hinges on accurate prediction of the phenomenon 
itself with the help of direct observation and the uncovering of general laws. For more on DN-model, 
see e.g. Hempel, Carl-Gustav 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice Hall; 1st edition 1966; Pop-
per, Karl 2002, Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge 2002 (first published in 1959).  
148 For a discussion of sufficient and necessary conditions, see e.g. Mahoney, James 2008, ‘Toward a 
Unified Theory of Causality’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4/5, April/May 2008, p. pp. 
412-436.
149 Ibid., pp. 417-418. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah 1997, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holo-
caust, Vintage Books, 1997.
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Goldhagen’s claim that are neither necessary nor sufficient but when com-
bined together are more likely to produce the observed outcome. For in-
stance, think of Hitler’s rise to power, the rise of the Nazi party (NSDAP) as a 
political force and its racial doctrines, the preceding economic decline in the 
1930s in Europe or German ‘humiliation’ in the Treaty of Versailles 1918 or, 
for that matter, the relatively high unemployment rate of young male Ger-
mans in the 1920s and 1930s. None of these factors alone (and there are sev-
eral others) can explain the Holocaust but when combined together in an ex-
planatory framework we are at least in a position to provide a better explana-
tion than ‘a culture of German anti-Semitism’.      
Hence, in order to posit an explanation of strategic cultural change, we 
need to be able to determine not only what the sufficient or necessary causes 
for its actualization are but we also need to focus on the underlying condi-
tions unravelling the causal mechanisms that may possess the emergent 
causal powers to bring about, i.e. to actualize the observed explanandum. 
This shifts the focus away from ‘individual causes’ to their combinations. 
However, as will be discussed further in in this chapter, the problem with 
studying how and why changes in strategic cultures occur is not only a ques-
tion of how one conceptualizes causality and therefore explanation, but also 
what exactly is regarded as ‘change’ in terms of strategic culture. Again, ap-
pearances may be deceptive if we only focus on the ‘surface’ of strategic cul-
ture. To reiterate, the point this thesis is attempting to get across is that if we 
only focus on directly observable empirical aspects of strategic culture, such 
as specific discourses, certain strategic practices or institutionalized forms of 
behaviour we may actually never fully comprehend the changes that we may 
observe in these directly observable entities. I argue that this is because the 
notion of ‘change’ in social sciences (as opposed to natural sciences) by ne-
cessity presupposes a social ontology of ‘change’ which cannot be reduced to 
‘observable effects of natural laws’ but is dependent on the ‘double herme-
neutics’ of social sciences. Methodologically, critical realism promotes the 
idea of epistemological relativism, but that does not mean that ‘anything 
goes’. Instead, what it means is that some but not all ways of telling stories 
result in better stories being told. This relates to the general belief of scien-
tific realism that the purpose of science is to deepen our understanding of the 
social and political reality which we inhabit, which, in turn, means that we 
ought to argue scientifically about what is ‘real’ about the world and hence go 
beyond mere appearances.152  
This study commences with the assumption that strategic culture is a 
multifaceted social and political phenomenon the study of which cannot be 
limited to a discussion on the virtues and vices of specific methods, because 
methods, if anything, depend upon the methodology, i.e. how the research is 
designed and supposed to be conducted as a whole. Indeed, it needs to be 
noted that none of the existing accounts of strategic cultural change dis-
152 See e.g. Bhaskar, Roy 2008, A Realist Theory of Science, Verso 2008. 
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cussed in this chapter apply a single, extractable method to the study of stra-
tegic cultural change. They each devise a more or less complex analytical 
framework the explanatory power of which can be evaluated against both the 
claims that they make based on the given research material, and against the 
chosen methodological avenue understood holistically as in ‘the manner in 
which research is conducted’. As the above discussion on critical realist meta-
theory suggests, however, methodological claims need to be founded on a 
solid ontological basis, meaning that the knowledge-claims made need to be 
based on an understanding of ‘what there is to know’ of any given research 
object, even though it is fundamentally an open question. And yet, so is the 
world we inhabit and which we study. The existence of a definition of strate-
gic culture as ‘abc’ does not hence mean that strategic culture could not be 
defined as ‘xyz’, but it does mean that both definitions have to be based on an 
explicit understanding of ‘what there is to know’ about strategic culture. This 
rather common-sense notion of ontological primacy seems to elude at least 
the mainstream accounts of strategic culture, which focus almost all of their 
research energy on dwelling on exhaustive epistemological debates.    
As was argued at the beginning of this thesis, strategic culture can be un-
derstood as consisting of specific strategic thinking and other strategic 
practices, the purpose of which is to establish clarity regarding the potential 
outcomes of questions and choices related to peace and war and the use of 
military force. It needs to be pointed out here that this definition basically 
aligns itself to that presented by Gray but with a crucial difference: it recog-
nizes that culture functions on a deeper level of reality than actors do. Actors 
act observably within and upon the strategic culture that they inhabit, but 
strategic culture as a whole, as argued, operates on a level that involves social 
and political processes which may or may not involve actors directly. As dis-
cussed, this level of reality is quite neatly captured by the notion of ‘detecta-
ble unobservables’. Hence, there is room for political agency in the above def-
inition. In fact, strategic culture understood as a social and political process 
by definition involves strategic actors, which are mainly the executive and the 
legislative bodies i.e. the Federal government, the Bundestag and the relevant 
ministries and governmental bodies, and the German army, the Bundeswehr. 
Of course, as Gray has pointed out, people are ‘encultured’ beings but that 
does not mean that there is no room for an analytical separation of strategic 
culture and the strategic actors that act upon it, often in the midst of the 
cross-pressures of the lessons learned from the past and emerging challenges 
to security. Yet, while the above definition recognizes the need for an analyti-
cal separation of culture and agency, it differs from Johnston’s concept in 
that it treats causality in critical realist fashion, allowing the concept to un-
fold.    
Moreover, contra Gray, the view of strategic culture presented in this 
study does not treat it primarily as a ‘tendency to think and act in a certain 
fashion’ but rather as a ‘response to a complex and unclear security environ-
ment’. The former is misleading in the sense that it suggests a concept of 
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strategic culture that rests on the idea of the cultural status quo, whereas the 
latter does not. In my view, in order to be meaningfully applied as a concept, 
this distinction needs to be made. The core purpose of any strategic culture is 
to establish clarity regarding the most fundamental issues of human condi-
tion: peace and war (and the use of military force) and what this means in 
terms of concrete policies. Finally, strategic culture is strongly embedded in 
the (national) past(s), because as a process, it evolves over time. However, 
the evolution of strategic culture is neither solely linear nor circular. Pure 
linearity would be confined to a path-dependency, and nothing could be 
learned from it because the past would not guide future. Pure circularity 
would be mere repetition of the existing patterns of thought and practices. 
With no possibility of breaking out, we would be bound by fate and nothing 
could be learned from it. Indeed, we may perceive a pattern, large or small, 
but the outcome of that pattern is not fated by the forces of history: there can 
be more than one outcome to a certain pattern, as is argued in Chapter 5 in 
conjunction with counterfactual argumentation and strategic cultural 
change. What makes the difference is how strategic culture establishes clarity 
in terms of potential outcomes of our questions and choices related to peace 
and war and the use of military force – a process which is guided but not de-
termined by the lessons we draw from the past and the experiences we make. 
This is, I believe, how strategic culture ultimately functions. 
With these rather significant methodological caveats in mind, this study 
is, first and foremost, exploratory in nature as it enters the terrain of critical 
realist metatheory in order to tell a better story about changes in German 
strategic culture after the end of the Cold War. The most valuable contribu-
tion this study makes is the attempt to devise an analytical framework for the 
study of strategic cultural change. It is my belief that this framework, captur-
ing strategic cultural change as a process which incorporates sources, mech-
anisms as well as outcomes of strategic cultural change is flexible enough to 
be applied to both single entity studies as well as comparative research de-
signs on strategic cultures with certain epistemological caveats.   
2.2.  EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF STRATEGIC CULTURAL 
CHANGE 
I will focus on four specific accounts of strategic culture that have been used 
to attempt to construct a concise view of strategic cultural change. For the 
general purpose of analytical clarity, these accounts need to be discussed 
separately, because they all focus on different aspects of strategic cultural 
change and have a distinct way of capturing (what in their terms) is the es-
sence of change. While I will mainly discuss the key arguments that these 
accounts make in terms of strategic cultural change I will also attempt to ad-
dress their strengths and weaknesses in comparative fashion whenever it is 
feasible. I will also summarize the key findings of these accounts before pre-
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senting my own analytical model for the study of strategic cultural change. 
First, I will discuss Christoph O. Meyer’s and Tobias Wilke’s accounts of the 
mechanisms of strategic cultural change. Second, I will draw on Kerry Long-
hurst’s view on strategic cultural change understood in terms of ‘fine-tuned’ 
and ‘fundamental’ change. Finally, I will elaborate on Carolin Hilpert’s ac-
count of strategic cultural change understood as change on the level of ‘recur-
ring policy practices’. While each of these accounts can be argued to either 
conform to Johnston’s or Gray’s theoretical premises (Wilke, Meyer) or devi-
ate from them (Longhurst, Hilpert), they all provide their own twist to the 
study of strategic cultural change. 
2.2.1. MECHANISMS OF STRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE 
Meyer’s study was among the first serious studies to set out to explore the 
question of a common, European strategic culture. Meyer compared the po-
litical elites of several EU member states as well as similarities and differ-
ences in their strategic discourse in an attempt to discover the persistence 
and transformation of strategic norms on the European level. Indeed, for 
Meyer, strategic norms are a key component in understanding continuity and 
change in strategic cultures, because he strongly agrees with Martha Finne-
more’s argument that norms can be understood as ‘reasons for action’. Meyer 
argues that Johnston’s account is “better in line with the arguments of mod-
ernist constructivists concerning the use of non-material factors within a re-
search design that aspires to identify causality and advance explanations.”153 
As Meyer writes regarding the study of strategic culture, “(w)e are therefore 
dealing with theories, which can tell us whether the strategic behaviour of 
collective actor, ‘X’, is possible on the grounds of defending a constituent 
norm, ‘Y’, against violation. Behaviour ‘X’ could still occur, but would have to 
be caused by other considerations.”154 The merits and demerits of positivism 
and post-positivism were discussed earlier in the context of the Gray-
Johnston debate and there is no need to repeat them here. Suffice it to say 
that when Meyer talks about ‘mechanisms of strategic cultural change’ it 
means that these are causal mechanisms which can bring about real change 
in strategic culture.  
As I argued in the first chapter, the approach that understands norms as 
‘reasons for action’ is plausible, but, in contrast to Johnston, I also argued 
that this is not all there is to how norms affect strategic thinking and strategic 
behaviour. First off, norms cannot be reduced solely to the role of ‘explanato-
ry variables’ in the framework of strategic culture because real life simply 
does not work that way. For instance, take a classic example of a fire alarm 
situation in a classroom. If the alarm goes off, we will get out of the class even 
153 Meyer, Christoph O. 2006, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Secu-
rity and Defense in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 17.  
154 Ibid., p.18. 
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if we did not smell any smoke, because it is considered the appropriate way 
to act in such a situation. However, whether the school is actually on fire or 
not, we do not get out primarily because it is an appropriate way to behave in 
a situation like that. Rather, we get out above all because otherwise there is a 
possibility that we could be burnt. Similarly, if the act of leaving the class-
room would for some reason be regarded as going against the prevailing 
norms, we would still get out or at least attempt to do so if the classroom 
caught fire. Now, one could argue that even when behaviour deviates from 
what is considered to be the norm in a given situation, actors are still aware 
that they are not abiding by that norm. Hence, norms certainly constitute 
and regulate behaviour one way or the other, but they do not necessarily de-
termine its outcome, which may depend on a multitude of factors. This is 
why norms alone cannot explain change in terms of outcomes. But norms do 
play an important role in the process of strategic cultural change (or continu-
ity) because they embody the collectively accepted and approved ways of 
thinking and doing, even if we don’t always abide by them. In short, as ‘rea-
sons for action’, norms are part of the explanation, not the explanation itself. 
Meyer would most likely agree with this distinction because he argues that 
“norms and ideas do not only come into play at the decision-making stage, 
but perhaps more importantly, at every stage of the cognitive process ranging 
from issue-selection, interpretation and evaluation, which precedes and feeds 
into the identification of interests and options for action.”155 Crucially, by re-
ferring to previous studies Meyer further states that so far, “(t)he evidence is 
that norms tend to be followed under conditions when policy-makers have 
sufficient time to consider their choices, when a large group of actors is in-
volved, and when uncertainties are high.”156 Hence, situational factors matter 
when norms are put to test.  
Meyer’s solution to the Gray-Johnston problem is so to speak to embrace 
the best of both worlds, i.e. to pursue a causal explanation of strategic cultur-
al change by focusing on specific ideational, cognitive or normative compo-
nents without resorting to an over-determination of outcomes along the lines 
of national essentialism (e.g. Germans cannot help but act as Germans).157 
This is a stance that makes sense in cases in which we are able to determine 
what the relevant norms, ideas or cognitive positions are in a given strategic 
culture. Therefore, in order for Meyer’s solution to work, strategic culture 
needs to be unpacked into its ideational, normative and cognitive compo-
nents. Meyer’s key argument is that “changes in national strategic cultures as 
well as the norms and narratives underpinning them can and do occur, if ex-
isting cognitive schemata are challenged either through a constant stream of 
similar, or a repetition of the same kind of discrepant information, or it can 
occur through the accumulated, high intensity exposure to such information. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., p. 19. 
157 Ibid., p. 20. 
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The latter case has been described […] in terms of ‘external shocks’, ‘crises’ or 
‘formative moments’ which can, but do not have to, lead to the revision and 
reinterpretation of collective memory and beliefs.”158  
Clearly, the most obvious source of such mechanisms is the participation 
in and experience of warfare or conflict management that involves more or 
less directly the question of the use of military force. Hence, external shocks 
may cause change by putting the normative framework of strategic culture 
under pressure and by questioning the prevailing understandings of not only 
what kind of behaviour is morally acceptable or appropriate, but also by forc-
ing the political decision makers to contemplate their response in the face of 
a new security threat. Even so, it is important to highlight the fact that new 
interpretations of existing norms do not necessarily overturn the ideational 
core of strategic culture, unless we can argue that there is a changed pattern 
of behaviour that relates to a transformation in the normative framework. 
Meyer argues that there are two further mechanisms of normative change 
that can gradually change strategic culture. As he posits, “(b)eyond the dra-
matic case of normative change through military defeat or occupation, more 
gradual changes can arise also from international or transnational processes 
related to international law-making, peer pressure, naming and shaming, as 
well as arguing and persuasion. Agents of such changes can be epistemic 
communities of lawyers or the military profession, non-governmental organ-
izations, the audio-visual mass media, international organizations or gov-
ernments. At the same time, normative change may also occur gradually 
within societies because of the changing impact of historical experiences, 
opening opportunities for normative contestation as new groups occupy posi-
tions of influence within a given society.”159      
In contrast to Meyer, I posit that the mechanisms of change other than ex-
ternal shocks can have significant impact on the evolution of strategic culture 
in areas that are not necessarily primarily concerned with norms or norma-
tive influence per se. One such domain is practical and material defence and 
security policy co-operation that is aimed to be based not only on shared ide-
as and values, but also on best practices, benchmarking, economic efficiency 
and viability. For instance, the Bundeswehr reform (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5) can be seen not only as a solidification of the shift from territorial 
defence to out-of-area operations but also in the context of the broader de-
158 Ibid., p. 25. 
159 Meyer 2006, pp. 26-27. 
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velopments at the European and EU level toward a professionalization and 
specialization of the armed forces.160  
In summary, the argument is that of all three of the mechanisms present-
ed by Meier, the experience of warfare is the most significant, ‘first order’ 
mechanism of strategic cultural change, because as discussed at length in this 
thesis, it has the power to question directly the fundamental beliefs related to 
the questions of peace and war and the use of military force. In the German 
case this has been a particularly pertinent feature because it relates directly 
to the process of coming to terms with the German past. In this sense the 
changing impact of historical experiences is among the experiences that re-
late to warfare, and should therefore be viewed as part of that mechanism, 
which is imperative in understanding and explaining continuity and change 
in German strategic culture. Moreover, the other mechanisms mentioned by 
Meier can be important in terms of change, but they serve rather as ‘second 
order’ mechanisms in that they are usually complementary to the experience 
of warfare.  To be sure, there’s no doubt that the second order mechanisms 
can be powerful in their own right, and that the impact of generational 
change or public opinion on the evolution of strategic culture should not be 
underestimated.  
Indeed, as a critical remark regarding the above delineation of the causal 
mechanisms into ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ mechanisms, one could of 
course posit that the generation that did the fighting in World War II in 
Germany has nearly vanished. Moreover, the generation of Kriegskinder, the 
last generation to directly experience World War II is getting older, and the 
political power in Germany is shifting to younger generations. But then, it 
seems that every generation experiences a war, either directly or indirectly, 
which has a considerable impact on the evolution of the respective strategic 
culture. In Germany, this has been the legacy of World War II and the Nazi 
past which will eventually continue, as an indirect experience, to be reflected 
upon and mixed with the direct experiences made with modern warfare and 
Bundeswehr’s current and future out-of-area operations. Hence, the argu-
ment put forward is that in terms of causal mechanisms, it is primarily the 
evolving experiences related to warfare (of which reinterpretations of the 
past are an integral part) which have the power to challenge the status quo in 
strategic cultures and the existing beliefs and ways of doing things, regard-
less whether we talk about the people in power currently or the millennials.    
160 This shift is also reflected in the new White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of 
Bundeswehr. It aims to balance the Bundeswehr role between global deployments and territorial de-
fense, given the recent crisis in Ukraine and the unpredictability of Russia, reflecting the hybrid nature 
of emerging security threats.  The new White Paper also underlines concepts such as ‘Pooling and 
Sharing’ as well as the recommendations of the ‘Rühe-Commission’ in 2015 in highlighting the ‘in-
teroperability’ aspect of the armed forces of NATO-member states. See White Paper on German Securi-
ty Policy and the Future of Bundeswehr (2016). Available at: (https://www.bmvg.de). 
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Wilke’s account, which is discussed below, is similar to Meyer’s in that it 
aims to account for the causal mechanisms at work in strategic culture via the 
assessment of the normative and ideational structure of strategic culture. Yet 
his methodological approach differs from Meyer’s in one crucial respect, 
namely, that his view on causality is more nuanced than that of Meyer’s. 
Wilke has argued that “the incremental adaptation of the country’s strategic 
culture – defined by perception of threat and self, and its understanding of 
spatial and functional limits of the use of force – seems to have come to a 
preliminary conclusion. As adaptation has allegedly culminated in a final 
‘Enttabuisierung des Militärischen’, entailing a readiness to defend German 
security ‘auch am Hindukusch’, we find sound and ample justification to look 
for the roots of Germany’s basic strategic cultural tenets and reasons for their 
change, paving the way for this new outlook in international affairs and in-
creased sense of global responsibility, turning the former civil into an in-
creasingly normal power.”161  
On factual terms, there is not much to be disputed about the above state-
ment, except for the alleged transformation of Germany into a ‘normal’ pow-
er, which, according to the view presented in this thesis in Chapter 5, never 
was a very accurate description of what took place in German strategic cul-
ture to begin with. Yet the more interesting part involves the form rather 
than the substance of Wilke’s argument, because, if change is coined in terms 
of incremental normative or ideational adaptation, it must be based on the 
assessment of the underlying social and political processes that are causing 
this adaptation.  
Wilke’s assessment of this incremental adaptation rests on his observa-
tion that while “Cold War strategic cultural adaptation was largely informed 
by societal and elite learning processes about the devastating effects of au-
thoritarian militarism and hegemonic strivings for power, since the 1990s 
German governments and subsequently society has begun to embrace a new 
understanding of international responsibility in security and defence, which 
still recognizes the specific reasons for the nation’s Cold War civil identity 
but is far more willing to actively respond to international demands and con-
tingencies.”162 According to Wilke, this willingness is epitomized by the Ger-
man government’s decision in 2003 to agree to the draft of a European Secu-
rity Strategy (ESS) which provides the declamatory proof for this new under-
standing of responsibility to become a “normal” partner. His argument is that 
“if we find a consistency between norms and ideas put forward by national 
society and political elites […] and those addressed in the ESS, unanimous 
convergence towards a European strategic culture as well as substantial and 
lasting German Normalisierung can be argued to take place.”163  
161 Wilke, Tobias 2007, German Strategic Culture Revisited. Linking the past to contemporary Ger-
man strategic choice, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2007, p. 12. 
162 Ibid., p. 13. 
163 Ibid. 
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However, I posit that Wilke’s argument falls short not only with regard to 
Germany’s ‘normalization’, but also as far as the link between German re-
sponsibility and the agreement over ESS is concerned. First, the issue of a 
new sense of responsibility does not fit well with an understanding of Ger-
many willing to become a ‘normal’ partner, because ‘normality’ as such does 
not provide any definitive standards as far as responsibility is concerned. 
Furthermore, no empirical evidence exists that would suggest that Germany 
agreed to the ESS in particular because of a new sense of international re-
sponsibility. We could just as well argue that Germany agreed to the ESS be-
cause it was in line with the tenets of its strategic culture. Indeed, the princi-
pal restraint in all things military, which is still a prevalent feature of German 
strategic culture, fits well with the ‘soft’ power character of EU foreign and 
security policy. Hence, German agreement on ESS could be explained by the 
general ‘good fit’ between German strategic culture and the ESS rather than a 
new sense of international responsibility in terms of ‘normality’. Therefore, 
even if we could find empirical evidence to back up Wilke’s claim, the factors 
which underline continuity in German strategic culture seem to explain 
German attitudes toward the ESS better. Second, as will be argued in Chapter 
5, the argument about norm convergence at the EU level is problematic, if it 
is taken to explain the formation of a common, European strategic culture. 
Most importantly, key differences remain between EU member states on the 
issue of the use of military force. Moreover, as long as the decision on wheth-
er to use military force or not remains strongly in the traditional domain of 
nation states and in the hands of their executives and legislatives, the differ-
ences between EU member states on this particular issue will directly impact 
the formulation of any kind of European strategic culture. Third, and im-
portantly, if Germany would be adapting as Wilke describes the adaption 
process, it would seem reasonable to assume that Germany would not hesi-
tate to use military force in a more consistent manner. Yet there has been no 
detectable empirical pattern of the sort since the end of the Cold War. This 
alone makes the argument regarding the link between increased internation-
al responsibility and a desire to become a ‘normal’ power difficult to digest, 
because ‘normality’ would then refer to a status of normality regarding the 
use of military force, which in the German context, given its experiences on 
warfare and the German past, is a contradiction in terms.   
However, despite the problematic nature of the substance of his argument 
regarding the adaptation of German strategic culture, Wilke’s methodological 
approach is quite detailed and sophisticated. Wilke understands change as 
normative and ideational adaptation. He aims to account for the underlying 
causal mechanisms of normative and ideational adaptation of strategic cul-
ture by pitting constructivist logic against a rationalist one. His basic argu-
ment is that constructivist logic would state that formative moments or criti-
cal junctures initiate either learning processes or adaptation pressure that 
lead to adaptation of a strategic culture which enables new strategic choices 
or alternatively, and according to the rationalist logic, either structural 
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changes or material demands that initiate learning or adaptation enable new 
strategic choices.164  Hence for Wilke, change is ultimately to be understood 
in terms of the causal mechanisms which underline the processual nature of 
change. Hence, he actually deviates from the Johnstonian angle and Meyer’s 
account in the sense that the underlying causal mechanisms are grasped in 
terms of ‘x leads to y through abc’ instead of ‘if x then y’, which, as discussed, 
refers to an understanding of causality as a static correlation the aim of 
which is to reveal the underlying causal mechanism as a natural law.165  Im-
portantly, what this methodological choice implies is that change is ultimate-
ly to be understood in terms of dynamic processes, not only as static out-
comes.  
There are a couple of further points to Wilke’s methodological approach 
that need to be addressed before we turn to discuss Hilpert’s account. Firstly, 
even if the move from ‘if x then y’ to ‘x leads to y through abc’ enables us to 
contemplate strategic cultural change in the form of social and/or political 
processes, it does not fundamentally alter the way strategic culture is thought 
to function, because if the latter formula is true, then by definition so is the 
former. However, the advantage of the latter formula compared to the former 
is in that it does not ‘black-box’ all the intervening variables and hence the 
latter provides a better way of looking at the underlying causal mechanisms, 
which can and do vary and thus deny the existence of strategic cultural 
change as a result of static causal mechanisms. Therefore, Wilke’s approach 
is definitely more nuanced than Johnston’s in that it pays attention to the 
intervening variables which affect the process of change.  
Secondly, and more importantly, Wilke’s account is still unsatisfactory 
especially because it delineates the impact of the causal mechanisms underly-
ing strategic culture to producing new strategic choices in a more or less de-
terministic fashion. As I argued in Chapter 1, while I agree with the principle 
that norms provide ‘reasons for action’, they do not have a monopoly over 
strategic choice, let alone over the policies that ensue based upon these 
choices. To translate this argument into Wilke’s terminology would be to ar-
gue that norms or ideas (x) do not necessarily lead to new strategic choices 
(y) through a, b and/or c, but they can be one of the reasons why new policies
are introduced and hence be part of the explanation of strategic cultural
change.  To be sure, this modified position is more in line with Gray than
Johnston because while it ultimately argues that neither the basic conditions
‘if (idea) x then (behaviour) y’, ‘(idea) x precedes (behaviour) y in time’ nor
the modified position ‘(idea) x leads to (behaviour) y through abc’ is a satis-
factory formula for an understanding of how strategic culture functions, it
164 Ibid., p. 32, see Table VI. 
165 On the differences between these two accounts, see Bennett, Andrew & George, Alexander L. 2005, 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press 2005 and King, Gary, Keo-
hane, Robert & Verba, Sidney 1994, Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative re-
search, Princeton University Press, 1994. 
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rests upon a counterfactual condition that ‘but for (strategic thinking) x, (be-
haviour) y would not have occurred’.  
This formulation also alleviates the problem mentioned by Neumann and 
Heikka of trying to attempt to account for the explanatory power of individu-
al ideas.166 It shifts the focus from individual ideas to the ideational structure 
of strategic culture understood as a combination of different beliefs, ideas 
and norms, hence avoiding the determinism of Wilke’s account. Hence, for 
Gray’s constitutive argument about strategic culture to make sense, the rela-
tionship between strategic thinking and strategic behaviour has to be one 
that has a meaningful correspondence with the world within which strategic 
culture operates. Strategic thinking does not have to be the effective cause of 
strategic behaviour in order for either to be meaningful but it has to fulfil the 
counterfactual condition if we are to assess the explanatory power of the con-
cept. In other words, strategic thinking is part of the explanation for strategic 
behaviour. In this sense, the relationship between strategic thinking and stra-
tegic behaviour is one where ideas, norms and beliefs precondition, not nec-
essarily determine, the course of strategic action.  
2.2.2. FINE-TUNED CHANGE VS. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 
Kerry Longhurst’s view on strategic culture and change differs from the 
above two in that it does not actually pay much attention to how strategic 
culture functions, or what the underlying mechanisms are, but rather focuses 
on pointing out the structured nature of strategic culture. She argues that 
strategic culture consists of multiple ‘layers’ of culture which incorporate the 
possibility of change and is worth quoting at length: “there are the deeper, 
basal, qualities that have their origins in the primordial or formative phases 
of a given strategic culture; these are here called foundational elements. 
Foundational elements comprise basic beliefs regarding the use of force that 
give a strategic culture its core characteristics. Importantly, foundational el-
ements are highly resistant to change. Extending out of these foundational 
elements are the observable manifestations of the strategic culture: the 
longstanding policies and practices that actively relate and apply the sub-
stance of the strategic culture’s core to the external environment, essentially 
by providing channels of meaning and application. These aspects of strategic 
culture – here called regulatory practices – are less resilient to change. Mid-
way between the foundational elements and regulatory practices are the se-
curity policy standpoints, the contemporary, widely accepted, interpretations 
as to how best core values are to be promoted through policy channels, in the 
sense that they set the preferences for policy choices.”167  
Hence, the core of Longhurst’s argument is that the fundamental beliefs 
understood as the ‘deeper qualities’ or ‘foundational elements’ are much 
166 See Neumann & Heikka 2005. 
167 Longhurst 2004, p. 17? 
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more resistant to change than longstanding regulatory policy practices. What 
this definition also implies is that if there is a stable, non-conflictual and con-
sensual link between foundational elements and regulatory practices, there is 
no reason to expect any radical or fundamental change in strategic culture. 
This, in turn, translated to Meyer’s line of argumentation would mean that as 
long as particular norms, which can be understood as embodying the core of 
the foundational elements in a given strategic culture, i.e. the beliefs regard-
ing the use of military force, offer not only morally but also practical and via-
ble solutions in terms of security and defence policy, there is no reason to 
expect any radical or fundamental change in strategic culture.  Yet as Long-
hurst argues, ‘(t)he normal functioning relationship between foundational 
elements and regulatory practices may be disturbed if a certain policy prac-
tice has become so ingrained that it can be a force for inertia, appearing as a 
lag or even an ill-suited policy to pursue.”168 This, in turn, implies that the 
institutionalization and the taking for granted certain strategic practices can 
both serve as a force for inertia and as an impediment to change. 
Longhurst’s view on strategic cultural change rests on the notion of ‘fine-
tuned’ and ‘fundamental’ changes. She argues that “(f)undamental change of 
a strategic culture is a far less common phenomenon. It is more abrupt serve 
to reinforce memory. This means that subsequent generations, in nature, 
occurring when trauma is sufficiently severe as to nullify the existing strate-
gic culture, giving rise to the establishment of new core beliefs, leading sub-
sequently to new policies and practices. This fundamental change to or col-
lapse of a strategic culture is best described as a situation of ‘collective infan-
cy’. Related to this theme of change is the issue of policy inertia: even in the 
event of a foundational element being challenged, certain practices or poli-
cies may resist change or adjustment.”169 Hence, what we could draw from 
this line of argumentation is the notion that fine-tuned change or adaptation 
of policy practices occurs more frequently simply because policy practices 
deal with everyday politics that may require adaptation or streamlining of 
policy standpoints without a comprehensive overhaul of the underlying idea-
tional fundaments of a strategic culture. Moreover, this also implies that the 
moment of ‘collective infancy’ can only take place if the existing ideational, 
normative and cognitive structure of a strategic culture is put under so much 
strain that it no longer provides a viable way of thinking about and pursuing 
security and defence policy. Therefore, a way out of this phase of infancy to-
wards a strategic maturity takes place via novel strategic ideas, thoughts and 
norms as well as fresh regulatory practices. 
However, it is imperative that a couple clarifications from the viewpoint of 
this study are made in terms of how we could utilize Longhurst’s stance ana-
lytically. First, it is important to specify the distinctions between ‘a complete 
collapse’ of a strategic culture on one hand, and ‘collective infancy’ and ‘fun-
168 Ibid., p.18. 
169 Ibid. 
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damental change’ on the other. Collapse of a strategic culture can be under-
stood as a comprehensive strategic reset of the hitherto existing system of 
strategic beliefs and actions whereas fundamental change may refer to a 
change within these belief systems and result in new policies. However, 
whereas fundamental change need not imply a complete strategic reset, by 
definition strategic reset always necessitates fundamental change. Hence, if 
we are intent on using both ‘collapse’ and ‘fundamental change’ analytically 
as signifying qualitative differences within and between strategic cultures, 
then this distinction is necessary. Second, and regrettably, Longhurst spends 
little time on the question of change beyond the notion of fine-tuned change 
and fundamental change. Ultimately, her conception of change relies on an 
understanding of how the different layers, i.e. fundaments, policy stand-
points and practices of strategic culture relate to one another. It also seems 
that beyond these layers there is not a lot of room to contemplate the under-
lying social and political processes which bring about change (Meyer and 
Wilke would call these ‘mechanisms’). This can be derived from Longhurst’s 
clear distinction between fine-tuned change understood in terms of policy 
corrections, alterations or adaptations on one hand, and fundamental change 
in terms of either ‘collective infancy’ or new policies and practices on the oth-
er hand. The problem here is that all of these notions refer to a concept of 
change that is knowledgeable only as an observable outcome.  Third, and 
consequently, what remains unclear is the relationship between fine-tuned 
and fundamental change in terms of not how they differ but how they affect 
one another. For instance, the question of whether enough fine-tuning of 
regulatory strategic practices is enough to trigger a change on the more fun-
damental level, is left open.  
Overall, it would seem that Longhurst’s categorization of change under-
stood qualitatively as either fine-tuned or fundamental change is analytically 
useful in a rather broad sense, because it gives a generic idea of the magni-
tude of change(s) in question and where we might be able to observe them, 
but as I will argue later, it needs to be supplemented with Meyer’s arguments 
regarding the mechanisms of change. This enables us to contemplate on the 
question of change both in terms of outcomes as well as processes. 
2.2.3. CHANGE ON THE LEVEL OF RECURRING POLICY PRACTICES 
Hilpert’s account differs from the above three in one crucial respect, namely, 
that it shifts the focus from ideational structure to agency. She shows how 
German participation in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan (2002-2014) – 
understood as an external challenge – changed some of the strategic practic-
es of the Federal Republic on the level of civil-military relations, military doc-
trine as well as procurement.170 In terms of strategic cultural change, she ar-
170 Hilpert, Carolin 2014, Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy. Germany 
and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan, Palgrave Macmillan 2014. 
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gues in particular that “the most prevalent patterns of change are the exter-
nal challenges which are seized by political entrepreneurs to forge new prac-
tices. Though there have also been other reasons for change, it has been ded-
icated agents seizing windows of opportunity and using external threat-
related challenges that have been the most successful at gradually adapting 
the German way of warfare.”171 Importantly, for Hilpert, “(o)nly in combina-
tion with practices, the final institutionalization of repeated patterns of be-
haviour, will I be able to truly assess change”.172  This is because while “fac-
tors, which have the potential to change German strategic culture may mere-
ly evoke a new, altered rhetoric, without leading to any changes in how things 
are actually done.”173  
The analytical shift in focus from ideational structure to agency and prac-
tice reflects the most recent criticism voiced toward the Gray-Johnston di-
chotomy. For instance, Neumann & Heikka argue that that the definition of 
most the current strategic culture literature is based on an outdated defini-
tion of culture. Instead, they suggest a definition of strategic culture as the 
‘dynamic interplay between discourses and practices’.174 What this implies is 
a co-constitutive understanding between strategic discourse and practice. It 
seems that bringing the discussion about practices into the realm of strategy 
is a way for them to break out of the methodological impasse of trying to ex-
plain the relationship between cultural ideas and cultural behaviour, which 
according to Neumann & Heikka is an outdated way of looking at strategic 
culture.175 This argument reflects the ‘practice turn’ in IR, the general argu-
ment of which is that when we find ourselves in problematic situations, we 
try to apply a practical form of inquiry to find appropriate ways to deal with 
the problem. As Hellmann has argued in terms of how pragmatism relates to 
beliefs, “(e)xperience (that is, past thoughts and actions of ourselves as well 
as others), expectation (that is, intentions as to desired future states of the 
world we act in as well as predictions as to likely future states), and creative 
intelligence merge in producing a new belief.”176 He further specifies that 
while “beliefs are rules for action, language is a tool for coping with the world 
rather than for representing reality or for finding truth.”177  Hence, what this 
implies is that pragmatists categorically reject the view that our beliefs would 
somehow correspond with the reality ‘out there’.  
While I find that the study of practices is useful in an attempt to capture 
the different aspects of strategic cultural change, the approach falls short in 
171 Ibid., p. 3. 
172 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
173 Ibid, p. 8. 
174 Neumann & Heikka 2005, p. 9. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Hellmann, Gunther 2009, ?Pragmatism in International Relations’, International Studies Review, 
Vol. 11, No.3, (Sep., 2009), p. 639. 
177 Ibid. 
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some crucial respects, the details of which will be discussed below. However, 
a couple theoretical and conceptual clarifications need to be made before 
that. First, it needs to be noted that while I have argued that strategic culture 
needs to be understood as a set of ‘responses’ to the internal and external 
security and defence policy challenges rather than a ‘tendency’ to think or act 
in a certain fashion, these responses do not always follow the most ‘practical 
form of inquiry’, as will become clear in the course of the empirical chapters. 
Second, for the concept of strategic culture to make any sense the relation-
ship between strategic thought and action needs to be one which has a mean-
ingful correspondence with the world within which strategic culture operates. 
Hence, if we agree that the ideational structure of strategic culture consists of 
ideas, beliefs and norms then these have to have a meaningful correspond-
ence with strategic action and strategic practices because without it there can 
be no meaningful correspondence between strategic culture and the reality 
‘out there’. Moreover, even if we followed the line of argument that the reality 
‘out there’ becomes meaningful only through our efforts to make sense of it, 
it needs to be noted that culture is the very domain of human thought and 
action which either enables or constrains us in finding practical solutions or 
otherwise to the problems we face and hence in our very ability to make 
sense of whatever may be ‘out there’. In other words, and following Gray, the 
fact that we are ‘encultured beings’ sets limits to how we are able to experi-
ence the past and what we can expect of the future. This, however, also 
means that there necessarily exists a reality ‘out there’ which is not exhausted 
by our experiences of it.  
Hence, the point is not whether what we believe is ‘true’ in terms of the 
reality ‘out there’ but rather that what we believe makes sense in terms of 
what is ‘out there’. This is why I find the pragmatist position rather problem-
atic; it squeezes the diverse impact of the German past on the evolution of 
German strategic culture into a ‘vacuum-packed box of readily available ex-
periences’ which are arguably harnessed by the political actors in the most 
practical way possible.  Anybody who has studied the discourse on German 
defence and security in depth should arrive at an opposite conclusion: the 
German discourse on strategy, defence and security is anything but practical 
– it is complex, diverse, conflictual and even contradictory. It also begs the
question of how one can actually be “creatively intelligent” about beliefs that
relate to the lessons learned from the past. However, it needs to be noted in
defence of Hilpert, that while maintaining her stance on practices Hilpert
seems to recognize the problem of combining the theory of pragmatism with
the concept of strategic culture as she criticizes Neumann and Heikka for
completely abandoning the motivations of the actors: norms, ideas and be-
liefs.178 Indeed, if strategic discourse is not based on norms, ideas and beliefs,
then what?
178 Ibid., 9-10. 
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I agree with Hilpert that, in terms of change, identifying a practice as an 
institutionalized pattern of behaviour is a strong analytical move because in 
this way we might be able to observe the result of the process of change as an 
‘institutionalized political outcome’. Yet it is absolutely imperative to under-
line a fact which Hilpert does not discuss, namely, that not all processes of 
strategic cultural change lead to practices which can be coined as institu-
tionalized patterns of behaviour or which can be detected as ‘observable 
outcomes’. However, and contra Hilpert, this does not mean that these pro-
cesses would be unable to bring about change just because it seems that they 
are lacking a clearly definable empirical referent (for instance the evolving 
relationship between German guilt and German behaviour in German strate-
gic culture) or that they would be inconsequential in terms of policy out-
comes. What this means, however, is that we need to attempt to make these 
processes manifest in some empirical fashion. For example, a detailed de-
scription of the substance of the process itself (e.g. the evolving relationship 
between guilt and responsibility) with the help of an existing analytical cate-
gory (e.g. categories of guilt) is a viable method at arriving at a point where 
these processes become more intelligible, and hence more ‘observable’. How-
ever, it is crucial to note that the explanatory power of these processes does 
not reduce itself to the results of our observation efforts, because while these 
observations may be valuable, they do not exhaust the realm of where and 
when these processes might become empirically manifest. 
The other issue I have with Hilpert’s account is the fact that she criticizes 
the existing accounts of German strategic culture179 for being too obsessive 
about ‘high politics’ and for stopping the discussion on the decision to send 
troops to other countries and argues for an approach that shifts the analytical 
focus to operative-strategic level because “(s)trategic culture influences not 
only whether forces will be sent, but also how these forces have to behave 
once they are in a foreign country.”180 While this criticism has its merits to a 
degree, it remains unclear how a conception of a political practice as an insti-
tutionalized pattern of behaviour remains somehow external to the realm of 
‘high politics’. Even if a particular process of change was triggered as bottom-
up, i.e. as a ‘grass-roots’ process, it becomes an institutionalized practice in 
terms of strategic culture only when it becomes in contact with ‘high politics’, 
because in order to be institutionalized, it requires political legitimacy. 
Hence, norms matter more in terms of strategic culture than what Hilpert is 
willing to admit. Related to this is the fundamental question whether change 
understood in terms of strategic practices unfolding as institutionalized pat-
terns of behaviour is sufficient for an explanatory account of strategic cultur-
al change. As I have attempted to argue, an explanatory account of strategic 
cultural change needs to go beyond the notion of observable strategic prac-
179 Hilpert specifically refers to the writings of Dalgaard-Nielsen, Duffield, Longhurst, Lantis and Ber-
ger, see ibid., p.9.  
180 Ibid., p. 10. 
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tice to grasp the essence of change. And even so, even with its flaws, Hilpert’s 
account is a valuable analytical addition to the empirical study of strategic 
culture and strategic cultural change, in particular. 
2.3.  CONSTRUCTING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE STUDY OF STRATEGIC CULTURAL 
CHANGE 
So far in this chapter, I have portrayed the few existing accounts which have 
addressed the issue of strategic cultural change in more detail. Taken as a 
whole, these accounts bring added value to the study of strategic cultural 
change because they all approach the aspect of change from different episte-
mological angles. Based on the above analysis of these accounts, a couple of 
key points stand out: 1) change often takes place as an incremental process, 
to be understood primarily as ideational and normative adaptation or fine-
tuning of existing strategic practices, observable mainly but not only when it 
becomes institutionalized pattern of behaviour; 2) change can also be fun-
damental in case the existing ideational/normative structure is challenged by 
external shocks to the degree that it no longer provides clarity in terms of the 
issues of peace and war and the use of military force which also implies dys-
functionality in the link between strategic thinking and strategic behaviour; 
3) external shocks related to the experience of warfare are the most im-
portant, ‘first order’ mechanisms of strategic cultural change because they
are capable of triggering fundamental change that goes beyond the notion of
change understood in terms of observable shifts in policy practices. These
primary mechanisms are supplemented by other, ‘second order’ mechanisms
such as generational change, peer persuasion or mediatized crisis-learning
which are, from an explanatory perspective, secondary to the experience of
warfare.
Empirically, if we talk about Bundeswehr out-of-area operations as ‘sin-
gle’ case studies, the case of Afghanistan and German participation as part of 
the ISAF operation (2002-2014) is arguably the best-case scenario since here 
we have a longer time frame and hence more data to make arguments about 
how these operations are capable of changing strategic culture at the level of 
strategic practices. However, the question that is often left unanswered is 
that if fundamental or major change is such a rare occurrence, how do the 
changes and shifts at the level of strategic and policy practices, which argua-
bly take place more frequently, affect the overall evolution of strategic cul-
ture? If the case of Afghanistan is used as an example, it might be too early to 
draw any far-reaching conclusions on the matter. However, as Zapfe has not-
ed in an important recent article, German strategic culture plays a pivotal 
role in the current Bundeswehr reform that is supposed to be in full effect in 
2017. This reform largely relies on the experiences gathered during the 
OEF/ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The key document in the reform is the so-
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called ‘Conception of the Bundeswehr? (Konzeption der Bundeswehr or 
KdB), published in 2013. As a central  element,  the  KdB  introduces the con-
cept of Bundeswehrgemeinsamkeit, meaning a dimension of ‘jointness? be-
yond the military sphere: the KdB, and its subordinate documents, shall bind 
uniformed and civilian pillars of the Ministry of Defence. As Zapfe states, 
“(o)n the operational side, the year 2016 may well see a historical first. The 
Ministry of Defence is well into a process of publishing a document that is 
internally titled ‘Operational Guideline? (Einsatzleitlinie) and supposed to 
serve as the central document guiding German operational doctrine. It is 
supposed to serve as a capstone document on joint operations – on how to 
use the structure and equipment lined out in the KdB.”181 
Hilpert, who has studied the case of Afghanistan in depth, does not at-
tempt an answer to this question. However, she makes an interesting obser-
vation that “discourse is not an absolute necessity for a change in practices. If 
the nature of the external challenge, coupled with internal factors – primarily 
agency – is large enough, there can be change regardless of the political-
strategic rhetoric. In such cases, most agents of change do not come from the 
highest political levels; they need not even be politicians.”182 She particularly 
mentions German reluctance to adjust to the NATO COIN (Counterinsurgen-
cy) doctrine as well as the changes in German Rules of Engagement (RoE), 
which were forced upon Germany by external events and challenges and 
championed by agents other than the Federal government (rank and file of 
Bundeswehr in the case of the former and Bundestag MPs in the case of the 
latter).183 However, while it is impossible to prove the opposite of Hilpert’s 
above claim, it would seem plausible to assume counterfactually that had the 
German government decided to take a firm stance on the issue of COIN for 
instance, the discourse surrounding that stance would have made a differ-
ence in how Germany would have acted upon it. In other words, as the Ger-
man government did not take a firm stance on the issue, it provided windows 
of opportunity for other actors to function as policy entrepreneurs in this re-
gard. Moreover, both the adoption of the NATO COIN doctrine as well as the 
changes in the German RoE were initially made possible by specific forms of 
strategic thinking, even though these changes were not initiated by the Ger-
man government.   
Indeed, the answer to the question posed above regarding the way chang-
es in policy practices affect the overall evolution of strategic culture rests 
mainly with how one defines strategic culture. If, on one hand, we take 
Hilpert’s claims regarding the primacy of strategic practice as granted, then 
we need not think any further. This is because change in strategic practices – 
if it establishes an institutionalized pattern of behaviour – affects the way 
181 See Zapfe, Martin 2016? ?Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The Bundeswehr and the 
Joint???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
182 Hilpert 2014, p. 195. 
183 Ibid., pp. 193-194. 
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strategic culture is shaped. However, on the other hand, if we apply the defi-
nition of strategic culture I offered above, it could be argued that if changes 
in strategic practices fundamentally alter the fashion in which the ideation-
al/normative structure is able to establish clarity in terms of potential out-
comes to the questions and choices regarding the use of military force, these 
practices might significantly shape the way strategic culture unfolds. To give 
an example, it can be argued that the strategic practice of Bundeswehr out-
of-area operations since the mid-1990s has had a considerable impact on 
how German strategic culture has evolved, not only because it represents an 
institutionalized pattern of behaviour but perhaps more importantly since it 
has provided new ways of addressing the issue of the use of military force – 
the core of any strategic culture.  
Aside from the assessment of change in strategic culture studies, there ex-
ists a broad literature on foreign policy change in terms of so-called ‘critical 
junctures’. These studies are informed by historical institutionalist perspec-
tive which posits that historical development is characterized by long periods 
of stability which are punctuated by ‘critical junctures’ during which more 
dramatic change becomes possible. For instance, Capoccia & Kelemen define 
critical junctures as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the out-
come of interest.”184 This definition also suggests that actors’ choices have 
more impact on the outcomes of policy during the critical juncture than after 
this period has come to an end. This is because their choices during the criti-
cal juncture are assumed to trigger a path-dependent process that constrains 
future choices.185  
However, there is no a priori reason to assume that actors’ choices would 
be necessarily freer during phases of change and more constrained during 
times of institutional equilibrium. What may appear as windows of oppor-
tunity for some actors may mean something entirely different for other ac-
tors. Hence the very opposite may very well be the case. Realists could argue 
for instance that militarily more powerful states possess more options than 
weaker ones regardless whether the institutional situation is characterized as 
equilibrium or as a ‘critical juncture’. Indeed, what would count as a ‘critical 
juncture’ in terms of strategic culture is unclear; the notion of ‘critical junc-
ture’ seems to rather point to a set of structural, contextual circumstances 
than to highlight specific factors for change.  
Sociologist Ann Swidler, who already in the 1980s developed a theory of 
cultural influence on action in terms of practices, argued that culture has in-
dependent causal power because it shapes the capacities from which strate-
gies of action are constructed. During ‘settled periods’ culture “independently 
influences action but only by providing resources from which people can con-
184 Capoccia, Giovanni & Kelemen, Daniel R. 2007, ‘The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, 
and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism’, World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Apr., 2007), p. 348 
185 Ibid. 
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struct diverse lines of action”, while during ‘unsettled periods’, “explicit ideo-
logies directly govern action, but structural opportunities for action deter-
mine which among competing ideologies survives in the long run.”186 The 
problem with these notions is not so much that they seem to equate structur-
al uncertainty with increased possibility for change, but that the logic of his-
torical evolution rests on circular trajectory, i.e. ‘stability-critical juncture-
stability’ or ‘settled-unsettled-settled’. Hence, the notions of ‘stability-critical 
juncture’ and ‘settled-unsettled period’ refer to a state in which a culture 
finds itself at any given point in time. This is defined either as a de facto pe-
riod of continuity or a period of change, because structural uncertainty is 
taken to explain either a) the increased probability that actors’ choices influ-
ence action by affecting the outcome of interest or b) the prominence of a 
certain ideology over another in terms of affecting the way how strategies of 
action are constructed on a general level (irrespective of given value assess-
ments).  
First, this is misleading in the sense that it not only overdetermines the 
structural vis-à-vis contingent factors in bringing about change187 , but it also 
neglects the idea that there is more to strategic cultural change than to focus 
solely on observable outcomes in terms of practices (e.g. institutionalized 
patterns of behaviour). Second, the problem with a fixed understanding that 
cultural change is primarily driven by structural determinants risks the dan-
ger of tautological reasoning, since culture is often understood via the notion 
of ‘social structure’. Without a clearly articulated framework that differenti-
ates culture as a social structure from other structural factors it is difficult to 
avoid the impression of structural determinism, because unless one makes an 
ontological distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘action’, culture either explains 
everything or it explains nothing. This relates to the problems that were de-
tectable in Gray’s account regarding culture understood broadly as ‘the con-
text’ but it also highlights the problem in the opposite argument in the sec-
ond generation scholarship of strategic culture, namely, that culture exists as 
a resource that can be harnessed by cultural actors in an instrumental fash-
ion.   
In the following, based on the analysis of the existing accounts of strategic 
cultural change discussed above and the discussion of critical realist meta-
theory regarding causality from the beginning of  Chapter 2, I present an 
analytical framework of strategic cultural change which understands change 
both in terms of processes and outcomes: 
186 Swidler, Ann 1986, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sosiological Review, Vol. 
51, No.2 (Apr., 1986), pp.273-286. 
187 For more on contingency and change, see Chapter 5.4. 
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Table 2.  Analytical Framework of Strategic Cultural Change 
A few clarifications and specifications regarding the above analytical catego-
rization are necessary. First and importantly, as an analytical framework, the 
above illustration of the process of strategic cultural change is not intended 
to be understood as corresponding to empirical reality as it is presented, but 
to simulate the likely constellations of sources, mechanisms and outcomes of 
THE PROCESS OF STRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE 
SOURCES OF CHANGE MECHANISMS OF CHANGE NATURE OF 
CHANGE 
external shocks primary fundamental 
threat images, security 
challenges, crises,  
conflicts, wars, systemic 
shifts 
the experience of warfare  
major changes in the     
ideational/normative   
structure of strategic 
culture and introduction 
of new strategic  
practices    
 (institutionalized  
patterns of behaviour) 
other external factors secondary fine-tuned 
alliance patterns, level of 
technology, status of      
economy 
peer pressure, persuasion, benchmarking, 
imitation, socialization 
ideational/normative   
adaptation, shifts in the 
security policy  
preferences, changes in  
procurement practices 
internal factors secondary/tertiary fine-tuned 
level of ambition in  
security and defence  
policy, status of economy, 
the role of the executive vs.  
legislative powers in 
 matters of security and 
defence, civil-military 
relations, specific  
traditions in strategic 
culture 
generational change, mediatized crisis  
learning, public opinion 
ideational/normative   
adaptation, introduction 
of symbolic practices 
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change on a general level. Subsequently, when conducting an empirical anal-
ysis or a case-study on strategic culture, we cannot hope to cover every aspect 
of this process in detail, because the different mechanisms of change operate 
on a multitude of epistemological levels. In this study, I will mainly focus on 
the mechanism of the experience of warfare specifically from the viewpoint of 
coming to terms with the German past.  
Second, the difference between external and internal factors as sources of 
change cannot necessarily be so readily conceptually distinguished, because 
these factors sometimes overlap in the same fashion that external and inter-
nal factors constituting ‘security’ overlap (for example). However, I believe 
these distinctions are necessary in terms of analytical clarity. The sources of 
change can be regarded as either necessary or sufficient conditions for stra-
tegic cultural change to take place, i.e. for it to be ‘actualized’ in the fashion of 
the proposed categories.   
Third, regarding the mechanisms of change, the order from primary to 
tertiary is meant as a general distinction because unanimous scholarly 
agreement exists that strategic cultures are prone to maintaining the status-
quo and this is why internal factors alone are insufficient in explaining 
change.188 This also highlights the traditional prevalence of the aspect of con-
tinuity in the study of strategic culture, and speaks volumes in favour of a 
‘status-quo’ view of strategic culture. In other words, what this framework is 
not trying to argue is that socialization or mediatized crisis-learning (for ex-
ample) can never lead to fundamental changes in strategic cultures, but ra-
ther that it is less likely than when initiated by external shocks filtered 
through different forms of experiences of warfare.  
Fourth, as I argued when discussing Hilpert’s account, observable out-
comes e.g. institutionalized patterns of behaviour are not the only or neces-
sarily a sufficient indication of change in strategic culture because strategic 
cultures operate on a socio-cognitive level which goes beyond the notion of 
observable policy practices.   
Fifth, it needs to be stressed here that while this thesis has made no spe-
cific arguments or claims regarding the role of agency within strategic cultur-
al change beyond the notion that it is hardly possible without some form of it, 
it goes without saying that almost all the mechanisms of strategic cultural 
change necessitate political agency in some way, shape or form. Perhaps the 
reason why I haven’t touched upon the issue of agency in more detail lies in 
my principal criticism of the second generation scholarship, who argued for 
an instrumental understanding of strategic culture. I believe this to be a 
crude simplification of the subject matter of strategic culture, but it is also 
188 This is reflected in practically every piece of scholarly work on strategic culture that has elaborated 
on the question of change at some depth. See e.g.  Lantis, Jeffrey 2002, ‘The Moral Imperative of 
Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo’, Comparative Strategy, 21:1, pp. 21-46.; 
Longhurst 2004; Meyer 2006; Wilke 2007; Hilpert 2014. 
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necessary to note that the role of political agency, and that of individual ac-
tors, may vary in the different phases of the process of change.  
Indeed, while political agency in the form of political leadership may be 
critical in the phase when external shocks are filtered through (e.g. Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer’s role in the debate concerning the ‘never again’ –
framework in the 1990s, to be discussed in Chapter 3) or when it comes to 
the pace of the change in terms of strategic practices (e.g. German defence 
ministers’ role in Bundeswehr reforms, to be discussed in Chapter 5)189 it is 
also important not to overstate the role of political agency regarding the na-
ture of change, not to mention that of individual actors, at least if we follow 
Gray in this respect (and while we do, we need not follow him all the way). 
Finally, it needs to be noted in the spirit of reflective analysis that the 
above framework is limited in that the workings of the systemic/macro level 
(i.e. international or global relations) are more or less reduced to the func-
tion of the theory of strategic culture. However, as discussed in the next sub-
chapter, system-level analysis includes several logics of interaction apart 
from wars or warfare. One way to highlight the potential diverse effects that 
the system level has on national strategic cultures is to contemplate on 
Wendt’s account regarding the different logics of anarchy, because it can be 
argued that while rather generic in posture, these logics cover different and 
relevant types of interaction on the international/global level. This is where 
the thesis turns next.  
2.4. WENDTIAN CULTURES OF ANARCHY AND THE 
STUDY OF STRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE 
First of all, the notion that international relations and world politics are gov-
erned by anarchy (the absence of centralized authority) is one of the core as-
sumptions and claims of rationalist theories (realism/liberalism) in the field 
of IR. What scholars like Wendt sought to accomplish by reintroducing a 
constructivist account of anarchy to systemic theorizing was not only the fa-
mous notion that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ but rather that the spe-
cific distribution of ideas in the system can lead to different kinds of anar-
chies governed by different logics, or in Wendt’s words, cultures of anarchy 
and that therefore, as Wendt argued, “we would do better to focus first on 
states’ ideas and interests they constitute, and only then worry about who has 
how many guns”.190  
Theoretically, Wendt’s approach differed from the top-down approach of 
realism (logic of international politics on system level is singular and does 
not depend to any degree of the units that constitute the system) and from 
the bottom-up approach of liberalism (logic of international politics depends 
189 See Dyson, Tom 2007, The Politics of German Defence and Security, Berghahn 2007. 
190 Wendt 1999, p. 256. 
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entirely on actors on the unit level) in that it embraced the idea that anarchic 
structures construct their elements but that these structures vary at the mac-
ro-level and may therefore possess multiple logics.  The point Wendt was try-
ing to get across was that in international politics, ‘structure’ should be un-
derstood first and foremost in its social dimension (even though Wendt by no 
means argued that all structures are social) because ‘social’ implies that ac-
tors take each other’s behaviour into account in choosing their actions.191  
Before considering Wendt and cultures of anarchy, it needs to be pointed out 
that the purpose of this section is not to elaborate in detail on whether and to 
what degree these cultures of anarchy actually manifest themselves empiri-
cally in international politics, but rather what the different logics of anarchy 
imply in terms of strategic culture and its change. In the following, I will dis-
cuss Wendt’s account of anarchy in a condensed form, because the purpose is 
not to discuss the merits and demerits of his whole theory but rather to pin-
point some interesting aspects of it by linking it to our discussion on strategic 
cultural change. 
Wendt distinguishes between three logics that are characteristic of three 
‘cultures of anarchy’. These logics are epitomized in the specific ‘role’ struc-
tures that underpin each of these logics. Importantly, as Wendt points out, 
‘roles’ should not be understood as properties or qualities of actors but rather 
of structures (roles can then be filled by different actors).192 These logics are 
Hobbesian logic of enmity, Lockean logic of rivalry and Kantian logic of 
friendship, resulting in respective ‘cultures of anarchy’ the stability of which 
depends on the degree of internalization of the normative structure by the 
units (states) that operate within these cultures.193 Wendt further argues that 
there are three degrees of internalization: coercion, self-interest and altru-
ism, which basically translate into (de)stability arguments regarding the 
structure of the system because the level of internalization defines the ‘ac-
ceptance’ level of the shared norms and ideas within the system. These levels 
of internalization can also be seen as the minimal sustain-requirements for 
each of these cultures, respectively (coercion in Hobbesian, self-interest in 
Lockean and altruism in Kantian) because they form the primary logics of 
interaction within these cultures.   
Hence, it seems that for the given logic of anarchy to function as intended 
by the role structure, there has to be a critical mass of units (states) willing to 
support this logic and hence fill the role of enemy, rival or friend depending 
on the prevailing logic (coercion, self-interest or altruism) at any given time, 
otherwise these systems may become unstable. Theoretically, a ‘critical’ mass 
of units in this regard might consist of just two units if they agree to the same 
191 Ibid., pp. 247-249. 
192 Ibid., p. 25?? 
193 Ibid., pp. 266-268. 
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logic as is indicated by Wendt’s discussion on ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’194. Moreover, 
this is also echoed in Wendt’s example that if two states agree to the princi-
ples of a Kantian culture while the rest do not, the prevalent logic in the sys-
tem won’t change unless those two particular states are in a dominant posi-
tion in the system and hence the others are likely to follow suit, which, in 
turn, would in principle suggest that the most powerful state in the system 
could ultimately make others internalize its culture. However, Wendt would 
argue that what counts as power would depend on the definitions of the situ-
ation.195 Indeed, dominance as such need not be based on physical coercion 
or raw military force (or the threat of it).  
Wendt further specifies four ‘master variables’ that can bring about struc-
tural change, i.e. change in the structure of anarchy, which for Wendt is a 
collective identity.196 These are independence, homogeneity, common fate 
and self-restraint. For Wendt, actors are independent when the outcome of 
interaction between them depends on the choices that those actors make. 
Moreover, interdependence does not occur only in co-operative relations but 
also in hostile as well as more benevolent relations.197 In turn, actors face a 
common fate when their own survival depends on that of the group but it 
differs from interdependence in that common fate does not necessarily imply 
any kind of interaction between actors because common fate is brought upon 
them by a third party.198 Homogeneity refers to actors being alike in either 
their corporate identities (the degree to which actors are isomorphic in terms 
of their functions, institutional forms, causal powers etc.) and in their type 
identity (organization of political authority).199  
According to Wendt, the first three are ‘effective causes’ whereas self-
restraint is an ‘enabling cause’. He posits that interdependence, homogeneity 
and common-fate by themselves are insufficient to explain structural change 
and that only when they occur under the condition of self-restraining units 
can they bring about change, even though the likelihood of change increases 
if there is more than one effective cause at work simultaneously. Self-
restraint is a necessary enabling factor because it alone ensures that there is a 
sufficient degree of trust among actors which means that they trust each oth-
er to act similarly when they interact. In short, Wendt’s hypothesis regarding 
194 In terms of identity formation, Wendt assumes two actors, ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, who meet in a First 
Encounter, a world without shared ideas, which by assumption bring with them to their Encounter 
preconceived ideas about who they are that assign tentative roles and form the starting point for their 
interaction. For more on ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, see ibid., p. 328. 
195 Ibid, p. 331. 
196 Wendt argues that collective identity formation follows ?cultural selection? instead of ?natural selec-
tion?. Cultural selection consists of imitation and social learning. For more on cultural selection, see 
ibid., pp. 324-336.  
197 Ibid., pp. 344-345. 
198 Ibid., pp. 349-350. 
199 Ibid., pp. 354-355. 
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structural change is that when interdependence, common fate or homogenei-
ty is on the increase, change is more likely to happen (under the condition of 
self-restraint). However, Wendt does not discuss the reverted hypothesis of 
what is likely to occur when these factors are on the decrease, or when inter-
dependence turns into dependence etc. Wendt does not give an answer to the 
question of cultural regress, because according to him, history has shown 
that cultures tend to progress due to increasing interaction between units in 
the system.  
Indeed, if these factors are supposed to bring about a collective identity 
i.e. form a structure of anarchy, it would seem logical to assume that their
continued absence would not necessarily ensure the status quo of any given
system of anarchy but would invert the process (and bring about change all
the same). Wendt argues that it is unlikely for “cultural time to move back-
ward unless there is a big exogenous shock”.200 It is important to point out,
however, that Wendt’s hypothesis was based on the notion that while states
formed a Lockean system in the seventeenth century based on sovereignty,
states were undergoing another structural change from a Lockean culture to
a Kantian culture of collective security in the late twentieth century.201 Hence,
Wendt’s hypothesis regarding these variables needs to be understood in this
context.
However, Wendt also then somewhat confusingly argues that there is 
nothing in his theory that would necessarily point to the inevitability of cul-
tural progression: “there is no historical necessity, no guarantee, that the in-
centives for progressive change will overcome human weaknesses and the 
countervailing incentives to maintain the status quo.”202 Technically, this 
may be so but then again the point of Wendt’s model is to argue in terms of 
collective identity formation which in itself cannot occur without some de-
gree of ‘cultural progression’ since, and as Wendt posits, “(i)t is possible for a 
Hobbesian anarchy to have no culture at all”.203 However, this confusion is 
cleared to a degree if we think in empirical terms how difficult it is for a 
Kantian culture to sustain itself in the contemporary international politics on 
the system level.   
Table 3 illustrates the differences that these logics of anarchy imply for 
the conduct of international relations in in a summarized format. In terms of 
Wendt’s model, we can formulate a couple of hypotheses regarding the link 
between cultures of anarchy and the strategic cultures of the units.  First, 
Wendt’s model would seem to suggest that strategic cultures change ‘with the 
system’, i.e. the continuity of their cultural patterns (ideas, practices) would 
200 Ibid., p. 312. 
201 Ibid., p. 314. However, Wendt also argues that there is nothing in his theory that would necessarily 
point to the inevitability of cultural progression (except historical evidence, it seems) and that and that 
the possibility of structural change depends on the malleability of social facts, see ibid., pp. 314-15.    
202 Ibid., p. 311. 
203 Ibid., p. 266. 
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depend on the stability of the overall system (i.e. the degree to which the pre-
vailing norms have been internalized by the units as a whole) and on the de-
gree to which a state’s strategic culture has internalized the prevailing logic of 
anarchy, i.e. the collective culture on the system level. 
Second, however, Wendt’s model also at least implicitly suggests that this 
would ultimately depend on the specific logics of anarchy because in Hobbes-
ian anarchy, a state would have to adapt to the condition bellum omnium 
contra omnes or accept its own demise, whereas in the Lockean and Kantian 
systems it would be presented with a logic that would either require self-
interested behaviour (with the possibility of periodic violence) or with a logic 
that would require the acceptance of total self-restraint. 
Table 3. Three cultures of anarchy 
Cultures of Anarchy 
Relations between 
units 
The use of violence 
Level of norms 
internationalization 
Hobbesian 
culture 
logic of enmity 
hostile relations between 
mutually perceived 
enemies 
states deny each other the 
right of existence 
violence, war and the use 
of force is the ‘modus 
operandi’ of the 
Hobbesian self-help 
culture 
as enemies, units are 
ultimately coerced to this 
logic and if they are weak 
they cease to exist 
units have no self-control 
or self-restraint 
Lockean 
culture 
logic of rivalry 
competition between 
mutually perceived rivals 
states’ right of existence is 
accepted because it is 
based on sovereignty 
wars and violence are not 
the norm but they may 
occur periodically 
disputes between units 
may be settled by war 
instead of negotiation 
as rivals, self-interested 
units act in an 
international society that 
adheres to the principle of 
sovereignty 
units balance between 
external constraints and 
self-restraint 
Kantian 
Culture 
logic of friendship 
benevolent relations 
between mutually 
perceived friends 
states’ right of existence is 
accepted and two rules 
adhered to: rule of 
non-violence and rule of 
mutual aid 
interstate wars and 
violence are prohibited in 
the international law 
the use of military force is 
an aberration of the norm 
of peaceful co-existence 
as friends, units identify 
with each other – units 
form a collective identity 
that can be expressed in 
the distribution of 
cosmopolitan ideas on a 
global scale 
units have full self-control 
and accept external 
constraints as legitimate 
the Self in effect becomes 
the Other 
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Hence, it would seem that systemic, external pressure would ultimately de-
cide the terms on which strategic cultures are able to evolve (or regress, for 
that matter) even in a Kantian system. Indeed, as Wendt points out, in a 
Kantian system norm-breakers are quickly brought into line (ultimately by 
coercion if need be) if their behaviour threatens the identity of the shared 
security community, given the principle of mutual-aid.204  
Thirdly, we could also posit that change at the level of national strategic 
culture depends on the degree to which Wendt’s master variables are at work 
in the strategic practices of the state, because if we follow Wendt’s logic, that 
would imply the degree to which the state itself is willing to change and fol-
low certain logic of interaction.  
Hence, in terms of German strategic culture we could formulate the fol-
lowing hypotheses based on Wendt’s model (under the assumptions regard-
ing the nascent Kantian culture): 
1) Change in German strategic culture is dependent on the changes of
collective identity formation at the system level, which, in turn, is de-
pendent on the degree of interdependence, common fate and homo-
geneity of Germany with other units in a system in which states have
agreed on the principle of self-restraint.
2) Change in German strategic culture is ultimately conditioned by ex-
ternal constraints and pressure (i.e. the prevailing logic of anarchy).
Hence, on one hand, these hypotheses would seem to fit as basic condi-
tions (or rather claims regarding the basic conditions) for the functionality of 
the analytical framework of strategic cultural change, which I presented in 
Chapter 2.3, but, on the other hand, they would ultimately suggest a different 
kind of logic of change that highlight the explanatory power of macro-level 
phenomena. My argument is that these hypotheses alone cannot explain 
change in German strategic culture because they take the internal dynamics 
of unit level cultures other than identity formation largely as given. Moreo-
ver, Wendt’s model ultimately indicates that identities are essentially social 
and political entities that can be negotiated between states, which is a point 
of criticism that could be made. Taken as a whole, however, Wendt’s model 
can serve as either a contrasting or a complementary argument to the claims 
made in Chapter 2.3, because Wendt’s model seems ultimately compatible 
with the one I presented. Indeed, another way to treat the unit-system level 
interaction is to argue that they focus on different parts of the same causal 
process in explaining change. I will return to discuss these contrasts at the 
end of Chapters 3 and 4.   
204 Ibid., p. 299. 
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2.5. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have discussed methodological issues and argued that stra-
tegic cultural studies need to shift the focus from epistemology to ontology in 
order to be able to incorporate better the aspect of change to the study of 
strategic culture. In effect, a focus on the ontological question ‘what there is 
to know’ serves as an encouragement for us to move beyond the ‘observable 
realm’ of strategic culture.  Indeed, the main argument regarding strategic 
cultural change posited was the notion that, besides of grasping strategic cul-
tural change in terms of both processes as well as outcomes, we need to go 
beyond the observable if we aim for an explanation of strategic cultural 
change that takes into account the socio-cognitive features of (strategic) cul-
tures.  
In terms of the proposed analytical framework, the primary mechanism of 
change can be identified as ‘experience of warfare’ which is the causal mech-
anism through which sources of change (external shocks, threat images, cri-
ses, conflicts and wars etc.) are filtered and which may result in fundamental 
changes in strategic cultures (major changes in the normative/ideational 
structure of strategic culture; introduction of new strategic practices which 
become institutionalized as patterns of behaviour).  
In the case of German strategic culture, the process of ‘coming to terms 
with the German past’ is a crucial part of this mechanism, because it deals 
directly with how Germans have dealt with the question of peace, war and the 
use of military force in terms of the lessons drawn from the (Nazi) past i.e. 
the historical experience of warfare. However, since the end of the Cold War, 
as Germany has increasingly taken part in international crisis management, 
these out-of-area operations provide for new experiences of warfare which, in 
turn, are gathered, filtered and mirrored against the lessons drawn from the 
past. In this sense, the ‘experience of warfare’ is not a static mechanism but 
one that is in constant flux operating in the mix of the experiences drawn 
both from the past and the present. 
While the main argument in this chapter is that the experience of warfare 
is key in unravelling what strategic cultural change in Germany is all about, 
there are contrasting (or complementary) arguments to be made. For in-
stance, the Wendtian account of cultures of anarchy points to the order of 
interstate relations on the system level that go beyond the notion of ‘experi-
ence of warfare’ to the question of ‘order’ and hence refer to the multiple 
logics of interaction at play on the system level that may affect the function-
ing of strategic cultures. 
In the next chapters, the thesis provides a detailed elaboration of the 
development of German strategic culture since the end of World War II in 
order to provide the relevant contextual and historical frame for the rest of 
this study. The narrative spans from the early Cold War years to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and beyond the unification of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. It depicts the political trajectory of Germany’s security since 1990, 
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covering primarily the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), the wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo (UNPROFOR, IFOR/SFOR, Operation Allied Force), 
Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom/ISAF) and Iraq as well as some of the more 
recent cases; Lebanon (UNIFIL), Libya (Operation Unified Protector) and 
Ukraine. Although there are a number of other cases that can be considered 
relevant to the debate on German strategic culture after the end of the Cold 
War, such as Cambodia (UNTAC) and Somalia (UNOSOM II), or Congo 
(EUFOR RD Congo), the Balkan wars, together with Kosovo, Iraq and the 
long mission in Afghanistan form the backbone of the debate within 
Germany from 1990 to 2015 concerning the changes and continuities in 
German out-of-area military deployments and in the attitudes, beliefs and 
practices on the use of military force.  These cases also address issues that 
cover the whole strategic cultural spectrum, including the image of peace and 
war, the use of military force, security threats as well as civil-military 
relations and alliance commitments. However, it is also important to address 
the more recent developments because they are indicative of further 
evolution in German strategic culture. 
First, the narrative is presented in analytical form, i.e. it will 
systemically assess the post-Cold War German discourse on the 
mentioned cases in chronological order, utilizing the Bundestag debates as 
the primary empirical source. This is supplemented by drawing on the 
wider German and international discourse surrounding German out-of-
area operations, such as media coverage, speeches, defence and security 
policy documents and secondary literature. The analysis aims to identify 
and interpret the key shifts in the German discourse regarding the use of 
military force since the end of the Cold War. Second, by applying the 
analytical framework developed in this chapter to these cases, the analysis 
aims to showcase how the primary mechanism of change in German 
strategic culture, i.e. ‘experience of warfare’, functions and shapes German 
strategic culture.  
The analysis follows certain principles that are characteristic of discourse 
analytical methods in general. First, I take discourse to mean ‘a system of 
signifying meaning’. Hence, the idea of the analysis is to ascertain how the 
meanings given to peace, war and the use of military force are 
constructed and how and why they change.  This is crucial in uncovering 
the potential tensions between key strategic cultural tenets. Second, the 
analysis covers the aspect of discourse productivity, i.e. how discourse 
produces policy choices (e.g. military participation vs. non-participation). 
This relates to the discussion in this chapter regarding ‘norms’ as ‘reasons 
for action’. Third, the study acknowledges that discourses are contingent 
and open-ended (they require effort in terms of discursive actors to 
reproduce them).205  
205 For a discussion on the principles of discourse analysis in IR, see e.g. Milliken, Jennifer 1999, ‘The 
Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’, European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999, pp. 225-254. 
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One small but important remark is in order regarding the content of the 
next chapters: while the issue of military deployments is often at the pinnacle 
of strategic culture for a good reason, it does not mean that strategic cultural 
continuity/change would manifest itself only via the issue of the (non) use of 
military force or that the (non) use of military force would pose the most ap-
propriate way to study continuity/change in strategic cultures at all times. 
This will become especially evident when we turn to discuss the issue of com-
ing to terms with the German past in Chapter 5, which covers a ‘small cos-
mos’ of issues, which deal not only with the question of the use of military 
force, but also the very foundations of strategic culture in socio-cognitive 
terms. 
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3 THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN FOREIGN 
AND SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGIC 
CULTURE FROM 1945 TO THE WAR IN 
KOSOVO 
3.1.  BEGINNINGS OF A NEW STRATEGIC CULTURE: 
????????????????????O REARMAMENT AND 
?WESTBINDUNG?
The importance of the so-called Zero Hour (Stunde Null), which marked the 
immediate post-war period, culminating in the collapse of the Third Reich 
and Wehrmacht’s unconditional surrender to the Allied troops in the ashes of 
Berlin in May 1945, is contested till this very day, especially the impact it has 
had on German society as a whole. In May 1985, German Federal President 
Richard von Weizsäcker gave a famous speech to commemorate the 40th an-
niversary of the end of World War II.  He argued that it would be better to 
just talk about a ‘fresh start’ (Neubeginn) instead of Zero Hour since the 
German society didn’t change overnight but incrementally through the long 
Cold War decades.206 The same could be said about German strategic culture, 
even though the importance and consequence of Zero Hour is perhaps more 
evident in the realm of security and defence policy than when observed 
through a broader societal lens. The significance of Zero Hour as a set of his-
torical occurrences lies precisely in its formative power in the sense of simul-
taneously accounting for the end of an ideational structure upon which the 
hitherto strategic thinking and practice of Nazi Germany had been based and 
a beginning of a new one, that had no other alternative than to be based on 
the abolition of the old. 
In that sense, Zero Hour indeed provides us with a beginning of strategic 
cultural change because it represents the beginning of the process of total 
renouncement of the principles, ideas and values that led to the most de-
structive five-year period in human history. The eschewal of the old ideation-
al structure meant also that new strategic narratives had to be conjured 
which would not stand in conflict with Germany’s new status in Europe.  Ker-
ry Longhurst has argued that the so-called foundational elements of German 
strategic culture (beliefs, ideas on the use of military force) were forged in the 
period 1945-1955.  These meant effectively a denunciation of Clausewitzian 
principles – the use of war as a tool in foreign policy, redundancy of milita-
206 Speech by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker at the German Bundestag to commemorate 
the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, 8.5.1985. Available at: (http://webarchiv.bundestag.d
e/archive/2006/0202/parlament/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok08.html). 
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rism and statism and exhaustion of nationalism.207 Moreover, the system of 
ideological indoctrination that had led to the glorification of war for tens of 
millions of Germans was finally at an end (only to be replaced by a totalitari-
an system in the German Democratic Republic).  The contours of new Ger-
man strategic thinking and practice were beginning to take shape with the 
formation of the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949, and its 
membership in the European ?????and ????? Community (ECSC) in 1951 and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955. Germany was forced 
to abandon its Prussian militarist traditions and come to terms with 
Hitler’s Vernichtungskrieg (war of annihilation), Holocaust and the 
innumerable atrocities committed by the Nazi regime (and later also, 
those of the Wehrmacht).208 
Indeed, by linking the evolution of German strategic culture to European 
and transatlantic structures, the first German post-World War II govern-
ments made sure that the nascent German strategic culture was devoid of 
any form of the old German militarism (even though many former Wehr-
macht officers were re-instated in the Bundeswehr and in the Peoples’ Army 
in the GDR). The West German strategic culture was forged to correspond to 
the external realities of the Cold War and the internal requirements of mak-
ing amends and taking responsibility for German actions in the past, espe-
cially for the destructive period of the Third Reich, even though the idea of 
ordinary Germans as the ‘perpetrator people’ (Tätervolk) came to be accept-
ed more broadly only since the 1970s in West-German society.209  
During the formative years of the FRG, two competing lessons of history 
came to dominate the debate on German security policy, lessons which still 
today significantly shape and constitute the substance of German strategic 
culture.  According to Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, these two schools of German 
security policy were formed around two differing lessons from World War II 
and German defeat: ‘Nie wieder Allein’ (never again alone) and ‘Nie wieder 
Krieg’ (never again war). She has argued that these two schools differed in 
“their core beliefs about Germany’s role in international security, fundamen-
tal aversions and threat perceptions and in their operational beliefs about the 
207 Longhurst, Kerry 2004, Germany and the use of force, Manchester University Press, 2004,  p. 46. 
208 This process, often generally referred to as ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, coming to terms with the 
past, will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 5, since, as will be argued, it is the central cognitive process 
underlying continuities and changes and (re)interpretations of German strategic culture. However, the 
term might be misleading in the sense that the German word ‘bewältigen’ also means ‘to overcome’ and 
this clearly was not the original intent. In his commemoration speech, von Weizsäcker also argued that 
there is no such thing as ‘overcoming the past’ – the only thing what one can do as a German is to “look 
the past in the eye as best and as honestly as one only can”. See footnote 206.  
209 For more on German ‘guilt’, see Chapter 4 and Niven, Bill 2006, Germans as Victims. Remember-
ing the Past in Contemporary Germany, Palgrave Macmillan 2006. 
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efficiency of various instruments of security policy”.210 Significantly, it can be 
argued that the lessons of never again in themselves epitomized a radical 
shift away from Prussian militarism and the ethos of soldiery – a shift that 
had its origins in the formative years 1945-55 within the post-World War II 
German strategic culture.  
The lesson of never again alone became the dominant one among the ma-
jority of the German population and the political centre-right, the CDU/CSU, 
the FDP, the Catholic Church and the German industry after the war. Never 
again alone meant that Germany should never again embark on a Sonderweg 
(special path), which was used here in a negative sense meaning German iso-
lation from the rest of Europe.211 This lesson found its early expression in the 
policies of Westbindung (Western orientation) of the first German post-war 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Westbindung signified everything that 
Sonderweg did not, meaning the return to the family of Western nations and 
transatlantic political, economic and military integration and co-operation. 
In the emerging Cold-War context and the bipolar world order the relevance 
of ‘never again alone’ was in the idea that one had to be ready to defend 
Western (and Germany’s) values and interests against the totalitarianism 
(and communism) of the USSR, a thing that was neglected both by the Ger-
mans themselves and the rest of the international community when Hitler 
rose to power during the run-up to World War II in the 1930s.  
In contrast, the lesson of never again war, popular among the German po-
litical Left, the centre-left wing of the SPD, the Greens (in the Bundestag 
since 1983), the Lutheran clergy, trade unions and youth organizations, 
iden-tified the threat from coming ?within?, meaning that the lesson to be 
drawn from World War II was that war should never again emanate from 
German soil. Hence, Germany should concentrate on furthering civilian 
means and ends in international politics and show self-restraint in all 
things military. Yet it would be wrong to argue that these lessons had 
everything to do with the past and (the then) present but nothing with the 
future or that the lessons provided ends in themselves only. This was clear 
in Adenauer’s policies towards the West (never again alone) which 
culminated just as much in the effort to atone for German sins as in the 
effort to provide Germany with the means for regaining a sense of equality 
and political leverage in the future. In that sense, as Granieri has stated, 
German Westbindung was never about giving up national policies per se.212 
210 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja 2006, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-Enforcement, Manchester University 
Press 2006, p. 37.  
211 There is also a positive conceptualization of German ?Sonderweg’. It highlights the Germans as 
‘Volk???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
and criticism towards European Enlightenment. I will discuss ‘Sonderweg’ in detail in Chapter 5.  
212 Granieri, Ronald J. 2003, The Ambivalent Alliance. Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the 
West, 1949-1966, Berghahn 2003,  p.230?  
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Dyson, who has studied German strategic culture from the perspective of 
the Bundeswehr reform, has argued that during the Cold War, the German 
defence and security policy subsystem came to possess a basic structure 
formed around three advocacy coalitions: ‘freedom’, ‘peace’ and ‘pacifist’ coa-
lition.213  This definition highlights the role of actors more than structure, yet 
the freedom and peace coalitions are basically equivalent with ‘never again 
alone’ and ‘never again war’. The difference in Dyson’s account is that he re-
fines the lesson of ‘never again war’ into two sub-advocacy coalitions, peace 
and pacifist. According to Dyson, the pacifist coalition comprised those who 
opposed the doctrine of territorial defence and conscription and shared a 
deep fundamental opposition to war. It was to be found on the fringes of 
German society and it was popular in German university towns and the radi-
cal right wing of the Green Party. However, until the Greens entered the par-
liament in 1983, the movement was an ‘outsider’ rather than an ‘insider’ coa-
lition and its influence was rather felt in German civil society and mass peace 
demonstrations.214  
The outbreak of the war in the Korean peninsula in 1950 had raised the 
stakes in the emerging nuclear race. This prompted the US to bolster the Eu-
ropean defence capacity because fears regarding a possible Soviet aggression 
in Western Europe were growing. The de facto threat posed by the USSR 
meant that only a few years after the fall of the Third Reich, German armed 
forces would once again be established. It also meant that old enemies had to 
become partners and that France and the UK had to accept German rearma-
ment. Increasingly, as Large has argued, a German contribution to the de-
fence of Europe was seen not only as a military necessity but also as part of 
burden sharing and as a means of dismounting the security load of other 
Western countries. Additionally, burden sharing would be seen as a way of 
removing the advantages German economy could yield by enjoying its free-
ride in the field of security.215  
The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was a heated 
issue especially in the first half of the 1950s, despite the Berlin blockade in 
1948-9, Soviet atomic tests and the war in Korea, all of which raised the pro-
spect of a re-establishment of the German armed forces as a response to the 
military threat posed by the USSR and the subsequent fact that a German 
military contribution was slowly perceived to be indispensable for the de-
fence of Europe. Chancellor Adenauer had to overcome domestic opposition 
and win over public opinion in Germany, which did not support an extended 
German military role. Adenauer’s concept of Westbindung initially had to 
compete with that of Jakob Kaiser's ‘bridge concept’ and that of Kurt Schu-
213 Dyson, Tom 2007, The Politics of German Defence and Security, Berghahn 2007, p. 29. 
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macher’s ‘democratic socialism’.216 The CDU/CSU won a landslide victory in 
the 1953 elections and Adenauer was successful in turning the domestic op-
position to German rearmament into a victory in the negotiations with the 
Western powers as he convinced the Western leaders that German rearma-
ment was domestically implementable only in case the West accepted Ger-
man sovereignty in return.217  
After the plans for the European Defence Community (EDC) had failed 
because the French ultimately rejected the idea, the British and the Ameri-
cans took the initiative and suggested that Germany should be incorporated 
into NATO structures as soon as possible. As the Germans agreed to join the 
newly founded Western European Union (WEU) and got reassurances 
that France would not stand in the way of German membership of NATO, a 
win-win situation emerged: French fears towards a new German 
‘Sonderweg’ were alleviated and vital German interests secured.218 Germany 
joined both the WEU and NATO in 1955 and this marked the formation of a 
new German army, the Bundeswehr, which was initially a force of 500,000 
men based on general conscription. An important aspect of the German re-
armament for the Western powers at the time was also that the new 
German army would not have a command structure of its own but was 
strictly tied to that of NATO and WEU. In addition, Germany accepted a 
number of other military restrictions, including the offensive use of 
German military outside of the confines of NATO and the use of force for 
the purpose of German unification. Germany also renounced the 
production of ABC-weaponry on its soil.219 
The rearmament of the FRG based on general conscription also meant 
that the civic-military relations had to be reorganized. The core of the refor-
mulation of these relations was the concept of Innere Führung (inner con-
duct) which coincided with a reformulation of the responsibility of a German 
soldier as a Bürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform). According to Longhurst, 
216 Kaiser’s (CDU) concept foresaw a united, block free Germany that could function as an ideological 
and political bridge between the east and west and lead to the end of the Cold War. Schumacher’s 
(SPD) concept, in turn, envisaged a socialist Germany within a socialist Europe, which would clearly 
differentiate itself from Soviet-driven communism. Schumacher’s idea entailed a vision of Germany as 
a military, democratic state which could function as a buffer between the two superpowers. The Soviet 
military authorities removed Kaiser from office as early as 1947 and the SPD lost the Bundestag elec-
tions to the CDU/CSU in 1953. As a consequence, the road for a successful advocacy of Adenauer’s 
Westbindung was made possible domestically. For more on Kaiser and Schumacher, see Haftendorn 
(2006). 
217 Zangl, Martin 1995, ‘Ansatz der Zwei-Ebenen Spiele. Eine Brücke zwischen dem Neoinstitutionalis-
mus und seinen KritikerInnen??, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 2/1995,  p.398.  
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“(t)he Bürger in Uniform was the ideal and the reality which Innere Führung 
was to create […] the Bürger in Uniform was to be a fully-fledged member of 
society imbued with full rights of political participation and responsibility – 
to be circumscribed only by law and only for the duration of military service, 
the aim here in the basic architecture of the Bundeswehr being to dispose of 
the ideological caste of the military and to initiate the flourishing of a wide 
array of political and social ideas.”220 This development was significant as it 
testified to the fact that Germany made structural changes to the code of 
conduct of the Bundeswehr which were not meant to be provisional but were 
to be permanent changes that highlighted especially the role of the individual 
soldier and his responsibility towards the German people. Also, the idea of a 
citizen in uniform was the central idea behind the understanding of the locus 
of the Bundeswehr, which should find itself amidst and not outside of Ger-
man society. However, as Large has argued, this new German concept was in 
contrast to the initial thoughts of the other Western powers regarding the 
incentive of German rearmament given that the view on German soldiers as 
the best possible conventional bulwark against the Soviet threat based on the 
track record of an ‘unbeatable Wehrmacht’ in World War II was widely 
shared and acknowledged.221   
During the 1950s NATO’s strategy relied on ‘Nuclear Sword’ and ‘Conven-
tional Shield’, because an effective nuclear strike was seen as the only possi-
ble way to deter any Soviet aggression in Western Europe as it was deemed 
that Soviet Union had superior numbers in conventional armaments.222 Yet 
towards the end of the decade, it was clear that the Soviet Union had reached 
nuclear parity with the US, if not superiority. This prompted the US to seek 
an arrangement with the Soviet Union based on status quo in Europe to-
wards the end of the decade. European NATO countries became worried 
about the ability of the US to protect them from a Soviet nuclear strike as a 
result of a shift in the American policy towards a ‘relaxation’ in Europe.  The 
then German defence minister Hans-Josef Strauss (1954-62) later argued 
that the best way to deal with the situation was to give Europeans more pow-
er in deciding about nuclear policies in Europe. Strauss argued that “(t)he 
West will not be in a position to fulfil the tasks it has set itself – victory over 
physical and spiritual misery in the world – until there is an Atlantic com-
munity standing securely on two legs.”223 In effect, this meant a supranation-
al European body responsible for strategic command over nuclear weapons 
based on a federal political union in Europe – a concept within which Ger-
220 Longhurst 2004, p. 42? 
221 Large 1996, p. 57. 
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many would not have any national control over nuclear weapons correspond-
ing to Germany’s agreement in the context of its WEU and NATO-
membership. As Suri has argued, American Foreign Secretary Henry Kissin-
ger basically agreed with this position since he often criticized American 
mismanagement of its European allies, but it was Kissinger who then imple-
mented President Nixon’s policy of détente that was based largely on direct 
negotiations with the Russians and “oversaw this period of extended Europe-
an separation from substantive US strategic consultation”.224 
The issue of nuclear weapons was very difficult for Germany. Firstly, 
Germany did not want them to be deployed on German soil since there were 
fears in both German states that superpowers would play out their nuclear 
game using Germany as a proxy playground.  Secondly, having a finger on 
the nuclear trigger would have effectively meant giving up on achieving Ger-
man unification through political means. Yet the Federal Republic did not 
want to lose the possibility of the threat that the nuclear weapons provided in 
case the West would sacrifice the prospect for German unification in negotia-
tions with the Soviets. However, as Nehring has stated, nuclear tests evoked 
mass protests in Germany against nuclear weapons in mid-to?late 1950s, or-
chestrated by the SPD and trade unions under the slogan ‘Fight the 
Atomic Death’ (Kampagne Kampf dem Atomtod) which was at first 
targeted at Adenauer’s attempts to acquire nuclear-capable equipment for 
the German army. At the beginning of the 1960s, the focus of these protests 
shifted from nuclear disarmament to disarmament in general, which 
emerged as a vocal critique towards the Vietnam War in the UK and 
culminated in the Easter-Marches in the form of extra-parliamentary 
activity in Germany from mid-to?late 1960s.225 
3.2.  THE LEGACY OF WESTBINDUNG: FROM 
OSTPOLITIK TO THE CONFERENCE O? SECURITY 
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) 
In terms of German reunification, the policy of Westbindung did not bear the 
fruit Adenauer had hoped for. The establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 
cemented the division of Germany. This led West Germany to adopt the 
‘Hallstein doctrine’, named after state secretary Walter Hallstein, according 
to which West Germany had the sole right to represent the German people 
and the German nation internationally. In practice, this meant that West 
Germany did not have diplomatic relations with any country that recognized 
224 Suri, Jeremi 2006, Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 
1960s, CSS Studies in International Relations 2006, p. 17. 
225 Nehring, Holger 2005, ‘National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nu-
clear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 
1957–1964’, Contemporary European History, vol. 14, Issue 04, November 2005, pp. 564-565; p.581. 
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the GDR as a sovereign state (except for the Soviet Union). The Hallstein 
doctrine could be considered the first strategic unilateral foreign and security 
policy act of the Federal Republic and it remained the official West German 
foreign policy doctrine for a decade, until détente and Willy Brandt’s Ostpoli-
tik in the late 1960s. Yet during the Berlin crisis in 1958-61, the erection of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 showed that 
Adenauer’s Policy of Strength had been exhausted and offered little in terms 
of a solution to the German question, even though it had secured West Ger-
man independence and security.  
Adenauer’s long era ended in the Bundestag elections in 1963 but leader-
ship of the country remained in the hands of the Christian Democrats as 
Ludwig Erhard, the minister of economics in Adenauer’s government, was 
elected Chancellor. In terms of German Westbindung, a political debate en-
sued in Germany between the so-called ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Gaullists’ about the 
focus of German western orientation after the ratification of the Elýsee Trea-
ty between France and Germany in 1963 – should Germany intensify its rela-
tions with France and Europe or should the transatlantic link be strength-
ened? Chancellor Erhard stressed NATO’s significance for German strategic 
interests and went as far as to renounce Adenauer’s Friendship Treaty with 
France because it wasn’t supported by other NATO members.226 Even though 
Erhard was successful in consolidating and strengthening the German econ-
omy, in terms of foreign and security policy, Erhard’s term was encumbered 
with the differences between the French and German stances towards NATO 
culminating in the French withdrawal from NATO’s military structures, the 
French policy of ‘empty chair’ and the Luxembourg compromise in 1966. Im-
portantly, this has remained one of the most difficult aspects of the lesson 
‘never again alone’ because the German balancing act between Paris and 
Washington has never been a matter of simple policy choice between Europe 
and the US. In addition to discrepancies within the Alliance, American inter-
ests seemed to be directed elsewhere than Germany and Europe starting with 
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the beginning of the war in Vietnam in 
1963. Even though it was clear that the Americans were the only ones able to 
provide for German security if push came to shove, the atmosphere in the 
European NATO countries in the beginning of 1960s was one of suspicion 
towards the US policies, which was only exacerbated by the war in Vietnam.  
In the mid-1960s, the government of Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) made 
the first tangible diplomatic steps towards the east in an attempt to intensify 
the relations with the Warsaw Pact members on all ‘economic, cultural and 
political levels’.227 The results remained modest at first. Eventually, the late 
1960s and early-mid 1970s marked a change in Germany’s international pos-
226 Suri 2006, p. 20. 
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ture in the sense that time was ripe for a policy of rapprochement towards 
the Eastern neighbours, particularly the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia as 
the Cold War in Europe entered into a period of détente. This period was 
marked by Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik which cultivated a funda-
mentally different approach to Adenauer’s Policy of Strength, since it sought 
to sustain peace not by rearmament or economic or diplomatic embargos but 
was based on the concept of Annäherung (rapprochement) with the Eastern 
neighbours.228 In essence, Brandt’s Ostpolitik did not try to contest the polit-
ical and territorial status quo of the Cold War but rather based its founda-
tions on this settlement. This was an important strategic difference to the 
policy of Adenauer. The early 1970s unfolded in active German diplomacy 
towards the Eastern European states and the USSR and resulted in the sign-
ing of the so-called Ostverträge (German Eastern Treaties).229  The Brandt 
government sought an understanding with Moscow on the renunciation of 
the use of force in Europe and linked it with a settlement over the Berlin 
question. Intense diplomatic negotiations during 1970-71 led to an agree-
ment concerning Berlin and hence to the Treaty of Moscow (1972) between 
Germany and the Soviet Union, within which Germany and the Soviet Union 
agreed to the existing borders east of the Oder-Neisse river line and agreed to 
the principle of renunciation of the use of force in Europe.230 Likewise, the 
conclusion of the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) in 1972 (within which 
the existence of the two German states as representatives of the German 
people was acknowledged based on the status quo in Europe) established 
diplomatic relations between the FRG and the GDR and ended the policy of 
the Hallstein Doctrine. In terms of German strategic culture, this resonated 
well with the lesson ‘never again war’ since Germans had firmly come to be-
lieve that the unity of Germany, let alone Europe, could not be achieved by 
the use of military force or the accumulation of nuclear arsenal but rather by 
policy of political and societal rapprochement. 
Ostpolitik paved the way to the CSCE in 1975 in Helsinki which was a 
culmination point in the era of détente during the Cold War years. Strategi-
cally, Brandt’s Ostpolitik was as important for entailing the integrity and 
identity of a one German nation between two German states as was Adenau-
er’s Westbindung for reassuring the international community in general and 
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Germany’s closest partners in particular, that West Germany was a reliable 
partner and committed to the liberal democratic development of its society 
according to Western standards. In a way, the successful German Westbin-
dung was a necessary prerequisite for a successful rapprochement to the 
East. The policies differed in method but were united in the overarching ob-
jective of German unity. Hence, at the time, both of the lessons of German 
history, taken together, offered a viable way for pursuing foreign and security 
policy because ‘never again war’ was preconditioned on the premise of ‘never 
again alone’, meaning that for Germany peace in Europe could only be 
achieved by the policy of co-operation and multilateral institutional ar-
rangements. 
3.3.  TOWARDS THE END OF THE COLD WAR: NATO 
REARMAMENT AND GENSCHERISM 
Even though the new Ostpolitik and the CSCE had established a political 
modus vivendi with the Warsaw Pact states, the strategically important ques-
tion of nuclear weapons and disarmament were not part of the CSCE agenda. 
As Readman has argued, the CSCE had little effect on hard security in Eu-
rope because the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) excluded non-
strategic nuclear weapons and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
talks (MBFR) did not concern nuclear weapons at all and were making hardly 
any progress.231 After the CSCE, the Soviet Union began replacing its old nu-
clear weapons systems with new SS-20 mid-range nuclear missiles. The pur-
pose of these missiles was to pose a direct threat to European NATO mem-
bers by enabling a massive first strike capability, which would make the US 
nuclear shield obsolete. This threat was considered a severe blow to the poli-
tics of détente but also for the security of Western Europe. German Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) was the first European leader to raise concerns 
about the Soviet rearmament and argued for the importance of NATO re-
armament in the area of mid-range nuclear missiles. This was a necessary 
evil in order to save the détente.232 Schmidt was very vocal in his criticism 
towards Russian deployment plans and made several unsuccessful diplomat-
ic attempts to deter Russians from further nuclear deployments in Europe. 
After the US had decided to deploy the neutron bomb in 1978, the negotia-
tions over a NATO response quickly followed. The NATO members agreed at 
Guadeloupe in 1979 that they would adopt a double-track strategy: firstly, 
they would demand that the Russians withdraw from the SS-20 deployment 
231 Readman, Kristina S. 2011, ?Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western 
Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979’, Journal of 
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and in case the Soviet Union would not budge, NATO would proceed with its 
own counter nuclear deployment. As Wettig has observed, even though the 
German government agreed to Jimmy Carter’s plan at Guadeloupe, it did it 
unwillingly, as Russian refusal to withdraw the missiles would have meant 
nuclear deployment on German soil, a thing which was politically sensitive 
and very unpopular in Germany, especially for the governing parties.233  
The Soviet Union condemned the ‘double-track’ decision and warned the 
West against a new rearmament race. Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko 
had advised Schmidt during his visit in Bonn in late 1979 to review the link 
between Germany’s support to the double-track decision and the German 
pledge to the maxim that never again should war emanate from German soil. 
At the concluding press conference, Gromyko warned that the double-track 
decision would spiral a new arms race in and beyond Europe.234 The Soviets 
were particularly concerned about Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher’s activism around the double-track decision. Russian 
newspaper Pravda wrote before Gromyko’s visit to Bonn that Genscher was 
‘actively spreading anti-Soviet lies’ and was functioning as ‘advocate of the 
Pentagon’.235  
The 1980s marked an intensification of the Cold War tensions as conflicts 
broke out in Africa, Middle-East and Afghanistan. In Germany, the ac-
ceptance of the NATO-dual track decision in 1983 to deploy Pershing mid-
range nuclear missiles to West Germany to respond to Soviet rearmament 
created both fear of Germany becoming a nuclear battlefield and skepticism 
towards US policies. This also reflected Schmidt’s personal attitude towards 
‘strategy’ – in an interview with the Economist in late 1979 the Chancellor 
had argued that “it's wrong to use the word ‘strategic’ only in the context of 
intercontinental nuclear weaponry. It's a wrong perception of strategy. I use 
the word ‘strategy’ in the sense of the late Captain Liddel Hart's grand strate-
gy which embraces not only all the military fields but of course also the polit-
ical, the psychological, the economic fields.”236 These fears in West Germany 
were also shared by the GDR because of Soviet belligerence and the first war 
in Afghanistan. The dual-track decision was supported strongly by Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt – support which ultimately led SPD to lose power over 
the chancellorship in the 1982 elections characterized by mass peace protests 
and fears of nuclear war. Over 350 000 Germans took part in peace demon-
strations during US President Reagan’s visit to Bonn in June 1982. Schmidt’s 
coalition fell apart in September 1982 and in the 1983 elections a new gov-
ernment was formed under Helmut Kohl. Kohl was a strong supporter of the 
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dual-track decision and after months of Bundestag debates the decision was 
approved by the German Bundestag in November 1983. 
The period from 1974 to 1992 in German foreign and security policy is of-
ten referred to as an era of ‘Genscherism’, a term associated with the record 
long-time West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) 
whose political career had started during the Brandt government in the mid-
1960s as the minister for the interior from 1969. Genscher was in office for 
almost 18 years and served in the Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl governments as 
foreign minister. Emil Kirchner has termed ‘Genscherism’ as follows: “a) 
elimination of hostility from international relations; b) demilitarizing and de-
ideologizing East-West Relations and c) development of new peace struc-
tures.”237 It could be argued that these three ideas epitomized the ideational 
core behind German strategic behaviour, which had been launched by 
Brandt’s new Ostpolitik; a policy which for its part made these later com-
mitments possible. In the international press at the time, the term 
‘Genscherism’ was often used as an equivalent to an overtly uncritical stance 
towards the success of Gorbatschov’s perestroika and glasnost and the mis-
placed belief that the changes in the USSR were substantial and long-lasting. 
Also, Genscher’s persisting idea of Germany functioning as a bridge between 
the East and West was not welcome across the Atlantic at the time when the 
US expected Germany to be a reliable ally.238 Genscher was also often ac-
cused of being the ‘dove’ in times of great superpower tensions, most notably 
because of his insistence on the discussions over short range nuclear missiles 
with the Warsaw Pact in 1989 but he also received a lot of credit after the end 
of the Cold War for his efforts towards European integration and German re-
unification.239 Genscher, like Chancellor Kohl, was a strong supporter of Eu-
ropean integration and the détente with the Eastern Europe and the USSR. 
His views were strongly influenced by the positive results of the CSCE in Hel-
sinki 1975 where he made his international debut as the German foreign min-
ister. 
‘Genscherism’ was very popular among the German populace since it di-
rectly referred to German sentiments and skepticism about the continuing 
nuclear race between the superpowers and Germany becoming a pawn in the 
struggle between the rivalling ideologies and political systems, an issue which 
clearly posed one of the biggest threats to German security throughout the 
Cold War. Essentially, even though both Kohl and Genscher supported the 
NATO dual-track decision, the German leaders’ stance differed from that of 
their NATO-partners in two crucial respects: the German question and the 
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de-nuclearization policies. Genscher himself talked about the ‘policy of re-
sponsibility’ (Verantwortungspolitik) instead of power politics. The policy of 
responsibility was an aversion of traditional power politics (Machtpolitik) 
and consisted of military restraint, human rights advocacy and multilateral 
co-operation240 and could hence be interpreted as an incarnation of both of 
the post-war lessons, ‘never again war’ and ‘never again alone’. Even though 
both German leaders acknowledged that the reduced threat from the Soviet 
Union due to its leadership change by no means equated with a relaxation of 
conventional defence policies, they also insisted that the deployment of nu-
clear weapons in Germany further served to cement the division of Europe, 
and therefore also the division of the two German states.241  
In summary, especially the early Cold War years marked a formative peri-
od for the emerging strategic culture for West Germany. This formative peri-
od meant, first and foremost, forming a sense of ‘Self’ within the internation-
al community which in a first step meant a strong institutionalization, dena-
zification, demilitarization and Westernization of German society and poli-
tics. As Kelly Longhurst has illustrated at length in her studies, domestically 
the reformation of civic-military relations on the basis of Innere Führung 
and Bürger in Uniform was inevitable in order to re-establish and justify the 
reformation of a new German armed force.242  
Second, the Cold War years were an enormously difficult period for Ger-
mans in the sense that there existed two German states under one German 
nation – the GDR never managed to consolidate a sense of another German 
nation, but explicitly referred to the common German cultural tradition. As 
Schoch has observed, “(t)he [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] SED repeated 
its vindication of German militarism and Nazism on the soil of the GDR like a 
mantra. With a good conscience, the SED spread this message throughout 
the whole country beyond the confines of the party itself and could, there-
fore, blatantly refer to a national tradition” and that “(t)he SED employed a 
national terminology in its discussions on peace and détente during the 
1980s […] Already in the beginning of the 1950s the Marxist-Leninist histori-
cal nationalism embraced old Prussian heroes such as Stein, Scharnhorst, 
Gneisenau, Clausewitz, Heinrich von Kleist, Fichte, Arndt and Turnvater 
Jahn in its own ancestral gallery.”243 
240 Baumann, Rainer 2005, ?Der Wandel des deutschen Multilateralismus. Verschiebungen im außen-
politischen Diskurs in den 1990ger Jahren?? Ulbert, Cornelia & Weller, Christoph (eds.),????????????
vi?tische Analysen der Internationalen Politik, VS. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2005, p.118?  
241 See Wittmann, Klaus 2015, ’Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss‘, Brauckhoff, Kerstin & 
Schwaetzer, Irmgard (eds.) Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s Aussenpolitik, Akteure der Aussenpolitik. Sprin-
ger Verlag, 2015, pp. 141-165. 
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Hence, beyond the fact that both German states faced similar military 
threats (nuclear war; Germany becoming a battlefield) and that both coun-
tries’ security political agency was very limited, the same principal founda-
tion of ‘never again war’ united all Germans on both sides of Checkpoint 
Charlie. This was also a factor which strongly underlined the continuity in 
the immediate post-Cold War German strategic culture. However, some dif-
ferences seem to have persisted. According to Maull, even though there has 
been a considerable evolution in the views of the German electorate concern-
ing the use of military force for other than solely defensive purposes, the 
former East Germans have remained much more skeptical towards NATO 
and the Bundeswehr deployments than their former Western counterparts 
after the end of the Cold War.244  
Third, the German question was the underlying impetus for German stra-
tegic behaviour ever since the rearmament debates in the 1950s and the poli-
cies of Westbindung. Having to deal with the illusive long-term objective of 
reunification, besides the omnipresent fear of a worldwide nuclear war, was 
one of the biggest threat images during the long Cold War decades, because 
the advocacy of such a policy was anything but a risk-free enterprise in stra-
tegic sense. This of course did not mean that every German wholeheartedly 
supported the reforming of a new German state under one banner. In addi-
tion to a number of politicians, there were strong dissenting voices among 
prominent philosophers and intellectuals alike who were either strongly op-
posed to or very critical of a possible German reunification towards the end 
of the Cold War, including Jürgen Habermas.245  
Finally, the superpower relations largely dictated the political room for 
manoeuvre for Germany (and the rest of Europe), even after it was formally 
recognized as a sovereign state (1949) and after it had joined NATO (1955). 
Given the international and domestic restraints on the development of Ger-
man ?military ?capabilities,  Germany’s ?post World War II self-conceptualiza-
tion as an emerging civilian power, and the subsequent redefinition of Ger-
man national interests as striving towards world peace instead of world dom-
ination, meant that during the Cold War, the actual German influence on in-
ternational security policy making was fairly limited and therefore the future 
244 Maull, Hanns 2000, ‘Germany and the use of force: Still a Civilian Power?’, Survival: Global 
Politics?????????????????????????????????????????????
245 Philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the central figure in the German Historikerstreit, saw that the Ger-
man Westernization had been a big intellectual accomplishment which also meant a denunciation of all 
ideas concerning a great power status for Germany or even sovereignty. Even after the process of re-
unification had been long ongoing, Habermas never abandoned this position, which saw the nation as 
?overcome?. However, many critics rightly noted that the Habermasian concept of ‘Constitutional Pat-
riotism’ was unreal in the sense that there could not be patriotism without Patria, the Fatherland. 
Cf. Weissmann, Karlheinz 1992, ‘Der „Westen“ in the German historiography after 1945?, 
Zitelmann, Rainer (ed.), Westbindung: Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland, Frankfurt a.M 
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of the German strategic culture seemed to be determined first and foremost 
by foreign powers and the international relations of the superpowers – at 
least as long as the prospect of a reunified Germany seemed unrealistic. 
Overall, German security policy was a reaction to unfolding events rather 
than proactive policy making or substantial strategic planning that had a lot 
to do with the structural imposition of a permanent agency vacuum that 
Germany was occupying during the Cold War (notwithstanding Adenauer’s 
Policy of Strength and Brandt’s Ostpolitik). Germany was cultivating the im-
age of a civilian power which served German strategic interests and the ulti-
mate goal of German reunification but it was at odds with the prevailing logic 
of bipolarity and balance of power.246 This would all begin to change on 19 
October 1989 as the fall of the Berlin wall marked the prelude to the end of 
the long Cold War years and symbolized the reforging of a new Europe after 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the bipolar world order 
enabling the re-emergence of a unified Germany at the heart of Europe. 
3.4.  THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION, THE GULF WAR 
AND STRATEGIC CULTURE AFTER 1990 
The German reunification has not spurred much meaningful debate in terms 
of German strategic culture (unlike the debates concerning foreign policy) 
besides the more general notion of a structural change, crystallized in the 
new security and defence political reality after the collapse of bipolarity. This 
is all the more surprising in the sense that the German reunification 
?????????????????? ?? ????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ???????? if not 
another Stunde Null, since the reunification was a process that was both de 
jure and de facto pre-requisite for Germany to rethink, develop and 
especially execute genuine foreign, defence and security policies as a re-
unified nation based on its own values and norms that were and are part of 
the one-of-a-kind German strategic culture. But perhaps at least as 
significant was the possibility that the re-unified Germans could really come 
to clearer terms with their Nazi past and the memory of World War II. These 
reflections on the past and how they con-tinue to shape the present German 
strategic culture will be dealt with in de-tail in Chapter 5. 
However, there are a number of good explanations for the lack of academ-
ic debate on strategic culture and German reunification. Firstly, the lack of 
this debate is partly understandable since Germany’s future had been institu-
tionally, economically, politically and perhaps most importantly also militari-
ly tied to the rest of Europe and the transatlantic alliance for decades and 
German policymakers had done their best not to convince anybody otherwise 
since the end of World War II. Perhaps this has also something to do with the 
inability of social sciences in general to predict the end of the Cold War or 
246 The question about Germany as a ‘?ivilian ?ower’ will be discussed at the end of this ?hapter. 
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even fully grasp its meaning in terms of the development within specific poli-
cy fields and institutions. But with certainty, it has even more to do with the 
fact that strategic culture is inherently built on the foundation of continuity 
that is most likely expected to last even after major structural shifts in the 
international system.  
This continuity can be witnessed in the traditional ways different political 
parties and the whole German society have been disposed to the question of 
peace and war during and after the end of the Cold War which was closely 
connected to the respective threat images and lessons of history during the 
long Cold War decades. Interestingly enough, the post-Cold War threats such 
as the emergence of international terrorism with its global reach and conse-
quences have had a profound effect on partly cementing the role played by 
the historical lessons of the World War II on German foreign and security 
policy making, but also facilitating policy change in terms of the substance of 
German strategic culture which can be seen for instance in a reconceptualiza-
tion of German international responsibility, national interests and participa-
tion in out-of-area peace-keeping and military conflict management.  
However, even though the view of Germany as a civilian power came to be 
the most popular view outside the realist camp in the 1990s, continuity as 
such wasn’t a particular mantra among the mainstream IR and FPA litera-
ture on German foreign and security policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Realists found themselves watching the clock, waiting for the return of the 
belligerent Boche because in (neo)realist theory sudden gains of power will 
result in an unbalance of the international system which will be brought into 
balance through war.247 The grand old man of (structural) realism Kenneth 
Waltz argued in 1993 that Germany was likely to be on its way to becoming a 
great power once again.248 However, as the first Gulf War already showed, 
the long-awaited German ‘return to normality’ (Wiederkehr zur Normalität) 
did not materialize, if by normality we understand the realist account of 
statehood based on military power; and becoming ‘normal’ in that sense 
would suggest a Germany also actively aspiring for a great power status, a 
thing which has yet to materialize on realist terms. Yet equally important was 
the realization during the 1990s that the core idea of continuity in German 
strategic culture, based on the premise of civilian power, was no longer an 
omnipotent answer to the changing threat environment or the widening 
scope of German security political agency. The decade following unification 
was the most tumultuous in terms of redefining a strategic direction for a 
247 See Waltz, Kenneth 1988,  ‘The origins of war in neorealist theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, vol. 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 615-628;  Waltz, Kenneth 2000,  ‘Structural realism after the 
end of the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 25, issue 1, pp. 5-41; Mearsheimer, John J. 1990, 
‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 15, no.1 
(Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.  
248 Waltz, Kenneth 1993, ?The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security, vol. 
12, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 50. 
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reunified nation in its search for a robust security political identity – under-
standably so given both the need and the demand for adjusting to the chang-
es in the international system and the domestic political environment. 
The strategic orientation of the reunified Germany was codified in the 
new German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which basically endorsed the view of 
Germany as a civilian power and consolidated the meaning of the lessons 
Germany had drawn not only from World War II but also the long Cold War. 
The preamble of the German Basic Law states that “(c)onscious of its respon-
sibility towards God and people, inspirited by the desire to contribute to the 
world peace as an equal member in a unified Europe, the German people has, 
based on its legislative powers, given this Basic Law.”249 Moreover, at the 
time, any German military deployment, notwithstanding the defence of Ger-
man territory, was ruled out by the Basic Law – even though the debate con-
cerning possible German participation in UN peacekeeping operations had 
been undergoing ever since Germany’s membership in the UN in the early 
1970s. 
German strategic culture wasn’t the most pressing issue on the agenda as 
the new German Bundestag convened for the first time on 12 December 1990 
in Bonn. The period of German reunification was first and foremost a period 
of strategic cultural continuity in a very particular sense: it showed Germans 
that political objectives, which indeed seemed untenable as well as mostly 
unrealistic during much of the Cold War, could be met with peaceful means. 
Moreover, the unification had a direct impact on the further development of 
German strategic culture in the sense that it created both the external expec-
tancy and the internal need for German strategic action in an unprecedented 
scope and depth; things which would unravel the discrepancy in the idea-
tional structure of German strategic culture step by step – the tension be-
tween the different lessons of ‘never again’. This discrepancy within the idea-
tional structure would begin to unfold during the first major post-Cold War 
crisis, the Gulf War, and the German government’s early adoption of the 
recognition policy towards Slovenia and Croatia a year later.  
When the Gulf War broke out on 2 August 1990, German politicians were 
still negotiating the future status of a reunified Germany in terms of the uni-
fication treaty and the former Allied Quadripartite powers on the so-called 
Two-Plus-Four-treaty.250 Negotiations were also underway on the issues of 
the Allied jurisdictional powers and their troop presence in Germany. Fur-
thermore, the new Federal Republic was also preparing for its first elections 
as a unified country. The German left, most notably the SPD, had been very 
249 The Preamble of the German Basic Law. Available at: (http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aufgab
en/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg/245216). 
250 Two-Plus-Four-treaty between the two German states and the four victor states of World War II 
established the shape of Germany as the combined territories of the FRG and the GDR, guaranteed the 
country’s borders, limited its weapons and military forces (from 490 000 to 370 000 troops), regulated 
the withdrawal of former allied troops, and ensured Germany’s continued membership in NATO. 
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supportive of the idea of collective security and a vocal supporter of strength-
ening UN’s role in international politics.251 But now, in the context of the Gulf 
War, these institutions required a vehement military response to Saddam 
Hussein’s war of aggression – a line which the Social Democrats as a party 
were not willing to cross. Even more painful was the realization of the fact 
that some German firms had sold technical material to the Iraqis which ena-
bled their troops to broaden the effective range of their SCUD-missiles so 
that they now threatened Israel with a gas-attack.252  When the plea for mili-
tary assistance was voiced to the Germans by the Israeli government, it 
caused massive disarray especially within the SPD and other parties as well. 
It was a political nightmare par excellence, since Germany’s special respon-
sibility towards Israel, besides being ever-present in the consciousness of the 
German nation as a whole, is also written down in the German Basic Law. 
Even so, Germany rejected the plea for deploying any German ground troops 
in the region but raised its economic aid to the participating countries to ap-
proximately €12 billion in 1990-1991253. Additionally, Germany functioned as 
the main transfer hub for the Western coalition troops that were sent to the 
Persian Gulf. Germany also supplied ammunition and artillery shells for the 
coalition troops and supplied Israel with eight armoured reconnaissance ve-
hicles (Fuchs Spürpanzer) as well as agreeing to sending two submarines to 
Israel (three submarines were delivered between 1998-2000).254   
In Germany, the refusal to provide military assistance was not scandalous 
behaviour by any means at the time but a rather well-established political 
practice during the Cold War decades, a practice which meant that the Ger-
man military was to be deployed only in cases of defending German territory 
or considered to be deployed within the NATO operational area according to 
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. This practice was reaffirmed and 
seemed to back up the continuity in German strategic culture all the way to 
the final years of the Cold War as the German government refused to send 
military vessels to back up Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987, in 
251 For an extensive analysis of SPD positions on security in the period after reunification, see Gerster, 
Florian 1994, Zwischen Pazifismus und Verteidigung. Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD, Nomos Verlag 
1994. 
252 See Hippler, Jochen 1991, ‘Iraq’s Military Power: The German connection’, Middle East Report, No. 
168, Jan-Feb 1991, pp. 27-31; Cooper A.H. 2004, ‘Media framing and social movement mobilization: 
German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia’, 
European Journal of Political Research, 41:2002, p. 37-80. 
253 Bennett, Andrew, Lepgold, Joseph & Unger, Danny 1994, ‘Burdensharing in the Persian Gulf War’, 
International Organization, vol 48, No.1 (Winter 1994), pp. 39-75. 
254 Nassauer, Otfried & Steinmetz, Christopher 2003, Rüstungskooperation zwischen Deutschland und 
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response to a request of the US to do so.255 Germany referred to the prohibi-
tive nature of its Basic Law and refused to send military assistance beyond 
the NATO operational area. This practice was ended – or rather further re-
fined – by the decision of the German Constitutional Court in 1994 which 
allowed the deployment of German troops in out-of-area missions as part of 
the institutions of collective security and de facto neglected through the 
German participation in the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo in 1999 (without UN 
authorization).256 
Importantly, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent international 
crises revealed the first cracks in the German foreign policy consensus that 
had lasted for decades.  The first Gulf War was the first real test for the old 
consensus. Externally, Germany was referred to as engaging in ‘cheque-book 
diplomacy’ that averts risking its own neck in tough situations that might 
require the use of military force.257 Internally, some politicians began to 
question the foreign policy direction and asserted that Germany might have 
to reconsider its position as a mid-sized European power and that Germany 
should also begin to take more responsibility militarily.258   
To sum up, the German reunification and the Gulf War certainly created 
more confusion as to the future German strategic orientation that was in-
tended by the Germans themselves. It showed also that the urgent need that 
was expressed both externally and internally for bearing international re-
sponsibility and taking a more active role in world affairs might not so easily 
be transformed into a behavioural credo of military abstinence. Hence, the 
importance of German reunification lies not only in the growth of both Ger-
man capabilities and external/internal expectations towards a more active 
role in international security affairs but also in the fact that German strategic 
culture had to reconcile two interpretations of German historical responsibil-
ity. These interpretations which culminated in the principal norms of never 
again were not under pressure during the Cold War decades because they 
conformed to the realpolitik of the Cold War and offered viable policy choices 
for Germany whose international agency was quite limited at the time and 
ensured a domestic political consensus on the issues of war and peace. How-
ever, the difficulty of conforming to these principles became apparent as the 
Gulf War revealed the discrepancy between ‘never again alone’ and ‘never 
255 See Baumann, Rainer & Hellmann, Gunther 2001, ‘Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total 
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again war’ in terms of what they meant for German strategic behaviour. 
Moreover, the Gulf War also disclosed that the question which historians had 
more or less deemed settled a few years earlier – namely that Auschwitz and 
the Holocaust should be seen as sui generis historical events generally in-
comparable with other atrocities in the world history, did not seem as politi-
cally clear-cut an issue given the wide comparisons between Saddam Hussein 
and Hitler at the time, comparisons, which were repeated during the run-up 
to the Iraq war in 2003.259 Beginning with the Gulf War, the pressure to-
wards a re-interpretation of German historical responsibility reached its 
eclipse in the debates concerning German military involvement and the 
scope, depth and purpose of the use of military force in Bosnia and most no-
tably, in Kosovo. 
3.5.  THE BALKAN WARS: FROM BOSNIA TO KOSOVO ? 
CIVILIAN POWER IN WAR 
“At the time of German unification hardly any observer would have 
ventured the prognosis that less than ten years later units of the Bun-
deswehr would be involved in combat in the Balkans, without the 
very thought of it provoking a global wave of indignation, not to 
mention the reactions within Germany.”260 
Indeed, throughout the 1990s, German strategic culture, that was built on the 
foundation of two principles, ‘never again war’ and ‘never again alone’, was 
challenged by Germany’s partners and allies and was strongly affected by 
what was happening in international politics, most notably by the different 
crises and conflicts which raised the question of future German strategic be-
haviour. As a result, the ideational structure of German strategic culture un-
derwent a significant process of change through which a new interpretation 
of the German past became a valid tool for legitimating certain policy deci-
sions and formed the basis for widening and deepening strategic action. But 
before we assess this issue in more detail, it is necessary to depict the inter-
national and domestic political context in which Germany was operating. 
 Since the Gulf War, it had become apparent that the world would be look-
ing quite closely at Germany and how it would deal with international con-
flicts that needed a swift and possibly also a military response. On one hand, 
foreign powers understood that the issue of using military force was of ut-
259 See. Lakoff, George 1991, ‘Metaphors and War: The metaphor system to justify war in the Gulf’, 
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most sensitivity for the Germans internally, but Germany’s allies also har-
boured the hope and indeed a strong expectancy that Germany would take 
responsibility in the international arena also in military terms. This trend has 
been evident since the first Gulf War. These hopes also entailed Germany 
taking the necessary steps on the road of becoming a ‘normal’ European na-
tion state after re-unification and for some of its partners this meant also be-
coming a primus inter pares given Germany’s central geographic position 
and powerful economy which would then subsequently result in a more 
forceful posture in defence and security political matters as the Zentralmacht 
in Europe.261 Moreover, the growth in the expectancy of a stronger German 
presence and involvement in solving the international security crises and 
conflicts went hand in hand with the realization that the times when Germa-
ny would pose a threat to its European neighbours and international security 
were finally over. However, the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 
the 1990s and the resulting war in Bosnia proved that Germany was not on 
its way to becoming a neorealist mid-sized European military power but un-
veiled an extremely cautious and weary German strategic culture that had yet 
to come to terms with the fact that war had not become a thing of the past on 
the European continent.   
In terms of German strategic culture, the conflict in the Balkans raised 
questions not only in terms of whether Germany would comply with the au-
thorization of the use of military force in the region but also whether or not 
Germany was truly committed to the rest of Europe and NATO. In essence, 
the crisis in the Balkans not only questioned the German ‘culture of restraint’ 
and the notion of Germany as a civilian power but also the other lesson, ‘nev-
er again alone’. This became apparent during the early German diplomacy 
towards the secessionist Yugoslav republics spearheaded by Foreign Minister 
Genscher. Indeed, at the beginning, Germany was very active in re-shaping 
the views of its European neighbours on how to approach the conflicting 
sides. German officials had been demanding an unconditional recognition of 
both of the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia since June 1991. 
Jakobsen has argued that these events served to construct three myths con-
cerning German behaviour: firstly, that Germany was on its way to acting 
according to the laws of power politics; secondly, that the German decision 
was determined by moral sentiment; and thirdly, that Germany’s unilateral 
recognition policy was the root cause of the war.262 Yet besides conjuring 
myths, the German policy had also direct consequences. As Crawford and 
Lipschutz have observed, the German attitude towards the conflict parties in 
the Balkans as seeing Serbia as the clear oppressor, exercising totalitarian 
domination and control over the other republics shifted the EC (The Europe-
261 Hyde-Price, Adrian 2007, European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multi-
polarity, Routledge 2007, pp. 117-138.  
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an Community) stance on the conflicting parties as well. Importantly, instead 
of looking at the conflict as a civil war, the prevalent interpretation of it 
would become one that supported the self-determination aspirations of the 
different Yugoslav republics mainly due to German pressure.263 The sympa-
thy in the reunified Germany towards the secessionist part-republics of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was strong, partly because Germany had re-
cently freed itself from communist rule and partly because there was a large 
vocal Croatian minority in Germany demanding independence throughout 
the 1991, supported by many prominent German politicians.264  
Chancellor Kohl’s and Foreign Minister Genscher’s efforts in bringing 
Brussels and Washington into line with German thinking failed until the end 
of 1991, mainly because of British and French fears that an early recognition 
would torpedo the peace talks.265 Yet the pressure towards recognition of in-
dependence was growing in Germany, also partly due to the escalating vio-
lence in the Balkans. In addition, the German press exercised a lot of influ-
ence on how the conflicting parties were seen in Germany and propagated 
the Balkan conflict as the fight for liberty from the communist rule. The 
prominent Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) released a series of arti-
cles, in which Croatia was portrayed as committed to ‘European values’, 
while Serbs were caricatured as hardly being European at all.266 In December 
1991 at a meeting of EC foreign ministers, Genscher was successful in getting 
other ministers to accept the German proposal of recognizing the defecting 
republics by 15 January 1992. Genscher was successful in his recognition pol-
icy even though there were many who thought that there were no guarantees 
that the consequences of recognition would lead to the cessation of hostili-
ties. Many had warned of a German unilateralist stance leading to aggravated 
violence, such as the President of Bosnia Alija Izetbegovi? and the UN Secre-
tary General Perez de Cuellar.267  
Others, in turn, have argued that Germany’s early recognition policy was 
not as reckless as has often been depicted. Libal, for instance, has observed 
that the EC announced in early October 1991 that it would decide on recogni-
tion after an absolute maximum of two months: there was thus no binding 
agreement among Germany’s European partners for a non-recognition poli-
cy.268 Libal also noted that once the international Badinter Commission de-
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termined in early December 1991 that Yugoslavia was facing dissolution not 
secession, there was no longer any good reason to deny recognition. Failure 
to internationalize the conflict in this way would simply have allowed the 
Serbs – who had already occupied one-third of the country, destroyed the 
Slavonian town of Vukovar and besieged the Adriatic port of Dubrovnik – to 
maximize their advantage. At this point, Bonn could no longer solve the 
problem of discouraging both secessionist tendencies and attacks by the Yu-
goslav People’s Army. As it happened, the fighting in Croatia stopped almost 
immediately after recognition.269 Hence, the question of German unilateralist 
action shows itself under a different light in terms of German strategic cul-
ture, allegedly breaking with ‘never again alone’, highlighting the first Ger-
man ‘Sonderweg’ after the end of the Cold War. I will return to the concept of 
Sonderweg in Chapter 5. Here, suffice it to say that Sonderweg – in any case 
– would be too strong a statement considering the political circumstances at
the time. The claims that German policy towards Yugoslavia would have been
‘unilateralist’ at the core seem inconsistent if one looks at German efforts to
internationalize the conflict and mediate a political solution.
Yet the failure of German diplomacy seemed evident as Bonn wasn’t ready 
to back up its recognition policy with actual robust security assurances to 
Slovenia and Croatia. The UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) 
which was established after the French and the British had taken the lead in 
the handling of the crisis, proved to be of little avail mostly because the Serbs 
were able to use the intra-European discord between the US and the rest of 
Europe to play against each other. Moreover, the US didn’t want to commit 
any ground troops to a conflict in which none of its direct interests were at 
stake.270  
The issue of German military involvement became acute when the UN Se-
curity Council decided to launch a sea embargo on Serbia and Montenegro 
and a no-fly zone on Bosnia in Spring 1992. The German government replied 
with faint optimism towards the early requests concerning German participa-
tion, but knew that such a decision would become the source of major do-
mestic political friction.  The whole political spectrum behind ‘never again 
war’ opposed this policy and the Social Democrats filed a complaint in the 
German Constitutional Court claiming that the government’s decision to 
send troops to the Adriatic was unconstitutional. The atmosphere of uncer-
tainty continued until the Constitutional Court decided in April 1993 that 
German crews could participate in AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control 
System) flights, which literally began the same day the Court had reached its 
decision. Germany also participated in the sea embargo by sending two de-
stroyers to the Adriatic Sea.  As Lantis has observed, the AWACS surveillance 
mission was not considered a traditional combat mission per se, but it none-
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theless caused some German MP’s to doubt and even accuse the conserva-
tive-liberal government of militarizing German foreign and security policy.271  
Moreover, the decision-making process behind German participation in 
the AWACS was rather peculiar. As Hellmann and Baumann have shown, the 
smaller government party, the FDP, pressured its major coalition partner the 
CDU/CSU to accept amendments in the Basic Law covering such operations. 
In a rather spectacular political move, the FDP supported German participa-
tion in AWACS but filed a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court with 
the opposition parties the SPD and the Greens against this very decision.272 
The Social Democrats were sure to use this opportunity to criticize the gov-
ernment’s policy but some members of the FDP argued that they had to file 
the complaint only because the SPD had not accepted the compromise pro-
posal between the governing parties.273 
Germany was also taking its first steps militarily beyond Europe as it par-
ticipated in UNOSOM II in 1993, the UN’s successor mission to the United 
Task Force, the purpose of which was to secure humanitarian aid to Somalia, 
a country which was on the brink of collapse. As Dalgaard-Nielsen has 
shown, the German government was unsuccessful in gathering support for its 
stance among the German left unlike in the case of the Balkans, because it 
could not posit a clear case that soldiers where needed for the tasks German 
soldiers were assigned to. In addition, the government was accused of har-
nessing Grossmacht aspirations after filing a request for a permanent seat in 
the UN Security council a few days after its decision to participate in UN-
OSOM II.274 This development received rich coverage in the German press, 
coverage that was full of references to concepts such as the end of 
‘Sonderweg’ and the beginning of ‘Remilitarisation’ and ‘Interventionism’.275  
The situation deteriorated rapidly in Bosnia during the first months of 
1994. After Serb artillery had massacred a number of Muslims gathered at a 
Sarajevo marketplace, NATO placed an ultimatum on the Serb forces to 
withdraw from their positions around Sarajevo or else face NATO’s response. 
Serbs complied but the pressure on the UN safe havens was mounting else-
where which led to NATO airstrikes against Serbian targets. As Lantis has 
noted, NATO’s position found wide acceptance in Germany.276  
After many official complaints about the German military deployments in 
the previous year, the German Constitutional Court ruled in July 1994 in fa-
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vour of Bundeswehr military deployment if the operation was conducted 
within the framework of collective security and institutions. Unsurprisingly, 
the decision of the Constitutional Court specifically referred to NATO as such 
an instance of collective security. In addition, the court ruled that the Bun-
destag had to establish a simple majority for every case of German out-of-
area military deployment.277 Hence, by tying each decision over military par-
ticipation to a democratic majority, the court ensured that the decision over 
peace and war remained firmly in the hands of the German Bundestag. Sig-
nificantly, however, as Dalgaard-Nielsen has observed, the Court decision did 
not spur a political debate on what the most favourable multilateral frame-
work for such deployments would be nor what the geographical and military 
limits for these would be, even though it was commonly agreed that military 
means would only be used as a last resort and that Germany would remain a 
‘civilian power’.278 
At the end of the year, the political tensions between Germany and its al-
lies had surfaced again as the US requested the use of German Tornado jets 
for NATO operations under the mounting pressure towards UNPROFOR 
troops.  As Lantis has observed, Chancellor Kohl was very hesitant in the is-
sue for historical reasons and his argument was that such decisions have to 
be based on domestic consensus.279 This was in line with his doctrine, ac-
cording to which it was unthinkable that Bundeswehr soldiers would embark 
on a military mission in an area occupied by the Wehrmacht during World 
War II.280 The Bundestag voted in favour of Germany’s participation in the 
eventual UNPROFOR withdrawal in June 1995 but there were many who 
doubted the mission, not least since the NATO generals and the Bundeswehr 
inspector General Naumann had warned that the conflict could well escalate 
into ‘another Vietnam’. German Tornados were deployed but Kohl insisted 
that Germany would not send any ground troops to Bosnia.281  
The perennial question concerning German international responsibility in 
the post-Cold War world that had already been raised during the Gulf War, 
was intensively debated in the Bundestag again after the tragic events of the 
Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, when units of the Bosnian Serb Army un-
der the command of notorious general Ratko Mladic killed around 8,000 
Muslim Bosniaks, mainly men and boys.282 The significance of these debates 
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should not be underestimated in terms of the further development of Ger-
man strategic culture since for the first time they represented a major and 
extensive principal discussion on what German international responsibility 
would entail and whether or not the use of military force would be acceptable 
in some extreme cases, such as preventing genocide. The events in Srebreni-
ca and their extensive coverage in the mass media at the time especially 
served the purpose of highlighting the fact of the unpleasant reality of the 
post-Cold War world, particularly for ordinary Germans, namely, that the 
Clausewitzian principle of war as a continuation of politics with other means 
was not buried in the mausoleum of history with the Iron Curtain. 
Similarly, the later debates over participation in the NATO airstrikes dur-
ing the Kosovo conflict, the debates over the Bosnian war as a whole and es-
pecially the events in Srebrenica presented probably the most intensive dis-
cussions about the German international responsibility on one hand and 
stance towards the use of military force since the end of the Cold War on the 
other. Given their intensity and relevance for our discussion in terms of stra-
tegic cultural continuity and change, it is worth to take a closer look into 
these debates and assess their meaning for the development of German stra-
tegic culture. 
As mentioned earlier, the general German reluctance to use military force 
and participate in international crisis management was acknowledged but 
mostly also disapproved of by Germany’s allies, which ever since the Gulf 
War, had been quick to remind the Germans that the time for cheque-book 
diplomacy was over. The German party-political spectrum was well aware of 
the allied concerns regarding German policy. For instance, in the discussion 
concerning German participation in the AWACS-surveillance mission in the 
no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, one member of the SPD voiced the 
growing concerns quite clearly: “I’m asking the Federal Government, why it 
does not possess the courage of Japan? I know some German soldiers and 
German politicians who are crawling towards their mouse hole as soon as an 
American Colonel says: you Germans provide the bloodbags but we provide 
the blood.”283 These kinds of statements reflected the changing mood among 
the German political left for which the historical lesson of ‘never again war’ 
did not seem to provide answers for crisis situations such as the one that had 
been emerging in the Balkans. Hence, a growing sense that a discrepancy had 
begun to materialize between what was expected of the reunified Germany as 
an ally on one hand and what the Germans were willing to do, on the other, 
even though nobody was outright condemning the German stance at the 
time. As Dalgaard-Nielsen has noted, on the centre-right, German conserva-
tives had basically accepted German military deployments that were in line 
with the UN Charter since the Gulf War in order to stress German reliability 
and partnership with Europe and the US, and liberals were to follow suit, 
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although disappointed in the inability of the institutions such as the UN or 
the EC to curtail the crisis.284  
The growing uncertainty concerning the viability of the ‘culture of re-
straint’ came to light strongly in the debates concerning the German partici-
pation in the AWACS and then in the decision to send combat troops (albeit 
no ground forces) in order to protect the UNPROFOR peace keeping force 
and then later on in securing the Dayton Peace Accords as part of the 
UN/NATO-led IFOR/SFOR. This uncertainty resurfaced strongly in the de-
bates over German participation in the NATO-airstrikes in Kosovo. The de-
bate on participation in the AWACS-mission already showed how difficult it 
would be to discuss these issues at the political level and this was partly the 
reason why the German Constitutional Court was called upon to solve the 
politically seemingly insurmountable question over military participation at 
the time. Indeed, as Schlaffer has pointed out, the Balkans also provided a 
different context from the Gulf War for German security and defence policy 
making in the historical sense that the security political doctrine of Helmut 
Kohl, namely, that, German soldiers could not be sent to a region occupied by 
the Wehrmacht during World War II in principle also prohibited any German 
military involvement in Yugoslavia.285  
To reiterate, the situation in Bosnia began to deteriorate drastically to-
wards the end of 1994 and continued to decline in 1995. The surrounded city 
of Sarajevo was constantly under Serb artillery fire and people in the Eastern 
Bosnian enclaves, the so-called UN Safe Zones – Srebrenica included, were 
suffering on a day-to-day basis. The international community decided that 
the UNPROFOR peacekeepers needed protection and reinforcement in order 
to fulfil their mission. UN forces needed also to be prepared for the worst-
case scenario in case the situation became unbearable and the forces would 
have had to be drawn out. Hence, the UNSC decided to launch IFOR (Im-
plementation Force), a NATO-led peacekeeping force to implement the mili-
tary aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which took this responsibility 
over from UNPROFOR.286  
The German government decided to participate in this mission and the 
Bundestag debate on the issue was held on 30 June 1995.287 In the debate 
itself, the government position was clear. According to Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel, Germany had to show solidarity towards its allies because 
Germany had a special political and moral responsibility from its own past. 
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The Allies had helped Germany back onto its feet and into the international 
community. Also at stake was the respect towards German politics and the 
future of the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the EU. According to 
Kinkel, there was absolutely no other option for Germany. He underlined the 
fact that the decision to participate did not mean a lowering of the hurdle for 
German military deployments or waging a war but that it was necessary for 
the UN peacekeepers to fulfil their mission and to stop the war. Kinkel re-
minded the members of the Bundestag that the planned German contribu-
tion was small-scale in comparison to others and that Germany’s partners 
understood that Germany was politically unwilling to send ground combat 
troops to Bosnia and that German Tornados would not wage war – they 
would only engage if the troops sent to support the UN peace keeping mis-
sion were fired upon.  According to Kinkel, the UN operation was first and 
foremost a humanitarian operation.288 
The leader of the SPD parliamentary group Rudolf Scharping reminded 
the Bundestag that Germany’s recognition policy of Slovenia and Croatia in 
1991 had led to a situation in which the rest of the EU had no other choice 
but to follow Germany and that this policy had had dire consequences and 
contributed to the deepening of the crisis. Moreover, Scharping saw that 
Germany’s respect had dwindled in the eyes of its partners due to this policy. 
He further claimed that the aftermath of the recognition policy had led the 
government to a situation that concessions had to be made and that the for-
eign minister himself had even spoken of a policy involving forcing Serbia 
onto its knees (Serbien auf die Knie zwingen). Scharping also noted that the 
SPD had always supported the maxim of the Kohl Doctrine because the 
memory of the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht would only lead to an 
escalation of the conflict and to the endangerment of Bundeswehr soldiers. 
However, Scharping argued that this policy had now been changed. He noted 
that the majority of the SPD supported the UN decision to reinforce the 
peace keeping contingent but that in many respects the SPD was against the 
government’s proposal – he particularly raised the question of German Tor-
nado jets, the sending of which the majority of the SPD would not support, 
because it would make Germany into a party to the UN mission proper as a 
troops provider, hence going against the former consensus of the Kohl Doc-
trine. Scharping also warned of fuelling the Great Serbian propaganda by 
sending German troops, because the atrocities committed by the Muslim SS-
Division against the Tito partisans had not been forgotten in Serbia and the 
deployment of German military would only serve to exacerbate the propa-
ganda.289  
The leader of the Greens Joschka Fischer argued that the debate at hand 
was about a historical break with the 50-year-old tradition of German foreign 
policy, the culture of restraint (Kultur der Zurückhaltung). The break con-
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sisted of sending German combat troops beyond the traditional geographical 
remit of NATO operations (the state borders of the NATO member states) for 
the first time since the end of World War II. He declined to support the gov-
ernment’s motion outright on behalf of his party’s pacifist tradition and ar-
gued that the Greens did not want a new German foreign policy and that 
Germany had never suffered from pacifism. He also questioned the govern-
ment’s claim about the need to uphold alliance solidarity by asking whether 
the fact that Germany does not send soldiers to all the places in the world 
make it less capable as an alliance partner.290 Günter Verheugen (SPD) also 
referred to the historical scope of the decision and underlined its consequen-
tiality for the future of German foreign and security policy in contrast to the 
decisions made on Bundeswehr deployments with regard to Gulf War, Adri-
atic Sea, AWACS and also Somalia.291 The government’s motion was accepted 
with a large enough majority with the support of a number of the SPD and a 
handful of members from the Greens. 
The events in the UN safe zone Srebrenica, which was taken over by Serb 
militia, who then committed a mass execution of Bosnian Muslims while the 
UN forces eye witnessed the whole event because they were not legally man-
dated to intervene, caused massive disarray in the whole German political 
spectrum and among the German populace but particularly on the tradition-
ally more pacifist/anti-militarist segments of the Alliance ‘90/the Greens. 
Having formerly distanced themselves from a consideration of any kind of 
military response in the Balkans – with or without a UN mandate – the 
events of Srebrenica caused a domino-effect (albeit not a very rapid one) 
among the German Greens in the sense that ‘realpolitik’ and the real, actual 
events and approaching the issue from the viewpoints of the civilian popula-
tion of the victims took precedence in the consideration of the stance of the 
party towards accepting a military response in the Balkans in order to stop a 
genocide from taking place. The leading figure in this transformation process 
was the party leader and future foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, a former 
left-wing radical, one of the most famous representatives of the so-called 
‘68ger’ generation in Germany.292 
Fischer wrote an open letter to the Greens on 30 June 1995293 in which he 
contemplated the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the consequences he 
had drawn from this and what it would mean for the Greens as a party. In the 
letter, Fischer lamented the state of the Western alliance by arguing, that 
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there were no Western nor any common interests towards the former Yugo-
slavia. He also questioned Germany’s decision in 1991 to recognize Slovenia 
and Croatia without prior negotiation concerning ethnic minorities and the 
border questions – German policy was “trying to extinguish the fire with ker-
osene”: there was no concept of order for the region behind the German 
recognition policy and therefore it inevitably led to chaos. He noted that the 
German Greens had opposed the German military deployment in Bosnia for 
the right reasons: because of the havoc that the Wehrmacht had wrought in 
Yugoslavia during World War II the party feared that a Bundeswehr deploy-
ment might aggravate the crisis instead of curbing it.294 
Yet Fischer saw no alternative to a UN embargo and the UN peacekeeping 
mission (although Fischer also noted that the UN mission was not about 
peace-keeping in Bosnia anymore).  Fischer argued that the West could not 
retreat because it would effectively mean the dissolution of the civilian efforts 
of the UN and would undermine both the future of European security and the 
credibility of the UN as being responsible for world peace. A retreat would 
effectively mean a victory for national power politics. And even if the UN and 
the West decided to retreat, to Fischer, the danger of the spread of fascism 
was clear. Fischer argued that the German Left was in danger of losing its 
moral soul if it started to turn a blind eye to the policies and violence of this 
resurging fascism.295 
But Fischer also reminded the Bundestag that military involvement would 
bear little hope for a political solution. He also questioned whether the West 
actually knew what it was fighting for in Bosnia, because the Bosnian Serbs 
would never accept a Muslim Bosnia as an independent state. Fischer con-
tinued that the question was not even about German involvement as such, 
because the historical lessons had not changed overnight and that the princi-
ple of saying ‘yes’ to German humanitarian assistance but ‘no’ to German 
peacekeepers or combat troops (nie wieder Krieg) had been valid until then. 
For Fischer, the question went deeper still – it would require the Germans to 
choose between two of their fundamental values regarding German political 
self-conception: freedom and value of human life on one hand, and non-
violence on the other.296 Even though Fischer and his party had voted against 
the government proposal on the same day, the conclusion he drew in the let-
ter was that the West needed to guarantee the safety of the civilians and the 
safe-zones militarily – there was no other option on the table anymore. Later 
in an interview with der Spiegel Fischer defended his posture of military de-
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ployment against the accusations of harbouring a bellicose attitude and a re-
militarization of German foreign and security policy.297 
A group of prominent Greens who represented the pacifist wing in the 
party (Claudia Roth, Jürgen Trittin, Kerstin Müller and Ludger Volmer) re-
plied to Fischer in a letter in October 1995. They accused Fischer of failing to 
explain who would do the intervening if the UN was not capable. The only 
answer would be NATO but there were risks of making NATO an interven-
tion force which only used UNSC as a springboard and a ‘rubber stamp’ for 
its military operations. Moreover, according to these Greens, Fischer had not 
explained what the differences would be between the Greens’ and the gov-
ernment’s intervention policies. These Greens depicted the Green interven-
tionism as a mirror image of the ideas of the US President Woodrow Wilson 
in the early 20th Century – basically legitimating the projection of military 
force in the name of freedom, security and democracy: “We are interested in 
the question of how we can prevent the Green military oriented human rights 
fundamentalism […] from being used as a cover for other, real interests. 
Moreover, what should a military operation approved by the Greens look 
like? Joschka has countered the criticism towards his claims for a military 
operation in Bosnia with the argument that he was in favour of one also in 
the case of Rwanda.”298 
Fischer replied to these charges by arguing that the position of the ‘Idea-
los’ would mean international isolation and that the picture which they were 
trying to convey of German remilitarization was based on false interpretation 
on firstly, what Fischer had actually argued and second, what it meant to be a 
member of the political left in Germany. The highest principle of the German 
political left should be that of solidarity towards another people and that 
alone was a reason enough to intervene militarily in case of genocide. Fischer 
also criticized the one-dimensional depiction of the US as the “agent of evil” 
harboured by the Green pacifists.299  
However, the issue was not only touching the Greens but also other par-
ties as well and that this ‘spiritual struggle’ (Seelenkampf) involved the whole 
German nation and its people. For instance, German academics and intellec-
tuals had seemingly been quiet until the events in Srebrenica. The reason for 
this, as German philosopher Jürgen Habermas put it in an interview with der 
Spiegel, was that until Srebrenica, a political and diplomatic, peaceful solu-
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tion had not been completely off the table and that is why the academics had 
not seen the need to intervene in the political discussion. According to Ha-
bermas, the atrocities committed in Srebrenica had opened his eyes to the 
painful truth that the use of force by the UN/NATO was now inevitable.300  
Indeed, the incident in Srebrenica was key in triggering the re-assessment 
of the German policy towards Bosnia that was accompanied by the realiza-
tion that the Western policy had effectively failed and that there were three 
choices left: to retreat and lift the weapons embargo, to provide military as-
sistance to the UN safe zones that were actually not safe-zones to begin with, 
or to see the whole conflict through by treating it someway as ‘business as 
usual’. The first and third options, at least if one considers Fischer’s position, 
were unthinkable for Germans as alternatives if one wanted to reach some 
sort of conclusion in the conflict, guarantee European security and the future 
of European integration as well as the credibility of the UN and NATO.  
Furthermore, in terms of strategic cultural change, the event in Srebreni-
ca was perhaps the most important singular example in the post-Cold War 
track record of German foreign and security policy as an event that could 
trigger a reinterpretation of historical responsibility as was seen from Fisch-
er’s re-appropriation of ‘nie wieder Auschwitz’ and ‘nie wieder Krieg’ and to 
enable a course change in the hitherto accepted policies. But as Fischer him-
self argued, at the nub of the issue was primarily not whether Germany 
would send military troops as a reaction to Srebrenica (and this was clearly at 
the top of the agenda of Germany’s allies), but rather it was a question of po-
litical identity: what would the consequences be for a pacifist who now has to 
deal with the issue that war is real and not a residual category of history and 
that safeguarding freedom and the value of human life are, therefore, not 
necessarily compatible with the value of non-violence? This was, and, to a 
certain extent still is, the most prevalent question within the contemporary 
German strategic culture. In a sense, the Historians’ controversy301 repeated 
itself in terms of what political lessons should be drawn from the past after 
the event of Srebrenica; even though Fischer strongly argued that Auschwitz 
was historically and empirically an incomparable crime302, the lesson from it 
could only mean the deployment of military means if genocide could be pre-
vented. 
The debates continued throughout the latter part of 1995 and the IFOR 
mission was approved by the Bundestag in December 1995. The voting re-
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sults corresponded to the situation in the German left: around two-thirds of 
the Social Democrats supported the mission while only half of the Green del-
egates voted in favour. Yet it was clear that the tide was turning and that at 
the time, it seemed as if ‘never again Auschwitz’ had triumphed over ‘never 
again war’. This trend continued more forcefully in terms of the decision on 
the participation in SFOR in December 1996, the follow-up mission to IFOR, 
the purpose of which was to deter any resumption of hostilities between the 
former conflict parties in Bosnia. The mandate of SFOR was more robust 
than that of IFOR and it included an armed German contingent, which, un-
like in the case of IFOR, was also charged with security tasks.303 The debate 
on SFOR was held on the same grounds as the one on IFOR. Even though the 
mandate of the SFOR troops was more robust and involved basically a de 
facto denunciation of the Kohl Doctrine as German troops were now sta-
tioned directly in Bosnia as opposed to Croatia during IFOR, the decision was 
accepted by an even larger majority than that for IFOR.304 However, even if it 
seems that the question was mainly about ‘Germany Crossing the Rubi-
con’305, at least as important for the Germans themselves was the emerging 
question whether or not Germany was willing to accept the role of a security 
provider instead of enjoying a free-ride in the backseat of the European mili-
tary convoy. In short, at stake was the other big question regarding the Ger-
man strategic culture as a whole: German responsibility internationally as 
well as in relation to Europe.   
Hence, on one hand, ever since the Bosnian war, and particularly after the 
atrocities in Srebrenica, Germany has had to come to terms with the fact that 
the use of military force might be indispensable in order to save human life 
and prevent things such as genocide from happening. This can be clearly wit-
nessed in the intra-party disputes at the time which did not only concern the 
Greens but also other parties, particularly the SPD. The only exception was 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) which had its roots in the East 
German SED (today known as Die Linke); a party which categorically contin-
ues to reject German military involvement in international crisis manage-
ment. However, on the other hand, the ‘primacy of politics’ (Primat der Poli-
tik) remained in the sense that there was a wide parliamentary consensus on 
the use of military force as being and always remaining the last possible 
means, ultima ratio. 
What these debates stressed in terms of the process of strategic cultural 
change during this period is that sources of change presented themselves ini-
tially in the form of threat images (the threat that Milosevic and his regime 
303 UNSC Resolution 1031 (1995) on IFOR. Available at: (http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u951215a.htm); 
UNSC Resolution 1088 (1996) on SFOR. Available at: (http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u961212b.htm). 
304 Von Krause 2013, pp. 206-213. 
305 A comparison often used as marking a point of ‘no return’, specifically the process of ????????????
????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ???????????????????????? ????? ??????
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posed not only to ethnic minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but under-
stood more broadly as a threat to German and European security in terms of 
conflict escalation). These factors alone provided an incentive for the German 
political elite to act militarily, and the Constitutional Court’s decision in 1994 
had paved the way legally to do so. However, the triggering factor for change 
was the massacre at Srebrenica (external shock) in 1995, which initiated the 
shift from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’. While it was un-
doubtedly important for Germany to abide by its alliance commitments, 
those alone would not have brought about a fundamental change in German 
strategic culture. This could already be seen during the run-up to the Gulf 
War, when Germany faced strong peer pressure to act. Indeed, while the alli-
ance patterns reinforced the incentive for Germany to act militarily at the 
time, they were not sufficient to bring about change at the more fundamental 
level, which was only triggered after the events at Srebrenica. This event set 
in motion the primary mechanism of change, as the experience of Srebrenica 
was projected against the backdrop of German experiences and lessons 
drawn from the German past. 
Kosovo 
„Im Krieg beginnt die Berliner Republik”306 
Following the decisions to support the UNPROFOR mission and subsequent-
ly in the IFOR and SFOR missions with a sizeable force, the decision was 
made to participate in AWACS. During these missions the number of Bun-
deswehr soldiers was raised from an initial 2,000 to 8,000 soldiers, which 
laid the groundwork for a substantial Bundeswehr presence in the Balkans. 
Yet the decision to participate in the NATO airstrikes against Serbia in 1999 
– in the operation Deliberate Force (Allied Force) – was of historical propor-
tion in the sense that this was the first time Germany participated in a large-
scale military campaign against a sovereign state without the mandate of the
UN Security Council and under a new Red-Green government.  In Germany,
the Bundestag elections in September 1998 brought about the first democrat-
ic change of government in the re-unified Federal Republic. The long reign of
the conservative-liberal Kohl government, the Chancellor of German Unity,
was brought to an end. The situation was as dramatic as it was historical. The
traditional torch bearers of German anti-militarist and pacifist sentiments,
the parties of the German Left – the SPD and the Bündnis ‘90/the Greens
(with the exclusion of the PDS which remained in opposition with conserva-
tives and liberals) were forced to begin their term by deciding over German
military participation in the NATO airstrikes against Serbia.
306 ‘In war begins the Berlin Republic’, headline of Die Tageszeitung, 20.4.1999, a few days after Ger-
man Tornados had bombed Serbian targets as part of the NATO squadron. 
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The situation in Kosovo, which traditionally has always been one of the 
main sources of political friction in the Balkans, began to deteriorate drasti-
cally towards the end of 1997 when clashes between the Serbian security 
forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to intensify. The 
fighting continued in early 1998 as the KLA attacked Serb installations in 
Kosovo and during the summer Serb forces pushed KLA back using artillery 
and other heavy weaponry.  In the autumn of 1998, the situation looked grim 
indeed – with around 2,000 dead and almost 200,000 refugees within the 
province, another 100,000 Albanians had fled from Kosovo. International 
diplomatic efforts had been made, aiming to get Belgrade to change its posi-
tion by considering lifting the sanctions that had been introduced in late 1997 
by the efforts of the Contact Group.307 These efforts proved to be in vain and 
as a consequence, the UN Security Council passed its first Resolutions on 
Kosovo (UNSCR 1160, 1199) in March and September 1998 but failed in the 
attempt to base these on Chapter VII of the UN Charter due to Russian and 
Chinese opposition. Therefore, the most viable option left for solving the cri-
sis seemed to be the threat of the use of military force. NATO had initially 
made its military threat public against Belgrade in the spring of 1998 and as 
Serbian President Milosevic seemed to hold his course, the threat was re-
newed in September 1998. After Milosevic failed to respond to the demands 
made in UNSC Resolution 1199, the NATO Council decided to keep the acti-
vation orders (ACTORDS) for ‘limited air operations’ against Serbia during 
October 1998 in order to prevent a human catastrophe in Kosovo.308 
The Bundestag debate over participation in the NATO bombing campaign 
was held on 16 October 1998 still under the old government leadership but in 
mutual understanding and agreement with the newly elected Red-Green gov-
ernment.309 The Free Democrats, spearheaded by the then Foreign Minister 
Kinkel, argued that NATO was right to issue the order to begin with the lim-
ited air campaign because, according to the discussions between US ambas-
sador Richard Holbrooke and Milosevic, it did seem to make Milosevic real-
ize the gravity of the situation if he didn’t react to the UNSC demands of Res-
olution 1199. Kinkel noted that US President Clinton was right in saying that 
the cemeteries in the Balkans were filled with Milosevic’s broken promises. 
Milosevic simply could not be allowed to continue his ‘game of cat-and- 
mouse’ which he had begun in Bosnia and that he had to comply with the 
demands of the international community or face the consequences. Moreo-
ver, the threat of NATO escalation had to be kept intact in order to bring the 
agreement reached between Holbrooke and Milosevic into practice as soon as 
possible.  Germany had to show solidarity towards its allies and its alliance 
307 Contact Group consisted of the US, Russia, Germany, UK, France and Italy. 
308 UNSC Resolution 1199. Available at: (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/R
ES/1199(1998)); NATO Headquarters Website on Operation Determined Force (Allied Force). Availa-
ble at: (http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page7196179.aspx). 
309 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/248, (16.10.1998). 
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capability (Bündnisfähigkeit) and to bear the responsibility for peace in Eu-
rope. However, the possible NATO operation should not be understood as 
the transition of Gewaltmonopol (monopoly on the legitimate use of force) 
from the UN to NATO and that the NATO operation did not constitute a 
precedence case in that sense but rather was an exception. The decision had 
first and foremost to be based on legitimate (as opposed to legal) grounds in 
order to protect human rights and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. If the 
UN Gewaltmonopol could not be carried out to prevent this then it would be 
problematic for the interpretation of international law since “reality was, in-
deed, much more complicated and more layered than as depicted by interna-
tional law”.310  
The Social Democrats stressed the importance and novelty of putting the 
lives of young Germans on the line and pointed out in particular that the po-
litical culture for it was only now being developed. A strong emphasis that 
reflected the German past was based on making a clear distinction between 
the perpetrators of the regime exercising a fatal policy and the ordinary peo-
ple opposing this policy. While the argument was that the German Bundestag 
would not allow a ‘second Bosnia’ to take place, Germany also had a vital se-
curity interest in solving the crisis in the light of the potential refugee crisis, 
since it would arguably hit Germany the hardest. However, the conclusion 
was that since it had been Germans who had been responsible for the atroci-
ties in the region in World War II, the only logical consequence for Germany 
was never to allow it to happen again. While the legal basis for the operation 
was deemed questionable, it was still ultimately acceptable, given the im-
portance of the effort of getting Russia to agree with NATO should there be 
another UNSC Resolution based upon the agreement between Holbrooke and 
Milosevic.311   
Union MPs highlighted the importance of German participation, reflect-
ing ‘never again alone’ – had Germany not supported the NATO policies, the 
result would have meant a withdrawal from the integrated security and mili-
tary structures of the West. There were occasions when the use of force was 
immoral but it would also be highly immoral not to send troops if it was the 
only way to stop the war and massacre. A critical remark was also directed at 
the Greens as it was deemed inappropriate for the same Greens, who now 
had to bear international responsibility by sending German soldiers into 
harm’s way, to protest against the Bundeswehr at home. The Union politi-
cians also stressed that the use of military force as ultima ratio was only 
meaningful and effective if Germany was also prepared to act accordingly, 
which, in turn, was indispensable for a successful NATO strategy.312 
The Greens highlighted the fact that the decision was not an easy one for 
the party and that it was extremely important that there not be any self-
310 Ibid., pp. 23127-31; 23143-5. 
311 Ibid., pp. 23132-3; 23135-8. 
312 Ibid., pp. 23133-5; 23138-40. 
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mandating of NATO in the issue. The question of German military deploy-
ment was not about re-instating interventionist policies based on uncon-
trolled nationalism, but in trying to prevent that from happening because the 
threat to European peace and security which Milosevic presented was real. If 
Germany did not act with the international community, the result would be 
another great war in the Balkans. Joschka Fischer in particular argued that it 
was also the reason why he changed his attitude towards pro-deployment 
during the Bosnian war. If Germany wanted to take responsibility for peace 
in Europe, it had to be ready to defend it, with military means if necessary. 
However, some Greens were clearly opposed to the government decision and 
would vote against it – the power of the strong had to be replaced with the 
power of legality. Also, some of the Greens took issue with the fact that the 
same actors who were considering the bombing of Serbia allowed its partici-
pation in the football World Cup. The argument was that “all of the experts 
agreed that preventing Serbia from participating would have been much 
more effective than the threat of bombardments in turning the mood of Ser-
bian people against Milosevic.”313   
The PDS stressed that it was consequently the only party in the Bundestag 
to oppose “the militarization of German foreign policy and international rela-
tions”. While it was not the first time that UNSC resolutions had been disre-
garded, nobody had hitherto come to think that the use of military force 
could be bestowed upon something else. Hence, criticism was raised by argu-
ing that Kosovo would present a precedent case for military intervention 
without a UN mandate. Therefore, according to the PDS those who support-
ed Germany’s participation in the NATO bombing campaign were ill-situated 
to argue that it was a special case but not a case of precedence.314 
In summary, this debate shows that even though there were strong con-
cerns about the legality of NATO policies among the German policy elite, the 
newly elected government had to follow suit since it realized that there were 
few other options if Germany wanted to be seen as a reliable partner. Espe-
cially important was the role of Fischer, as he knew that the fresh coalition 
would break up even before the actual litmus test of whether the Greens 
would accept the Bundeswehr participation or not. The decision to partici-
pate in the NATO air campaign was accepted with a large majority of the 
Bundestag. Indeed, as Hyde-Price has put it, it took the government initially 
no more than 15 minutes to agree to US President Clinton’s plea for German 
military participation.315 Given this background, the German government’s 
decision could be seen as being made rather hastily, but there are some well-
grounded reasons for the government’s rapid decision-making process in this 
particular issue. First off, the situation as such did not come as a sudden sur-
313 Ibid., pp. 23141-2; 23150-1. 
314 Ibid., pp. 23145-7. 
315 Hyde-Price, Adrian 2001, ‘Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?’, New Europe, New 
Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy since Unification, Routledge 2001,  p. 21? 
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prise for the government, as it had already been made aware of the US stance 
towards German participation during the Schröder-Fischer visit to Washing-
ton a few weeks earlier, when the German leaders had pledged their support 
in favour of the NATO airstrikes.316 Secondly, during the Bundestag debate 
over the issue, all parties except for the PDS were unanimously behind the 
government decision. This also reflected the broad sentiment within German 
society, which, according to the polls at the time, was united with its govern-
ment on the issue of German military deployment with a majority of over 
75% – considerably more than at the time of the Bosnian War.317 Still, there 
were dissenting voices among both the political elite and the wider popula-
tion about the military deployment. Some critics even argued that the Ger-
man deployment seemed to be less controversial than a proposed law against 
graffiti artists.318 
The OSCE mission that was launched to oversee the implementation of 
the armistice brokered by Holbrooke failed in January 1999 because the 
Serbs had massacred a number of Albanian civilians in the village of Racak. 
After this, the mood on both sides over the Atlantic shifted quite rapidly in 
favour of military action. Germany was still trying to find a political solution 
to the conflict but as the Rambouillet and Paris discussions proved to be of 
no avail since the Serbian side wasn’t ready for any concessions. Arguably 
there was no other option left than realizing the military threat of NATO.319 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder appeared on German television on the eve 
of NATO airstrikes on 24 March 1999. He famously stated that “we do not 
wage war” but that “we are called upon to achieve a political solution via mili-
tary means”.320 The beginning of the NATO air operation and German in-
volvement was debated again in the Bundestag on 26 March 1999.321  In the 
debate, Chancellor Schröder noted that there was no alternative for the in-
ternational community other than to act militarily, because the Serb delega-
tion had repeatedly refuted any diplomatic efforts to come to a settlement in 
the discussions in Rambouillet and Paris. He also pointed to the fact that this 
was the first time since the end of World War II that German soldiers had 
participated in an actual military mission but did not contemplate this fur-
316 ‚Man kennt sich, man duzt sich‘, Der Spiegel, 12.10.1998, 42/1998. 
317 Biehl, Heiko 2001, ‘Wendepunkt Kosovo? Sicherheitspolitische Einstellungen in den alten und neu-
en Ländern’, SOWI-Arbeitspapier, Nr. 128. Available at: (http://www.mgfa-potsdam.de); ‚Stimmungs-
gefälle’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.4.1999, p. 16. It needs to be noted that there were drastic 
differences in the acceptance of the NATO mission between the West and East Germans. Whereas 
around 70% of the West Germans were in favor of the airstrikes, only around 40% of the East Germans 
supported the bombings. 
318 Hyde-Price 2001, p.22. 
319 ‚Marsch in die Sackgasse‘, Der Spiegel, 22.3.1999, 12/1999. 
320 Schwab-Trapp 2002, p.294; Pressemitteilung Nr. 111/99 vom 24. März 1999, Presse- und Informa-
tionsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn. 
321 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/31 (26.3.1999). 
119 
ther. Rather, Schröder concentrated on the successes of the Berlin EU Sum-
mit and the compromise achieved in pushing through the so-called Berlin-
package, Agenda 2000.322  
Union MPs noted that they supported government policy on Kosovo and 
that the decision to partake in the airstrikes was right, inevitable and neces-
sary to stop the ever -escalating murder in Kosovo. He also said that it was 
time to put any suspicions about the legality issue aside since the Federal 
Constitutional Court had rejected all the complaints about the issue.323 Social 
Democrats argued that the decision to send combat troops for the first time 
was one that would affect all Germans in the realization that a break with 
past policies had occurred. This was done, however, to prevent another Sre-
brenica. The argument was that many still harboured doubts about the 
NATO operation, including some from within SPD but that the prevention of 
genocide weighed more than the respect for the veto right of two UNSC 
members. These members [Russia and China] abused their veto-right for 
reasons that had nothing to do with Kosovo. The West’s joint military opera-
tion was not targeted towards Serbian citizens but was solely for the purpose 
of preventing genocide and stopping the ‘dictator’ and ‘violent hazard’ Mi-
losevic, who was acting against the interests of his own people by isolating 
Serbia from the rest of Europe. There was also the argument put forward that 
the horrors in Kosovo had shown the German people that the only possible 
way to peace and prosperity in all of Europe was through European integra-
tion.324 
For the SPD, as was portrayed earlier, the issue of German military partic-
ipation was difficult to deal with during the Gulf War and the Greens had 
faced a similar, perhaps even more dramatic situation during the Bosnian 
War in the aftermath of the events in Srebrenica. The decision to participate 
in the NATO air offensive threatened not only to break the thin intra-party 
consensus on the issue of military deployment but it also presented a serious 
litmus test for the integrity of the newly elected government. The sentiments 
of the Greens became abundantly clear during a special ‘Kosovo Parteitag’ in 
Bielefeld in May 1999 under the headline ‘Combining peace and humane-
ness’325 – held under police protection because of the general unrest sur-
rounding the meeting as an infuriated delegate threw a plastic bag filled with 
red colouring at Joschka Fischer to illustrate that the Green leader had blood 
on his hands. The rift inflicted by Kosovo was serious between the so-called 
322 Ibid., pp. 2571-5. 
323 Ibid., pp. 2575-9.  
324 Ibid., pp. 2579-81. 
325 ‚Frieden und Humanität vereinbaren‘, Sonderparteitag der Grünen, 13.5.1999. For the competing 
petitions on the party conference, see (http://www.gruene.de/ueber-uns/35-gruene-jahre-35-gruene-
geschichten/35-gruene-jahre-22-kosovo-sonderparteitag-in-bielefeld-1999.html). 
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Realos and Fundis326 within the Greens and it not only threatened to split the 
party but also the freshly elected German government. Fischer, however, 
kept his cool during his speech – which many have deemed the most im-
portant one of his entire career – and argued that it was time for ‘uncondi-
tional pacifism’ and ‘moral overkill’ to end if it meant that people were being 
persecuted and murdered as a result. Hence, Germany needed to act and take 
international responsibility in the issue. He questioned the position of the 
Fundis by arguing that Milosevic had disregarded 18 armistice proposals and 
73 UNSC Resolutions since the conflict had begun in Yugoslavia. At the end 
of his speech Fischer famously noted that “[f]or me personally, the lessons of 
history mean never again war and never again Auschwitz but also never 
again genocide and never again fascism.”327 One could perhaps go as far as to 
argue that the shift in the leftist German strategic thinking was crystallized 
within this sentence which would translate into practice in the form of mili-
tary action as a form of humanitarian intervention.  
The Auschwitz rhetoric of the Green foreign minister was accompanied by 
similar sentiments within the SPD. Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping said 
in an interview with der Spiegel in March 1999 that Germany had not given 
up the credo of never again war but that the credo was based on a 40-year 
period of Cold War during which the threat of nuclear war was omnipresent. 
Scharping argued that even still, “a part of our soul had always held an out-
break of such a war completely unrealistic and hence also the outbreak of war 
itself” but that more recently since Srebrenica, things were different: “We 
have war in this part of Europe. Our responsibility is to end it.”328 Scharping 
caused a lot of unrest with his claims at the end of March 1999 surrounding 
the so-called Rugovo Affair, which dealt with the arguable execution of Alba-
nian civilians in the village of Rugovo by the Serb police in January 1999. In 
April, Scharping presented photographs of the supposed victims to the Ger-
man and international press. The German minister had also argued that the 
football stadium in the Kosovo capital Pristina was being used as a concen-
tration camp of sorts and that it was impossible as a German just to watch as 
326 The Realos and Fundis are the two traditional groups within the German green movement. Realos, 
most notably represented in the person of Joschka Fischer, were seen to be the ‘Realpolitiker’ in the 
party, exercising pragmatic politics and concentrating on present issues and reforms. Fundis, in 
turn, were labeled ‘fundamentalist’ because they were arguably idealistic in their policies and 
represented the voice of opposition and protest as well as a fundamentally pacifist stance. Most 
prominent Fundis are Jutta Ditfurth, Jürgen Trittin and Hans-Christian Ströbele.  See Kleinert, 
Sebastian  (1992), Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei. Die Geschichte der Grünen, Eichborn Verlag, 
1992, p. 110-118;  Sattler, Dieter (2014), ‚Realos und Fundis‘, Frankfurter Neue Presse 22.9.2014; 
‚35 grüne Jahre, Realos und Fundis‘,? http://www.gruene.de/partei/30-gruene-jahre-30-gruene-
geschichten/30-gruene-jahre-8-realos-und-fundis.html.  
327 Transcript of Fischer’s speech at the Sonderparteitag der Grünen in Bielefeld, 13.5.1999. Available 
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people were being detained there. A group of German journalists, who had 
interviewed locals in Kosovo, released a film called Es began mit ner Lüge (It 
all began with a lie) claiming that Scharping’s evidence was false and that his 
arguments were lies, attempting to soothe the deteriorating support for the 
NATO air campaign in Germany. Scharping’s maneuvering became clear af-
ter some key German OSCE officials were interviewed, including a former 
German general who sharply criticized Scharping’s comparison of Auschwitz 
with the situation in Pristina, that Scharping had clearly waged propaganda 
war in favour of German support for the NATO operation and that the Serb 
Hufeisen-Plan (Operation Horseshoe) was Scharping’s own invention.329 
Later it became clear that the journalists had also left vital evidence and tes-
timonies of local Albanians out of their film, that witnessed the mass expul-
sions of Albanians from Kosovo before the NATO bombings had started.330  
Many observers have considered Kosovo to be an important milestone, if 
not in the traditional power-driven sense of foreign policy normalization, 
then certainly in terms of the evolution of German foreign and security policy 
and strategic culture.331 In terms of strategic culture, however, the im-
portance lay not only in the historic decision to allow German troops to par-
ticipate in the actual fighting as part of the NATO bombing campaign, but 
rather in the conditions and reasoning behind the decision. First of all and 
significantly, Kosovo was the first war in NATO history that was fought with-
out a UN mandate, because Russia would not allow military strikes against 
Serbia because they were political allies (and as was the case later on, Russia 
accused the West of double standards when confronted with the question of 
Chechnya, Georgia and recently the crisis in Ukraine). In the Western media, 
politicians argued in favour of NATO airstrikes because it seemed the only 
way to stop the killing and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. German 
Chancellor Schröder also argued strongly in favour of the airstrikes because 
the sending of German ground troops to Kosovo would have been politically 
too costly, if not impossible. Second, Kosovo became the first war during 
which military action was strongly legitimized by the need for a ‘humanitari-
an intervention’ since it was clear that the West could have done more to pre-
vent some of the atrocities that took place during the Bosnian war a few years 
earlier and even before that in Rwanda. The novelty of the issue for German 
strategic culture since the Kosovo crisis – besides sending combat troops – 
329 Loquai, Heinz 2000, Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Wege in einen vermeidbaren Krieg. Die Zeit von Ende 
November 1997 bis März 1999,Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 137-145. Operation 
Horseshoe was allegedly a Serb plan of ethnic cleansing, yet officials of German Defense Ministry later 
admitted that the whole plan was bogus. 
330 ‚Schöngeredete Apartheid?, Der Spiegel, 12.3.2001, 11/2001. 
331 See Lantis, Jeffrey 2002, ‘The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Cul-
ture in Kosovo’, Comparative Strategy, 21:1, pp. 21-46; Baumann, Rainer & Hellmann, Gunther 
2001, ‘Germany and the use of military force: ‘total war’, ‘the culture of restraint’ and the quest for 
normality?, German Politics, Vol.10, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 61-82.    
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was that ‘humanitarian intervention’ became something of a standard cue 
whenever the legitimacy and purpose of Bundeswehr deployment was in 
question. Moreover, the humanitarian intervention propagated by the West, 
Germany included, seemed to fit rather well with the re-interpretation of 
German historical responsibility. Not only did the Germans comply with the 
requests of their allies (never again alone) but did that in full conscience of 
their historically re-determined responsibility (never again Auschwitz).  
Hence, against this background it is easy to perceive why many consid-
ered Kosovo to signify a break with the German past at the time, including 
many of the leading policy-makers. But there were those who argued that 
German behaviour was completely in line with the traditional antimilitaristic 
stance and the concept of Germany as a civilian power.332 These assessments 
are more in line with the German actions outside of the battlefield – in the 
realm of diplomacy. German diplomats had left no stone unturned in order 
to achieve a peaceful settlement between the conflict parties, however unsuc-
cessful these efforts turned out to be. Germany was also a strong supporter of 
a unified European response to the Kosovo conflict and was most vocal about 
the need to bring Russia in to achieve a lasting solution.333 Moreover, Fischer 
had already envisaged a draft for a peaceful solution for the region which lat-
er came to be known as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe that in-
cluded the prospect of EU-membership for the countries involved.334  
Overall, the decision to participate in the NATO military campaign against 
Milosevic and his regime was without a doubt a historic one. The Kosovo 
conflict, and the crisis in the Balkans more broadly understood, brought an 
end to unconditional German pacifism and seemed ultimately to confirm that 
the old Clausewitzian principle that war was a continuation of politics with 
other means was still valid to a degree because military threats and threats to 
security and stability simply had not vanished with the end of the Cold War. 
In that sense, the often-stated argument about ‘breaking foreign and security 
political taboos’ (Enttabuisierung) in Kosovo is accurate. Yet the difference, 
at least in Germany, was that the ends of such policies were strictly deter-
mined by the humanitarian discourse involving a strong sense of historical 
awareness and not power politics or inter-state rivalries. Hence, it could be 
argued that the German policy in the Kosovo conflict could be interpreted as 
both continuity as well as change in the German strategic posture, because 
the ideational shift from ‘never again’ war to ‘never again Auschwitz’ that had 
taken place since Srebrenica had now been implemented. In the aftermath, 
this seemed to be the new course for German strategic culture for the fore-
332 See Maull, Hanns 2000, ‘German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a Civilian Power?’, German 
Politics, Vol.9, Issue 2, 2000, pp. 1-24;  Hyde Price, Adrian 2001, ‘Germany and the Kosovo war: still a 
civilian power?’, German Politics, Vol.10, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 19-34. 
333 ‚Mílosevi? wird der Verlierer sein‘, Der Spiegel, 19.4.1999, 16/1999. 
334 Friedrich, Roland 2005, Die Deutsche Außenpolitik im Kosovo-Konflikt, VS Verlag für Sozialwis-
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seeable future as a result of the transformation process in the German Left. 
There remained only one party in the Bundestag which unequivocally re-
tained its position as a defender of unconditional pacifism, the PDS (later die 
Linke). However, the 9/11 terrorist strikes in 2001 and the subsequently 
propagated war on terror would not only divide Europe but also Germans on 
the issue of military deployment once again. This was already the case prior 
to 9/11, considering the contradictory debate on the German contribution to 
the NATO-led operation in Macedonia in 2001.335 
3.6.  SUMMARY ? STRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE 
FROM 1945 TO THE WAR IN KOSOVO 
To conclude this chapter, I will now elaborate more closely the different cases 
in terms of the analytical model presented in Chapter 2.3. The purpose of this 
exercise is to knit the analytical framework more closely together with the 
individual cases as well as to provide a synthesis of the process of strategic 
cultural change in the given period. I will also briefly contrast this analysis 
with Wendt’s conception of cultures of anarchy in order to bring a con-
trasting / complementary system-level view to the table. 
Cold War 
In terms of fundamental/incremental change, the most comprehensive 
change during the Cold War undoubtedly came in the form of a reformation 
of German strategic culture and of Germany turning towards the West. This 
was due to the external shock of the collapsing strategic culture of the Third 
Reich which was essentially caused by German defeat in WW II. The refor-
mation of German post-WW II strategic culture stands out as a comprehen-
sive change due to the process of rethinking and reconceptualizing German 
strategic thought and potential role in international security and defence pol-
icy. However, during the Cold War German strategic culture was poised to-
wards maintaining the status quo firstly, due to the external constraints put 
on German armed forces and German ability to project military power and 
secondly, due to the socializing effects of Europeanization and Westerniza-
tion on German polity. The reformulation of German strategic thought in the 
form of ‘never again’ was to ensure not only that Germany upheld its com-
mitments to NATO and its allies but also to ensure that Germany would nev-
er again play the role of the aggressor in initiating war and conflict. The 
foundation of ‘never again’ also served the purpose of solidifying German 
335 See ‚Rühe warnt vor hohen Risiken bei Mazedonien-Einsatz‘, die Welt, 19.8.2001; ‚Mazedonien: 
SPD: Zustimmung für Einsatz sicher‘, der Tagesspiegel, 28.7.2001; ‚Parlament streitet über Marschbe-
fehl‘, Handelsblatt, 19.8.2001. Available at: (http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/zahl-der-spd-
gegner-eines-mazedonien-mandats-waechst-parlament-streitet-ueber-marschbefehl/2091012.html). 
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international role image as a civilian power, which was well established in 
German strategic culture throughout the Cold War. However, it is important 
to point out that these fundamental changes at the level of strategic thought 
did not materialize in fundamental change at the level of strategic action, be-
cause they principally underlined the notions of anti-militarism, restraint in 
all things military as well as German boundedness to NATO, UN and EC, i.e. 
the Western political institutions. Overall, the Cold War decades paint a ra-
ther static view of German strategic culture that had to operate carefully 
based on the fact that Germany was considered a front-line state in a nuclear, 
bipolar world. 
 Regarding Wendt’s model of culture of anarchy, the early Cold War dec-
ades can be argued to be a transition period from a devastating war (5-6 
years of Hobbesian anarchy?) back to a Lockean system where war certainly 
was an option, but not a logical means of interstate interaction given the de-
structive power of nuclear weapons. We can certainly argue that Wendt’s ma-
jor variables regarding structural change seemed to be increasing at a sys-
temic level given the formation of collective institutions of security such as 
NATO, EC and the UN, which all underlined the importance of interdepend-
ence and expressed common fate among their members. However, and in 
contrast, self-restraint at the system level was internalized only to the degree 
that the existence of nuclear weapons forced states toward self-restraint. Al-
so, states did not collectively renounce conventional warfare as a form of in-
ternational interaction despite the fact that treaties were formed to express 
the contrary (e.g. the CFE Treaty).  
In terms of the hypotheses made about the links between Wendt’s model 
and strategic cultural change, we can argue that the early Cold War decades 
seem to confirm the first hypothesis, namely, that changes in German strate-
gic culture (formation of a new strategic culture) were conditioned by struc-
tural changes after the end of World War II. Interdependence and common 
fate certainly played a key role for Germany, whose policies were firmly di-
rected towards the West and its collective institutions. In addition, military 
self-restraint was not only accepted but was also established as a German 
raison d’être. These developments in the early decades after World War II 
seem at least partly to confirm the second hypothesis made regarding 
Wendt’s model. Strategic cultural change, i.e. the formation of a new strate-
gic culture after the end of World War II, was necessary for Germany’s sur-
vival, but it was largely dependent on external constraints imposed on Ger-
many. However, I would also argue that the process of domestic internaliza-
tion of the principal lessons of never again played a crucial role in how that 
new strategic culture was established and more importantly, sustained 
throughout the Cold War decades. Even though it could be argued that this 
process was forced upon Germany externally since Germany was basically 
left without a choice, it would be far-fetched to argue that Germans would 
have learned different lessons from their past in the absence of external con-
straints given the devastation and ‘total war’ of World War II. Hence, system-
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level features only partly explain German strategic cultural change during the 
Cold War. The experience of warfare (German defeat and the devastation of 
World War II) functioned as the primary causal mechanism in the refor-
mation of German strategic culture. 
Reunification, first Gulf War and Bosnia 
The end of the Cold War did not specifically alter the content of strategic 
thought in Germany – ‘never again’ remained the cornerstone upon which it 
was built. However, the end of the Cold War functioned as an important 
stepping stone in facilitating the later changes in German strategic culture. 
Significantly, it provided the external conditions for an expansion in the 
scope and depth of German strategic action. But perhaps most importantly 
and somewhat paradoxically, the end of the Cold War and the structural 
changes with the destabilizing effects that came with it also brought ‘war’ 
back to Germany. This was immediately detectable during the first Gulf War 
during which Germany remained on the side-lines and received a lot of in-
ternational flak for doing so. This conflict also revealed the extent to which 
the Cold War tenets of German strategic culture (antimilitarism, culture of 
restraint) seemed to be at odds with the emerging new world order. As ar-
gued above, in Germany, the situation after reunification and the end of the 
Cold War was politically very delicate. The Gulf War struck a chord in Ger-
many since Germany was now faced with the external pressure that demand-
ed exactly the opposite of Germany’s decades-long commitment to self-
restraint. In a way, the Gulf War could be seen as some sort of a wake-up call 
for Germany to the post-Cold War political reality, which seemed to reaffirm 
the Lockean logic of rivalry of the long Cold War years, even though in itself 
it did not present an external shock forceful enough to facilitate tangible 
change in strategic culture. Rivalry still remained the prevalent logic of post-
Cold War international politics at the system level, which did not sit well with 
Germany’s nascent strategic culture that at the time was built strongly on the 
notions of antimilitarism and self-restraint. 
In essence, the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity meant that power 
was distributed more evenly among the units in the system which theoreti-
cally need not necessarily have anything to do with the logic of how states 
interact with each other. Indeed, while the end of the Cold War prompted the 
shift from bipolarity to multipolarity and led to the cessation of the rivalry 
between the two superpowers (US and USSR), rivalry between the US and 
Russia continued. However, with the Maastricht Treaty, the EU established 
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itself as one of the poles in the multipolar system336 – the EU (and NATO) 
are perhaps the best examples of  nascent Kantian cultures of anarchy be-
cause the interaction among their members is based on friendship. 
Nonetheless, if we contrast the argument regarding the continuity of 
German strategic culture with the Wendtian model in the immediate after-
math of the Cold War, it was precisely the domestic developments and the 
institutionalization of the ‘never again’ normative framework which made 
German strategic culture substantially more progressive than the culture of 
Lockean anarchy that was driven at the system level. If we project this 
against Wendt’s model, its explanatory power becomes questionable in terms 
of strategic cultural change and we have to reject the hypotheses made in 
Chapter 2.4. Firstly, strategic cultural change would seem improbable for 
Germany because in Wendtian terms, it would in effect mean cultural re-
gress, not progress (if anarchy evolves from Lockean to Kantian as Wendt 
has claimed and if we accept the notion that the nascent German strategic 
culture after the end of the Cold War aimed to sustain a more progressive 
Kantian logic). Secondly, Wendt’s model does not take into account that 
Germany’s relative power vis-à-vis the system level and other units had 
grown considerably with the end of the Cold War and German reunification. 
Germany was hence able to resist the external pressure of the systemic logic 
better. Indeed, it was clear at the time that Germany was neither willing nor 
ready to abide by the Lockean logic of anarchy (if abiding by the logic in ef-
fect meant that Germany would periodically have the potential to use mili-
tary force). Importantly, however, if we were to frame the issue in systemic 
terms, we could argue that it was precisely Germany’s evolving relationship 
with the reality of the prevailing logic of Lockean anarchy that would cause 
problems for Germany and its strategic culture in the course of the 1990s. 
This particularly came to the fore in the break-up of former Yugoslavia and 
the wars that erupted as a result. 
In contrast to the Gulf War, the war in the former Yugoslavia and particu-
larly the massacre at Srebrenica in Bosnia stands out as an external shock 
that has had the most profound impact on German strategic culture since the 
end of the Cold War. Firstly, it facilitated the normative change in the ‘never 
again’ framework – from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’. Sec-
ondly, the escalating war in the Balkans basically led to the sanctioning of 
Bundeswehr out-of-area operations with the Constitutional Court’s ruling in 
1994337, hence representing a major break from the Cold War credo of terri-
torial defence. Thirdly, Bosnia not only problematized the Germans’ relation-
336 Van Langenhove describes ‘poles’ as “states endowed with the resources, political will and institu-
tional ability to project their interests at the global level”. See Van Langenhove, Luk 2010, ‘The EU as a 
Global Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 2.0 Environment’, Egmont Paper 36. Brussels, 
Egmont Royal Institute for, International Relations, March 2010, p. 6. Multipolarity describes a situa-
tion at the system level in which power is relatively equally distributed across three or more poles.  
337 See pp. 10?-10? for more detail. 
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ships to peace and war, but it also questioned German strategic behaviour, 
i.e. ‘never again alone’. This could not only be detected in the alleged German
‘unilateralism’ regarding its recognition policy towards the secessionist Yu-
goslav republics, but also in the re-emerging debate regarding German ‘nor-
malization’ and ‘Sonderweg’. Most importantly, though, Bosnia and Srebren-
ica in particular questioned the continuity of the strategic foundations of
German security and defence policy and scrutinized the position of ‘ethical
pacifists’ in Germany.
Indeed, the developments since the Gulf War and particularly beginning 
with Bosnia and especially the massacre at Srebrenica brought into light the 
normative discrepancy which basically pulled German strategic culture in 
two different directions which were not compatible in political terms. I will 
argue about the causal relevance of Srebrenica in terms of German strategic 
cultural change in detail in Chapter 5 and it is therefore not necessary to 
delve into that discussion here. For the purposes of the argument and related 
to the claims of the Wendtian model of anarchy, let us here instead proceed 
with the claim that it was a causally significant event in bringing about the 
observed outcome, i.e. the change in the normative structure of German stra-
tegic culture (which then enabled the introduction of a new strategic practice 
– the use of force to prevent genocide, ‘never again Auschwitz’).
This is a hard case for the Wendtian model. The main reason is the fact
that the Wendtian model implies that changes at the unit level regarding the 
use of military force are relatively unimportant unless they somehow drasti-
cally affect the process of change on the system level (otherwise they just 
contribute to the status quo / continuity of the given logic of anarchy). 
Hence, it is the argument of the Wendtian model that the prevailing logic at 
the macro level, not the individual logic at the micro level, ultimately decides 
how states react to issues that deal with the use of military force. The fact 
that the logic in the relationship between the Western coalition (NATO) and 
the Serbian government could be seen as based on something other than 
friendship (enmity, rivalry) at the time doesn’t tell us very much about why 
Germany chose to reconsider its position in terms of the use of force. Neither 
does the fact that the interaction within NATO is based on friendship suffi-
ciently explain why Germany took part in the conflict management opera-
tions militarily (even though it explains it to a degree since it aligns with 
‘never again alone’). Rather, as described above, these changes were not 
brought about by systemic variables, but by external shocks that fed directly 
into the German national experience of warfare. Hence, the above analysis on 
Bosnia and Srebrenica does not lend any particular support to a system-level 
explanation of strategic cultural change in Germany at the time, even though 
the structural change within the international system that was brought about 
by the end of the Cold War was a necessary precondition for the expansion of 
the scope and depth of German strategic action. In summary, while Bosnia 
and Srebrenica showcased the difficulty of maintaining continuity within 
German strategic culture and the fact that Germany was struggling with the 
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prevailing logic of Lockean anarchy, Germany did not change its stance to-
wards the use of force due to a systemic logic of interaction.  
Kosovo 
The significance of Kosovo in terms of strategic cultural change in Germany 
lies in that it principally highlighted the effects of the normative shift after 
Srebrenica, that was now realized in terms of strategic action as Germany 
took part in the NATO bombing campaign. It seems plausible to argue that 
the normative shift after Srebrenica was a necessary precondition for Ger-
man involvement in Kosovo. However, the fact that the Schröder government 
was under considerable pressure and seemed to go against the grain of the 
left supporter base seemed to indicate that other external factors actually 
played a crucial role in facilitating German participation in Kosovo. In terms 
of our analytical model, peer pressure stands out as one of the more im-
portant mechanisms as it was bolstered by ‘never again alone’ at the norma-
tive level, which seemed to surpass the very real problem of the potential 
Red-Green coalition break-up. 
The case of Kosovo seems at first to be a rather solid case for probing 
Wendt’s claims on anarchy. Firstly, German strategic behaviour in Kosovo 
seemed to correspond with how states are assumed to coalesce against a 
norm breaker in the system, according to Wendt. While this can also be ar-
gued to have been the case in Bosnia to a degree, the West acted much more 
cohesively and robustly in Kosovo. Secondly, the political consensus within 
the German government had shifted from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again 
Auschwitz’ which gave the political elite leeway in legitimating the decision of 
German military participation. Moreover, while especially the Greens had a 
hard time with the decision over Kosovo (as indicated by the debates during 
the party conference in Bielefeld in 1999), the argument can also be made 
that they moved due to external pressure since it is more than likely that the 
newly-elected Red-Green coalition would not have survived a Green com-
promise on the issue. The Green ‘Realo’ foreign minister Fischer clearly por-
trayed Milosevic and his regime as a ‘rival’ that had to be dealt with military 
force if necessary.   
Importantly, however, as argued, NATO air war was deemed illegitimate 
in terms of the UN Charter because it wasn’t based on a UNSC mandate, 
which was one of the reasons why the political debate surrounding Kosovo 
was controversial. The German Left (PDS/Die Linke) was consistent in its 
argumentation that the NATO’s air war was illegal, which has basically been 
the position of the party on international interventions ever since it has been 
represented in the Bundestag. Moreover, Russia was vehemently against the 
NATO military intervention, a fact which was of great concern especially for 
German social democrats. In a sense, the West was breaking its own norms 
by coalescing against a norm breaker without the approval of the UNSC. 
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The NATO air war was clearly a violation of international law and the sov-
ereignty of one of the members in the system, and was on one hand a blow to 
the credibility of international society to maintain its own principles, while 
maintaining international peace, on the other. These developments ham-
pered the path towards a Kantian system because it seemed that the states 
system wasn’t ready for a wide acknowledgment of self-restraint. The argu-
ment can also be made that Kosovo was the first litmus test for whether and 
to what degree German strategic culture would comply with the logic that it 
faced at the system level.  The degree to which this would have occurred had 
the German polity not reinterpreted the meanings of the German past the 
way it did is uncertain. I will return to discuss this in Chapter 5.4.      
To summarize, in terms of the causal mechanisms presented in the ana-
lytical model, the evolving experience of warfare stands out as the most cru-
cial one in bringing about tangible change in strategic culture. However, it is 
crucial to point out that the actualization of this change did not manifest it-
self only in terms of the shift from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Ausch-
witz’ and the subsequent German participation in military crisis management 
(outcome). It was also an important part of an ongoing process where the 
tenets of Cold War German strategic culture were pitted against the emerging 
post-Cold War political reality. Indeed, the ‘second order’ mechanisms that 
had ensured continuity in German strategic culture during the Cold War in 
form of socialization and peer pressure by establishing a strategic culture 
based on military restraint in a political and military alliance with the West 
were steering German strategic culture towards uncharted waters after Ger-
man re-unification. Instead of non-action and military restraint, these mech-
anisms now pulled in the opposite direction, but not only that – they also 
reinforced the ‘never again alone’ principle. This came to the fore particularly 
during the Gulf War and later in Kosovo. What is more, the end of the Cold 
War created a ‘capability-expectations’ gap in German strategic culture that 
the Kohl government and the conservatives were committed to closing by 
policies often referred to as incremental change in the form of ‘salami tac-
tics’.338 German participation in IFOR/SFOR and the NATO bombings in 
Kosovo testified to the fact that this gap had at least temporarily been closed. 
However, the evolving experience of warfare during the 1990s revealed an-
other gap which had rather more to do with German willingness to use force 
than its capability to do so. While peer pressure and socialization within 
NATO and the nascent EU called for increased German activism in the field 
of security and defence, Germany was not willing to draw the conclusion that 
increased activism was inevitably to be equated with increased use of military 
force. The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo disclosed that the main reason lay in 
the mechanism of evolving experience of warfare - which by generating tan-
gible change at the normative level simultaneously created a sense of uncer-
338 See Chapter 5.4. for more detail. 
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tainty as to where German strategic culture was going and into what sort of 
an entity it was incrementally transforming.  
Indeed, this seems to be the most important thing to take from this period 
in terms of the evolution of German strategic culture. Hence, the fact that 
Germany participated in actual combat alongside its NATO partners for the 
first time since the end of World War II is an interesting and a significant 
outcome in terms of strategic cultural change in its own right. However, the 
discrepancy that the experience of the Balkan wars created, with reflections 
on the German past within the normative structure of German strategic cul-
ture ultimately suggests that the causal mechanisms involved were also ca-
pable of potentially leading to different outcomes. To put it in another way, 
German military participation in the Balkans was anything but inevitable. 
Interestingly, however, it seems that neither persuasion, peer pressure nor 
socialization were sufficient to bring about German military participation 
and that the normative shift in the mid-1990s was a necessary condition for 
this outcome to be actualized a few years later in Kosovo.  
The benefit of applying the proposed analytical framework of strategic 
cultural change can be detected in the strong case made about Srebrenica as 
an external shock that was crucial in triggering fundamental change in Ger-
man strategic culture in the period from Bosnia to Kosovo – as exemplified in 
terms of the evolving process of experiences related to war and warfare. The 
added value of the framework also lies in the realization that external shocks 
are not necessarily determined by specific moments in time prompted by 
‘grand scale’ historical events (e.g. the end of the Cold War), but can arise out 
of geopolitical situations of lesser magnitude that can lead to cultural adapta-
tion and transformation. This differentiates the analytical framework from 
notions that stress the role of structure in facilitating change, i.e. ‘critical 
junctures’ or ‘unsettled’ periods during which it is argued that change is more 
likely to happen.339 We can certainly describe the period from Srebrenica to 
Kosovo in terms of political uncertainty in German strategic culture (as op-
posed to the period from 1991 to 1993, for instance), but as will be argued in 
the next chapter, this did not lead to a period of ‘structural stability’ in terms 
of strategic culture, if we take that to refer to the overall stability of discursive 
and other practices of the entity in question. Hence, the argument that struc-
tural uncertainty facilitates strategic cultural change is too vague, because it 
refers to the instability of a set of structural conditions (institutional, eco-
nomic, political etc.) without assessing the specific factors that were either 
sufficient or necessary in bringing about change. 
339 See Chapter 2.3 for a discussion on ?critical junctures’ and ?unsettled periods’. 
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4 ?IM EINSATZ? ? GERMAN STRATEGIC 
CULTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN TO 
LIBYA AND BEYOND 
4.1.  THE WAR ON TERROR: FROM AFGHANISTAN TO 
IRAQ ? ?????????????????????????
“We can’t let the lie win the day, the lie which proclaims that the ter-
rorists are fighting for the oppressed people of the world. Bin Laden 
is no Robin Hood.”340 (Peter Struck) 
On the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon in New York and Washington, German Chancellor Schröder made 
a governmental statement at the Bundestag regarding the attacks. Schröder 
said: “Ladies and Gentlemen, I’ve expressed the deep sympathy of the Ger-
man people towards the American President. I’ve promised him our uncondi-
tional – I stress: unconditional – solidarity.”341 The Bundestag discussed the 
situation in a long plenary session on 19 September 2001.342 Schröder de-
scribed how the Americans had freed the Germans from the Nazi yoke and 
that Germany was eternally grateful for the US for enabling German integra-
tion into the West and finally making German re-unification possible. But 
Schröder said also that German gratefulness, albeit an important and 
weighty category would not suffice as the sole basis for the ‘existential deci-
sions’ that would perhaps have to be made. He made clear that the decisions 
would be made solely in terms of securing the future viability of Germany in 
a free world.  Yet he referred to UN Resolution 1368 which made a new in-
terpretation of the existing international law which could, according to 
Schröder, now enable firm actions, potentially also military ones, against in-
ternational terrorism. Schröder said also that Germany fully supported the 
UNSC stance as well as the reinterpretation made by the NATO Council, 
namely, that a terrorist attack against a NATO-member state was in accord-
ance with the interpretation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty as an 
attack against all NATO partners. Schröder argued that the US had the right 
to pursue the perpetrators and masterminds behind the 9/11 attacks includ-
ing states which provided shelter for terrorist activities. This re-
interpretation of the international law exemplified in UN resolution 1368 and 
the German ‘unconditional responsibility’ he had promised, would also have 
to be understood in this spirit. Schröder confirmed that Germany was ready 
for military action if necessary and required but would not venture into any 
340 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/192? (11.10.2001), p.?18689.?
341 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/186, (12.9.2001). 
342 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/187, (19.9.2001). 
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kind of adventures. The Chancellor also noted that a fixation solely on mili-
tary means was the wrong way to go and that Germany wanted an extensive 
concept for fighting terrorism, which had to be founded on the grounds of 
political, cultural and economic co-operation.343 
The tone of the plenary session was consensual in the sense that the oppo-
sition parties mostly agreed with Schröder’s notion of ‘unlimited solidarity’. 
Yet there were some differences in how this was interpreted.  Politicians on 
the right were more eager to interpret this as de facto military assistance to 
the US, whereas those on the left stressed the need for a collective anti-
terrorist alliance, which should exhaust economic, political and cultural 
means and not only military ones. The whole Bundestag, however, had a joint 
understanding that 9/11 had changed the world and created the need to es-
tablish a new kind of security policy as a solid strategic fundament for tack-
ling the upcoming challenges of the 21st Century.  Many MPs also stressed the 
fact that the fight against terrorism was not about the clash of cultures but 
about a battle of civilization against barbarism. A common understanding 
emerged within the Bundestag (with the exception of the PDS) that now was 
the time for Germany to stand by the US, no matter what. Some MPs, such as 
Angela Merkel (CDU) raised the question of Germany’s future role – whether 
Germany was capable of becoming a political power besides being an eco-
nomic one.  The underlying idea behind a new concept of security, which 
emerged in the discussion, was based on the interplay between civilian and 
military means in a bipartisan understanding.  This occurred even though the 
need to reassess the Bundeswehr capacities and tasks and to review the 
freshly introduced budget in terms of defence spending was raised by the 
opposition.344  
The Bundestag discussed the Operation Enduring Freedom and Germa-
ny’s role in it three weeks later.345 Chancellor Schröder’s rhetoric had re-
mained much the same. He deemed the American response to the terrorist 
strikes as ‘necessary’ and ‘justified’. According to Schröder, Germany had to 
show the kind of solidarity, which did not only pay lip service but was appro-
priate to Germany’s responsibility at the international stage.  The US and 
Germany were not fighting a war against another state but against a criminal 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Schröder pointed to the necessity of German 
solidarity in the actual situation – a necessity which had not only historical 
and contemporary reasons, but which was also important considering Ger-
many’s future position in international politics. Importantly, he stressed that 
the time of cheque-book diplomacy was over and that it was time for Ger-
mans to take international responsibility. According to Schröder, this unmis-
343 Ibid., pp. 18301-5. 
344 Ibid., p. 18315; p. 18325. 
345 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, (11.10.2001). 
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takably meant the deployment of military force in the defence of freedom and 
human rights in order to create stability and security.346    
Schröder’s speech can also be interpreted as being aimed at shifting the 
focus in the debate concerning the future orientation of German strategic 
culture: he argued that the readiness to provide security also via military 
means was an important confession to Germany’s alliances and partnerships. 
But not only that – Schröder also said that in order to come to terms with 
Germany’s greater responsibility for international security, Germany had to 
develop a new self-understanding in its foreign and security policy. He also 
argued that accepting international responsibility and simultaneously avoid-
ing every immediate risk could not be the guiding principle of these policies. 
However, Schröder acknowledged the fears in the German citizenry towards 
anti-terrorist military actions and noted that German civil society was more 
skeptical than ever towards the deployment of military means against terror-
ism. Schröder saw this skepticism as ‘a progress in terms of civilization’, even 
though it sometimes made it more difficult to argue in favour of the use of 
military means as a necessity.347  
The Chancellor noted that for him personally, the well-justified restraint 
that existed within German society was always more welcome than any form 
of ‘Hooray-patriotism’. He pointed to the links between terrorism and the 
continuing crisis in the Middle East, the peaceful resolution of which needed 
highest political priority in the current situation. Schröder concluded that the 
German concept of security was extensive and had already been introduced, 
and partly also implemented during the conflicts in the Balkans: it consisted 
not only of material security and social security, but also of legal security. The 
concept also entailed the ability to put up a fight understood in this context – 
hence the concept also had a special European quality to it.348 However, 
there is no denying that while declaring unlimited solidarity with the US, 
Schröder remained skeptical concerning the ultimate motives of American 
politics. Nonetheless, the precariousness of the situation also made it easier 
to pick up the subject of German international responsibility in the field of 
military deployments in the domestic political arena. 
The argument put forward by the CDU/CSU was that 9/11 had conse-
quences but it would be wrong to say that everything had changed as a result. 
What remained were the values and the respect for human dignity and above 
all the chance to stand up for them and for freedom and justice stronger than 
ever before. Germans had to play a leading role in the fight for human 
rights and against terrorism in the 21st Century. This could be achieved by 
finally making Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) a reality and by 
making the EU a central pole in the Weltinnenpolitik (understood as a new 
concept of ?‘world ?domestic ?policy’).??Alliances?that?were?based?on?sh???? 
346 Ibid., pp. 18680-4. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
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??????? ????? important but the end of the Cold War had not led to value 
neutrality but was the result of advocating human rights and the values of 
freedom and democracy. The argument was that the common interests in the 
fight against terrorism could not lead to an immediate acceptance of Russia 
into NATO, for instance. The Union acknowledged that the use of military 
means was indispensable in the fight against terrorism but that it could not 
be the solution in the long term. 9/11 had blurred the boundaries of internal 
and external security in the sense that the terrorists had acted from the 
midst of open societies which posed a new kind of threat.  That is why there 
should be no segregation between internal and external security – “there is 
only the threat”, as Merkel posited. The threats had changed and that they 
required new thinking and above all resolute and coherent action: “The 
mission for Germany in the 21st Century will be to act consistently, 
considerately and consequently without compromise.”349 
Social Democrats argued that the whole extent of the fight against terror-
ism had become more precise since 9/11. A complex and multi-layered strat-
egy against terrorism was deemed necessary – a strategy which had to be 
based on political, economic, financial, cultural and military elements and 
development aid. As Peter Struck put it: “We need an intellectual-political 
examination of the kind of thinking, which questions every value based on 
freedom and democracy. We can’t let the lie win the day, the lie which pro-
claims that the terrorists are fighting for the oppressed people of the world. 
Bin Laden is no Robin Hood.”350 
The Greens argued in a similar vein that the answer to terrorism had to be 
extensive. Military aspects of that answer were currently in spotlight, but a 
focus on economic and political issues was also needed. In addition, a 
stronger cultural dialogue was indispensable in the conflict-ridden world. 
According to Foreign Minister Fischer, the task was no less than devising a 
draft for a peace policy in the 21st Century. In contrast to the Cold War days 
this policy meant establishing an ‘international politics of order’ pitted 
against international terrorism. This meant creating a world order which did 
not allow zones without or a complete loss of political order, as was the case 
in many parts of the world. This point was important not only in the sense of 
the dangers, which could arise within these zones without order, but even 
more importantly, in the sense of attempting to alleviate the suffering of the 
civilian population within these zones.  If there was anything about the crea-
tion of the new world order everyone could be critical about it was the fact of 
living in the illusion of a peaceful world. Multilateralism would determine 
much of the international politics of the 21st Century and that was also an 
important consequence of 9/11. Among the objectives of Islamic terrorism 
was to destroy the state of Israel and that was something the Germans could 
never allow to happen because of Germany’s historical responsibility towards 
349 Ibid., ????18684-8. 
350 Ibid., ????18688-90. 
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Jews and Israelis. Germany would resolutely condemn every act of such ter-
rorism against Israel irrespective of its origins – whether instigated by Bin 
Laden, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah or whomever. Germany was committed to 
securing the existential right of Israel and its right to secure borders and 
peace. As a ‘friend of the Israeli people’ Germany was just as committed to 
the peace process in the Middle East – a process which acknowledged the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. These rights included autonomy 
and the possible option of a state of their own, but with the caveat of the exis-
tential right of Israel as well as taking into account Israeli security interests. 
Moreover, the central axis of the international politics was moving and Rus-
sia would also emerge more strongly on the world stage. This was in the in-
terests of Europe but Europe would have to be united in its policies towards 
Russia unless it wanted to make a severe strategic mistake. A united Europe 
was one of the powerful poles of the 21st Century, not Great-Britain, France 
or Germany individually.351  
The PDS argued in defence of its position that it had not resorted to radi-
cal pacifism. The PDS was arguably not a pacifistic party even though paci-
fists and their principal objection of armed violence were highly appreciated 
among the party’s ranks: “There are more things between heaven and earth 
than just pure pacifism and unbound solidarity between the NATO mem-
bers.”352  
The Bundestag debated the actual German participation in the Operation 
Enduring Freedom on 8 November and 16 November 2001.353 Chancellor 
Schröder argued that Germany had to do more than just show solidarity be-
cause the terrorist attacks on 9/11 constituted not only a case against the 
American way of life but also against the German Basic Law and the values 
upon which it was built. Schröder said that Germany would meet the Ameri-
can requests and send 3,900 troops to be deployed as part of Enduring Free-
dom, consisting of reconnaissance, ground and naval units. Schröder 
stressed that the German deployment was not about participating in the ac-
tual bombing or fighting on the ground and that German participation in En-
during Freedom should be understood as proof that Germany had grown 
ready to bear more responsibility internationally. According to the rather 
confusing formulation of the Chancellor, the German deployment was not 
about implementing a foreign political strategy; it was about implementing 
Germany’s own interests and protecting its values. Schröder also made clear 
that terrorism could not be won solely by using military means, which were 
an indispensable but only one part of a strategy for international security and 
peace.354 
351 Ibid., ????18690-92. 
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The Chancellor concluded by noting that Germany had participated in 
military deployments with the international community whenever these de-
ployments had been deemed as necessary, objectively possible and justifia-
ble, like in the Balkans. He stressed that the decisions to participate militarily 
had always been accompanied with sustained political, economic and hu-
manitarian engagement and that this was also the basis in the German fight 
against terrorism. The Chancellor argued that the decision to deploy the 
Bundeswehr in the fight against terrorism was definitely ‘a turning point’ be-
cause it was the first time that the international situation and terrorism 
forced Germans to deploy the armed forces in a military operation outside 
the Alliance territory.355 . Schröder had to be meticulous in navigating be-
tween the pledges made to the US and the domestic political terrain. Ulti-
mately, he was forced to tie his policy on Afghanistan to a vote of confidence 
in November 2001, because of growing concerns among the governing par-
ties, especially the Greens, regarding US actions in Afghanistan.  Schröder 
won the vote but only narrowly – with the opposition parties CDU/CSU and 
FDP voting against it, even though they had principally supported the US 
policy on Afghanistan from the start.356 However, at the SPD party confer-
ence in Nuremberg a few days after the debate, Schröder was re-elected as 
party chair with a record majority of more than 88% of the delegates.357 
Social Democrats argued that the question about German military de-
ployment was more important than just dispatching soldiers. Germany’s reli-
ability was at stake and that if Germany would say no to Enduring Freedom, 
it would have to sheer itself off from the international anti-terrorism coali-
tion, which in turn would lead to isolation.358 The war in Afghanistan was 
neither a traditional war between states nor a war of aggression but an at-
tempt to destroy terrorist networks and prevent attacks such as that of 9/11 
altogether.359 The argument was that it had always been an essential re-
quirement for both the SPD and the Greens that international law be upheld 
in the military operations as well as sanctioned by the UN. The problematic 
legal status of the Kosovo mission made its own mark on the discussion and 
certainly did not make a decision one way or the other any easier, as long as 
the international law was not evolving. As long as that was the case, the SPD 
argued, the UNSC should remain the authority on the issue. Germany was 
right to show solidarity to the Americans, which did not have to mean an un-
conditional support of US military strategy: “A culture of doubt has to have 
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some room, and this has to pertain to the discussion on the military deploy-
ment as well.”360 
The Greens had not shaken their deep skepticism towards all things mili-
tary, but the sentiment within the party was that a clear majority would vote 
for Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan. The Greens referred to Chancel-
lor Schröder’s clarification regarding the Bundeswehr mandate, namely, that 
Germany would neither deploy combat troops on the ground nor participate 
in the bombing campaign against Taliban.361 Foreign Minister Fischer re-
ferred to German history and argued that even though war had brought im-
mense suffering and destruction to Germany, it was because of the domestic 
oppression and the dictatorship that had trampled human rights which made 
the outbreak of World War II possible in the first place. That is why the pre-
sent-day Germany had the responsibility to act not only based on the lesson 
‘never again war’ but to oppose violence wherever it threatened the most 
basic elements of peaceful coexistence. Fischer acknowledged that war was 
despicable and that he understood the emotions considering the unavoidable 
civilian casualties that accompanied every war. Yet he reminded everyone 
that it wasn’t America who had attacked but America was the one which was 
under attack and argued that even though it was dreadful, there was some-
thing such as ‘pacifistic real-political consequence’. Hence, the consequence 
was to act militarily, even though the background of the Greens stemmed 
from the lesson ‘never again war’. If Germans had something to criticize 
about themselves, then it was the fact that during the last decade, Germany 
had harboured the illusion of collecting peace dividends without investing in 
the peace itself. In concrete terms, this meant that the US should not revert 
to a unilateralist track but should work with Europe and embark on a preven-
tive peace-policy throughout the world – peace policy meaning something 
else than the use of the military means, which would always remain, so 
Fischer, ultima ratio.362 
The opposition (CDU/CSU and FDP) backed the government position on 
German military participation but would not vote for it since Schröder tied 
the decision of Bundeswehr deployment to a vote of confidence. Criticism 
was voiced on how Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul (SPD), Minister for Devel-
opment Aid, had publicly stated that a ceasefire was needed and that the con-
servatives, who backed the government policies, were simultaneously deni-
grated as warmongers. The Union argued that the successes in Afghanistan 
showed that Germany’s solidarity comes very late, if ever: “It is similar to a 
fire brigade which deploys only when it has made sure that the fire has al-
ready been put out. Bundeswehr wields a similar role as does our whole 
360 Ibid., pp.?19883-5. 
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country”.363  The FDP claimed that a major break in German foreign and se-
curity policy was at hand which was due to the change in the self-conception 
of German responsibility. This change entailed the notion that Germany 
could no longer remain neutral in the face of international terrorism.364 
In summary, Germany stood politically united behind its Western part-
ners, particularly the US and there were very few dissident voices in consid-
erations about the German support for the operation in Afghanistan (with 
the usual exception of the PDS). The reason why Germany was as united as it 
was in its actions was mainly because the fears of a possible war were si-
lenced by the tragedy of 9/11 and the sympathy and solidarity that the Ger-
mans felt towards Americans in its immediate aftermath. Overall, the mes-
sage that the Federal government was trying to convey was clear: the changes 
in international security after 9/11 posed challenges to such a magnitude that 
now was the time for Germans to ‘remove the military taboos’ (Enttabuisier-
ung des Militärischen).365 And yet, despite the initial feelings of solidarity 
towards the US, the overall sentiment in Germany did not reflect Schröder’s 
optimism, and this was echoed among the governing parties, the SPD and the 
Greens. As was already evident during the latter debates, the German posi-
tion of ‘unlimited solidarity’ would not translate into a wholesale acceptance 
of the US military strategy. As these debates showed, German preference was 
still clearly on the political and economic end of the spectrum, even though it 
was willing to act as a reliable partner in the fight against international ter-
rorism. Hence, after the vote of confidence was narrowly passed, Germany 
could begin with the deployment of the planned 3,900 troops to the Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom (OEF). OEF mainly focused on the fight against ter-
rorism, whereas the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that was 
deployed after the Petersberg meeting in December 2001 was the military 
component of NATO’s Afghanistan operation. Mandated by the UN and led 
by NATO since 2003, ISAF was tasked with addressing the overall security 
situation in Afghanistan and aid local governance via counterinsurgency 
(COIN) activities. Crucially, however, the original purpose of ISAF according 
to UN Resolution 1386 was to assist the Afghan government in the area in 
and around Kabul366, and therefore German politicians originally referred to 
ISAF as a ‘peace-keeping’ mission. Bundestag approved of sending 1200 
troops to ISAF in December 2001 and the vote was almost unanimously ac-
cepted, in stark contrast to the vote on OEF. This was clearly due to the dif-
ference in the original roles envisaged for OEF on one hand, and ISAF, on the 
363 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/202, pp. 19873-7. 
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other.367 However, German involvement in the OEF turned out to be rather 
uneventful whereas the ISAF slowly turned from providing assistance to tak-
ing part in counterinsurgency operations. Hence, the shift from peace-
keeping to peace-enforcing was evident as the operation progressed. 
German deployment as part of the OEF/ISAF contingent in Afghanistan 
was literally new and uncharted territory for Germany and its strategic cul-
ture. It was the first time Germany had dealt with counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency operations of major international scale. This was initially 
reflected in the debates concerning the Bundestag approval of German par-
ticipation: Germany would participate primarily to show solidarity in the al-
liance and hence prove to be a reliable partner. As Hilpert has noted, the de-
bate on the military threat of Taliban was barely mentioned.368 
The security situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate in 2003. In the 
summer of 2003, four German soldiers were killed in an attack against an 
unarmoured bus transporting German soldiers to the airport. As a result, ten 
armoured personnel carriers (Fuchs-Radpanzer) were sent to take control 
over the transport between the German base and the airport.369 However, 
patrols continued to be conducted in unarmoured vehicles, which was a 
symptom of a discrepancy between the German political elite still viewing 
Afghanistan primarily as a ‘stabilizing mission? and the deteriorating security 
situation for Bundeswehr troops on the ground. Given the US’ priority on the 
war in Iraq over Afghanistan, the then German Defence Minister Peter 
Struck (SDP) began to think about Germany expanding its operational remit 
to the northern part of Afghanistan in 2003. Struck justified his decision by 
stating that Germany faced a turning point in Afghanistan: Germany had 
both to expand and export security beyond Kabul to more insecure regions, 
or to withdraw completely and leave the country to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 
which were now increasingly active in the southeastern part of the country. 
In order to coordinate  the  work  of  the  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams 
(PRT) operating under ISAF better, NATO formed regional commands 
throughout Afghanistan.370 Germany took control of Regional Command 
367 Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Bundesregierung. Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte 
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North and as a result, a new German base was built in Mazar-i-Sharif in mid-
2004. 
The situation in Afghanistan kept deteriorating further and German 
troops were caught in armed fights with the insurgents who had now made 
their appearance in the hitherto relatively peaceful northern part of Afghani-
stan during 2006-2007. This was reflected in the growing rift between the 
political discourse and the situation on the ground. One of the more promi-
nent examples was the so-called Tornado debate, when Germany decided to 
send reconnaissance aircraft to the southern part of Afghanistan upon re-
quest to provide support for its allies. However, the decision was made de-
pendent on the planes not providing close air support to the ground troops – 
the use of force was allowed only as self-defence.371 This  was  in  stark  con-
trast  to  the  existing  practice  for  the German troops who, according to 
Hilpert, had received close air support 19 times from others by early 2009.372 
Germany’s allies were clearly irritated by this decision and it was not the first 
time Germany was blamed of applying double standards in implementing the 
Rules of Engagement (RoE). Indeed, as Hilpert has argued, “the Tornado 
debate showed again that the taboo on the military was still an issue”.373 
In December 2009, US President Obama declared a new strategy for Af-
ghanistan at West Point the aim of which was to root out Taliban and Al 
Qaeda and bolster the fragile situation by sending an additional 30,000 
troops. Obama’s strategy relied on the COIN concept (Counterinsurgency) 
initially adopted by the US forces in Iraq.374 Essentially, COIN included of-
fensive operations and expected combat despite its ‘partnering’ principle, 
which were targeted at the civilian population. This aspect of COIN is per-
haps better known as ‘winning hearts and minds’ – a slogan which became 
infamous after it came to light that US special troops operating under COIN 
were responsible for civilian casualties. As Hilpert has argued, the German 
response to Obama’s new strategy was lacklustre given the gravity of the sit-
uation in that it did not, in effect, adopt the more offensive measures of the 
strategy.375  Indeed, a day before the Afghanistan Conference in London, in 
January 2010, Chancellor Merkel gave a government declaration through 
which she argued that the Conference was about “developing a strategy for 
handing over responsibility”.376 At the Conference, Merkel pledged to send 
another 850 troops to support the existing German contingent, totalling 
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thereafter 5,350 troops. However, even though NATO commended Merkel’s 
pledge, the number of troops requested was originally a lot higher (2,500)377, 
which clearly indicated that Germany wasn’t buying wholeheartedly into the 
US approach. The German plans included the training of the Afghan army 
and police force as well as economic contributions – there was no mention of 
offensive operations of any kind despite the fact that ground combat had be-
come the new normality for those German soldiers who actively operated in 
patrol duties outside the safety of their bases.378 The last couple years of ISAF 
were spent on increasing Afghan ownership of their own affairs, training and 
schooling police, as well as providing security for the PRT’s. Also, with the 
help of better equipment compared to the early years of the deployment, 
German soldiers were able to keep their casualty count at zero – a striking 
contrast to years 2007-2010 with 33 fallen soldiers (with a total of 56 casual-
ties during 2002-2014).379 The last German ISAF contingent flew home in 
December 2014. 
Indeed, the German stance during its 14-year tenure in the Hindukush, 
the preference for political over military solutions proved to be remarkably 
resilient, and it wasn’t scrutinized even after the external shock of the 
Kunduz airstrike in 2009 brought home the brutal reality of the ‘warlike’ cir-
cumstances, that Bundeswehr troops had been operating under ever since 
the security situation had taken a turn for the worse sometime in 2007 even 
in the German controlled northern part of Afghanistan. Indeed, without the 
notion of traditionally strong strategic cultural continuity in the form of mili-
tary restraint, the discrepancy that ensued between the German political elite 
‘living inside their own discourse’ and the actual everyday reality for Bun-
deswehr soldiers on the ground might seem unfathomable given that the 
purpose of strategic culture is to establish clarity regarding the question of 
peace and war and the use of military force. However, and as will be dis-
cussed in detail in the next chapter, the critical re-interpretations of the 
German past, while culminating in the debate on German international re-
sponsibility and hence playing a major role as a legitimation for German par-
ticipation in OEF/ISAF, did not showcase a German strategic culture which 
would have been willing to change to the degree that seemed necessary for 
establishing clarity in terms of the use of military force. Indeed, this was 
highlighted by the clear differences in the experience of warfare at the level of 
high politics and the level of operational reality. Even though German partic-
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ipation in Afghanistan can be grasped in terms of change (particularly with 
regard to certain strategic practices), it also highlights the traditional lines of 
restraint in German strategic thinking. 
When we apply the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 to the 
case of Afghanistan, we can make a number of observations. Firstly, the ex-
periences of warfare gathered on the ground were mostly limited to the latter 
period (from around 2007) onwards. This partly explains the rather slow 
pace of German adaptation during the early years of ISAF. Indeed, as Zapfe 
has noted, the initial German reluctance to adapt to the COIN–concept was 
striking, even though Germany acted on COIN principles at latest from 
2009.380 Secondly, the Bundeswehr was not initially ready for wide-ranging 
counterinsurgency operations in terms of military capacity. This was not only 
reflected in the lack of specific military equipment, but both in the initial de-
piction of ISAF as a rather limited ‘peace-keeping’ mission and the Bundes-
tag mandate of the ISAF deployment. Moreover, the word ‘insurgency’ has a 
negative echo in Germany due to the German past (the suppression of the 
resistance movement by the SS and Wehrmacht during World War II). In 
addition, the lack of readiness for this type of military action was reflected in 
the debates pending the decision of military participation and the general 
understanding of a rather limited role for the Bundeswehr. Thirdly, the rift 
between the elite discourse and the operational reality on the ground that 
was caused by a steady mission creep from peace keeping to peace enforce-
ment was a disruptive factor in terms of the overall German experience of 
warfare and hence in the mechanism of strategic cultural change. While the 
operational level required adaptation, the political level was not ready (at 
least until the Kunduz incident) to draw the necessary conclusions. Fourthly, 
incremental adaptation did take place on the ground, however. As Zapfe has 
illustrated, this occurred in form of ‘Alliance Shortcut’ that was applied in-
crementally after the US had sent strong reinforcements to Afghanistan in 
2009. The practical needs resulting from combined and joint operations with 
the US forces under the ISAF depended on “a harmonized operational ap-
proach as well as shared Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), and in 
turn reinforced this operational alignment, even without a distinct national 
doctrine on COIN.”381 Hence, this functional requirement pitted the bottom-
up dynamic of adaptation against the top-down dynamic of strategic deliber-
ation, and hence, was a disruptive factor in terms of strategic culture provid-
ing clarity regarding the use of military force. 
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Iraq 
“We feel solidarity towards the United States but that does not mean 
we will embark on an adventure” (Gerhard Schröder)382 
The Iraq, along with Kosovo, has often been considered to be one of the wa-
tersheds in German foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War. 
The reasons for this are manifold but the main one is the fact that this was 
the first time when Germany openly challenged the unilateralist policy of the 
Bush administration by declining to play any part in American ‘adventurism’. 
However, the discord in the German-American relationship was not solely 
the result of the Bush administration’s unilateralist policies but rather of the 
whole process of renewing American security and defence policy thinking 
towards NATO, Europe and its stance in the fight against terrorism. It can be 
argued that US unilateralism, the strategy of pre-emptive conflict resolution 
and the way some states were written off as ‘rogue’ states and imprinted as 
the ‘axis of evil’383 stood in diametric opposition not only to the traditional 
German concept of the ‘culture of restraint’ but more significantly to the 
ideological cornerstones behind the Red-Green security and defence political 
thinking, the focus of which was on strengthening the EU’s own defence po-
litical capabilities, pursuing multilateral avenues in global security policy is-
sues and highlighting the role of civilian measures and actions in conflict res-
olution. Hence, the rift that ensued within German-American relations can-
not be explained only by US neo-conservative policies or the governmental 
change in Germany from Atlanticist to Europeanist orientation. It was rather 
the result of a deep conflict in views of how the fight against terrorism should 
be conducted, on the ground as well as in the cabinets of international poli-
tics. 
 Chancellor Schröder had argued as early as in September 2001, shortly 
after the Twin Towers in New York had collapsed, that Germany would not 
partake in any American military ‘adventures’. To many observers, this 
sounded hasty at best after he had proclaimed “unconditional solidarity to-
wards the US and the American people” a couple weeks earlier.  Yet, as 
Harnisch has noted, there was no firm German stance in the issue during the 
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run-up to the Iraq War between late 2001 and early 2003.384  Indeed, at 
times it seemed as if Germany was ready to participate militarily in Iraq pro-
vided there was a UNSC resolution. However, (and this was the more com-
mon position) the more consistent German interpretation was that even the 
UNSC resolution would not establish an automatism for war.  
The Red-Green coalition tried to soothe the rift with the Bush administra-
tion after its re-election in September 2002 especially during the NATO Pra-
gue Summit in November 2002, at which it pushed for a common position 
regarding Iraq. The NATO member states agreed that Iraq had to comply 
fully with the requirements of USNC Resolution 1441 if it wanted to avoid the 
consequences of non-compliance.  These soothing efforts also consisted of 
the German agreement to provide for the security of the American military 
bases in Germany and to open up German airspace for American transport 
flights. However, as a der Spiegel report vividly illustrates, German and 
French delegates were facing their US and UK counterparts “shoulder to 
shoulder” but on the opposite sides of the table.385 In addition, after an initial 
veto against the Turkish invocation of the NATO defence clause Article 4 in 
the face of potential Iraqi aggression late 2002, Germany agreed to provide 
Turkey with Patriot -missiles which were already being sent to Israel for the 
same purpose.386    
However, by the end of 2002 the German position had become firmly en-
trenched against any kind of military participation in Iraq especially as it be-
came clear that only a military option would suffice for the US administration 
regarding Iraq. The French and German qualms towards US policy had 
caused an outbreak by US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld who argued to a re-
porter that “(y)ou're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I 
think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the 
centre of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of new members.”387 
During the prelude to the war in Iraq, the German conservative-liberal oppo-
sition accused Chancellor Schröder and his government of breaking with the 
long German tradition of balancing between Paris and Washington and 
world security, hence arguably moving away from one of the cornerstones of 
German post-WW II strategic culture and of driving a wedge both within the 
NATO and the EU hence embarking on a new ‘Sonderweg’. Schröder was also 
personally accused of harnessing German foreign policy for the purposes of 
election campaigning. The Chancellor was called ‘a pacifist with the spiked 
384 Harnisch, Sebastian 2004, ?Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik auf dem Prüfstand: Die Nonproliferations-
politik gegenüber dem Irak?, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder, Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag, pp. 173-200. 
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helmet’, ‘the Tin Drummer’ and there were even comparisons in the German 
media between Schröder and Kaiser William II.388  
However, these accusations were not completely unfounded as there was 
also a certain ‘adventurism’ to be detected in the way Schröder himself navi-
gated through the international diplomatic waters at the time for which he 
received both domestic and international flak. As early as August 2002, be-
fore anything was decided and before anyone had asked for a robust German 
contribution in Iraq, with the UN report on Iraq still pending, Schröder de-
clared that Germany would not participate in any kind of military action 
against Iraq, even if the UNSC so decided. This was seen by Germany’s part-
ners, the political opposition and many observers alike as unnecessary and 
misplaced, because Schröder seemed to shrink Germany’s room for manoeu-
vre without any comprehensible reason.389  One of the main explanations for 
Schröder’s bold behaviour was that unlike in the case of Afghanistan in 2001 
when he had to tie the decision about partaking in the war against terrorism 
to a vote of confidence, the governmental “no” to Iraq was much easier to 
manage thanks to the traditional anti-militarist and pacifist sentiments with-
in both the Greens, the SPD and the German public as a whole. Hence, unlike 
in the case of Afghanistan, Schröder could count on the support within his 
own ranks and face international pressure that was put on his government by 
the US and the ‘coalition of the willing’ with a resolute ‘no’.  
In the crucial Bundestag debate over Iraq on 13 February 2003, Schröder 
argued that the decision about the use of military force and deployment of 
troops would never be easy and that Germans would never make these deci-
sions easy for themselves.390 Moreover, Schröder noted that such decisions 
are based on universal values of freedom, peace and justice and that this 
would also form the future basis of German security political behaviour, in 
questions concerning the use of force as well as Germany’s alliances and 
partnerships.  He also expressed the main concerns of the German govern-
ment concerning the possible military solution to the Iraqi conflict, which 
would exacerbate the rift between the West and the Islamic countries and 
would also potentially destroy the worldwide alliance in the fight against ter-
rorism. Schröder said that there was absolutely no doubt that Germany 
would stay in the forefront of combating terrorism, as the example of Ger-
man engagement in Afghanistan as part of the alliance testified, but that 
showing solidarity towards the US concerns since 9/11 would also give Ger-
many not only the right but also the duty to express their own opinions. In 
the effort of downplaying the differences between the German and American 
stances and appeasing the domestic opposition, Schröder praised the Ger-
388 ‚Diplomatie am Rotwein‘, Die Welt, 16.2.2003; Interview with Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutschland-
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man contribution in the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan and argued that 
without Germany there would be far less going for it in this difficult region.391 
Yet Schröder made it clear that Germany was not going to play by the uni-
lateralist rules set by the most powerful nation of the world and reiterated 
Germany’s commitment to Europe and the Franco-German axis: “Today, we 
are not arguing about the details of security politics or the ostensible strate-
gic or economic gain. We are not arguing about whether NATO should exist 
or not either, by the way. For us, the concern is whether the decision-making 
process remains multilateral or not. This is also about the current and above 
all the future role of Europe, the whole of Europe mind you. It has always 
been a common recognition within the Bundestag that this continent, our 
Europe, cannot fulfil its role without the most closely-knit co-operation be-
tween France and Germany.”392  
Schröder raised the issue of why Iraq was suddenly threatened with a mil-
itary strike and occupation even though it had been proven that North-Korea 
possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), a fact not yet proven in 
the case of Iraq. In fact, Schröder argued that Iraq did not possess WMDs 
and that threatening Saddam Hussein with military strike would not make it 
any easier to make the regime in Iraq budge in response to UN resolution 
1441, disarmament and complete co-operation with the weapons inspectors. 
For the Chancellor, the most important task of international politics was to 
prevent wars and that it was imperative for the UN to withhold the sole and 
only right in making the decisions about peace and war. Importantly, he ar-
gued that “(n)o Realpolitik nor security doctrine may lead to a situation, 
where we have slowly gotten used to treating war as a normal means of poli-
tics, or as it has been once said, as the continuation of politics with other 
means.” This stance echoed the difficult decisions concerning the use of mili-
tary force that had been made within the German Left during the conflict in 
the Balkans and later Kosovo where the authority and credibility of the UN 
was severely undermined.393  
Schröder noted that international law had been developed for centuries 
based on the principle of non-violence. He argued that according to this prin-
ciple, “the power of the strong should be replaced by the power of justice”. 
Schröder said that even though Iraq had to comply with the requirements of 
UNSC Resolution 1441, the Resolution itself did not create any automatism 
towards war and that the inspections had to continue and that they had to be 
reinforced.394  
The Greens criticized the domestic opposition, particularly the CDU/CSU 
for not bringing a credible option for peace to the table. Foreign Minister 
Fischer noted that the position of the German government was a majority 
391 Ibid., pp. 1874-1879. 
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position noticeable all over Europe, where anti-war sentiments were high. 
However, the argument was that even though the majority of European peo-
ple were against a possible war in Iraq, it didn’t make these majorities anti-
American, an accusation thrown at the government occasionally during the 
Iraq-crisis.395 Firstly, the Greens argued that the German Basic Law obliged 
Germany to do everything in its power to avoid war. Secondly, what was at 
stake was regional stability – a point on which Germany disagreed with the 
US concerning Iraq. In the case of Afghanistan, according to the Greens, 
Germany had no alternative because it was clear that Afghanistan provided 
the basis for Al Qaeda’s terror operations. Yet the case of Iraq was different, 
because the work of the weapons inspectors was still on-going and there was 
still a possibility to solve the crisis via peaceful means. Foreign Minister 
Fischer pointed out that the German government, with its French and Rus-
sian allies, stressed three points as an alternative to war: 1) full compliance 
by Saddam Hussein with the weapons inspectors; 2) intensifying the inspec-
tions; and 3) establishment of a long-term verification-  and control regime 
for WMDs for the whole region.396  
To provide the government’s anti-war stance with as much domestic polit-
ical leverage as possible and to counter some conservative reservations, 
Fischer told Bundestag about his meeting with the Pope who had argued that 
the biggest fear was “a war between civilization and Islamization of the Ara-
bic-Muslim world in the mid-term with fatal consequences.”397 Therefore, 
there was no more room of manoeuvre for Hussein besides full co-operation 
with Blix. Fischer agreed and argued that “(i)n a world where instability is 
increasing, we cannot seriously consider war as part of a strategy with the 
purpose of disarming the WMDs”.398  
Social Democrats were also critical of the opposition’s stance on the issue, 
arguing that while it appeared that the opposition did not want war with Iraq 
either, it had not introduced any steps how to prevent the war and that the 
conservatives were wrong to accuse the government of “embarking on a 
Sonderweg”, which the Social Democrats had explicitly denied.399 In addi-
tion, Defence Minister Peter Struck voiced his concerns about the American 
mistrust, especially that of his American colleague Donald Rumsfeld towards 
Germany, which, according to Struck, was totally misplaced and unfair. 
Struck noted that the Americans had already accepted that Germany would 
not send any kind of troops to Iraq during talks in the previous summer. Yet 
Germany was ready to fulfil and had already fulfilled a number of other 
American wishes: Germany was ready to provide security for the American 
transports from Rhineland-Pfalz to Bremerhaven if necessary; Germany was 
395 Ibid., pp.1884-7. 
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already securing the Gibraltar sea route and the entrance to the Suez canal in 
the framework of Operation Active Endeavor in the fight against internation-
al terrorism; the German navy was deployed at the Horn of Africa; and that 
Germany would say yes to the AWACS surveillance operation in Iraq. Against 
this background, it was incomprehensible that Rumsfeld would pretend as if 
it was nothing and why he compared German leadership to Fidel Castro and 
Muammar Gaddafi.400 However, the Germans did not fare a lot better in the 
diplomatic language considering Struck’s own outbursts and those of his 
comrade and fellow minister Hertha Däubler-Gmelin, who argued that the 
Bush administration was instrumentalizing the Iraq conflict to draw atten-
tion away from a deteriorating domestic economy, a tactic used also by ‘Adolf 
the Nazi’.401  
The CDU/CSU criticized Schröder for having steered Germany into a for-
eign policy crisis which was without precedent. In general, the CDU/CSU 
questioned the credibility of Germany’s ‘no’ in light of the Kosovo example. 
In addition, comparisons were made between Saddam Hussein and Hitler, 
the purpose of which was to remind the Bundestag what the consequences 
had been as Hitler was left unopposed both domestically and internationally. 
An argument was also made that the peace movement did not have the 
means to get Hussein to capitulate to UN demands, and that while the ideo-
logical-ethical pacifism might be completely acceptable as a stance of an in-
dividual, it was not viable in securing world peace or in containing dictators 
– hence the need for ?ethics of responsibility? instead.402 ??In addition, Angela
Merkel pointed out that Schröder was driven more by domestic political tac-
tics than concerns for Germany’s future as a reliable alliance partner. She
accused Schröder of pitting Washington against Paris and abandoning the
principle which endured from Adenauer through Brandt to Schmidt: ‘never
again war’ which according to Merkel in praxis meant ‘never again
Sonderweg’. Merkel argued that Schröder, while committing to his ‘no’ so
early on, had lost all ‘political weight’ unlike the French, who were diplomati-
cally much more experienced.  She also commented that the Chancellor had
to resort to a vote of confidence in the deployment of German troops in the
case of Afghanistan since he could not count on the unconditional support of
his own party. According to Merkel, this is why the Chancellor could not
withstand another vote in the case of Iraq, since it would mean new elections
– hence the vehement early ‘no’ on the Chancellor’s part.403
Merkel also wrote a piece in The Washington Post which received much
international attention at the time. She argued that “Schröder doesn’t speak 
for all Germans” and that “(i)t is true that war must never become a normal 
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way of resolving political disputes. But the history of Germany and Europe in 
the 20th century in particular certainly teaches us this: that while military 
force cannot be the normal continuation of politics by other means, it must 
never be ruled out, or even merely questioned as the ultimate means of deal-
ing with dictators, as has been done by the German federal government.”404 
The FDP mostly echoed the CDU/CSU’s positions and added that Germany 
had to abide by the rule of international law and stand by the UNSC Resolu-
tion, even if it demanded military action, otherwise Germany would be send-
ing a false message to Hussein that ‘anything goes’.405 
To summarize, in terms of German strategic culture, the war in Iraq 
seemed to confirm the continuity in the practice of military restraint. Im-
portantly, however, Iraq was the first case when Germany directly opposed 
the US’s unilateral policy. It represented the first major break in terms of its 
commitment to multilateralism due to Schröder’s unconditional ‘no’ and 
hence to the other side of its civilian power identity (the first break being the 
participation in the OAF mission during the Kosovo crisis). Yet the im-
portance of Iraq for German strategic culture was not in the famous German 
‘no’ as such but rather what it actually implied: a picture of a fundamentally 
more active Germany on the issues affecting global security. Germany want-
ed to provide an alternative way of reacting to terrorism that was not solely 
military in nature and was willing to commit its political and economic 
weight in order to achieve this. This alternative was reflected on the behav-
iour of the red-green government throughout the crisis, even though there 
were times when German military participation was not completely ruled 
out. Secondly, the Iraq crisis revealed the inherent discrepancy within the 
normative structure of German strategic culture unlike any other previous 
conflict including the Balkans and the incident of Srebrenica massacre in 
1995. In practical terms, the traditional balancing act between Washington 
and Paris was impossible given the principal ideological differences between 
the Bush and Schröder governments and the German commitment to a poli-
cy of non-aggression. Hence, Merkel’s and the conservatives’ interpretation 
of ‘never again war’ understood in practice as ‘never again alone’ was turned 
upside down by the red-green government as was clear from Chancellor 
Schröder’s remark during the Bundestag debate that a course of action had to 
be available other than “to fight a war with friends or give peace a chance 
without them”.406 
In light of the analytical framework of strategic cultural change, we need 
to answer the question of how it can contribute to our understanding of 
change and continuity regarding the case of Iraq. At first glance, it would 
seem plausible to argue that German ‘no’ was significant because it testified 
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to the continuity of German strategic culture. However, as argued earlier, 
while the actual German decision to participate in the NATO bombing cam-
paign in Kosovo was significant in its own right, the question of what the par-
ticipation implied for the evolution of German strategic culture (whether par-
ticipation in military crisis management was established as an institutional-
ized practice in German strategic culture, for instance) was even more im-
portant. Therefore, it seems that the significance of the German ‘no’ is linked 
to the German participation in the NATO bombings in Kosovo and to the de-
ployment in ISAF in Afghanistan, which somehow rendered the German 
non-military participation in Iraq more significant than it actually was in 
terms of the discussion regarding the issue of the use of military force. How-
ever, while the German ‘no’ implied a well established strategic practice of 
military non-participation (and hence continuity in German strategic cul-
ture), the process of strategic cultural change was not thwarted by Germany’s 
‘no’ in the case of Iraq, but continued throughout the German deployment 
during the ISAF in Afghanistan. Indeed, what the Iraq case shows, most of 
all, is that strategic cultural change and continuity can be two coincidental 
processes that highlight the different tenets of (German) strategic culture. 
Again, the more important thing in terms of change was not that Germany 
said ‘no’ to the war in Iraq (i.e. decided not to participate in it militarily), but 
rather what the ‘no’ implied in terms of the further evolution of German stra-
tegic culture, namely a break with the policies of Germany’s long-time ally, 
the US. As was portrayed in the analysis of the Bundestag debates, the Ger-
man ‘no’ was constructed on the basis of deep skepticism on behalf of the 
red-green government towards the Bush government’s political motives and 
conduct regarding Iraq specifically but also regarding the Middle East in 
general. Hence, what the case of Iraq shows in the context of the analytical 
framework of strategic cultural change in particular is, that while German 
non-military participation implied continuity in the German strategic prac-
tice regarding the use of military force, it simultaneously signified a break 
with Germany’s alliance with the US and led to the rift in the transatlantic 
relations. However, it did not facilitate change in terms of ‘never again alone’ 
in the sense that Germany was not acting unilaterally in its opposition to the 
US policy in Iraq.     
4.2.  POST-IRAQ: EUROPEANIZATION INSTEAD OF 
TRANSATLANTICISM? 
With regard to further evolution of German strategic culture, the transatlan-
tic rift that ensued based on the differences regarding the Iraq war and US 
unilateralism, was not a factor that would have clearly underlined the aspect 
of continuity. This was so despite the fact that the German rejection of Bush’s 
‘adventurism’ was strongly framed in terms of the German culture of re-
straint and ‘never again war’. Indeed, the firm ‘no’ on behalf of the Schröder 
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government raised serious questions regarding Germany’s alliance policies 
and partnerships, and seemed at first to indicate a change in terms of ‘never 
again alone/Sonderweg’ principles. First and foremost, US unilateralism and 
the issue of interventionist warfare raised questions regarding the use of mil-
itary force for Germany that went beyond the war in Iraq and the question of 
WMD’s. Even though Germany continued to be skeptical in terms of the ef-
fectiveness of the use of force especially as a pre-emptive means to topple 
dictatorships or regimes, the shift from multilateralism to unilateralism in 
US grand strategy, the repercussions of the transatlantic crisis for the func-
tioning of NATO and subsequently, the decrease in Germany’s ability to be 
able to influence the US and its other partners via traditional avenues of co-
operation within the transatlantic security community all seemed to under-
mine the idea of Germany as a civilian power.407 The German post-Iraq poli-
cy towards buttressing the process of CFSP and ESDP408 can hence not only 
be seen as an attempt to steer clear of US unilateralism but also as an aspira-
tion to preserve what was left of the idea of Germany as a civilian power. 
 CFSP and ESDP seemed particularly viable for the Germans in this re-
gard, because they strengthened the foundations of multilateralism in for-
eign, security and defence policy and functioned not as an alternative for 
NATO, but as a way to decrease European dependency on NATO in the realm 
of security.409 Moreover, the professed more active role for the EU as a secu-
rity provider underlines a rather complex transformation process. This needs 
to occur on the level of EU member states’ strategic culture before we can 
continue to argue for the evolution of a genuine European strategic culture. 
However, CFSP and ESDP continue to be of utmost relevance to this process 
and as Gross has argued, offer Germany an avenue to project and protect its 
interests.410 Furthermore, this policy framework aligned itself gradually in 
the German efforts to maintain a balance between civilian and military 
means in crisis management, with a clear national accent on the former. This 
had already been highlighted in the Action Plan Civilian Crisis Prevention, 
Con?ict Resolution and Post-Con?ict Peace Building which was passed by 
the German government in 2004. One of the main objectives of the Action 
Plan was to enhance the interconnectedness of actors and structures within 
crisis management and conflict prevention which paved the way for the in-
troduction of ‘networked security’ (Vernetzte Sicherheit) in terms of ‘Whole 
of Government Approach’. Even though the inclusion of CFSP in the Maas-
tricht Treaty’s pillar structure and the integration of WEU and CFSP within 
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the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 would hardly have materialized without 
strong Franco-German co-operation, Germany remained on the sidelines 
when France and Britain took the St. Malo initiative in 1998 in order to en-
hance the EU’s military capability and operability. Allens has argued that this 
was because “Germany had neither the ability nor a strong interest in leading 
an initiative that would make the EU more operative militarily”.411 However, 
the Schröder government gradually shifted its stance towards the ESDP be-
cause it enabled the German government to “develop the role of the WEU in 
line with the result of the Amsterdam Treaty and to use the ESDP in order to 
strengthen the EU’s capacities in the area of civilian con?ict prevention and 
peaceful crisis management.”412 Moreover, as Berenskoetter and Giegerich 
have observed, “(t)he [German EU] ‘Presidency Conclusions’ presented in 
Cologne in June 1999 clearly shows the German attempt to build up ESDP as 
an alternative to NATO, more precisely as a preferred alternative whose ac-
tivities resonate with German ideas of appropriate mandate, missions, and 
means.”413 
While it can be argued that Germany had been a steadfast supporter of 
both CFSP and ESDP since their introduction into the EU policy framework 
(ESDP especially since the St. Malo Declaration 1998), cases such as Opera-
tion EUFOR RD Congo and Operation EUFOR RD Chad have shown that 
Germany has fallen short in terms of implementing this support into con-
crete policy action. What is more, if we take a look at some of the crisis man-
agement tools created within CSDP framework, such as the EU Battlegroups 
concept, German reluctance to act is evident. When faced with actual deci-
sion, Germany has rejected calls to deploy Battlegroups that consist primarily 
of German troops (e.g. in the case of the Congo), even though it has been a 
strong supporter of the concept verbally. As Becker has argued, the official 
reasons given by the Germans for rejecting the deployment of the Battle-
groups include financial deficits, an overstretched Bundeswehr as well as a 
lack of military capability of the Battlegroups, which, in turn, were connected 
with pooling and sharing at the EU level. However, the problematic nature of 
the Battlegroups concept was already visible in the different roles envisaged 
for them by France, the UK and Germany. While France and the UK treated 
EU Battlegroups primarily as a way to a more effective burden-sharing of EU 
crisis management, for Germany the Battlegroups concept underlined the 
idea of multilateralism in common defence policy and the German insistence 
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on the inclusion of smaller member states indicates that the Battlegroups 
primarily served the function of EU integration for Germany.414 
Despite the elevated profile of CFSP and ESDP/CSDP in German post-
Iraq security and defence policy, it can be argued that NATO (together with 
the UN) remains the primary multilateral platform considering the issue of 
the use of military force in particular for Germany. This is regardless of the 
problems that the transatlantic crisis created and even though Germany has 
often been considered a ‘lukewarm’ or ‘status quo’ alliance partner.415 Keller, 
for instance, has argued that Germany never fully subscribed to the shift in 
NATO’s strategic posture towards out-of-area operations because of “fear of 
overstretch and a perception of insufficient threat”.416 However, the German 
military contribution to the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan can be seen 
not only as the German commitment to upholding its alliance commitments 
but also as a token of the significance of NATO in German strategic thinking 
without forgetting German preference for civilian measures in crisis man-
agement and its long term policy of intensifying the co-operation between the 
EU and NATO. This can be witnessed in the context of the perceived security 
challenge that Russia posed to the security of Europe and the transatlantic 
security community after the War in Georgia in 2008 and in the light of the 
current crisis in Ukraine, where Germany has played a key mediating role. It 
needs to be noted that the German preference for NATO in military matters 
also includes keeping the US vested in the developments in Europe and by so 
doing decreasing the pressure on the German leadership in expanding its 
role in military crisis management that has been on the increase ever since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Ultimately, as is reflected in the recent publication 
of the new German White Paper on Defence (July, 2016), NATO, unlike the 
EU, will continue to guarantee peace in Europe, even though it underlines 
the importance of the further development of the European Pillar in 
NATO.417 
In the following section, I will present an assessment of some of the key 
post-Iraq developments in terms of out-of-area operations for Germany and 
highlight the reasons why they matter in the discussion regarding the evolu-
tion of German strategic culture after the end of the Cold War. As the majori-
ty of the post-Iraq War crises and conflicts have occurred in the Middle East 
or in neighbouring regions in North-Africa as a result of the Arab Spring, it is 
worthwhile providing a more extensive overview of the German strategic 
stance in the region. Finally, I will also discuss the recent crises in Europe, 
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particularly the crisis in Ukraine from the viewpoint of German strategic cul-
ture. 
4.3.  FROM LEBANON TO LIBYA AND BEYOND: BACK 
TO THE FUTURE? 
Overall, as we have witnessed since the end of the Cold War, the German 
strategic stance towards the whole Middle East has been alternating between 
a more distant and a more active role while strategic continuity, in turn, can 
be detected in terms of Germany’s political and moral conviction to guaran-
tee Israel’s security and territorial integrity. As Behr has noted, after the first 
Gulf War, strategic continuity seemed to persist as Germany continued to 
support US hegemony in the region and for Israel while exercising a policy of 
self-restraint in terms of the other parts of the Middle-East.418 Hence, while 
keeping close to Israel and its interests, Germany distanced itself from other 
parts of the region, only occasionally interceding on behalf of its historical 
partners, Turkey and Iran. This ‘distancing’ was also highlighted in the Fran-
co-German agreement at the EU level that while Germany takes the lead in 
Eastern Europe, France concentrates on the Mediterranean.419 
However, as Jünemann has argued in detail, Germany became incremen-
tally more vested into the Mediterranean area through the introduction of 
institutionalized political co-operation such as the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership (EMP) and its successor, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Crucial in this regard was the growing awareness among German policymak-
ers over the new security challenges posed by the instability of the Middle 
East after the removal of internal borders at Schengen and the stepwise con-
solidation of EU foreign policies at Amsterdam, which, in effect, made Ger-
many a ‘Mediterranean country’.420 Behr points out that a notable rise in the 
German interest toward the Middle East became apparent after the Middle 
East Peace Process had failed and when it seemed clear that the US had em-
barked on a war against Iraq.421 Indeed, increasing US intransigence created 
windows of opportunity for the Schröder government to increase Germany’s 
foreign policy profile in the Middle East. This was reflected in the so-called 
Idea Paper for the Middle East (Nahost Ideenpapier), drafted by the then 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, which included concrete steps towards a 
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lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Elsewhere, Chancel-
lor Schröder hinted on the possibility of German military participation in a 
conflict management mission sanctioned by the UN if that was in the wishes 
of the conflict parties themselves.422   
Even though Germany has been a vocal supporter of Israel at practically 
every turn and while it has officially defended Israel against critical voices 
concerning the more robust Israeli policies rising within the EU (this was the 
case e.g. in the July 2006 war between Israel and the Hezbollah), Germany 
has also been an outspoken supporter of a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and supported the Palestinian authorities in the West 
Bank and Gaza districts with sizeable financial contributions.423 The majority 
of the German public does not, however, support a more visible role for Ger-
many as an advocate for either the Israelis or the Palestinians. For instance, 
according to a survey conducted during the time of the crisis in Gaza in 2014, 
69% argued in favour of Germany remaining on the sidelines.424  On the 
whole, Germany’s policies in the post-Iraq Middle East have attempted to 
harvest the benefits of being perceived as some sort of a counterweight to US 
supremacy and an interlocutor between divergent interests at times of rising 
unrest and turmoil (which was particularly pertinent at the time of the Iraq 
war and the subsequent period of crisis in transatlantic relations). At other 
times, Germany has sought a co-operative and multilateral approach to the 
US, both from within the EU and the CFSP framework and in its bilateral 
relations to other international actors in the region. Still, regardless of its 
resolute official support for Israel’s security and territorial integrity, Germa-
ny has remained far more sensitive to Palestinian issues than many other 
actors that are among the Israel’s closest allies in the region, particularly the 
US. Differences between Germany and the US were also detectable in the 
wake of the Syrian civil war at the G20 Summit in St. Petersburg in Septem-
ber 2013, when Germany refused to sign a US sponsored declaration which 
called for a strong, i.e. military response against Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad and his cohorts. However, as Schumacher has pointed out, “24 hours 
later at an EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Vilnius, Germany per-
formed a U-turn and acknowledged that some consequences will have to be 
422 ‚Fischer legt Ideenpapier für Nahost-Lösung vor‘, Handelsblatt, 9.4.2002. Available at: 
(http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/ruestungslieferungen-nach-israel-eingefroren-fischer-legt-
ideenpapier-fuer-nahost-loesung-vor/2155622.html). 
423 In 2014 for instance, Germany supported the Palestinians in terms of state-building, infrastructure 
and humanitarian assistance with around 225 Million Euro. For more information, see the website of 
German Foreign Ministry. Available at: (http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Regionale 
Schwerpunkten/IsraelPalestinensischeGebiete/ZukunftPalaestina/Uebersicht_node.html). 
424 ‚Umfrage: Deutsche gegen Engagement im Gaza-Konflikt‘, Spiegel Online, 7.8.2014. Available 
at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gaza-konflikt-mehrheit-der-deutschen-will-keinen-
einsatz-a-985066.html).  
156 
drawn”.425 Germany’s stance towards Syria (especially before the outbreak of 
the war) was much more accommodating in terms of a resolution to the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict than that of the US and Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
pushed hard for Syrian engagement in the issue. During the Syrian conflict, 
Steinmeier has been very active in his diplomatic efforts in the region.  Ger-
many’s role has also been considered pivotal in the mediation of the Nuclear 
Agreement with Iran in 2015.426 
Lebanon 
“Germany’s foreign and security policy has never been neutral.”427 
(Angela Merkel) 
In terms of German strategic culture, the war between Israel and Hezbollah 
in the summer of 2006 (the so-called second Lebanon-War) sparked a con-
siderable debate in terms of the use of military force, because it was the first 
time since the end of World War II that Germany’s military assistance had 
been requested by both the Israelis (and the Lebanese) to participate in the 
UN peacekeeping operation (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 
UNIFIL) as part of a Maritime Taskforce in the Mediterranean and the Leba-
nese coast. The conflict broke out in July 2006 as a result of the Hezbollah 
paramilitaries firing rockets across the border, killing a number of Israeli 
soldiers and kidnapping a further two. Israel Defence Forces (IDF) respond-
ed with air and heavy artillery strikes against Hezbollah military targets but 
also the civilian infrastructure. In addition, Israel imposed an air and naval 
embargo on Lebanon. Hezbollah continued to engage the Israeli forces 
through guerrilla -warfare and rocket strikes. 
On 11 August 2006, the UNSC unanimously approved UNSC Resolution 
1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution was approved by both 
the Lebanese and Israeli governments in the following days. It called for dis-
armament of Hezbollah, for withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, and for the 
deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces and an enlarged UNIFIL.428 UNI-
425 Schumacher, Tobias 2015, ‘Uncertainty at the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in 
the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands’, European Security, 
Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 392.  pp. 381-401. 
426 ‚Atomabkommen mit Iran: Wie wichtig Deutschland für die Verhandlungen war‘, Süddeutsche???????
tung, 14.7.2015. Available at: (http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/atomabkommen-mit-iran-wie-
wichtig-deutschland-fuer-die-verhandlungen-war-1.2565136); ?Westen begrüßt Atom Abkommen ????
dem Iran‘, Focus Online, 17.1.2016. Available at: (http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/sanktionen-
aufgehoben-atom-abkommen-mit-iran-begruesst_id_5216644.html).
427 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/50, p. 4832. 
428 UNSC Resolution 1701, S/RES/1701 (2006). Available at: (http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Reso?
lutions/S_RES_%201701(2006).pdf). 
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FIL was provided with an extensive mandate in terms of the use of force, in-
cluding the ability to provide forceful protection from hostile activities their 
area of operations. Moreover, the use of force was allowed in terms of resist-
ing attempts by force to prevent UNIFIL from conducting its mission.  
In September 2006, upon requests from both conflicting parties, Lebanon 
and Israel, the Bundestag authorized a naval deployment of up to 2,400 
troops as part of UNIFIL. The mission objective of the German contingent 
was to monitor the Lebanese coast to prevent weapons smuggling to Hezbol-
lah forces in Lebanon. The preceding debate around the German deploy-
ment, discussed below, would span a period of couple months not only be-
cause a German military deployment to the Mediterranean would mark a 
historical first, but also due to the fact that it included the possibility of 
armed German soldiers finding themselves staring at Israeli soldiers across 
the border.   
The Bundestag debates on the UNIFIL deployment were held on 19 Sep-
tember and 20 September 2006 and subsequently a vote on the participation 
followed. German military participation was accepted with more than a four-
fifths majority of Bundestag votes. Social Democrats highlighted the histori-
cal dimension of the issue. For instance, Foreign Minister Steinmeier recog-
nized the historical weight of the German decision by noting that “ten years 
ago nobody would have probably come to the idea of discussing sending 
German soldiers alongside other European soldiers to the Middle East”, he 
also stressed that “[...] since then, the conditions around the world had 
changed fundamentally, and we [the Germans] have changed with them.” 
Furthermore, for Steinmeier, German deployment in the Middle East was a 
sign of a maturing and the coming together of Europe, since he was certain 
that Europe would become a factor in moves towards peace in the Middle 
East. Moreover, while Steinmeier clearly recognized the pace of change and 
the novelty of the mission for Germany and the Bundeswehr, he tied it closely 
with ‘good’ German foreign policy tradition underlying continuity: “There is 
no doubt whatsoever: with this mission […] we are stepping onto politically 
new territory. But I say: this mission, as any, is part of the good tradition of 
German foreign policy. Always when the Bundestag has approved of such a 
mission, we have done it in order to create peace, to secure peace treaties or 
to prevent people from having to flee their homes or of their persecution.” 
Moreover, according to Steinmeier, the question of German deployment in 
UNIFIL was not a question of “the unprincipled breach with the taboos in 
foreign policy, which we ourselves have laid upon us after the era of National 
Socialists” but rather about “credibility and the recognition of normality, 
which does not protect us from demands anymore”.429   
Similarly, the CDU/CSU linked the deployment to the broader issue of 
German responsibility. Chancellor Merkel argued that “(t)his Bundeswehr 
mission in the Middle East is not like every other mission, it is a mission of 
429 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/49, pp. 4799-4801. 
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historical dimension. Why is this word not highlighted, although it is factual-
ly not the first out-of-area mission of the Bundeswehr beyond Germany and 
Europe? We all know that German responsibility in the world has changed 
with the course of the change of 1989/1990 and German reunification. This 
has consequences, which are also of military nature.”430 However, partly con-
trasting the historical dimension of the issue, the CDU/CSU also argued that 
Germany needed to participate in UNIFIL mainly because its interests in the 
region predicated that it should do so. For instance, a reference was made to 
a recent apprehension of suitcase bombers in Germany, the purpose of which 
was to highlight that Germany was threatened by the volatile situation in the 
Middle East and had vital security interests in maintaining a peace in the re-
gion.431   
The PDS argued against this logic. Gregor Gysi maintained that “you can-
not establish normality by soldiers and artillery” and that the German de-
ployment was controversial in terms of what was expected of the German 
soldiers: “It is known that both conflict parties have particular but very dif-
ferent expectations towards the German soldiers. The one hopes for respon-
sibility because of our history and the other hopes that something of our his-
tory still remains. A German government, which knows this, should have al-
ready beforehand said no to a mission involving our soldiers.”432  
The FDP, while representing the opposition, seemed principally to be in 
favour of German military deployment. Hoyer, for instance, argued that 
“(t)here are colleagues, who – after a thorough deliberation – are of the opin-
ion that the presence of the German military in the Middle East is a taboo. I 
highly respect this opinion, although I don’t share it. Others think that our 
history explicitly does not legitimize or give us an excuse to stay out of there, 
militarily too if need be. Finally there are those who say that it is just as un-
wise to participate militarily, although we are without any doubt ready to 
bear a great responsibility. I support this last line of argument.” Hoyer con-
tinued by legitimizing his party’s opposition to German military deployment 
by arguing that if the military mission failed, it would inevitably lead to an 
endangering of the political process.433  
However, it seemed that even the particular aspect regarding the relative-
ly extensive rules of engagement included in the original formulation in the 
UN mandate that was based on UNSC 1701 (which were eventually watered 
down by the Lebanese requests and the Bundestag mandate) did not prove to 
be too hard to accept for the majority of the Bundestag (with the exception of 
PDS). Chancellor Merkel reflected on this as she argued that “it is not an out-
of-area operation of the Bundeswehr as such nor is it the concrete formula-
tion of the mandate, which would make this mission to stand out from the 
430 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/50, p. 4831? 
431 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/49, pp. 4813-14. 
432 Ibid., pp. 4804-6. 
433 Ibid., pp. 4801-3. 
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rest. It is the region, which makes this operation into a special mission, a 
mission of historical dimension. In hardly any another place on earth can the 
special responsibility of Germany, the special responsibility of every German 
government and German Bundestag for the lessons learned from the German 
past, be conveyed as clearly as here.”434  
Another significant topic in these particular debates was the question re-
garding values and neutrality. Chancellor Merkel was particularly outspoken 
in this regard, as she argued that “Germany’s foreign and security policy has 
never been neutral. It was, it is and it will remain tied to values. Being tied to 
values is the opposite of neutrality.”435 However, this position had particular-
ly been criticized earlier by FDP’s ‘grand old men’ of German foreign and se-
curity policy, i.e. Walter Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Otto Graf 
Lambsdorff for whom it was imperative to protect German soldiers from get-
ting into conflict situations with Israeli soldiers – according to them, this was 
also in line with German ‘responsibility’.436  PDS also criticized the Chancel-
lor’s position of linking neutrality and values by arguing that there was a 
strong contradiction in the willingness to contribute to the weapons embargo 
on Hezbollah and the simultaneous delivery of weapons to Israel. The Arab 
world would not take the German position in this question for granted.437   
Initially, Merkel had been much more reserved towards the deployment of 
a German military contingent in the Mediterranean, but the direct request 
from the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert convinced her to reconsid-
er. This ultimately led to the decision to send in the naval contingent. How-
ever, after the German contingent was deployed in October 2006, there were 
several reported incidents of Israeli fighter jets harassing German naval ves-
sels which led to heightened diplomatic tensions between Germany and Isra-
el and loud criticism about government policy from the German opposi-
tion.438 Moreover, the Lebanese government had been able to negotiate a 
much more restricted mandate for the UNIFIL naval contingent than what 
was originally planned – German vessels needed the approval of Lebanese 
authorities to operate within a six-mile radius of the Lebanese coast, which 
434 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/50, p. 4832. 
435 Ibid. 
436 FDP-Granden warnen vor deutschen Soldaten im Libanon‘, Handelsblatt, 18.08.2006. Available at: 
(http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/brief-an-bundeskanzlerin-fdp-granden-warnen-
vor-deutschen-soldaten-im-libanon/2694618.html). 
437 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/50, p. 4835-7. 
438 ‚Libanon: Zwischenfall bei deutschem Marine-Einsatz‘, Spiegel Online, 25.10.2006.? Available 
at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/libanon-zwischenfall-bei-deutschem-marine-einsatz-
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considerably hampered German efforts to track potential arms shipments.439  
Indeed, the successes of the UNIFIL mission since the second Lebanon-war 
in 2006 have been few and far in between. Israel has always treated UNIFIL 
with a large dose of skepticism and even hostility, and considered the mis-
sion ‘ineffective’ and ‘toothless’ at best. However, it has always consented to 
the extension of the yearly mandate because there had not been a better al-
ternative.440    
In terms of German strategic culture, the UNIFIL deployment underlined 
the primacy of a historically conscious security and defence policy the princi-
pal aim of which is to bring about peace and peaceful relations, but added to 
the mix the notion of Germany defending its own interests and security 
through the deployment of military force – a factor which had not promi-
nently surfaced in the similar debates before UNIFIL. The discourse sur-
rounding German security interests was also reflected in the aspect of non-
neutrality professed by Chancellor Merkel. However, even though strategic 
continuity was detectable in the German government’s refusal to send 
ground troops to the Middle East, members of both governing parties (SPD 
and CDU/CSU) were surprisingly willing to consider it, and, as Belkin has 
argued, it was largely because the German ground troop presence had origi-
nally been requested by Israel. This was imaginable in a context in which the 
request of the Israelis seemed to indicate placing a high level of trust in Ger-
man politics.441 
Above all, the case of Lebanon particularly expressed the principled ten-
sion between the fact that Germany’s decision on the UNIFIL deployment 
was described as a decision of ‘historical dimension’ and the fact that this 
notwithstanding, Germany in any case had security interests in the region 
that needed to be secured. Hence, it can be argued that the process of strate-
gic cultural change since Srebrenica had come to a point where German par-
ticipation in military crisis management could in principle be legitimized 
without an explicit reference to the lessons of the German past. However, in 
this case, the reference to the past was evident, since the UNIFIL deployment 
concerned the security and territorial integrity of Israel – the German raison 
d’être. In addition, this was highlighted in the notion that participation in 
military crisis management did not equal the ‘militarization of German for-
eign and security policy’ but rather entailed recognition of German ‘normali-
439 ‘Israel versus Germany Confrontation off Lebanon Leads to Questions’, Spiegel International 
Online, 30.10.2006. 
440 See e.g. Shpiro, Shlomo 2008, ‘UNIFIL and EU BAM: The Limits of European Security Engagement 
in the Middle East  Nathanson’, Roby & Stetter, Stephan (ed.) The Israeli European Policy Network  
Renewing the Middle East:  Climate Changes in Security and Energy and the New Challenges for EU-
Israel Relations, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2008, pp. 85-112. 
441 Belkin, Paul 2007, ‘Germany’s relations with Israel: Background and Implications for German Mid-
dle East Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, January 19, 2007. Available at: (http://www.dtic.mil+ 
a464690.pdf). 
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ty’. However, the notion of ‘normality’ is problematic in terms of German 
strategic culture, because it would seem to suggest that the German past up 
until the point of Srebrenica was essentially something else than ‘normal’.442 
In the Bundestag debate, the term ‘normality’ was used to not only pinpoint 
that military crisis management had more or less become a ‘normal’ practice 
for the Bundeswehr, but to detract from the inconvenient truth that was also 
expressed in the debate, namely, that there were no guarantees that the Bun-
deswehr soldiers would be able to evade every confrontation with their Israeli 
counterparts, even if it would not involve the use of military force.443 This 
alone was a factor that warranted extreme caution on behalf of the Bundes-
tag. Even though the Bundeswehr deployment in UNIFIL marked a historic 
first, UNIFIL deployment itself was rather uneventful and did not do much to 
shape the German experience of war and warfare. Despite this, however, the 
significance of Lebanon in terms of strategic cultural change can be detected 
in the way German ‘responsibility’ was linked with ‘normality’. In order to act 
responsibly internationally, Germany had to come to terms with its ‘normali-
ty’. However, that did not mean a ‘normalization’ of the use of military force 
in the sense of rendering it ‘business as usual’. Rather, the idea was that 
Germany should accommodate the idea of ‘normality’ in the sense that mili-
tary crisis management should be seen as acceptable strategic practice in 
Germany’s toolkit, because Germany’s international responsibility depended 
on it (which was criticized by the PDS as ‘militarization’ of German foreign 
and security policy). Hence, the argument was that Germany’s ‘international 
responsibility’ could not be fully realized without the recognition of ‘normali-
ty’. 
Libya 
“The Faustian bargain”444 
In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, the conflict in Libya began when Lib-
yans started mass protests against the regime of Colonel Gaddafi, a reign 
which had lasted for more than 40 years. The protests soon turned violent 
following brutal repression by the regime. The City of Benghazi in Eastern 
Libya became the stronghold of the armed rebels. Under an arms embargo 
442 For more on ‘normality’ and German strategic culture, see Chapter 5.3.2. 
443 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/50, p. 4833. 
444 This term, which alludes to Goethe’s drama and the ‘deal with the devil’ was used by the chief for-
eign policy editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stefan Kornelius, to describe the problems that the West will 
face in the wake of the Arab Spring because of their earlier support of and deals with the dictators of 
the Middle East. See ‚Der Faustische Pakt‘, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13.1.2011. Available at: 
(http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/proteste-in-aegypten-rolle-der-usa-der-faustische-pakt-
1.1053171). 
162 
and UN sanctions placed upon the Libyan regime, Gaddafi’s troops pushed 
towards Benghazi and threatened to crush the rebellion and punish the Liby-
an population in early March 2011. Colonel Gaddafi himself announced that 
he would exterminate his political opponents and their supporters.445  The 
UN responded to these impending mass atrocities by taking preventive ac-
tion and issuing Resolution 1973, which called for protection of civilians un-
der the principles of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Resolution 1973 author-
ized member states, acting nationally or via regional organizations, to take all 
actions necessary to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya. Howev-
er, as Resolution 1973 ruled out the use of any form of a foreign occupation 
force on any part of Libyan territory, the protection was to be accomplished 
by overwhelming air power.446 In support of the Resolution 1973, NATO took 
robust action and enforced a no-fly-zone. NATO operation Unified Protector 
lasted until the end of October 2011, and arguably succeeded in preventing 
mass atrocities against civilians. Colonel Gaddafi himself was captured and 
subsequently executed by armed rebels before the end of the NATO opera-
tion. 
UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote of ten in favour to none 
against, but with five abstentions (China, the Russian Federation, Brazil, In-
dia and Germany). Instead of aligning itself with its NATO allies, Germany 
chose to abstain from the vote. This raised suspicions about the country’s 
commitment to a forceful see-through of the principles it so vehemently 
claimed to support.447 Germany’s UN ambassador Peter Wittig tried to ex-
plain his government’s position in the issue. He stated that while Berlin was 
concerned about the safety and well-being of the Libyan people and lent its 
support to the Security Council in stopping the violence in Libya, the Federal 
Government still saw enormous risks in the implementation of the Resolu-
tion 1973. Particularly, he mentioned the likelihood of a large-scale loss of life 
not to be underestimated; the risk of participating countries running into a 
prolonged military conflict that could spread in the wider region and the pos-
sibility of failure in the implementation of the Resolution which would make 
a quick and efficient military action unlikely.448 
445 ‘Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears’, The New York Times, 17.3.2011. Availa-
ble at: (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).  
446 UNSC Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973 (2011). Available at: (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_?
doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)). 
447 ‘Security Council Abstention: Germany Hesitates as UN Authorizes Action against Libya’, 
18.3.2011. Available at: (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/security-council-abstention-
germany-hesitates-as-un-authorizes-action-against-libya-a-751763.html); ‘Germany has marginalised 
itself over Libya’, The Guardian, 18.3.2011. Available at: (https://www.theguardian.com/comment 
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In the following, I will discuss the Bundestag debates surrounding Libya 
and subsequently assess their repercussions in terms of German strategic 
culture. Indeed, German behaviour and its abstention in the UNSC vote 
raised a number of questions concerning the state of its strategic culture. 
Firstly, China, Brazil, India and Russia certainly made rather strange bedfel-
lows for Germany in the vote on global security issues. Secondly, Germany 
took a conscious gamble by abstaining from the vote in terms of its effort to 
acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council – an effort that was set 
back considerably. Thirdly, German abstention might seem controversial 
from the outset given that Chancellor Merkel herself had earlier clearly set 
out two conditions for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya: regional 
support that had been received in the form of the Arab League vote and a 
pending UN Security Council authorization and the fact that Germany had 
been a vocal supporter of the earlier UN Resolution 1970 that condemned the 
violence in Libya and put economic and political sanctions on the Gaddafi 
regime. Finally, German abstention raised serious doubts about German reli-
ability as an alliance partner and the future course of German security and 
defence policy – indeed of the very foundation of the ‘never again alone’ 
principle.449 
The Bundestag debates took place before (16 March 2011) and after (18 
March 2011) the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973. In the first debate, Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle made the government position clear by arguing that 
“we do not want and must not become a party of war in an African civil-war”. 
According to Westerwelle, the effects of a military intervention would in all 
probability spread throughout the whole of North Africa and have repercus-
sions in the Arabic world. Westerwelle also argued that while Germany re-
spected and welcomed the decision of the Arab League to recognize the Liby-
an rebel movement as the country’s legitimate government, he underlined 
that the primary responsibility of the international community was in the 
hands of the states in the region with reference to the Arab League’s call on 
the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. He added that Germany’s be-
haviour in New York was conditioned accordingly. Ultimately, Westerwelle 
was skeptical towards the establishment of a no-fly zone because it would in 
effect be a military intervention as its implementation required the disabling 
of Libyan anti-aircraft positions.450  
449 See e.g. Kappel, Robert 2014, ‘Global Power Shifts and Germany’s New Foreign Policy Agenda’, 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 341-452; Oppermann, Kai 2012, ‘National Role Conceptions, 
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(http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-becoming-more-cautious-on-military-
missions-a-890931-2.html). 
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However, many members of the Bundestag remained skeptical towards 
the Arab League across party divisions. The Social Democrats argued that 
there was a discrepancy between the idea of Arabic ownership of the man-
agement of the conflict and the fact that three countries of the Arab League 
voted against the implementation of the no-fly zone, because it would be in-
terpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.  The 
CDU/CSU reminded the Bundestag that Saudi Arabia had sent troops to 
Bahrain to protect its fragile royal house but had done nothing to help the 
Libyan liberty movement. In this context one could not expect that Germany 
would be part of a NATO or EU coalition just because this had been antici-
pated based on the declaration of the Arab League. Moreover, Gaddafi’s disil-
lusionment over the German position was seen not only to show how para-
noid the Libyan dictator had become. Gaddafi had claimed in an interview 
with German media that he thought German position on Libya was, in con-
trast to many other Western countries, ‘very good’ and that he could there-
fore think to provide Germans with oil contracts in the future. It was there-
fore vital for the UNSC to check every possible and responsible avenue of ac-
tion in Libya, even the probability of sending weapons to the freedom fight-
ers, to end the violence as soon as possible. It was clear, however, that a no-
fly zone would not stop the Gaddafi regime from murdering civilians and that 
is why the question of sending ground troops would also be imminent.451   
Despite of the criticism towards the Arab League, there was a strong consen-
sus within the Bundestag that the Arab world had to take ownership of the 
Libyan crisis. The FDP argued that it was no longer possible for the West to 
act as the sole problem-solver only to be accused of having done something 
wrong afterwards.452 
Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD drew attention to the wider strategic out-
look of German foreign and security policy in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East in the context of the Libyan crisis. The argument was that the 
former EU colonial powers had often had too much say in the issues involv-
ing the future of the Arab world. Moreover, these colonial powers had raised 
political claims that were not implementable or even desirable according to 
the German standards. A particular reference was made to France, which had 
lost a lot of credibility in the past few weeks in the region even though the 
French had previously exercised some sort of ‘householder’s rights’. Germany 
was standing before a new era in its policy towards North Africa and the 
whole of the Arabic region. This policy was bound to entail the classical ten-
sions between an interest- and value –driven foreign policy. This meant that 
Germany had to exercise self-criticism in the fact that it had done a bit too 
much realpolitik with some of the Arab leaders and in the process perhaps 
forgotten the needs of the people in those countries.453  
451 Ibid., pp. 10818-21. 
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The CDU/CSU also argued that the interests Germany had in the region 
should be clearly spelt out – co-operation in the energy-sector and market 
participation. Germany also had a strategic interest in Israel’s security and in 
preventing a mass wave of refugees to Europe and therefore also an interest 
in the modernization, reforms and good governance in the area. Finally, 
Germany also had an interest with the countries in the region to fight terror-
ism.454 The position of Die Linke455, in contrast, was to reject German mili-
tary participation from the start and to disconnect the link between German 
interests and military conflict management. The only way forward would be 
to negotiate further and that wars should not be fought over oil as had been 
the case in Iraq.456  
Hence, as the first debate indicated, Germany remained skeptical not only 
towards the countries in the region and their capability to take ownership of 
the Libyan conflict (even though this was principally seen as positive), but 
towards Germany’s own allies and partners and the capacity of the West to 
solve the crisis by military means. Given that these sentiments were shared 
across the Bundestag and the sense of danger about getting dragged into a 
civil war in one of the most volatile regions on earth, an argument could be 
made that the German abstention from the vote on UN Resolution 1973 was 
perhaps not as surprising as the reactions among the scholars and media in-
dicated.457  
In the second debate on 18 March after the UNSC vote on Resolution 
1973, Foreign Minister Westerwelle tried hard to explain the German posi-
tion. Germany stood vehemently against Gaddafi and had proposed an even 
tougher line towards the Libyan regime in terms of economic sanctions by 
the UN in order to curtail the money flow for weapons supply. Germany 
stood at the side of those aspiring for liberty and those who were being per-
secuted and murdered because of their democratic beliefs. However, West-
erwelle drew a clear line between this and the question of military interven-
tion – a factor which was criticized by the opposition. According to Wester-
welle, the answer was the tightening of sanctions, not military action. Moreo-
ver, the Libyan crisis ultimately had to be solved through domestic dialogue 
between the conflicting parties, not Western intervention. Westerwelle re-
ferred to the latest experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and argued that mili-
tary deployments always meant civilian casualties, which Germans should 
keep in mind given the experiences from German history and the latest out-
of-area deployments.  Moreover, every potential German military deploy-
ment should be evaluated on its own terms. Westerwelle also tried to stress 
454 Ibid., pp. 10831-2. 
455 Die Linke was formed in 2007 as the merger of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) and the 
Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG), commonly referred to as ‘The Left’ in 
Germany. 
456 Ibid., pp. 10821-3. 
457 See footnote 449. 
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that Germany’s abstention did not mean that Germany would not be ready to 
take international responsibility - over 7,000 Bundeswehr soldiers were de-
ployed in out-of-area missions at the time.458   
A few members of the SPD and the Greens remained skeptical regarding 
the German abstention and claimed that abstaining in the UNSC vote was 
not decisive in the issue of national sovereignty but the explanation of why 
Germany did not stand by its allies was. They required measures from West-
erwelle to prevent an impression of Germany not willing to do enough for the 
human rights of the people of Libya. A reference was also made to the experi-
ence and lessons of Rwanda and the principle of R2P and that it was “a dis-
grace that Germany had abstained from the UNSC vote”.459 Moreover, vocal 
criticism was raised by former German MPs concerning Germany’s absten-
tion. The most prominent criticism came from former Green Foreign Minis-
ter Joschka Fischer, who claimed in an interview with der Spiegel that Ger-
many’s decision to abstain from the vote represented “one the biggest deba-
cles since the formation of the Federal Republic” and that “Germany is simp-
ly too big to play the role of Switzerland”.460 Even the former Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl later criticized the German government for endangering trans-
atlantic relations with its decision to abstain and lamented that Merkel’s for-
eign policy “was missing a compass”.461  
A number of scholarly accounts have made an attempt to explain German 
abstention from the UNSC vote. As Berenskoetter has observed in more gen-
eral terms regarding German abstention, the critics, accompanied by an air 
of moral superiority and/ or a sense of embarrassment, explained the Ger-
man decision “with a misplaced pacifist reflex, poor strategic thinking, and 
an incompetent Foreign Minister and, of course, with a short-sighted and an 
inward-looking government concerned mainly about public opinion.”462 In-
deed, the parties of the governing conservative-liberal coalition had been 
trailing in polls for the state elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-
Pfalz which took place a week after the UN vote and an argument could have 
been made that this played a role in the German abstention (as out-of-area 
operations have never been particularly popular in Germany). Some observ-
ers have even argued that German abstention was ‘a professional mistake’ 
458 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/97, pp. 11138-9. 
459 Ibid., p. 11139; p.11145; p.11149; p.11151. 
460 ‘Shame for the Failure of Our Government: Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council 
Abstention’, Spiegel Online, 22.3.2011. Available at: (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ 
shame-for-the-failure-of-our-government-fischer-joins-criticism-of-german-security-council-
ab????????-a-752542.html). 
461 ‚Merkels Außenpolitik ist ohne Kompass‘, Süddeutsche Zeitung 25.8.2011. Available at: 
(http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/helmut-kohl-kritisiert-bundesregierung-merkels-aussenpolitik-
ist-ohne-kompass-1.1134682).  
462 Bereskoetter, Felix 2011, ‘Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany’s Abstention 
on Libya’, SOAS. Available at: (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/). 
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made allegedly under time pressure as nobody had the time to explain to Mr. 
Westerwelle how the voting works in the UN.463 Others have claimed that 
German abstention can be explained by the bad timing of the events – Ger-
mans were not aware of the shift in the US position in favour of military in-
tervention in Libya while debating the issue on 16 March in the Bundestag. 
The argument here is that the shift in the US position was a major ‘game 
changer’ in that it enabled a UN resolution authorizing all necessary 
measures, supported by both Washington and all Arab countries. Indeed, as 
Brockmeier has claimed, had Obama or Clinton informed the Germans of 
their changed positions, “they would have provided the Bundestag with the 
opportunity to discuss Libya in a new light. Such a debate would have al-
lowed the German government to change course, possibly leading to a ‘yes’ 
vote in the Security Council and even minimal German military participa-
tion.”464    
However, all of the above explanations for German behaviour disregard 
the argument which would have more than likely ensured German military 
participation of some kind, namely the prevention of possible genocide or 
mass murder, a case which was admittedly much harder to make in the con-
text of Libya (even though it could not be disregarded completely) as was the 
case with Bosnia or Rwanda, for instance. There simply was not enough evi-
dence to make it a clear-cut case for German military participation, not to 
mention that even if proven to be true, the Germans would have been at 
pains to deploy  the Bundeswehr under ‘never again Auschwitz’ once again, 
especially as Libya was not exactly in Germany’s backyard. In essence, Gad-
dafi’s utterances regarding upcoming bloodbaths in Benghazi did not con-
vince the German government of the necessity to deploy military means – at 
least German ones. Hence, the R2P norm did not play a major role in the 
German decision-making process over Libya. What is more, there was no 
Libyan ‘Srebrenica’ upon which a case of intervention could have been made. 
Hence, R2P was not a sufficient cause on its own to move German govern-
ment to act militarily.  
Moreover, as Katsioulis has noted, NATO’s operational strategy of bomb-
ing strategic locations throughout Libyan territory corresponded much better 
with the objective of toppling a regime/dictatorship than the objective of pro-
tecting the people and establishing safe-zones or conditions for ceasefire ne-
gotiations – indeed the things mentioned in the UNSC Resolution 1973.465 
Hence, the actual fashion in which the crisis management was carried out 
resembled more a policy of regime change than that of a responsibility to 
463 Rühl, Lothar 2011, ‘Deutschland und der Libyenkrieg’, Zeitschrift für Aussen- und Sicherheitspoli-
tik, Vol. 4, No. 4, November 2011, pp. 561-571. 
464 Brockmeier, Sarah 2013, ‘Germany and the Intervention in Libya, Survival, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 64-
65. 
465 Katsioulis, Christos 2011, ‘Die Deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach der Intervention in 
Libyen‘, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, Vol. 4, pp. 36-37 (27-44). 
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protect. This was clearly an aspect that did not sit well with the powers-at-be 
in Berlin, because even though Germany wanted to see Gaddafi go, it wasn’t 
convinced of toppling the Gaddafi regime through military action. Indeed, 
Germany’s position at the brink of the Libyan conflict in 2011 was similar to 
its stance towards Iraq several years earlier, even though there were notable 
differences. While it was clear that the Germans did not believe that Gaddafi 
and his actions posed an immediate threat to world peace and Western secu-
rity (as was the case also with German view on Saddam and Iraq), one of the 
most important differences was that Libya did not have any major repercus-
sions in terms of transatlantic relations nor did it create a considerable rift in 
US-German relations, even though German reliability as partner was heavily 
questioned.  
How should we evaluate the case of Libya in terms of German strategic 
culture? From the outset, it would seem that Libya did not prove to be a case 
in which we could clearly argue in favour of strategic cultural change but then 
again, it is not a clear-cut case of strategic cultural continuity, either. First of 
all, Libya did not shake the normative or ideational foundations of German 
strategic culture to the degree that was feared by the alarmist observers at the 
time. Perhaps more than in any other case of potential German military de-
ployment, Libya stands out as a case in which German strategic behaviour 
was based on very careful strategic deliberation about potential risks and 
threats vs. potential gains of military intervention.466 This was much dis-
cussed during the debates on Libya which were not driven primarily by high-
er principles or moral imperatives but rather by objective assessments of the 
conflict situation. The wider context included the international actors and 
above all, the strongly conveyed notion of German interests (or the lack 
thereof) in terms of Libya. Miskimmon argues similarly claiming that Ger-
man abstention was a result of a combination of factors involving German 
national interests, which did not directly involve Libya: German responsibil-
ity and pressure in the handling of the euro crisis as well as its fallout in the 
German electorate.467 
Indeed, if one does not accept as unequivocal that the German Bundestag 
had not been informed about the US policy shift before the first debate on 
Libya, Germany would have most likely voted in favour of UN Resolution 
1973. Taking the wider context into consideration seems to offer the best ex-
planation for German policy in the Libyan case. However, perhaps an even 
more convincing explanation for German abstention can be found when we 
assess German policy towards the Arab Spring as a whole. Ever since the Iraq 
War, Germany had sought to establish not only a stronger profile for the EU 
466 Which is not to say that this would not have been the case earlier. However, German government 
officials reportedly exercised different scenarios of military action and non-action. On the repercus-
sions for German position, see e.g. Brockmeier, 2013. 
467 Miskimmon, Alister 2012, ?German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis’, German Politics, Vol. 
21, No. 4, pp. 392-410. 
169 
in the Middle Eastern peace process, but had attempted to carve out a 
stronger and more independent profile for Germany as well. This could be 
detected for instance in the active ‘post-Iraq shuttle-diplomacy’ that German 
foreign ministers have conducted over the years in the region during peace 
talks between Israelis, Arabs and the Palestinians. However, despite their 
qualitatively different approach to the Middle East compared to the major 
players France, the UK and the US which is detectable in their increased ef-
forts to engage in a dialogue with Islam468, the Germans were equally taken 
by surprise by the spiral of violence that followed the Arab Spring, in particu-
lar with regard to Libya and Syria. Hence, as one observer put it, the Ger-
mans had committed the ‘Faustian bargain’ along with the rest of the West, 
meaning that they had mistaken stagnation for stability in that they had ei-
ther ‘bought’ dictators off or offered concessions and turned a blind eye to 
human-rights issues, societal transparency and aspirations for political and 
societal modernization in exchange for stability in the region and ‘a little bit 
of hope’ for peace for Israel (e.g. in the case of German policy towards Egypt 
and President Hosni Mubarak).469 However, German policy differed consid-
erably from the rest of the major Western actors in the conclusions it drew 
from the violent popular upheaval brought about by the Arab Spring. Ger-
many remained skeptical of a military solution in Libya and later in Syria and 
focused its efforts on strengthening the national dialogue in the countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) as part of its peace media-
tion efforts.470 Hence, German abstention in the UNSC vote in the Libyan 
case was caused primarily by these sentiments – i.e. in the German strategic 
view, that the spiralling violence and the unpredictable domino-effect of 
spreading civil unrest was far more threatening to Germany’s security and its 
interests as Gaddafi and his regime and the fact that Germany was not will-
ing to risk becoming a party to this spiral of violence by committing troops to 
Operation Unified Protector. 
To sum up, firstly, the crisis in Libya reaffirmed Germany that military 
force can only be a part of a larger political solution in the effort to end a con-
flict, which seemed to fit rather well with what the Germans basically already 
knew based on the experiences of Iraq and especially Afghanistan. Second, 
however, German behaviour in the crisis was nothing but predictable and 
regardless of the utterances of Merkel and Westerwelle that German absten-
tion did not mean that Germany was principally opposed to the Western pol-
468 See e.g. Jünemann 2005. 
469 Ratka, Edmund 2012, ?Germany and the Arab Spring - Foreign Policy Between New Activism and 
Old Habits’, German Politics and Society, Issue 102, Vol. 30, No. 2, Summer 2012, pp. 59-74. 
470 See e.g. ‘Germany as Mediator. Peace Mediation and Mediation Support  in German Foreign Policy, 
Conference Report 25.11.2014, Federal Foreign Office, Directorate-General for Crisis Preven-
tion, Stabilisation and Post Conflict Peacebuilding. Available at: (http://www.friedensmediation-
deutschland.de/fileadmin/uploads/friedensmeditation/dokumente/Report_on_Peace_Mediation_ 
Conference_2014.pdf). 
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icy on Libya, only to the part relating to the use of military force, was certain-
ly not seen as such by France, the UK and the US and many Arab states (even 
though many EU member states were equally in favour of the more cautious 
approach represented by Germany). Indeed, it can be argued that for the 
skeptics, the German behaviour was a testament of a cherry-pick strategy 
that seemed to amount to a sine qua non for German foreign and security 
policy in the Middle East.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the Bundestag debates over 
Libya, few references were to be found to German historical responsibility 
which had hitherto been the decisive factor for both those who advocated a 
German military deployment and for those who were against it, especially in 
the case of Lebanon. At the very least, this can be taken as a sign of ‘German 
normalization’ in terms of security and defence policy in the very particular 
sense that not every decision on the use of military force would have to be 
subordinated to the dichotomy of German guilt and responsibility. And yet, 
as will be argued in the next chapter, continuity can be detected in how this 
dichotomy structures the strategic debate in Germany while the ways the 
past continues to affect the present have changed. This can be detected for 
instance in the current strategic cultural context when the question is not so 
much whether Germany needs to bear international responsibility but rather 
how, to what extent and in what ways it should do so. However, as will be 
argued in the next chapter, German ‘normalization’ has very little to do with 
a specific pattern of security and defence policy behaviour. It also does not 
function very well as a conception of German international responsibility via 
some ‘objective’ argument of what is or should be considered ‘normal’ behav-
iour. An example of this can be found in the traditional realist view on states 
as ‘normal’ when they aim to maximize their military power. ‘Normality’ ra-
ther, is what Germany and Germans make of it. 
In terms of the analytical framework of strategic cultural change, there are 
several observations to draw from Libya. Firstly, Germany’s abstention from 
the UNSC Libya vote can not only be attributed to the meagre effects that 
peer pressure had on the German government at the time. It can just as well 
be argued to stem from Germany’s deep skepticism towards the use of force 
in general and in the context of the Middle East, in particular. However, it 
was not as if Germany’s abstention was an established political practice in 
the Federal Republic, and German behaviour in the crisis was rather peculi-
ar. However, it cannot be argued that German strategic culture did not func-
tion seamlessly in the Libyan case. It provided the necessary clarity in terms 
of what the implications for German military participation in the Operation 
Unified Protector would be, and provided the basis for Germany’s abstention 
from the UNSC vote. Moreover, while the crisis in Libya did not trigger any 
fundamental change in German strategic culture, it caused a shift in the 
German policy preferences in the sense that the German government at-
tempted to carve out an independent role for Germany in the crisis, with the 
attempt to not to clearly break with the ‘never again alone’ principle. Howev-
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er, this did not arise out of specifically articulated foreign or security policy 
ambitions but was rather reflected in the Bundestag debates when a clear 
delineation was made between the former colonial powers and Germany. 
From stagnation and weak strategic culture to ‘new activism’? 
“Germany is not an island”471 (Joachim Gauck) 
As argued, the aftermath of the Libya crisis did not lead to a renewed crisis in 
transatlantic relations nor did it really isolate Germany in terms of interna-
tional politics. However, the decision to abstain from the UNSC vote on 
Resolution 1973 was increasingly conceived as a regression of German for-
eign and security policy and a sign of a ‘weak strategic culture’. As Hyde-
Price has argued, this ‘regression’ was crystallized not only in Germany’s ab-
stention over Libya or its refusal to help eliminate Syria’s stock of chemical 
weapons or to participate in NATO’s 2013 military exercise Steadfast Jazz in 
the Baltic region, but in the very persona of the then Foreign Minister Guido 
Westerwelle, who “was out of his depth in the more complex world of inter-
national politics, which has its own logic and dynamics. During his tenure as 
Foreign Minister, Germany not only failed to live up to its responsibilities as 
a major European power, it also failed to nurture and sustain its relation-
ships with key allies and partners.”472 This was especially reflected in the 
worsening Franco-German relations. France was increasingly worried about 
German lack of enthusiasm to invest further in CSDP and the French media 
and diplomats summoned the doom for CSDP after EU’s disunity in Libya.473 
 However, while Hyde-Price’s account of the Foreign Minister’s merits 
and demerits might be accurate, it hardly accounts for an explanation of the 
‘stasis’ within German strategic culture at the time. Moreover, part of the 
reason for the argued ‘weak strategic culture’ can be found in the German 
predicament with the euro crisis, which raised the issue of economic security 
to the forefront. And yet, even the financial crisis alone cannot explain the 
stagnation in German strategic culture because, while it had a direct effect on 
the aggregate defence spending at the EU level, Germany’s defence budgets 
remained approximately the same during 2010-2015 (between €34.93 billion 
and €35.52 billion).474 Moreover, while the argument of overstretch has quite 
often been used against further out-of-area deployments of the Bundeswehr, 
471 ‘Germany’s role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances’, speech by Federal 
President Joachim Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security Conference, 31.1.2014. Available 
at: (http://www.bundespraesident.de/). 
472 Hyde-Price, Adrian 2015, ‘The “sleep-walking giant? awakes: resetting German foreign and security 
policy’, European Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 605? 
473 Menon, Anand 2011, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, Vo. 53, No. 3, p.76.  
474 Militärausgaben?von?Deutschland?von?2000?bis?2015?(in Milliarden Euro).?Available?at: 
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this has hardly amounted to the described weakness in German strategic cul-
ture. Hence, it is rather the political ramifications of the economic crisis that 
play a more important role here. In addition, it can be argued that one of the 
more pertinent reasons was the lack of major successes on behalf of the Bun-
deswehr as part of the ISAF, which further decreased the German belief in 
military solutions as part of crisis management. As argued above, even 
though the Kunduz airstrike in 2009 functioned as sort of an external shock 
and brought home the operational reality of ‘warlike circumstances’, and 
even though it ultimately led to a considerable increase in German participa-
tion in NATO counterinsurgency operations, in the eyes of the German poli-
ticians, Kunduz was clearly a military failure.475 Indeed, even the Bun-
deswehr military operations in Afghanistan that were first and foremost mili-
tary successes, were mostly downplayed by the federal government.476 As 
Sangar has argued in detail, even though the Bundeswehr participated in ful-
ly-fledged counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan, ever since 
the ‘wake-up’ call of Kunduz, the general reluctant reaction to the spreading 
violence “can partly be understood by a missing doctrinal debate on the nuts 
and bolts of expeditionary and counterinsurgency experience”.477 This had 
the effect of German ground commanders not knowing the intentions of their 
superiors which led “many soldiers on the tactical level to the intuitively cor-
rect impression that they are ‘aimlessly’ wandering around”.478 Indeed, it is 
not difficult to conclude that a lack of strategic debate does not reinvigorate 
strategic culture. This was well highlighted in the response of a German Lt. 
Colonel in an interview with Sangar as he claimed that “What I wish is that 
the impact of our own experience would move away from the tactical towards 
the operational, strategic levels – towards thinking about the war. In that 
aspect, we are still light years away from other nations.”479 
Hence, we could argue that the weakness of German strategic culture at 
the time was due to not only a ‘pacifist reflex’ of the German government but 
also due to existing structural deficiencies in Bundeswehr strategic capabili-
ties, the lack of strategic debate as well as lack of military success – or rather 
the lack of perceived or officially acknowledged military success in Afghani-
475 However, German soldiers and officers serving in Afghanistan usually treated Kunduz rather as a 
success, because it in effect drew attention to the material deficits of the Bundeswehr and had a dissua-
sive effect on the Taliban insurgency in the Kunduz region. See e.g. Sangar, Eric 2015, ‘The Weight of 
the Past(s): The Impact of the Use of Bundeswehr’s Use of Historical Experience on Strategy-Making in 
Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, p. 439.  
476 Consider i.e. Bundeswehr’s first counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan in 2007,‘Harekate Yolo 
II’, see e.g. ‚Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Der weichgespülte Kampfeinsatz‘, Spiegel Online, 10.1.2008. 
Available at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-in-afghanistan-der-weich 
gespuelte-kampfeinsatz-a-527869.html). 
477 Sangar 2015, p. 440. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid, p. 441. 
173 
stan. To put it another way, we could argue that the lack of experience (in 
expeditionary and counterinsurgency warfare) prohibited the normal func-
tioning of German strategic culture. This led to the impression of strategic 
inertia that was reflected at the level of Bundeswehr operational reality as 
aimlessness and at the political level as inertia or even as disillusionment.   
Nonetheless, however one wishes to describe this period of stagnation or 
weakness in German strategic culture, it came to an end rather abruptly due 
to the intervention of German Federal President Joachim Gauck in his Day of 
German Unity Speech on 3 October 2013. Gauck argued strongly in favour of 
a broader political and societal debate on the question of whether Germany 
lives up to its international responsibility. He argued that as “(o)ur country is 
not an island, we should not cherish the illusion that we will be spared from 
political and economic, environmental and military conflicts if we do not 
contribute to solving them.”480 Even though not outspoken, a reference to 
German behaviour during the Libya crisis was evident. Indeed, Gauck’s 
speech seemed to reinvigorate the security and defence political debate in 
Germany. This was partly made possible by the Bundestag elections in 2013, 
which resulted in Angela Merkel’s third term as Chancellor.  Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier (SPD) took the Foreign Ministry from Westerwelle and Ursula 
von der Leyen (CDU/CSU) was appointed as the new Defence Minister. As 
Hyde-Price has argued, “(b)oth von der Leyen and Steinmeier have indicated 
a desire to break with the foreign policy legacy of Westerwelle, and to pursue 
a more active foreign policy. This includes the use of military force, and a 
more proactive and engaged approach to multilateral military operations.”481  
Signs of this new activism in German foreign and security policy were 
clearly detectable during the 50th Munich Security Conference in January 
2014. The appearances of key German politicians did not go unnoticed. One 
observer even called the behaviour of Gauck, Steinmeier and von der Leyen 
at the conference as “the revenge of the German elite” as the German “foreign 
policy establishment struck back against a public they say has become in-
creasingly insular, self-satisfied and pacifist”.482 Indeed, especially Gauck 
seemed to continue where he left off in October 2013 in terms of the debate 
regarding German responsibility: 
I have to admit that while there are genuine pacifists in Germany, 
there are also people who use Germany’s guilt for its past as a shield 
for laziness or a desire to disengage from the world. In the words of 
480 Speech by Federal President Joachim Gauck to mark the Day of German Unity Stuttgart, 3 Octo-
ber 2013. Available at: (http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2013/1
0/). 
481 Hyde-Price 2015, p. 603. 
482 Leonard, Mark 2014, ‘The revenge of the German elite’, European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 5.2.2014. Available at: (http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_revenge_of_the_german_
elite). 
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the German historian Heinrich August Winkler, this is an attitude 
that grants Germany a questionable “right to look the other way, 
which other Western democracies” cannot claim for themselves. Re-
straint can thus be taken too far if people start making special rules 
for themselves. Whenever that happens, I will criticize it.483 
However, while the above passage was undoubtedly the most cited one in the 
media and among the critics, the key message Gauck attempted to deliver 
was that Germans should begin to trust themselves and their country in in-
ternational issues, because Germany had proven to be trustworthy. By doing 
so, Germany would also make an even better friend and a partner to its al-
lies.484  
Foreign Minister Steinmeier especially seemed to take up on the ‘new ac-
tivism’ as he often talked about reactivating the foreign ministry at the time. 
Steinmeier also announced a revival of Franco-German relations (which had 
arguably sunk to an all-time low during Westerwelle’s tenure) by conducting 
joint trips with the French in Moldova, Georgia, Libya and Tunesia and offer-
ing to destroy Syrian chemical weapons in Germany.485 Von der Leyen, in 
turn, argued in a similar vein that “indifference is not an option”. She 
pledged an increase in the German deployment to Mali and her support for 
the establishment of a European army.486 However, and as Leonard has ar-
gued, “history is ‘dialectical’, as Germans like to say. It rarely advances in 
straight lines. It usually takes jagged swings between opposites. One senior 
diplomat explained to me that if Westerwelle had not embraced the ‘culture 
of restraint’ so proudly, it would be impossible for the current players to 
throw it overboard so comprehensively”.487 In any case, Steinmeier’s shuttle 
diplomacy  in mediating the crisis in Ukraine that will be discussed below, 
has received a lot of appreciation – and as the chief political correspondent of 
Deutsche Welle argued, it moved Germany “from the comfort zone into the 
middle of things”.488 
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Ukraine 
It can be argued that the political crisis which erupted in Ukraine in early 
2014 has effectively ended the rather co-operative phase in Russian-Western 
relations, which began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In retrospect, 
it seemed that the brief Russo-Georgian war in 2008 delivered the foretaste 
of what was to become a period of heightened rivalry and even confrontation 
between the old Cold War adversaries, because it ended the prospects of 
NATO membership for both Georgia and Ukraine and cemented the Western 
view of Russia as a resurgent power that will seek to implement its interests 
with the use of military force and the dismissal of international law if need 
be.  
The crisis in Ukraine started in late 2013 when unrest and riots spread as 
a result of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to accept the as-
sociation agreement with the EU that had been offered. The suppression of 
‘Euromaidan’ – a name given to a wave of protests and civil unrest that began 
in the Maidan square demanding closer integration into Europe – turned 
violent and bloody and Yanukovych had little choice but to make concessions 
to the opposition to end the bloodshed and crisis in Kiev. Agreement on the 
settlement of political crisis in Ukraine was signed by Yanukovych and the 
representatives of the Ukrainian parliamentary opposition, including Ger-
man-based ex-boxer Vitali Klitschko on 21 February under the mediation of 
German and Polish Foreign Ministers Steinmeier and Sikorski. Russia did 
not endorse the agreement. Ultimately, Yanukovych was ousted from office 
in the ‘February 2014 revolution’ and was forced to flee the country to Rus-
sia. 
After Yanukovych had fled the country, the Ukrainian government made a 
decision that proved to be fatal in terms of the aftermath of the Maidan revo-
lution. It voted to make Ukrainian the sole state language at all levels. As 
Freedman has argued, this caused a strong adverse reaction in Crimea and 
southern and eastern Ukraine, all of which backed Yanukovych and prompt-
ed street protests. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the bill on 1 
March.489 As Forsberg has argued, German policy in Ukraine during these 
initial phases had three strings: “Germany was ready to assume a role as a 
mediator, or at least to serve as a contact partner to Russia. Yet Germany was 
also willing to advocate tougher action in terms of sanctions if Russia esca-
lated the crisis. A third strand in Germany’s policy was to support Ukraine. 
In formulating this response to Russia’s action, it was also pushing for unity 
in the West and the EU in particular.” In terms of strategic culture, “Germa-
ny ruled out the use of military force as a solution to the crisis, believing in-
489 Freedman, Lawrence 2014, ‘Ukraine and the Art of Conflict Management’, Survival, Vol. 56, No.3, p. 
20 (7-42). 
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stead in the power of long-term diplomatic efforts to end the crisis.”490 In-
deed, German strategic behaviour did not seem to deviate drastically from 
any established strategic patterns during this phase and seemed to corre-
spond to the views of ‘new activism’ in German foreign and security policy, 
but as Forsberg has argued, the continued escalation of the crisis signaled an 
“erosion of [German] Ostpolitik”.491  
However, Germany’s policy toward Russia shifted considerably as the cri-
sis escalated in the course of Russian military intervention, annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula and the subsequent armed conflict which erupted be-
tween the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian 
insurgents and militia in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine. This 
was particularly detectable in Chancellor Merkel’s tough stance as she con-
demned Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula by arguing that Russia 
had violated international law. As Russia did not call off the referendum in 
Crimea492, which Merkel had pleaded to Putin, she “opted for targeted sanc-
tions and advocated more if Russia took further military action in 
Ukraine”.493 However, even though the principal argument of the German 
political elite was that co-operation with Russia would continue in the mid- 
to long term, Germany’s tough stance toward Russia in the Ukraine crisis had 
“obliterated the core principle of Germany’s traditional Ostpolitik, according 
to which the country sees itself as Russia’s chief interlocutor in Europe”.494 
This view is confirmed in the recent German White Paper (Weissbuch) 
which clearly signalled that the former strategic co-operation with Russia has 
turned into strategic rivalry: 
 Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with 
its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilat-
erally redraw borders guaranteed under international law, as it has 
done in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This has far-reaching implica-
tions for security in Europe and thus for the security of Germany. The 
crisis in and surrounding Ukraine is the concrete manifestation of 
long-term internal and external developments. Russia is rejecting a 
490 Forsberg, Tuomas 2016, ‘From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German policy to-
wards Russia’, International Affairs, Vol. 92, No.1, pp. 28-9. 
491 Ibid. 
492 The referendum was held by the legislature of the Autonomous Republic of Crimean Peninsula and 
the local government of Sevastopol (both are subdivisions of Ukraine) on 16 March 2014, following 
Russian military takeover of the Crimean Peninsula. The referendum asked the local population 
whether they wanted to join Russian Federation or if they wanted to restore the 1992 Crimean consti-
tution and Crimea as part of the Ukraine. An overwhelming majority (over 80%) voted in favour of 
joining Russian Federation. The referendum was declared illegitimate by the UN General Assembly on 
28 March 2014. For more detail, see the press release on UN General Assembly 80th Plenary Meeting, 
available at: (https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm). 
493 Ibid., p. 29. 
494 Ibid., p. 36. 
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close partnership with the West and placing emphasis on strategic ri-
valry. Internationally, Russia is presenting itself as an independent 
power centre with global ambitions. This is reflected, for example, by 
an increase in Russia’s military activities along its borders with the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). In the 
course of extensively modernising its armed forces, Russia appears to 
be prepared to test the limits of existing international agreements. By 
increasingly using hybrid instruments to purposefully blur the bor-
ders between war and peace, Russia is creating uncertainty about the 
nature of its intentions. This calls for responses from the affected 
states, but also from the EU and NATO 495
Moreover, the White Paper clearly describes Russia as a security challenge 
(short of a military threat) even though it acknowledges the fact that security 
in Europe cannot be established and maintained without co-operation with 
Russia: 
Without a fundamental change in policy, Russia will constitute a 
challenge to the security of our continent in the foreseeable future. At 
the same time, however, Europe and Russia remain linked by a broad 
range of common interests and relations. As the EU’s largest neigh-
bour and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia 
has a special regional and global responsibility when it comes to 
meeting common challenges and managing international crises. Sus-
tainable security and prosperity in and for Europe cannot therefore 
be ensured without strong cooperation with Russia. It is therefore all 
the more important that, in our relations with Russia, we find the 
right balance between collective defence and increased resilience on 
the one hand, and approaches to cooperative security and sectoral 
cooperation on the other. What is important for the common security 
space of our continent is thus not the development of a new security 
architecture, but rather respect for and consistent adherence to exist-
ing and proven common rules and principles.496 
Some observers of German foreign and security policy, such as Hans Kund-
nani, have offered a rather different view. Kundnani makes an argument that 
Germany’s response to the Ukraine crisis can be understood against the 
backdrop of “a long term weakening of the so-called Westbindung” which 
despite Germany’s contributions to Afghanistan and its pledge to NATO, is to 
be detected in the change in Germany’s attitude toward the rest of the West: 
“Germany has hardened its opposition to the use of military force. After its 
experience in Afghanistan, Germany appears to have decided that the right 
lesson from its Nazi past is not ‘never again Auschwitz’ the principle it in-
495 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of Bundeswehr (2016), p. 31-32. Available 
at: (https://www.bmvg.de/). 
496 Ibid., p. 32. 
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voked to justify its participation in the 1999 NATO military intervention in 
Kosovo, but ‘never again war.’ German politicians across the spectrum now 
define their country as a Friedensmacht, a ‘force for peace.’”497  
Firstly, it needs to be noted that there are no absolute right lessons, or ra-
ther that the prevailing lessons ‘never again war’ and ‘never again Auschwitz’ 
are both equally absolute in terms of their impact on German strategic cul-
ture. This is clearly detectable if one considers the track record of German 
strategic culture after the end of the Cold War discussed in this chapter. 
Moreover, in terms of strategic culture, ‘a long-term weakening of Westbin-
dung’ seems hardly compatible with a simultaneous ‘obliteration of Germa-
ny’s traditional Ostpolitik’, because increased economic co-operation with 
China or other rising international powers can hardly supplant either in 
terms of security for Germany. Moreover, the 2016 White Paper does not 
seem to reflect Kundnani’s predictions as it clearly states that NATO remains 
the ultimate guarantee for peace and security in Europe for Germany: 
Alliance solidarity is a fundamental principle of German governance. 
Strengthening the cohesion and capacity to act of NATO and the EU 
is of paramount importance for Germany. We actively strive to strike 
a balance between conflicting interests and are prepared to assume 
responsibility and lead in order to make joint action possible. Priority 
is given to the continuous adaptation to the changing security envi-
ronment, the close interlinking and progressive integration of Euro-
pean armed forces, the strengthening of NATO’s European pillar, and 
coherent interaction between NATO and the EU. In addition, Germa-
ny is committed to the goal of a security order that includes all the 
states of the European continent.498 
In terms of German strategic culture, it can be argued that the crisis in 
Ukraine highlights both the aspects of continuity and change. This is well 
exemplified in the notion of a ‘double strategy’ (Doppelstrategie) adopted 
within NATO which is a mix of both restraint and engagement, reflected in 
the shift of the image of Russia from strategic partner to a strategic rival in 
Germany or as the 2016 White Paper puts it: “the right balance between col-
lective defence and increased resilience on the one hand, and approaches to 
cooperative security and sectoral cooperation on the other”.499 
 During the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, Merkel reaffirmed the German 
double strategy in that it was ready to ‘act strongly’ if required but that the 
avenue for co-operation was open, if Russia showed signs that it respected 
the agreements signed between NATO and Russia, i.e. the Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation signed in May 1997 in Paris. According to this document, it was 
497 Kundnani, Hans 2015, ‘Leaving the West behind’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No.1, pp. 108–16. 
498 White Paper 2016, p. 49. 
499 Ibid. 
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agreed that NATO would not station military troops permanently on Russia’s 
borders. However, Merkel criticized Russia for violating the principles of the 
1997 agreement. Germany also supported the establishment of a rapid reac-
tion force (as part of NATO’s Response Force) and Merkel pledged to bolster 
the multinational brigade of Poland, Denmark and Germany stationed in 
Stettin.500  
Some observers have labelled German strategic behaviour in the crisis as 
‘strategic wait and see’ (Strategisches Abwarten).501 This highlights continui-
ty in German policy towards Russia, despite the shift in the image of Russia 
in Germany. However, in the context of Russian aggression, this behaviour 
has triggered serious questions in the German capacity to deliver real politi-
cal solutions to the Ukraine crisis. This can be seen in Steinmeier’s and Mer-
kel’s political mission to stabilize the volatile security situation that has most-
ly resulted in helplessness and frustration in Germany.502 The political left, in 
particular, has been critical of NATO’s re-armament plans and criticism has 
been voiced regarding NATO’s pledge not to station permanent troops adja-
cent to Russia’s borders.503 
Before the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, Chancellor Merkel ar-
gued in a government declaration that the deployment of the rapid reaction 
force was not enough and promised more support for NATO’s eastern mem-
ber states – Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. She also reacted to For-
eign Minister Steinmeier’s criticism of NATO’s ‘martial behaviour’ in Eastern 
Europe by arguing that the elements of the double-strategy belong together 
and that security and peace in Europe cannot be established without Rus-
sia.504 In the Warsaw Summit, NATO decided to deploy four battalions, each 
of 1,000 troops, in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These troops 
would circulate in order for NATO to keep intact its pledge to the 1997 
agreement with Russia. Germany takes the lead in the Lithuanian battalion 
500 See e.g. ‚Nato beschließt schnelle Eingreiftruppe‘, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5.9.2014. Avail-
able at: (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/gipfeltreffen-in-wales-nato beschliesst-schnelle-
eingreiftruppe-13137102.html); Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between  
NATO and the Russian Federation, 27.5.1997. Available at: (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offici
al_texts_25468.htm).  
501 Kwiatkowska-Dro?d?, Anna and Frymark, Kamil 2015, ‘Analyse: Deutschland im Russland-Konflikt: 
eine politische oder eine humanitäre Aufgabe?‘, Ukraine-Analysen Nr. 148, Bundeszentrale für Politi-
sche Bildung. Available at: (http:www.bpb.de). 
502 See e.g. Kwiatkowska-Dro?d? and Frymark 2015; Haukkala, Hiski 2016, ‘A Perfect Storm; Or What 
Went Wrong and What Went Right for the EU in Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 661. 
503 Pflüger Tobias, ‚NATO-Gipfel: Aufrüstung für den Kalten Krieg 2.0‘, 8.7.2016. Available at: 
(https://www.die-linke.de/nc/die-linke/nachrichten/detail/artikel/nato-gipfel-aufruestung-fuer-den-
kalten-krieg-20/). 
504 ‚Regierungserklärung: Merkel verspricht Nato-Truppen für Polen und das Baltikum‘, Spiegel Onli-
ne, 7.7.2016. Available at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-nato-wird-feste-
kontingente-im-baltikum-und-polen-stationieren-a-1101756.html). 
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with several hundred Bundeswehr soldiers. NATO also agreed to step up its 
fight against the terrorist organization ‘Islamic State’ by deploying 16 AWACS 
surveillance aircraft in the airspace over Syria and Iraq. According to Bun-
deswehr’s own estimates, it would deploy around one-third of the crews re-
quired. The US also requested the EU to cover more of the costs and US Pres-
ident Obama appealed to Chancellor Merkel especially in this regard.505 Mer-
kel had already signalled a considerable increase in German defence spend-
ing before the NATO Summit. At the economic conference of the CDU/CSU 
in June, Merkel had argued that the EU of today was not in a position to de-
fend itself and that therefore it was essential that German defence spending 
(1.2% of the GDP) would come closer to that of the US (3.4 % of the GDP). As 
a member of NATO, Germany is pledged to the common Alliance goal of 2% 
defence spending of the GDP.506 
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier remained more skeptical than 
Chancellor Merkel towards NATO’s rearmament, having warned against 
‘symbolic tank parades at the eastern border of the Alliance’ and ‘sabre-
rattling’. However, Steinmeier was quick to defend NATO’s position after 
Russia had condemned the Warsaw Summit. The Russian Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement which declared that “NATO concentrates its effort in cur-
tailing a non-existent danger from the east”, calling NATO’s actions as ‘Rus-
sia’s demonization’. Similarly, former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev 
accused NATO of ‘warmongering’. Steinmeier defended the deployments and 
argued that the upcoming NATO-Russia Council “would be a chance to eluci-
date NATO’s decisions and aim for a serious and continuous dialogue with 
Russia”.507 
Reflecting on the recent developments in global security policy and 
change and continuity in German foreign and security policy, Steinmeier 
elaborated at length on Germany’s ‘new global role’ in a recent article by as-
serting that, today, “Germany is a major European power that attracts praise 
and criticism in equal measure”. He argued that the actions Germany had 
undertaken in the international stage in recent years “are forcing Germany to 
reinterpret the principles that have guided its foreign policy over half a cen-
tury. But Germany is a reflective power: even as it adapts, a belief in the im-
portance of restraint, deliberation, and peaceful negotiation will continue to 
guide its interactions with the rest of the world.”508 Steinmeier also high-
lighted Germany’s increased role as a leader, especially regarding the crisis in 
505 ‚Die Nato rüstet auf‘, Zeit Online, 9.7.2016. Available at: (http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-
07/nato-gipfel-aufruesten-russland-osteuropa). 
506 ‚Merkel will Militärausgaben erhöhen‘, Wirtschaftswoche, 22.6.2016. Available at: (http://www. 
wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-merkel-will-militaerausgaben-erhoehen/13769148.html). 
507 ‚Russland wirft NATO Dämonisierung vor‘, tagesschau 10.7.2016. Available at: (https://www.ta 
gesschau.de/ausland/nato-gipfel-125.html). 
508 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter 2016, ‘Germany’s New Global Role. Berlin Steps Up?, Foreign Affairs, pp. 
106-7.
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Ukraine: “Germany did not elbow its way into that position, nor did anyone 
else appoint it to that role. Its long-standing economic and political ties to 
both Russia and Ukraine made it a natural go-between for both sides, despite 
Berlin's obvious support for the victims of Moscow's aggression.”509 He also 
pointed out that “(t)he Minsk agreement that Germany and France brokered 
in February 2015 to halt hostilities is far from perfect, but one thing is cer-
tain: without it, the conflict would have long ago spun out of control and ex-
tended beyond the Donbas region of Ukraine. Going forward, Germany will 
continue to do what it can to prevent the tensions from escalating into a new 
Cold War.”510 
In summary, the crisis in Ukraine has confirmed recent trends in both 
strategic cultural continuity and change. However, the changes have not been 
as fundamental at the normative/ideational level as they might appear at the 
level of policy. Nonetheless, the fact that Russia’s image has shifted from be-
ing a strategic partner to being a strategic rival will have long-term repercus-
sions on German strategic culture. This pertains in particular to the image of 
peace and war in Europe, because in the long-term, the unresolved situation 
in Ukraine is a destabilizing factor, which, as we have witnessed, has already 
shifted the focus in NATO’s defence posture from out-of-area operations to 
collective defence and effectively brought about a spiral of rearmament and a 
considerable increase in German defence spending. 
How should we apply the framework of strategic cultural change in the 
case of Ukraine if there is no major detectable effect on either the ideation-
al/normative structure or the strategic practices of German strategic culture? 
As argued, the conflict has already caused a fine-tuning of German policy 
preferences towards Russia (from strategic ‘partner’ to strategic ‘rival’) and 
contributed to a notable increase in German defence spending. It can also be 
argued that these are both significant outcomes in their own right, given that 
the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, as an external shock, was not forceful 
enough to facilitate the shift in German strategic stance towards Russia and 
that the year 2015 marked the first year since the end of the Cold War, when 
Germany considerably increased its defence spending (the Bundeswehr’s 
budget, for instance, had steadily dropped from 3.2% of the GDP in 1983 to 
1.2% of the GDP in 2014).511 However, perhaps the value of the analytical 
framework of strategic cultural change is best expressed when we elaborate 
on the possible repercussions of the Ukraine crisis in terms of future devel-
opments. First, in general, the Ukraine crisis has unsettling effects in light of 
the ongoing Bundeswehr reform512, because it highlights the role and im-
509 Ibid., p.112? 
510 Ibid. 
511 See e.g. ‘The Bundeswehr Backs Away From the Brink. Germany Patches Up its Military’, Foreign 
Affairs, Snapshot, 19.1.2016. Available at: (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-01-
19/bundeswehr-backs-away-brink). 
512 See Chapter 5.3.3. for more detail. 
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portance of traditional territorial defence in German (and NATO) military 
doctrine, which puts pressure on the Bundeswehr and the German govern-
ment economically and politically. This might facilitate a further fine-tuning 
of German security policy preferences that go beyond an increase in defence 
spending. Second, while NATO and the rest of ‘the West’ have presented a 
rather united front in the Ukraine crisis (as opposed e.g. to the Russo-
Georgian War), the policy of introducing tougher sanctions on Russia has 
neither borne much fruit politically nor contributed to the increase of the 
security situation in the volatile Ukraine. The sanctions are tied to the Minsk 
peace accords, which have been breached multiple times as clashes have con-
tinued between the Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian forces in 
East Ukraine. Given these developments, it is reasonable to assume that 
Germany, which is widely considered to have the closest relationship to Rus-
sia of all the key NATO and EU member states, will be the target of increas-
ing peer pressure from its allies. While Chancellor Merkel has not backed 
away from engaging Putin in the question of Ukraine and his commitment to 
the Minsk peace process, not much has hitherto come out of these talks. 
However, all this points to an increase in the probability that the ‘double 
strategy’ will be scrutinized and possibly even replaced with a more effective 
strategic practice at some point. This is so because Germany is well aware of 
the geopolitical implications for its economy and security with regard to po-
tential ‘freezing’ of the conflict and even more so given the possibility, how-
ever small, that Russia will continue with its policy of aggression. More spe-
cifically, however, an argument can also be made that the Ukraine crisis has 
consolidated the shift in the German image of war and peace in Europe and it 
echoes the images during the Cold War, even though Germans are united in 
the idea that lasting peace in Europe cannot be achieved without the co-
operation with Russia. Hence, a particular challenge for German strategic 
culture remains how Germany is able to re-engage with Russia and prevent 
the development of Frostpolitik from turning the crisis in Ukraine into a ‘fro-
zen conflict’.    
4.4.  POST-COLD WAR GERMANY ? STILL A CIVILIAN 
POWER? 
Conflicts in and beyond Europe have reshaped the security policy context for 
all EU member states since the end of the Cold War. For Germany, this has 
meant a process of reassessing and redefining the German post-Cold War 
identity in the sense of attempting to find an international profile which 
could be reconciled with interpretations of German historical responsibility. 
And as we have seen during the course of the 1990s and beyond, this process 
has been immensely difficult, not only because the different interpretations 
offer different suggestions as to what kind of role Germany should actually 
play in international affairs but also because the expectations towards a more 
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active German international military presence have often exceeded either the 
capabilities or the willingness of the German polity. Ever since war again be-
came political reality for the Germans during the first Gulf War in 1990, the 
inherent discrepancy built within the normative structure of German strate-
gic culture (the tension between the different never again principles) has 
been in the spotlight. This discrepancy has been exacerbated on one hand by 
the growing external demands towards an increased German military pres-
ence in crises throughout the world and on the other hand by the domestic 
public opinion that at present remains largely negative towards the issue of 
growing German military presence in global crises.513 
In the wake of the human catastrophes beginning with the Balkans and 
Srebrenica, this inconsistency has been reflected in the domestic German 
criticism towards ‘unconditional pacifism’ and in the argument that the per-
fectly conceivable individual stance of ‘ideological-ethical pacifism’ cannot be 
so easily converted into a fundament for German state identity, as Michael 
Glos noted during the debate on Iraq. The humanitarian interventions since 
the Balkan conflict have been coined by critics as ‘liberal interventionism’ 
and by advocates as the deployment of military means in defence of human 
rights and the norm of responsibility to protect.514 Political and financial 
support for these interventions is important for their success and it is some-
thing that Germany more often than not has been ready to provide. However, 
despite the fact that the taboos concerning German military participation 
were largely removed in the period from mid-to?late 1990s (Enttabuisierung 
des Militärischen), the major Bundeswehr reforms and the abolition of con-
scription as well as the German debates on the Bundeswehr’s role in 
military conflict management still raise more questions than they provide 
answers. In that sense, there is continuity in the German strategic culture 
as Germany remains a rather reluctant military actor. Yet the global war 
on terror since 9/11 has shown that the political price for restraint has 
risen exponentially. This can be highlighted for instance in the 
repercussions of the Iraq war on Germany as well as in the rift within 
the transatlantic alliance regarding German abstention from the UNSC 
vote in the issue of NATO operation in Libya, which raised concerns about 
Germany’s commitment to the Western alliance and led some to interpret 
German behaviour? as ?‘isolationist’ or even ?????????????????????????????????
513 See e.g. ‚Deutsche gegen mehr Militäreinsätze‘, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31.1.2014. Available 
at: (http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/umfrage-zu-auslandseinsaetzen-deutsche-gegen-mehr-
militaereinsaetze-1.1876426); ‚Umfrage: Deutsche lehnen stärkeres Engagement in der Welt ab‘, Spie-
gel Online, 20.5.2014.?Available at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage-deutsche-
lehnen-auslandseinsaetze-der-bundeswehr-ab-a-970463.html). 
514 See Duffield, Mark 2013, ‘Liberal Interventionism and the Fragile State: Linked by Design?’, Duf-
field, Mark & Hewitt, Vernon (eds.) 2013, Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the 
Present, Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2013., pp. 116-129; Cooper, Richard H. & Kohler, Juliette (eds.) 2010, 
Responsibility to Protect. The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; 
Bellamy 2015, Responsibility to Protect: A Defense. Oxford University Press, 2015.  
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have argued that Germany’s decision to abstain was due to an ‘interest-
based’ calculation in the context of the looming euro-crisis.515  
Overall, the persistence of the normative inconsistency within German 
strategic culture has had the effect that Germany’s support of these 
‘liberal interventionist policies’ has been modest at best regarding 
Germany’s preference of civilian conflict management over pre-emptive 
or even preventive military policies, despite the fact that Germany has been 
a steadfast supporter of the R2P norm. Indeed, the more recent cases of 
Lebanon and Libya testify to the fact that the normative shift from ‘never 
again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’ has neither been permanent nor has 
it created a more assertive behavioural pattern or practice in terms of 
defence and security and that Germany continues to debate the direction 
of its strategic culture. Yet as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, these 
cases do not amount to an argument in favour of a static strategic culture 
based on continuous patterns of strategic thinking and practice. 
Indeed, given the aforementioned development throughout the 1990s and 
beyond, it seems that German strategic culture continues to suffer from 
a double dilemma. The first concerns the fact that the Cold War consensus 
between the never again principles is politically difficult to achieve, firstly, 
because Germany has become an international, global actor with diverse 
interests in its own right and secondly, because the nature of the threats and 
conflicts has changed. The consensus was not contested during the Cold 
War mostly because these principles reinforced each other and created 
consistency and stability in German policies towards both of the 
superpowers. In addition, Germany’s international actorness was limited in 
the area of international security and defence policy. Since the end of the 
Cold War, Germany has often faced a situation in which it has to go 
against one of the ‘never again’ principles in order to endorse the other. 
The second dilemma follows from the first: as these principles are rarely 
mutually reinforcing in terms of what kind of strategic behaviour they 
suggest, they have increasingly become a locus of conflict rather than a 
source of inspiration or guidance. The problem lies in that this conflict is a 
structural one; there is no easy way to simply ignore it, because even 
historical reinterpretations have their limits and that in terms of agency 
within strategic culture, thinking ‘outside the box’ is hardly possible. This 
will be shown in Chapter 5.  
Hence, German strategic culture appears to be less ‘strategic’ and more 
‘cultural’, since this fundamental normative discrepancy is historically con-
structed in the German self-understanding. Since this has basically always 
had concrete political consequences for German policy making, the debates 
515 See Maull, Hanns 2011, ‘Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos’, Zeitschrift für Politikwissen-
schaft, no. 1, 2011, pp. 95–119; Müller, Harald 2011, ‘Ein Desaster. Deutschland und der Fall Libyen’, 
HSFK Standpunkte, no. 2, 2011; Miskimmon, Alister 2012, ‘German Foreign Policy and the Libya Cri-
sis?, German Politics, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 2012, pp, 392-410. 
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on the lessons of the German past and their viability as political guidelines 
have remained rather lively and non-consensual. These debates also testify to 
the fact that even though the foreign and security political taboos have been 
removed, the discrepancy remains unresolved because many interpretations 
of German historical responsibility remain politically legitimate and offer 
viable options from the German perspective. Sometimes the different ‘never 
again’ lessons can be reconciled, but as argued, more often than not they 
amount to political conflict despite the Constitutional Court ruling in favour 
of the legality of Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments in 1994. Yet the 
Court’s decision only established the legal and formal prerequisites for mili-
tary deployments; the scope and depth were left for the politicians to decide. 
This continues to be the case as Bundeswehr deployments remain firmly un-
der parliament control.  
German concerns over the political legitimacy of the use of military force 
are also reflected in the question of a European army, which, according to 
many German politicians, should preferably be organized according to the 
German model. This would mean that the European Parliament would have 
similar rights to make caveats as the German Bundestag, something that was 
confirmed by the final report of the ‘Rühe-Commission’ (2015). The purpose 
of the report was to contemplate the appropriateness of the so-called Bun-
destagsvorbehalt516, but in the context of out-of-area operations in contem-
porary politics, it did not suggest any major revisions to the existing system 
in Germany. However, the report suggested that the German government 
should present a report on the multilateral military alliance capabilities to 
the Bundestag annually.517 In addition, Germany’s new White Paper under-
lines the hybrid nature of the emerging security threats which requires in-
creased co-operation between the armed forces of the EU member states.518 
What is more, both CDU/CDU and SPD aim to maintain the long term-goal 
of a European army, as stated in their coalition agreement.519 
However, the important point is that Germany is not willing to act beyond 
the normative boundaries of its strategic culture – yet these boundaries have 
become more contested than ever, and this was also highlighted in the new 
516 This means that the Bundestag retains the final veto on the deployment of the Bundeswehr in out-
of-area operations with a simple majority of votes. 
517 Unterrichtung durch die Kommission zur Überprüfung und Sicherung der Parlamentsrechte bei der 
Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr. Abschlussbericht der Kommission, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache 18/5000. Available at the website of German Defence Ministry 
(http://www.bmvg.de); ‚Wie von der Leyen die europäische Armee vorantreibt‘, Die Welt, 4.2.2016.  
Available at: (http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article151860389/Wie-von-der-Leyen-die-
europaeische-Armee-vorantreibt.html). 
518 White Paper 2016, pp. 48-9; See also ‚Enorme Herausforderungen für alle klassischen Instrumente 
der Sicherheitspolitik‘: Ein Gespräch zum Weißbuch 2016. Available at (http://www.bmvg.de). 
519 Shaping Germany’s Future. Coalition contract between CDU, CSU and SPD for 2013-2017, p. 177. 
Available at: (https://www.bundesregierung.de/). 
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White Paper.  In the next chapter, I will elaborate on this question through 
an examination of how some of the core elements of German strategic culture 
have been historically constructed, contested and partly redefined as part of 
the process of the ongoing Vergangenheitsbewältigung520 and, importantly, 
discuss some aspects of this process which the current strategic culture 
scholarship on Germany has largely chosen to ignore.   
To conclude this chapter, I will briefly discuss how the aforementioned 
development in the framework of German strategic culture since the end of 
the Cold War has been analysed in the scholarship on German foreign, secu-
rity and defence policy. The most important scholarly debate in this respect 
is undoubtedly the one that concerns Germany’s role as a civilian power. It 
also directly concerns the issue of continuity and change and is therefore also 
most relevant in terms of our discussion on German strategic culture. The 
concept of civilian power was initially used by Francis Duchêne in the 1970s 
to attribute to the EC a distinct international profile that was different from 
traditional military powers stressing instead low politics, politics of interde-
pendence and the role of ideas in shaping foreign and security policy.521 In 
the German context, the idea of Germany as a civilian power is based on the 
German foreign policy consensus that developed during the Cold War, cul-
minating in the politics of Westbindung and multilateralism. In terms of 
Cold War German strategic culture, this consensus was highlighted in the 
rather unproblematic coexistence of ‘never again war’ and ‘never again 
alone’, as discussed above. 
Hanns Maull, whose work is perhaps most widely recognized among the 
theorists on German foreign and security policy, has often been claimed as 
the strongest advocate of the continuity thesis, because of his argument 
about Germany persisting as a civilian power even after the Kosovo crisis and 
the NATO bombing campaign in which German Luftwaffe participated. He 
has also argued that Kosovo was not a watershed in terms of German foreign 
and security policy because Berlin’s decision to join in the NATO campaign 
was “not the fundamental rupture with the past but a further step in the evo-
520 ‘Coming to terms with the past’; in a broad sense to be understood as an ongoing process at the 
centre of which is the idea of learning from the injustices committed in the past and legitimating one’s 
own existence at present, highlighted in public debates, commemorations and in the politics and prac-
tices of remembrance. In a narrow sense, it can be understood also as a legally binding regulatory 
framework concerning the issue of admission of guilt, monetary compensation, reconciliation as well 
as ex post facto conviction and punishment of those responsible for past atrocities. In Post-WW II 
Germany, the debates concerning Vergangenheitsbewältigung have traditionally been rather contro-
versial concerning the substance and purpose of the whole undertaking. In recent times, the discussion 
has concentrated more on the reappraisal of the role of perpetrators and followers in Nazi Germany.   
521 F. Duchêne 1973, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, Kohn-
stamm, M. and Hager, W. (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems Before the European 
Community, London: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 1-21. 
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lution of German attitudes towards the use of force”.522 Maull has also posit-
ed that “this evolution had begun with the debate in Germany about the Gulf 
War in 1991, and reached its culmination in 1995, towards the end of the 
Bosnian war. What happened in 1998/99 represented a consummation of 
changes which had been under way for several years. This was true for the 
political parties and for the electorate as a whole.”523  
Hence, we could elaborate that the question for Maull was not so much 
whether German strategic culture has fundamentally changed or not, but ra-
ther whether these incremental changes in attitudes have caused any notable 
ruptures with the German past and could thus be seen as the natural flow of 
events that constitute a given strategic culture and its evolution. The decision 
during the Kosovo conflict to send in the German Tornados could then be 
interpreted as a culmination point of all of these internal developments with-
out representing any real change in terms of the civilian nature of Germany’s 
foreign and security policy, because in Maull’s terms, this would have neces-
sitated a considerable rupture with the German past. Hence for Maull, this 
decision was well within the framework of German strategic culture.  
Yet Maull’s account, with all of its merits, is unsatisfactory for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, it presumes – without further clarification – that changes 
of strategic cultures (or in his terms, civilian powers) have first and foremost 
internal origins. Second, Maull stretches the argument in favour of civilian 
power Germany even though it acknowledges the German predicament of 
dealing with all things military. Moreover, Maull does not clearly delineate 
the behavioural scope for civilian powers as he does not tell us where and 
when civilian power ceases to be a civilian power. This is partly understanda-
ble since we are dealing with an ideal-type construct. According to Maull, the 
political objectives of a civilian power relate to the ‘civilizing of international 
relations’ striving for a civilized political order which can be determined by 
the so-called civilizational hexagon of interrelated principles that include i.e. 
a culture of non-violent resolution of political disputes.524 By Maull’s defini-
tion, civilian power represents a “foreign policy role concept – a complex 
bundle of norms, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions – which tell a state (or 
more precisely, its decision makers) how to behave” and that therefore, “for-
eign policies may thus correspond to the actual role concept, rather than to 
the policy behaviour expected from an ideal-type civilian power.”525 Yet alt-
hough his ideal-typical conception of civilian power Germany allows for a 
dissonance between norms and beliefs that may not be fully reconcilable and 
for an actual role conception that will not fully correspond to the ideal type 
but contain specifics and variations, Maull’s definition still implies that civil-
522 Maull 2000, p. 5. 
523 Ibid. 
524 Ibid., p. 15. 
525 Ibid. 
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ian powers have specific behavioural consequences. This is also why it is dif-
ficult to fully agree with Maull’s argument about Germany and Kosovo.  
If we attempt to translate Maull’s take on civilian power into the language 
of strategic culture, being a civilian power would then equate to defining and 
practising some sort of a ‘civil grand strategy’. Indeed, from the standpoint of 
strategic cultures which are more often than not deemed as static, enduring 
as a civilian power appears like a self-fulfilling prophecy, because the evolu-
tion of attitudes is only a natural phenomenon and can be explained away by 
the grand scheme of a culture of restraint that is based on the promotion of 
civilian norms and values.  Hence, it is clear why for Maull, Kosovo did not 
signify a break with the past but rather an evolution of attitudes. Yet from a 
methodological standpoint, constructing ideal types that might have implica-
tions for actual foreign policy behaviour is vague enough to dodge the hard 
questions that concern the issues of strategic cultural change and more im-
portantly, the conditions under which such changes might take place. Anoth-
er implication of Maull’s argument is that these could only be equated with a 
complete reversal of the principles Maull mentions in his civilizational hexa-
gon. Yet as the concept of civilian power as an ideal type implies, a complete 
reversal of these principles would, in reality, be as far-fetched as to argue for 
eternal continuity of the civilian power role. Indeed, as Harnisch has argued, 
there has been both change and continuity in the domestic preferences as 
well as external expectations towards what Germany as a civilian power 
should stand for and that therefore, it is better to talk about ‘modified conti-
nuity’ concerning the role concept itself.526  
What we can conclude from Maull’s account is that the classification of a 
civilian power Germany as an ideal type should not be mixed up with the 
concept of German strategic culture because civilian power is an ideal-typical 
construct. Of course, we could argue that strategic culture also is, but then we 
would have to allow for a more rigorous methodological framework to differ-
entiate the concept of evolution from the concept of change. It seems that for 
Maull, this never was the intention of his civilian power approach in the first 
place. To be fair, Maull has since become more skeptical himself given the 
state of affairs among the German political elite concerning the issue of com-
ing to terms with the growing international responsibility, hence labelling 
Germany as an ‘uncertain power’ given the lack of direction and purpose in 
its foreign and security policy.527 
Maull’s concept of Germany as a civilian power has been both widely ac-
claimed and criticized. This has involved a wide spectrum of theoretical and 
methodological standpoints which do not necessarily form a coherent cluster 
of arguments that could be directly posed against one another. Yet, even 
526 Harnisch, Sebastian 2001, ‘Change and Continuity in Post-Cold War German Foreign Policy’, Ger-
man Politics, vol. 10, issue 1, 2001, pp. 35-60. 
527 Maull, Hanns 2006, Germany’s uncertain power: the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic, Pal-
grave Macmillan 2006. 
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though the coherence might be lacking, the question of continuity and 
change has always been at the centre of the debates on German foreign and 
security policy since the end of the Cold War.528 The case of Kosovo and the 
German participation in the Operation Allied Force (OAF) mission has re-
ceived a lot of attention which is no surprise given the fact that it was the first 
time the Bundeswehr was dispatched to participate in a combat mission since 
the end of World War II and hence made a good case for the study of conti-
nuity and change. The bulk of the literature seems to back Maull’s early 
claims on the persistence of Germany as a civilian power in the sense of con-
tinuity/change dichotomy. Miskimmon, for instance, has argued that “while 
German involvement in OAF was significant it resulted in relatively modest 
long-term change.”529 Hyde-Price, in turn, has posited that “the German pub-
lic’s response to the Kosovo war suggests that Germany remains at heart, a 
Civilian Power” even though he also added that “the Kosovo war demonstrat-
ed that the concept of civilian power needs further elaboration if it is to be 
analytically useful in exploring the political and moral dilemmas of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes.”530 This seems to be the main con-
clusion drawn from Kosovo by the observers of German foreign and security 
policy. The reason is that at the time, German foreign, security and defence 
policy was still widely considered to express itself through a ‘culture of re-
straint’ regardless of the growing German international presence and exter-
nal expectations towards a more proactive German foreign and security poli-
cy.  
Germany met with these expectations by showing solidarity towards the 
US after the 9/11 terrorist strikes, as Germany participated in Operation En-
during Freedom in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. Also, Germany’s 
stance towards NATO had shifted considerably in the sense that it was, first-
ly, ready to invoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty with its allies and 
secondly, that it allowed for a global role for NATO military action. These 
changes were significant compared to the hitherto rather skeptical German 
attitude towards any other role than territorial defence for NATO. Indeed, in 
the words of the then German defence minister Peter Struck, “Germany’s 
security is not only, but also, defended at Hindukusch”.531 The term ‘Hin-
dukusch’ underlined not only the German commitment to NATO but also to 
the principle of multilateralism and the value that Germany saw in preserv-
528 A good example of the prevalence of continuity/change dichotomy in this debate is illustrated in a 
series of articles in German Politics in 2001, vol. 10, Issue 1.   
529 Miskimmon, Alister 2009, ‘Falling into Line? Kosovo and the course of German foreign policy’, 
International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 3 (2009), p. 562. 
530 Hyde-Price, Adrian 2001, ‘Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?’, Webber (ed.), 
New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy Since Unification, 
Routledge 2001, pp. 31-32. 
531 Declaration of the German Federal Government, issued by Defense Minister Peter Struck, 
11.3.2004. Available at (http://www.bmvg.de).  
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ing NATO as the fundamental pillar in European (and in an increasing sense 
international) security. However, this also meant for Germany that US secu-
rity policy had to be more closely tied to multilateral decision-making struc-
tures. Yet in the run-up to the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, 
Schröder explicitly denied that Germany had concrete plans to increase the 
German defence budget which NATO Secretary General Robertson had been 
calling for in order to preserve NATO’s military capability in the future. Also, 
during the Summit, tensions were at boiling point regarding US policy to-
wards Iraq among the Europeans – at stake was no less than the future be-
haviour of NATO regarding international crises and conflicts.532 In addition, 
von Oppen has argued that the term ‘Hindukusch’ reflected both the German 
inability to acknowledge a combat role in the NATO mission but also a desire 
to evoke a colonial fantasy in which Germans could play the role of benevo-
lent onlookers. Hence in that sense, the term was used to modify the German 
position on civilian power and imagine a role as a civilizing power.533  
The transatlantic rift that occurred as a result of Germany’s reluctance to 
abide by US unilateralism (or US reluctance to abide by institutional multi-
lateralism) seemed to present a more drastic break with the past and the ten-
ets of German strategic culture even though it seemed to highlight the conti-
nuity of the restraint in German strategic culture. Since the war in Iraq, many 
came to regard the concept of civilian power Germany as outdated, not be-
cause Germany would have adopted a more offensive posture regarding mili-
tary deployments but because of the changes in German attitudes towards 
multilateralism. These changes were already visible during the run-up to the 
Iraq war, which highlighted Germany’s early unilateral stance regardless of 
how the UNSC would decide on the issue. Indeed, the war in Iraq is the sec-
ond “big” case in sense of the evolution of German strategic culture because it 
forcefully testifies to the power of the ‘never again’ principles in shaping 
German security and defence policy. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen has convincingly 
argued that “neither the timing nor the outcome of Germany’s policy trans-
formation can be properly understood without taking these two schools of 
thought into account”, and that their “co-existence and the cross-pressures 
they placed on German policy-makers help explain apparently contradictory 
and puzzling aspects of Germany’s stance on Iraq.”534 One plausible explana-
tion for these puzzling aspects (continuity in form of restraint but change in 
form of contingent multilateralism) is that the prevalence of the normative 
inconsistency discourages or even in some instances prohibits any long term 
strategic planning. As Forsberg has argued, “(t)he German position on the 
war on Iraq emerged in an ad hoc fashion, rather than as a result of con-
532 ‚Bundeswehr – Schnelles Dreirad‘, Der Spiegel, 18.11.2002, 47/2002; ‚NATO: Feuer in den Kulis-
sen‘, Der Spiegel, 25.11.2001, 48/2002. 
533 Von Oppen, Ulf 2013, ‘From “civilian power” to “civilizing power”: The German mission to the Hin-
du Kush 2001-2011’, Journal of War and Culture Studies 2013, (6)3, p. 215-225.  
534 Dalgaard-Nielsen 2005, p. 340-341. 
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scious strategic rethinking” and that “(i)n the Post-Cold War era, Germany 
had not become more anti-American as such, nor more pacifist, but more 
self-conscious about its role in international politics in general […] In ques-
tions of war and peace, it means neither a consolidation of pacifism nor a 
new militarization, but rather the ability to pick and choose those wars that it 
regards as necessary and justified in a manner that is compatible with the 
notion of a ‘civilian power’.“535 Karp, in a similar vein, has argued that the 
transatlantic rift was due to Germany’s different stance towards collective 
conflict resolution which had the effect that “Germany did not find an ap-
proach that allowed it to harmonize alliance relations and multilateral pref-
erences”.536 
Others have been vocal in their criticism of the notion of Germany as a ci-
vilian power. Overhaus, for instance, points to the decline of the transatlantic 
order that has also eroded the basis upon which the post-WW II German ci-
vilian power has been built. He enumerates three main factors: 1) declining 
security interdependence between the US and Europe after the end of the 
Cold War; 2) decline in the common basic principles of the international and 
European order, specifically concerning the differences attributed to the use 
of military force and the rule of law and 3) the process of de-coupling be-
tween America and Europe which has been exacerbated through demograph-
ic and sociological changes, for instance the emergence of a new political elite 
that is less bound with the legacy of World War II.537  His argument is that 
these structural changes have also made Germany’s role in the development 
of ESDP problematic because “the creating of ESDP caused ambivalences in 
German foreign and security policy as old principles became less compatible 
with new circumstances” and that “it became increasingly difficult for Berlin 
to keep its traditional equidistance towards United States and France.”538  
This is indeed the case if one considers the fact that unlike for France, the 
creation of ESDP was never a non-transatlantic project for Germany or an 
attempt to project European military power as such.  
Further examples considering the change in German stance towards mul-
tilateralism include for instance the decision of the German Constitutional 
Court in 2009 to approve of the Lisbon Treaty yet the decision also further 
imposed limits on transferring sovereignty to Brussels. Moreover, the Court’s 
decision also explicitly states that should the European Council unanimously 
decide over common European defence, the German constitution would 
guarantee the parliamentary caveat (Parlamentsvorbehalt) in issues con-
535 Forsberg, Tuomas 2005, ‘German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism 
or Emancipation?’ Security Dialogue 2005, vol. 36, no.2 (June 2005), p. 226; p.214. 
536 Karp, Regina 2005, ‘The new German foreign policy consensus’, Washington Quarterly, vol.29, no.1 
(Winter 2005-2006), p. 65. 
537 Overhaus, Marco 2004, ‘In search of a post-hegemonic order: Germany, Nato and the European 
security and defence policy’, German politics, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2004, p. 554. 
538 Ibid., p. 556. 
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cerning military deployments. In addition, Germany would not accept any 
changes to EU Treaties which would render the principle of unanimity into 
qualitative majority voting in the area of CSFP because the unanimity princi-
ple guarantees that no EU member state can be forced to participate in EU 
military operations without its consent.539 Also, in 2010, the then German 
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle publicly demanded the withdrawal of 
US nuclear weapons from German soil hence bypassing the relevant multi-
lateral forum, the North Atlantic Council.540 These sentiments have enjoyed a 
lot of political support across the party political spectrum in Germany. Since 
then, however, and particularly in light of the recent events in Ukraine, Ger-
many has backed down from its demands concerning the withdrawal of the 
last remaining warheads and instead more or less agreed to the US plans to 
upgrade the ageing missiles instead of withdrawing them.541 In any case, 
German behaviour during the Libya crisis can be seen as having been a ra-
ther unsuccessful attempt to reassert its civilian power profile. Indeed, as 
Kundnani has asserted, “while Germany is seeking more power through insti-
tutions, it has become less willing to transfer sovereignty to them.”542 Ger-
many still favours multilateral avenues as opposed to unilateral policies but 
its ‘all-in’ approach has been reversed to something which is contingent on 
the political conditions and the re-emergence of the debate on German na-
tional interests, which is undoubtedly part of the ‘new activism’ in German 
foreign and security policy. Crucially, given the post-Cold War developments 
in international security politics and the challenges that they continue to 
pose, it seems that Germany’s civilian power profile stands in contradiction 
with Germany’s commitment to effective multilateralism (which seems to 
increasingly require military deployments that are robust in nature) and 
hence to the principle ‘never again alone’. Even so, as will be assessed in the 
next chapter, it would be far-fetched to label Germany as a ‘Normal Power’ or 
argue that Germany has once again embraced another ‘Sonderweg’. 
Overall, it seems that, in terms of Germany’s civilian power stance, there 
are factors that both speak for its continuity and for its change. In general, 
Germany continues to uphold the culture of restraint despite the fact that 
Germany’s military commitments around the world have risen exponentially 
539 Constitutional?Court’s?decision?on?the?Lisbon?Treaty,?30.6.2009. Available?at:??????????????????? 
verfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2009/06/es20090630_?2bve000208.html). 
540 See? ‚Atomwaffen? Abzug: Wie Westerwelle abrüsten will‘, Spiegel Online, 13.4.2010. Available 
at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/atomwaffen-abzug-wie-westerwelle-abruesten-will-
a-686646.html). 
541 See ‚Nuklearwaffen werden nicht abgezogen sondern modernisiert‘, der Tagesspiegel,?27.3.2014. 
Available at:?(http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/us-atombomben-in-deutschland-nuklearwaffen-
werden-nicht-abgezogen-sondern-modernisiert/10236788.html). 
542 Kundnani, Hans 2001, ‘Germany as a Geo-economic Power’, The Washington Quarterly, vol.32, 
no.3, p. 35. 
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since the end of the Cold War. In addition, besides the shift from ‘never again 
war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’ no drastic change in the constitution of the 
normative structure of German strategic culture has taken place since the 
end of the Cold War either.  Nonetheless, the fact that Germany continues to 
send ‘boots on the ground’ has led to the elaboration of the more important 
question what for, both among the political elite and the German population. 
Significantly, this question cannot simply be answered in terms of ‘never 
again alone’, as was the case during the early 1990s. The key word here is 
‘responsibility’ (Verantwortung), which can have several dimensions in 
terms of German strategic culture. It can be understood both as Germany’s 
international responsibility to contribute to the peaceful resolution of global 
conflicts and Germany’s responsibility towards its allies and multilateral 
commitments, which also include military deployments. Yet it can also be 
understood as being Germany’s responsibility towards its own history, which, 
as will be shown in the next chapter, is still significantly shaping the evolu-
tion of German strategic culture – despite all the talk about the alleged Ger-
man ‘normalization’.  
4.5.  SUMMARY: STRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE 
FROM AFGHANISTAN TO LIBYA AND BEYOND 
The fundamental changes in German strategic culture that took place in the 
period from Bosnia to Kosovo (from ‘never again war ‘to ‘never again Ausch-
witz’, expansion in the remit of Bundeswehr deployments) have had a lasting 
impact on German foreign, security and defence policy making mainly in the 
form of bringing ‘war’ back into German politics. While the post-Kosovo de-
velopments have perhaps not entailed such fundamental change (either on 
the level of norms and ideas or strategic practices), they still represent a 
number of significant changes that have altered the strategic reality in Ger-
many. 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
In the run-up to the war in Iraq, Germany deviated from its ‘never again 
alone’ principle by drawing a clear line between solidarity and support for US 
‘adventurism’. Indeed, Germany seemed to reverse its strategic tenet as a 
close ally to the US. However, the rift in the German-US relations had a more 
considerable impact on the bilateral relations between the two than it even-
tually had on German strategic culture. While Iraq could be taken as proof 
that the changes in the mid-to-late 1990s in German strategic culture were 
not as fundamental as argued, Germany quite quickly ‘returned to the fold’ in 
Afghanistan. Firstly, with the German participation in Enduring Free-
dom/ISAF operations, Germany ‘crossed the Rubicon’ by participating in 
ground combat, a long time taboo in German strategic culture. Secondly, Af-
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ghanistan not only solidified the image of Bundeswehr as an army im Einsatz 
(‘in deployment’) but also affected the process of Bundeswehr reform as per-
haps no other conflict management operation to date. Thirdly, Afghanistan 
not only expanded the realm of German strategic action, but it also clearly 
showed the inconsistencies between the operational reality on the ground 
and the discursive reality of German political elite, which has undoubtedly 
hampered the functioning of German strategic practice at times (e.g. the 
Kunduz affair). Most importantly, Afghanistan has been key in bringing to 
the fore the complexities of long-time engagement in conflict management 
that put considerable economic and political pressure on the political deci-
sion makers. This constant pressure has functioned as a source of continuous 
incremental change to German strategic practices (e.g. procurement policies, 
counterinsurgency tactics) in order to adapt to the emerging challenges in the 
external strategic environment. 
These developments from Afghanistan to Iraq provide mixed arguments 
regarding Wendt’s account. Terrorism was clearly acknowledged to be a 
threat to German security yet there was the caveat in Schröder’s policy re-
garding Germany’s unlimited solidarity towards the US: Germany would not 
partake in any ‘military adventures’. Nonetheless, it can be argued to be the 
‘common fate’ of the rest of the world to take up arms against terrorism 
which threatened the existence of commonly shared values and way of life. In 
this sense Germany indeed shared in that fate. The existence of terrorism as a 
common threat also increased interdependence within the states system be-
cause the units mostly agreed that terrorists should be treated as enemies. 
However, as became clear during the run-up to the Iraq war, Germany did 
not agree with the Bush administrations’ policy of putting rogue states in the 
same basket as terrorists (i.e. Bush’s definition of the axis of evil). This same 
phenomenon also occurred in many other European states and led to the fa-
mous argument regarding ‘old’ vs. ‘new Europe’ – hence it seems that the 
issue at the system level was not about whether or not terrorism was identi-
fied as the common enemy, but rather who would count it as such and what 
the proper actions to be taken were.  
To apply Wendt’s terminology, whereas the US policy after 9/11 and its 
conception of Self vis-à-vis Others increasingly created images of enemies, 
this was not the case in Germany. Hence, it could be argued that Germany 
did not agree with how the US was defining its identity, because it did not 
correspond with Germany’s experience of ‘Othering’. Indeed, as Zehfuss has 
noted, articulations regarding German identity often rely on “contextualizing 
what is considered German now with respect to historical experience of the 
Third Reich.”543 Her research also shows that the principles of ‘never again’ 
take into account the need of others and that “(t)hey do not represent a com-
petition between a more egoistic and a more collective identity but rather 
543 Zehfuss 2001, p. 327. 
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focus on the question ‘who the Self should be?’”544 In that sense we can argue 
that German strategic culture was not willing to abide by the rules of unilat-
eralism that would increasingly divide the international system between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. Indeed, concrete iterations on enemy im-
ages are largely absent from German post-Cold War strategic thought. Re-
garding the above notion about the articulations on German identity, while 
we could argue that for Germany, the Self in the image of the Third Reich has 
been the worst and most threatening enemy of all time, it is not as simple as 
Wendt’s discussion on the pre-existing state of ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’ would sug-
gest?545?In this sense and following Zehfuss, we could argue that the existence 
of a strategic culture – as long as we agreed that culture is an ultimately het-
erogenous social and political entity – would suggest that the question 
whether Germany is more alike or different from the Third Reich cannot be 
determined a priori, but would depend on concrete articulations.546 Indeed, 
this can be presented as a critique of Wendt’s model, since, as argued, it 
largely suggests that identity is something that can be ‘negotiated’ between 
states. 
? ? ? And yet, there is more to the Wendtian angle than just pitting internal 
logics and forms of international interaction against one another in terms of 
their explanatory power. This is unravelled if we consider that unilateralism 
– as a specific form of international interaction – is at odds with the modus
operandi of a Lockean system (and Kantian even more so). From this point of
view, then, it would seem that Germany’s ‘no’ to Iraq could be explained by
factors other than its particular strategic cultural tenets. As was argued, even
though the continuity of ‘culture of restraint’ was reaffirmed by German poli-
cy regarding Iraq, it did not explain German resistance to the US and the ‘co-
alition of the willing’. Rather, US unilateralist policies were at odds with
German conceptions and aspirations about international order and hence,
the preferred logic of international interaction. In Wendt’s terms, we could
argue that Germany aspired to move towards a Kantian system whereas the
US preferred the Lockean one. From a systemic view, the significance of the
Iraq war lies particularly in the unravelling of this difference. Indeed, the
form of international interaction (unilateralism) was pivotal in bolstering
German resistance to the war in Iraq.
A critic could argue that this makes little sense given Germany’s participa-
tion in Enduring Freedom/ISAF operations that were arguably initiated on 
the same grounds – as ‘war against terrorism’ (in particular the former). 
However, the difference here is that German strategic culture was far more 
receptive to the idea of war against terrorism in general than it was towards 
toppling regimes or dictators in the name of the war against terrorism. 
Hence, both the ends and the means mattered. In fact, German participation 
544 Ibid., p. 332. 
545 See Chapter 2.4. 
546 Zehfuss 2001, p. 336. 
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in Afghanistan can be explained by the combination of solidarity towards the 
US, agreement on the means and ends in the fight against terrorism and a 
strong sense of displaying reliability as a partner, which culminated in the 
strong support for the ‘never again alone’ principle. All of these factors were 
largely missing in the case of Iraq. 
Lebanon, Libya and beyond 
The more recent developments testify to the continuity of change within 
German strategic culture. German participation in UNIFIL showed that 
Germany was ready to part with the last military taboo still remaining, since 
the possibility of German soldiers standing against their Israeli counterparts 
could not entirely be ruled out a priori. This also testifies to the fact that 
while the special German-Israeli relationship brings its own dynamic to 
German strategic decision-making (Israel’s security as German raison 
d’être), German strategic culture is able to adapt within the boundaries set by 
it. While the historical experience of warfare remains the key mechanism 
within these boundaries, there are a number of other factors that influence 
German strategic behaviour. This was clearly to be detected in the case of 
Libya where historical contemplation did not play a major role. Indeed, one 
of the more significant changes in recent years refers exactly to the role 
played by historical experience. Even though new experiences continue to be 
filtered through the prism of the German past, it seems that the past itself 
has less often been used as a direct legitimation of concrete strategic deci-
sions on the use of military force. This can be explained by the established 
nature of the ‘never again’ normative framework – the major contestation 
between the different interpretations of the past seems to have settled down. 
However, Libya also confirmed that whenever there is reason to doubt that 
Germany breaches or is about to breach one of these principles, it also evokes 
a debate on continuity/change of German strategic culture. This is a part of 
the continuing relevance of the past on German strategic culture, which con-
tinues to evolve in the debate regarding German international responsibility, 
as will be argued in the next chapter.   
     The recent developments, once again, paint a rather mixed picture in 
terms of Wendt’s model and strategic cultural change. Firstly, it can be ar-
gued that the transatlantic rift that ensued based on the differences mainly 
regarding the war in Iraq, was the culmination point of German distrust with 
a system in which relations between units would increasingly be played out 
in terms of enmity – in particular between the Christian West and the Islam-
ic East. This is not to suggest a change in the systemic logic of interaction as a 
whole, but Iraq in particular showed how far the system was from the princi-
ple of military self-restraint, which, as argued, has remained one of the cor-
nerstones of German strategic culture after the end of the Cold War. This 
constellation was clearly reflected in German policy in Libya (and to a lesser 
extent in Lebanon). Secondly, however, if we think about the recent crisis in 
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Ukraine, Germany has firmly realigned its strategic thought with the prevail-
ing external conditions in mind, in which the resurgence of a powerful unit 
(Russia) represents a common threat to the very foundation of the Lockean 
system (state sovereignty). This, in turn, has prompted the shift in German 
strategic thought regarding Russia – from ‘friend’ to ‘rival’, as is clearly de-
lineated in the new White Paper. Whether or not this shift will have more 
permanent repercussions regarding German strategic culture remains to be 
seen, but it nonetheless provides clear evidence of how the interaction at the 
system level can affect strategic culture. 
Overall, on the surface, the track record of German strategic culture from 
Afghanistan to the present highlights incremental adaptation instead of fun-
damental, comprehensive change. However, the argument can also be made 
that the period of Afghanistan and beyond represents a period of a more tan-
gible change because 1) the discrepancy within the ‘never again’ framework 
has lost much of its incendiary potential, even though the differences remain 
real and meaningful and the possibility of political conflict remains; 2) Ger-
man participation in ISAF at latest solidified the Bundeswehr out-of-area 
operations as institutionalized and continuous strategic practice and as a re-
sult 3) German strategic culture has lost much of its reactive and static na-
ture compared to the 1990s and seems rather to unfold under the professed 
‘new activism’ for the foreseeable future.  
Indeed, the ‘experience of warfare’ has remained the most crucial mecha-
nism in bringing about change also during this period, and is reflected in the 
shift from reactive to proactive strategic culture. The fundamental 
changes that took place in German strategic culture in the mid-to?late 1990s 
(shifts in ‘never again’, Bundeswehr out-of-area operations) have been 
institutionalized in the form of recurring and new strategic practices 
based on Bundeswehr reforms and new concepts on security (discussed 
in detail in the next chapter). Importantly, however, Germany has not 
faced external shocks of similar proportions to the massacre of Srebrenica in 
this latter period that would have fundamentally altered the tenets of 
German strategic culture. While the 9/11 terrorist strikes certainly 
functioned as an external shock that affected German strategic policy 
making and practices in the form of war against terrorism and by 
accelerating the process of Bundeswehr reform, they did not trigger 
fundamental change regarding the principled orientation of German 
strategic culture based on the idea of military restraint.  The ‘Kunduz 
affair’ stands out as one of the more powerful external shocks that 
initiated a shift in the elite discourse regarding the status of the 
Bundeswehr soldiers, but it did not lead to a tangible change on the level of 
strategic practices. One of the reasons for this is that neither 9/11 nor 
Kunduz represented instances that would have required a re-interpretation 
of the German past which is part and parcel of the evolving experience of 
warfare – a factor that was at the forefront in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Finally, the fact that Germany participated in ground combat for the first 
time since the end of World War II in Afghanistan without going through a 
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similar period of moral contemplation surrounding Srebrenica is proof that 
the normative changes within German strategic culture have been perma-
nent. The novelty, however, is that the purpose for which military force can 
be used is subject to more intense debate, despite the credo of the use of mili-
tary force as a last resort, ultima ratio. Hence, the debate has partly but not 
entirely shifted from the more fundamental question regarding the use of 
force per se to the question of whether, how and when and under what condi-
tions Germany should use military force. This is also reflected in the debate 
concerning the evolving relationship between German guilt and its interna-
tional responsibility – the focal point of the next chapter of this thesis. 
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5 RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE PAST AND 
GERMAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
“Being conscious about German history is part of the process of 
renewal. The nation state of the Germans is broken. The German 
nation has remained, and will continue to do so.” (Helmut Kohl, 1982) 
At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama famously posited that the vic-
tory of liberalism over other systemic alternatives also meant the “end of his-
tory as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government.”547 In one sense, Fukuyama was right: an interpretation of the 
reunification of Germany as a victory of the Western way of life, emancipa-
tory ideas and liberal thinking in general seems plausible. Yet as critics have 
noted, ‘the end of history’ did not only mean the shattering of a socialist uto-
pia but that of a liberalist utopia as well, since the democracy that evolved 
after the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe did not, in essence, resem-
ble the model of a Western liberal democracy.548 Similarly, in Russia, a form 
of democracy emerged that was not based on liberalism or individual free-
doms but rather on state sovereignty and centralized political authority.549 
Moreover, a cursory glimpse at post-Cold War developments around the 
globe is enough to show that political and economic liberalism is not the only 
‘ism’ competing for the hearts and minds of the people: religious fundamen-
talism, nationalism and various forms of totalitarianism have not vanished 
but rather made a strong re-appearance both within and beyond Europe’s 
borders. In Germany, however, the propagated ‘end of history’ was indeed 
first and foremost historic: it was the first time the political and economic 
systems of former Cold War adversaries had been merged into a democratic 
political system and social market economy based on the political and eco-
nomic model of the former BRD550.  But perhaps more importantly, the Ger-
man reunification, for its part, was a prerequisite for a sober discussion 
about the meaning of a common German past that could be conducted with-
547 Fukuyama 1989, ?The End of History’, The National Interest, Summer 1989, p. 3. 
548 See Tamás 1992, ?Socialism, Capitalism, and Modernity’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, Number 
3, July 1992, The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 72-74. 
549 See Morozov, Viacheslav 2008, ‘Sovereignty and Democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern 
subject faces the post- modern world’, Journal of International Relations and Development, vol. 11, 
June 2008, pp. 152-180. 
550 Social market economy relies on the principle of free market economy and highlights the same op-
portunities for all citizens. The state is expected to lead a stabilizing economic policy and a modest 
income distribution policy.    
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out the tainted glasses of the Cold War ‘isms’. In contrast, polarized debates 
concerning the legacy of Nazism a few years before the end of the Cold War 
were certainly not indicative of an emancipatory atmosphere - especially the 
famous Historians’ Controversy: one would either find apologetic or nihilistic 
arguments; critical historical reflection was lost somewhere in between. 
Hence, the reunification was a reason for Germans to venture into history 
again, not abandon it. In that sense, the triumph of liberalism and the end of 
the Cold War did not silence history but rather gave it a new voice, contrary 
to what Fukuyama had predicted. 
 Colin Gray has argued that if we want to truly understand what strategic 
culture is all about, then we have to go back in history. For Gray, history 
plays the role of the plot, the master narrative, because “a security communi-
ty is likely to think and behave in ways that are influenced by what it has 
taught itself about itself and its relevant contexts. And that education […] 
rests primarily upon the interpretation of history and history’s geography.”551 
This is a plausible argument since every strategic culture has its historical 
origins, which are rooted in specific ideational, material and political condi-
tions and contexts. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, these condi-
tions set the pace for the evolution of German strategic culture both during 
and after the Cold War. This is also significant in terms of the continui-
ty/change dichotomy: if strategic culture is based on patterns of strategic 
thinking and practice, it is evident that the national past plays a key role in 
shaping these patterns, because the existence of any kind of strategic cultural 
continuity would be impossible in a historical vacuum. Similarly, as will be 
discussed throughout this chapter, reinterpretations of the past wield the 
power to change the tenets of strategic culture.  
As discussed at the beginning of Chapter 1, constructivist studies in IR 
have emphasized the importance of cultural and institutional frameworks in 
which policy is generated. Interpretations of the past are an important part of 
these frameworks because beliefs, ideas and norms prevalent in international 
politics often originate in specific understandings of the past. Studies on col-
lective memory have traditionally underlined the importance that interpreta-
tions of the past have in terms of setting the limits of the possible within the 
political sphere by both constraining and enabling policy behaviour.552 Spe-
cific interpretations of the past involve value judgments, which necessarily 
result in either promoting or delegitimizing certain policies. Hence, these 
interpretations function as constitutive elements for policy behaviour. There-
fore, collective memory “plays a key role in the symbolic discourse of politics, 
551 Gray, Colin 2007, ?Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, 
Vol. 26, Issue 1, p.5? 
552 This understanding is prevalent in the seminal writings of sociologist Maurice Halbwacs. See 
e.g.?Halbwachs, Maurice 1992, On Collective Memory, Coser, Lewis A. (ed.), Chicago University Press,
1992. 
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in the legitimation of political structures and action, and in the justification 
of collective behaviour.”553  
Since the focus of this study lies in the question concerning the continui-
ties and changes in German strategic culture, the important thing is to tackle 
the questionof  how historical interpretations concerning the ideational ten-
ets of strategic culture evolve, and how all this affects the functioning of the 
strategic culture under investigation. In the previous chapters, this was illus-
trated by the shift in the normative structure of German strategic culture: 
from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’. This ideational shift among 
the German Left reflected the difficulty of the whole process of historical re-
interpretation in Germany. This was so because it involved the deeply rooted 
strategic principles and understandings that had become part of Germany’s 
raison d’état during the Cold War. In that sense, Colin Gray is right in argu-
ing that strategic culture touches upon the very core understandings of what 
it means to be: “Germans cannot help but be Germans, whether they are 
waging war as they would prefer or as they must […] those responsible for the 
[strategic] behaviour necessarily are encultured as Germans, Britons, and so 
forth.”554 
Indeed, the re-evaluation and re-interpretation of the national past is and, 
at least tacitly always has been, a simultaneous effort to (re)define German 
post-World War II national identity since the defeat of the Third Reich. The 
expression ‘national identity’ was, to say the least, politically ambiguous dur-
ing the Cold War decades, given the de facto existence of two German states 
under an arguably single German nation. Nationhood, not statehood, was the 
locus of a pan-German identity during the Cold War. The concept of a com-
mon German nationhood was the most important culturally uniting factor 
for all Germans during the long Cold War years, yet there were many open 
questions concerning the substance of national identity for a reunified Ger-
man nation. Internationally, it was important to reassure Germany’s allies 
that a reunified Germany was a Western nation, firmly committed to Euro-
pean and Western values. Hence, Germany’s European and transatlantic ori-
entations were important components of post-Cold War German national 
identity. One could posit that after reunification, the task was to provide as-
surance that the new German ‘Being’ was consolidated and directed towards 
Europe, the US and multilateral co-operation, in other words, to solidify the 
foundations of Cold War German strategic continuity. Yet, as was discussed 
in the previous chapters, further into the 1990s and especially ever since the 
Balkan Wars, the question of ‘Becoming’ became the more dominant one in 
553 Markovits, Andrei S. & Reich, Simon 1999, ‘The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas 
for German Foreign Policy’, Brady, John S,  Crawford, Beverly & Williarty, Sarah Elise (eds.), The 
Postwar Transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1999, pp.439–72, quoted here p.445. 
554 Gray, Colin 1999, ‘Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 1 (January 1999), p.55. 
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the sense of an attempt to redefine German historical responsibility in the 
context of emerging wars, conflicts and the use of military force. In this 
sense, there is certainly some overlap between the evolution of German stra-
tegic culture and German national identity. However, as discussed in Chapter 
1, it is imperative to maintain the conceptual and analytical distinction be-
tween strategic culture and national identity especially since strategic cultur-
al changes (in terms of strategic thinking and strategic action) do not neces-
sarily result in easily/readily observable changes in foreign policy identity. 
For example, as discussed earlier, the long prevalence of the concept of Ger-
many as a civilian power rested on the deeply rooted consensus on foreign 
policy and strategy during the Cold War. This view persisted even though 
changes in the German stance towards the use of force in the 1990s clearly 
indicated that civilian power approach’s explanatory power had reached its 
limits.  
Importantly, the redefinition of the historical responsibility of a Germany 
whose duty was to never to forget and to engage in reparations and reconcil-
iatory politics into a Germany where this responsibility has been transformed 
into an almost absolute moral imperative to prevent genocide even with mili-
tary means if needs be. This has substantially changed the way the past af-
fects the present in contemporary German politics, but whereas the past used 
to dictate the limits of the politically possible, the present asymmetrical glob-
al political developments and phenomena such as terrorism, climate change 
and failing states challenge these limits and create a sense of urgency in 
terms of security that often needs quick and also at times, creative responses. 
Political actors and decision makers do not always have the luxury of having 
the time to engage in deep normative deliberations or ethical soul-searching 
in case the normative framework of the strategic culture in question is unable 
to offer a viable policy alternative or legitimize the preferred policy option. 
However, despite the evident need for a degree of pragmatism in contempo-
rary security and defence policy in the face of rapid change in the interna-
tional environment, long term strategic planning is needed to tackle these 
challenges successfully. The legitimacy of a particular strategy often relies on 
a shared interpretation of historically significant events and issues, even 
though these would not be clearly articulated in the strategy.   
For instance, as Hilpert has illustrated at length in her case study on 
German policy in Afghanistan, the lack of clear strategic objectives and long 
term strategic planning on the political level created a certain kind of capabil-
ity-expectations gap over the period of Germany’s Afghanistan mission. This 
gap, in turn, distorted the way Germany’s participation in Afghanistan was 
assessed, both at the political level as in the theatre of operations. The Ger-
man soldiers seemed to be fighting in a war while the German politicians 
were still struggling to come to terms with the fact that, indeed, ‘war’ was the 
proper term to describe the conditions under which German participation 
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took place.555 This ‘assessment lag’ between the political level and the theatre 
of action can be explained not only by a lack of strategic planning or even an 
unclear conception of how ‘terrorism’ is understood and how it should be 
countered, but specifically also by a shared view among the German political 
elite that German military participation would never involve being party to 
war. This view was strengthened further especially after the transatlantic rift 
between Germany and the US in the wake of the Iraq war. Indeed, the strong 
re-appearance of ‘never again war’ in German strategic discourse in the con-
text of the war in Iraq, and the prevailing understanding of German historical 
responsibility did not offer much that would have altered the German politi-
cians’ view on the situation in Afghanistan. The last yearly status report on 
the progress made in Afghanistan (issued by the German government) re-
flects this understanding as well. While acknowledging the necessity of mili-
tary deployment in the early stages of the ISAF/Enduring Freedom mission, 
the report clearly questions the feasibility of the deployment of the military 
for the purpose of transforming the Afghan society (Transformations-
Einsatz).556 Indeed, the report testifies to Hilpert’s argument of lacking stra-
tegic goals – it states that the “objective of the NATO mission in Afghanistan 
actually turned out to be the Afghan ownership of their own affairs”557, 
which indicates a sincere lack of a clear strategic objective in different stages 
of the conflict. The EU post-ISAF strategy for Afghanistan 2014-2016, which 
was drafted under strong German influence, also highlights the importance 
of civilian measures and co-ordination of development policies instead of 
robust military involvement.558  
Overall, the experience of Afghanistan has shown that Germans continue 
to be at odds with the deployment of military force – this is reflected in the 
lack of a clearly defined strategy as well as the gap between political concep-
tualizations and experience and practice on the ground. Indeed, emerging 
global patterns of insecurity and new security threats such as failing states, 
natural disasters, climate change, global migration movements and terrorism 
challenge the German strategic culture in a way that can make historical re-
flection and traditional patterns of strategic thinking and practice seem re-
dundant. However, as will be discussed in this chapter, the German Compre-
hensive/Networked Approach on security (Vernetzte Sicherheit) rests upon a 
broad concept of security. It was developed based on the strategic experience 
of the Balkan conflict in the 1990s and it has distilled many traditional traits 
555 Hilpert 2014. 
556 Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode 20.11.2014, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung,?????? 
schrittsbericht zur Lage in Afghanistan 2014 einschließlich einer Zwischenbilanz des Afghanistan- 
Engagements, Drucksache 18/3270. 
557 Ibid. 
558 ‘Council conclusions on Afghanistan’, Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council Meet-
ing, 23.6.2014, Luxembourg. (Available at: http:// http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data?
/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/143322.pdf). 
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of German strategic culture: multilateralism, co-operation and co-ordination 
and incorporated new post-Cold War strategic practices such as the deploy-
ment of military means as ultima ratio. 
The German past continues to be of utmost relevance to German strategic 
culture not only because we can pinpoint a certain change in the normative 
structure of German strategic culture as a result of reinterpretation of the 
past (e.g. never again war – never again Auschwitz), but even more so be-
cause the evolution of German strategic culture after the end of the Cold War 
is part of the process of ‘coming to terms with the German past’. The con-
tours of change within this process were already detectable in the intellectual 
climate towards the end of the 1980s in Germany due to the legacy of the 
events at the Bitburg military cemetery and the Historians’ Controversy, dis-
cussed in detail in this chapter. This process attained a new facet through 
these events and the debates that ensued which, among other things, re-
vealed the fact that if change in attitudes could be considered relevant in 
terms of coming to terms with the past, then surely this insight would have 
repercussions on German strategic culture, too.  
Indeed, the last two decades have proven that Germany continues to be in 
a state of ‘Becoming’ in terms of strategic culture due to ideational shifts that 
have solidified the use of military force as a legitimate political tool. Even so, 
the German military action on the ground has not followed a clear-cut strate-
gy as far as the use of force itself is concerned as can be showcased by the 
German participation in the conflict management in Afghanistan regarding 
the then prevailing Rules of Engagement (RoE). Indeed, the reason for using 
the military seems often unclear for Germans. A national security strategy 
would perhaps help make the purpose clearer (notwithstanding Germany’s 
commitment to NATO and collective defence). However, the lack of a ‘grand’ 
strategy in terms of the use of force rests partly on the fact that the German 
past is clearly more limiting than it is enabling in this regard, despite the re-
moval of the military taboos during the 1990s and German participation in 
ground combat. Also, there are limits to how the past can be harnessed for 
the purposes of the present and the future in the first place. This can be de-
tected in one of the focal points of this chapter – the relationship between 
German guilt and German responsibility. Hence, what Harnisch & Wolf have 
labelled ‘continuity in change’ in German strategic culture is a fitting expres-
sion, since it also refers to the continuing relevance of the past on the present 
in German politics.559 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I laid out the track record of German strategic cul-
ture after the end of World War II. The purpose of this chapter is to concen-
trate on the evolution of the ideational side of German strategic culture, 
which is best achieved by looking at how (re)interpretations of the past have 
559 Harnisch, Sebastian & Wolf, Raimund 2010, ‘Germany; The Continuity of Change’, Kirchner, Emil & 
Sperling, James (eds.) National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance, Routledge, London 
2010, pp. 43-65. 
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shaped and continue to shape the essence and substance of German strategic 
culture.  The following discussion will hence cover key elements such as ideas 
and beliefs concerning the legacy of Nazism, the related issue of German guilt 
and responsibility as well as the debate on German ‘Sonderweg’ and Germa-
ny’s ‘normalization’. The first three elements combined have constituted the 
cornerstones of the ideational fabric of German strategic culture since the 
end of World War II – the setting out of which the norms of ‘never again’ 
emerged, as discussed in the previous chapters. The normalization of Ger-
man foreign and security policy, in turn, is sometimes interpreted in scholar-
ly writing as the outcome of the end of the Cold War and/or German reunifi-
cation and also as evidence of the evolution of German strategic culture. It 
refers particularly to a group of historians labelled as ‘Normalization-
Nationalists’, whose primary goal is to call upon Germans to ‘abandon their 
self-hatred’ and replace it with a ‘love for their own land’.560 Oftentimes, 
German normalization is also linked to the coming-of power of the Red-
Green government in 1998, and especially to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 
order to pinpoint a major political and moral break from Chancellor Kohl’s 
era. However, as will be discussed, it is not as new a phenomenon as is often 
claimed – Chancellor Schmidt was already supporting a normalization of 
German politics in the early 1980s and vehemently resisted any efforts, do-
mestic or international, to convey a collective guilt on the German people.561 
Hence, the debate on German normalization can be depicted as either a cri-
tique of the German tendency to ‘dwell on the past’ or as a form of apologet-
ics, depending where one stands on the issue (coming to terms with the past 
vs. ‘overcoming’ the past) but also as a counter-narrative to the theory of 
German Sonderweg (special vs. normal path). 
A further objective of this chapter is to dig deeper into the interconnected 
and historically constructed nature of these terms, because this makes the 
ideational structure of German strategic culture more intelligible and acces-
sible. It goes without saying that evaluating the impact of the past on con-
temporary policy is never an easy task, but as Hoffmann and Longhurst have 
argued, “an understanding of German strategic culture projects a picture of 
what ‘history qualifies Germany to do’”.562 
Therefore, in order to establish this understanding, a simple look at the 
defence and security policies Germany pursues will not do. Rather, we need 
560 Hellmann, Gunther 1996, ‘Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany’, 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.40, No.1 (April 1996), pp. 16-17. 
561 Schmidt’s opposition to accepting collective guilt was especially detectable in his Israel-policy: Con-
trary to the Israel’s official stance, Schmidt declined to accept collective guilt as a basis for the devel-
opment of German-Israeli relations. See e.g. ‚Die Deutschen in ihrer Gesamtheit waren nicht mitschul-
dig‘, Zeit Online, 28.4.2015. Available at: (http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-??????
mut-schmidt-zweiter-weltkrieg-kriegsende).  
562 Hoffmann, Arthur & Longhurst, Kerry 1999, ‘German strategic culture in action’, Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 20, No.2, p.31. 
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to pay attention to things which are not necessarily as easily empirically de-
tectable or verifiable – such as the issue of German guilt for the Nazi past, 
unlike the manifestations of defence and security policies. This is important 
because the ideational-normative structure of German strategic culture did 
not spawn in a vacuum – it was the feeling of guilt transformed into a sense 
of responsibility which informed the formulation of the ‘never again’ frame-
work after the end of World War II. During the Cold War, this transfor-
mation could for instance be detected in the Kohl Doctrine according to 
which Germany had the responsibility not to send ground troops to countries 
where the German Wehrmacht had wrought havoc during World War II. Af-
ter the German reunification and the subsequent crisis in the Middle East 
and the Balkans, the transformation from guilt into responsibility was clearly 
detectable. Indeed, being responsible for the past was conceived as a respon-
sibility to hinder any possible genocide from emerging again on European 
soil at present and in the future – from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again 
Auschwitz’ – with military means if necessary. However, before we turn to 
the linkages between guilt, responsibility and strategic culture in more detail 
it is necessary to locate and discuss the historical and discursive context 
within which the issues of German guilt and responsibility have evolved.  
5.1.  COMING TO TERMS WITH THE GERMAN PAST ?
FROM INDIVIDUAL GUILT TO COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The process of coming to terms with the German past has been as much a 
fencing contest among the German intelligentsia as an earnest debate on the 
repercussions of the legacy of Nazism for the reconstruction of German post-
World War II national identity. What is more, strong feelings of guilt and 
responsibility have always accompanied the process of German Vergangan-
heitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the German past). The immediate 
conceptual discrepancy concerns the validity of the term Vergangenheits-
bewältigung itself, since the German verb bewältigen can be translated in 
many ways – ‘coming to terms with the past’, ‘coping with the past’, ‘manag-
ing the past’, ‘dealing with the past’ etc. Indeed, many authoritative voices in 
Germany have argued that the German past cannot simply be dealt with and 
that the best Germans can do is to learn from it and never forget. Perhaps the 
term Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit (reappraisal of the past) is more to the 
point here since this process has indeed involved novel responses to the 
questions that the past has posed on the Germans. The purpose of this sub-
chapter is to show that the issue of German guilt and responsibility and espe-
cially their evolving relationship, is key in assessing ideational and normative 
change within German strategic culture. I will first discuss German guilt and 
responsibility in more general terms before turning to strategic culture in 
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particular, because it is necessary to cover the depth of the issue before as-
sessing its impact on particular policy fields. 
5.1.1? KARL JASPERS AND THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF GUILT 
Unsurprisingly, the issue of German guilt was raised immediately after the 
end of World War II. The so-called Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt in 1945 was 
the first public statement of guilt by influential German clergy and laymen. 
However, the Declaration was regarded by most Germans as an unnecessary 
concession to the Allies, who were seen by the majority of Germans as having 
been as ruthless as the Nazis were in the eyes of the world.563  Indeed, collec-
tive guilt theories flourished in the aftermath of the war. Swiss psychoanalyst 
Carl Jung wrote an influential essay in 1946 about the issue of guilt as a psy-
chological phenomenon, in which he asserted that the German people felt a 
collective guilt (Kollektivschuld) for the atrocities committed by their fellow 
countrymen. According to Jung, it was an essential task for the psychoana-
lysts to bring the Germans to recognize this collective aspect of guilt.564  Also, 
the occupying Allied forces promoted shame and guilt with a publicity cam-
paign, which included posters depicting concentration camps with headlines 
such as ‘These Atrocities: Your Fault!’ (Diese Schandtaten: Eure Schuld!) 
with the text ‘You just calmly watched and silently approved’ (Ihr habt ruhig 
zugesehen und stillschweigend geduldet) underneath.565 
However, despite the societal, political and psychological nausea brought 
by the end of the war the writings of prominent German scholars such as 
Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers took a more nuanced view on the issue of 
German guilt. In 1945, Arendt famously pointed to the ambiguous relation-
ship between guilt and responsibility: “(t)here are many who share responsi-
bility without any visible proof of guilt. There are many who have become 
guilty without being in the least responsible. Among the responsible in a 
broader sense must be included all those who continued to be sympathetic to 
Hitler as long as it was possible, who aided his rise to power, and who ap-
plauded him in Germany and in other European countries.”566  Yet for Ar-
endt, the most pressing issue was that ordinary German ‘jobholders and fam-
ily men’ had been organized by Himmler’s ‘Satanic genius’ to commit mass 
murder in the face of the threat of losing social benefits, thereby losing their 
563 See. Conway, John S. 1987, ‘How Shall the Nations Repent? The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, 
October 1945’, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol.38, Issue 4, October 1987, pp. 596-622. 
564 Jung, CG. 1946, ?Nach der Katastrophe?, Neue Schweizer Rundschau, XIII (1945), pp. 67-88. 
565 Picture available at the website of Imperial War Museums, (http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/ 
item/object/29110). 
566 Arendt, Hannah 1994, ‘Organized Guilt and Political Responsibility’, Kohn, Jerome (ed.), Essays in 
Understanding 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt Literary Trust Blue-
cher 1994, pp. 149-150. 
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human dignity and honour.567  Arendt did not, however, describe this solely 
as a German phenomenon, but argued that it was international and ‘bour-
geoisie’ in character.568   
In 1947, Jaspers published a book called Die Schuldenfrage  (The Ques-
tion of German Guilt) based on his earlier lectures. In this book, Jaspers – an 
anti-Nazi who had remained in Germany during the war – sought to draw 
distinctions between different kinds of guilt and corresponding degrees of 
responsibility.  From the outset, this seemed like an insurmountable task giv-
en the clear implications of guilt for Germany and Germans as a whole. For 
Jaspers, it was important to distinguish between different kinds of guilt be-
cause every German experienced guilt differently and yet there was some-
thing which was common to all Germans in this respect, which reflected Ar-
endt’s views on the issue. Hence, in order to be able to cope with their guilty 
conscience and make amends with and reparations to those who had been 
wronged, Germans had to know what they were actually guilty of. This was 
especially crucial in the context of German political life after 1945: “(w)e 
[Germans] only have shadows of a truly common political ground on which 
we might stand and retain our solidarity through the most violent controver-
sies. We are sorely deficient in talking with each other and listening to each 
other. We lack mobility, criticism and self-criticism. We incline to doctrin-
ism. What makes it worse is that so many people do not really want to 
think.”569   
Hence, Jaspers sought to differentiate between different aspects of guilt. 
His fourfold categorization can be summed up as follows: 1) criminal guilt; 2) 
political guilt; 3) moral guilt and 4) metaphysical guilt. Criminal guilt per-
tains to crimes that are “capable of objective proof and violate unequivocal 
laws”. Jurisdiction rests upon courts, which “in formal proceedings can be 
counted to apply the law”.570 Political guilt involves “the deeds of statesmen 
and of the citizenry of a state, results in my having to bear the consequences 
of the deeds of the state whose power governs me and under whose order I 
live. Everybody is co-responsible for the way he is governed.”571 Jaspers also 
mentioned that the jurisdiction depends on success and the will of the victor 
in both domestic and foreign politics. Political prudence as well as the exist-
ence of norms applied as natural and international law both serve to mitigate 
the arbitrary use of power. Moral guilt, in turn, does not rest with the com-
munity or groups of people: “I, who cannot act otherwise than as an individ-
ual, am morally responsible for all my deeds, including the execution of polit-
ical and military orders. It is never simply true that ‘orders are orders’. Ra-
567 Ibid., p. 152. 
568 Ibid., pp.152-153. 
569 Jaspers, Karl  2000, The Question of German Guilt, Fordham University Press, New York 2000, p. 
16. Originally published as Die Schuldenfrage in 1947, Piper Verlag München, Germany.
570 Ibid., p. 25. 
571 Ibid. 
209 
ther, as crimes even though ordered, so every deed remains subject to moral 
judgment. Jurisdiction rests with my conscience and in communication with 
my friends and inmates who are lovingly concerned about my soul.”572 The 
fourth category, metaphysical guilt, revolves around the wrongs committed 
either in or without a person’s presence but in his knowledge, without doing 
anything to prevent them: “If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I 
too am guilty. If I was present at the murder of others without risking my life 
to prevent it, I feel guilty in a way not adequately conceivable either legally, 
politically or morally.”573 
Jaspers argued that this distinction was important because it clarified the 
meaning of charges towards Germans: “(p)olitical guilt, for example, does 
mean the liability of all citizens for the consequences of deeds done by their 
state, but not the criminal and the moral guilt of every single citizen for 
crimes committed in the name of the state. The judge may decide about 
crimes and the victor about political liability, but moral guilt can truthfully be 
discussed only in a loving struggle between men who maintain solidarity 
among themselves. As for metaphysical guilt […] (t)here remains shame for 
something that is always present, that may be discussed in general terms, if 
at all, but can never be concretely revealed.”574   
It can be gathered from what Jaspers wrote at the time that moral and 
metaphysical guilt in particular were difficult to assess. The reasons for this 
can be argued to be at least threefold. Firstly, after the end of the war, soli-
darity was difficult to bring about since the war had profoundly transformed 
the way German society had learned to communicate and exercise self-
critique. Secondly, the hardships brought by the aftermath of the war had 
taken their toll on the German populace – there was simply not enough ener-
gy for critical reflection considering what every individual could or should 
have done in order to prevent the atrocities that took place during the war.575 
Third, German people had been indoctrinated into the racial and political 
ideologies of National Socialists, either willingly or against their conscience. 
For those that were willing the question of guilt seemed hence more perti-
nent. However, the issue here was that moral and metaphysical guilt did not 
differentiate between Germans with a guilty or a clean conscience – they 
touched upon each and every individual regardless of how they felt, what 
they had done or left undone.   
It was crucial that these aspects of guilt would be discussed, according to 
Jaspers, since they entailed the possibility of redemption for Germans: 
“[c]rime is met with punishment, political guilt with liability; moral guilt 
572 Ibid., 26. 
573 Ibid. 
574 Ibid., 27. 
575 On this point, Fulbrook has argued that it was the process of denazification that prevented any hon-
est soul-searching both in West and East Germany. See Fulbrook, Mary 1998, German National Iden-
tity After the Holocaust, Polity Press 1998, p. 54. 
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ends up in penance and renewal and metaphysical guilt will lead to a trans-
formation of human self-consciousness before God.”576 Jaspers also made the 
important distinction between internal and external aspects of guilt:  “(t)he 
accused either hears himself charged from without, by the world, or from 
within, by his own soul. From without, the charges are meaningful only in 
regard to crimes and political guilt. They are raised with the intention of ef-
fecting punishment and holding liable. Their validity is legal and political, 
neither moral nor metaphysical. From within, the guilty hears himself 
charged with moral failure and metaphysical weakness – and, if these led to 
political and criminal acts or omissions, with those as well.”577  In addition, 
Jaspers was very articulate about individual vs. collective guilt:  “(i)t is non-
sensical […] to charge a whole people with a crime. The criminal is always 
only an individual. It is nonsensical, too, to lay moral guilt to a people as a 
whole. There is no such thing as a national character extending to every sin-
gle member of a nation.”578  Similarly, Arendt had argued that “(w)ere all 
[Germans] guilty, nobody in the last analysis can be judged”.579  The point  
that Jaspers tried to make was that it was not up to outside powers to blame 
Germans as a people for the moral failures of individual Germans. 
5.1.2? GERMANS, GUILT AND THE COLD WAR 
Despite the popularity of collective guilt theories in the early postwar years, 
thorough deliberations on the issue of guilt were quickly set aside by the 
dawn of the Cold War. Superpower relations, ideological differences and the 
threat of an all-out nuclear war took precedence over the issue of German 
guilt as West Germany was needed as an ally in the fight against the USSR 
and communism, which was regarded as the new threat to European and 
world security by the West. It is also worth noting that the Denazification 
program put in place by the Allied powers had not worked as efficiently as 
was hoped because German courts could not handle the sheer volume of cas-
es – unless the crimes committed were indisputable, all members of the Nazi 
party born after 1919 were automatically exempted of any guilt related to war 
and were instead treated as ‘brainwashed’ by the Nazi regime. The program 
was officially terminated due to lack of resources and progress made in 
1951.580 
In 1949, Germany lost almost a quarter of its pre-war (1937) territory, 
around 115,000 square kilometres of land consisting mostly of East Prussian, 
Silesian and Pomeranian territories under the German Reich to Poland and 
576 Jaspers 2000., p.30. 
577 Ibid., p.33. 
578 Ibid., 34. 
579 Arendt 1994, p.150. 
580 See Art, David 2005, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, Cambridge University 
Press 2005, pp. 53-55. 
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the USSR. West Germans did neither accept the annexation of these territo-
ries nor the legitimacy of the new East German state. The West German-
Soviet relationship remained strained and complicated because West Ger-
many’s Ostpolitik was largely a function of its policy towards the German 
question. Therefore, there were no improvements in the FRG-Soviet relations 
until the FRG officially gave up the Hallstein-Doctrine in 1969, which sig-
nalled to Moscow that West Germany had accepted the status quo in Europe, 
hence acknowledging its guilt for the war. In terms of guilt, GDR officially 
renounced all responsibility for Nazi crimes – instead it officially attempted 
to convey a picture of GDR citizenry consisting solely of those who actively 
opposed the Nazis during the war. The blame for Nazi crimes was allotted to 
the capitalist FRG, which was portrayed as carrying on with the fascist tradi-
tions of the Third Reich.581  The FRG, in turn, regarded the official policy of 
GDR on the guilt question as pure socialist propaganda – hence, the ideolog-
ical differences and the political reality of the Cold War prevented any kind of 
a pan-German understanding on the issue of guilt from emerging. The GDR 
did not change its stance on the issue after détente and the CSCE in 1975. 
Paradoxically, the GDR recognized the state of Israel only in 1989, the year 
the GDR ceased to exist.582 
In a nutshell, the first Cold War decades were a period of ‘losing history’ 
in the sense that German history prior to 1945 was considered ‘banned histo-
ry’.  It was as if all the things that had taken place before the reign of the Na-
tional Socialists had lost their historical meaning. The culmination point of 
the Nazi era as a historical disaster was considered inevitable in the sense 
that German pre-1945 history was taken to be nothing else than a series of 
fatal path-dependent incidents and processes that had led to the fall of the 
Weimar Republic and the rise of the Third Reich.583    
This negative view on German pre-war history had immense implications 
not only for German historiography but also for politics and society in gen-
eral. It was not until the emergence of the so-called younger generation of 
critical historians (born in the 1960s) who breached the taboo of German 
history as fatal and non-historical.584 The critical historical science tried to 
develop a concept of rewriting history under the historical lens of the demo-
581 Niven, Bill (ed.) 2006, ‘Introduction: German Victimhood at the Turn of the Millennium’, Germans 
as Victims, Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p.1 
582 See Fulbrook, 1998, p. 34;  Timm, Angelika 1997, ?The Burdened Relationship between the GDR and 
the State of Israel’, Israel Studies, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 1997, pp. 22-49.; Timm, Angelika 2006, 
‘Ideology and Realpolitik: East German Attitudes towards Zionism and Israel’, Journal of Israeli Histo-
ry, 25:1, pp. 204-222? 
583 This is well reflected in the literature on the negative/critical view on the German Sonderweg dis-
cussed in this ?hapter. 
584 It needs to be noted that many of these German ‘critical historians’ cited below have strong right 
wing sympathies. For instance, Karl-Heinz Weißmann is widely regarded in Germany as the central 
intellectual figure in the movement of ‘New Right’.  
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cratically organized societies of the West, thereby positing that German his-
tory, too, was part of the bigger picture. During the 1960s and the 1970s, 
there were a lot of disputes among the German historians between the so-
called traditionalists and the new generation of scholarship about the prima-
cy of foreign and domestic policy in defining things such as the emergence of 
National Socialism and the world wars.585 
As Weißmann has observed, “(a) further transition in German historiog-
raphy became noticeable only at the beginning of the 1980s. Distinct devel-
opments such as the end of the social-liberal coalition of Helmut Schmidt 
and the government takeover by CDU/CSU and FDP, the emergence of the 
peace movement and the discussion about German identity all contributed to 
the transformation of political constellations, which affected the perspectives 
of historians respectively. The decisive impetus for this transition came from 
abroad in the form The German Problem reconsidered by David P. Calleo, in 
which he reaffirmed the [realist] thesis of the inevitability of inner-European 
battle over hegemony.”586 Also, two Marxist historians, David Blackbourn 
and Geoff Eley broke the myths of German historiography, namely, that the 
Western states would have fundamentally been more modern than Germa-
ny.587 Therefore, the reason for Nazism was not to be found in German 
‘backwardness’ compared to the rest of Europe but in the German polity it-
self. These works triggered an intensive discussion among the historical 
scholarship in Germany concerning the German Sonderweg and, for their 
part, paved the way to the famous Historians’ Controversy. Indeed, 
(re)interpretations of the past began to shake the German polity from its 
Cold War slumber from before the fall of the Berlin Wall with the ‘Bitburg 
history’ discussed below. It significantly rattled the hitherto understandings 
of the Nazi past and German guilt and responsibility, which were critically 
assessed in light of the events that took place at the Bitburg military cemetery 
in 1985. 
585 See Weißmann, Karl-Heinz 1993, ‘Der „Westen“ in der Historiographie nach 1945???Zitelmann, Rai-
ner, Weißmann, Karl-Heinz & Großheim, Michael (eds.), Westbindung. Chancen und Risiken für 
Deutschland. Propyläen, Frankfurt a.M, 1993, pp.352-355;  See also Fulbrook 1998, pp.118-120. 
586 Weißmann 1993, p.355. 
587 Blackbourn, David & Eley, Geoff 1980, Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung. Die gescheiterte 
bürgerliche Revolution von 1848, Frankfurt a.M/Berlin/Wien 1980. 
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5.1.3. FROM BITBURG TO HIST????????????????????AND 
BEYOND: REFRAMING THE ISSUE OF GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY 
AND VICTIMHOOD 
Bitburg 
Spring 1985 marked the 40th anniversary of the ending of World War II. US 
President Ronald Reagan had planned a visit to the concentration camp and 
funeral site of Bergen-Belsen to commemorate the ending of the war and at-
tend the G7 economic summit in Bonn. With respect to Reagan’s visit, Chan-
cellor Kohl had made a suggestion to Reagan about a joint military cemetery 
visit as a sign of reconciliation between old enemies during Kohl’s November 
1984 visit to Washington. Kohl argued that the cemetery of Kolmeshöhe in 
Bitburg would serve nicely because NATO had an operational air base there 
as well as over 10,000 US troops living side by side with the local population. 
Many of Reagan’s aides and staff advised against the visit because it was 
deemed to cause a public outrage among the Jew political groups in America 
and beyond. Reagan thought he owed a token of gratitude towards Chancel-
lor Kohl, who had backed US policy during the double-track decision despite 
strong domestic criticism, and hence, agreed to Kohl’s proposal.588 
Public uproar and vehement criticism arose because Bitburg was not just 
another military cemetery. Among the 2,000 German soldiers buried in Bit-
burg were the graves of 45 troops from Hitler’s elite guard – the notorious 
Waffen Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS), the main culprits behind the mass depor-
tations and murder of Jews in Germany and in the territories occupied by the 
Wehrmacht during World War II. One of the most vocal critics was the 
Chairman of US Holocaust Memorial Council, Elie Wiesel. In a meeting with 
Reagan he argued, referring to Bitburg: “May I, Mr. President, if it's possible 
at all, implore you to do something else, to find a way, to find another way, 
another site. That place, Mr. President, is not your place. Your place is with 
the victims of the SS […] Oh, we know there are political and strategic rea-
sons, but this issue, as all issues related to that event, transcends politics and 
diplomacy. The issue here is not politics but good and evil.”589 Yet Reagan 
argued similarly as he did in the several interviews he had given on the topic 
that he thought the visit was morally justified because the soldiers buried in 
those graves consisted mostly of young men who were also victims of Na-
zism. Reagan said in an answer to foreign journalists that the men who were 
buried in Bitburg had “long since met the supreme judge of right and wrong”, 
588 Bitburg was widely covered in both US and German media at the time. See e.g. ?Eine eigenartige
geistige Gymnastik?, Der Spiegel, 17/1985 (22.4.1985.); ?Kohl says Nazi crimes will never be forgotten?,
Los Angeles Times, 22.1985. 
589 Remarks on Presenting the Congressional Gold Medal to Elie Wiesel and on Signing the Jew-
ish Heritage Week Proclamation, April 19, 1985. Available at: (http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/resource
s/reagan.html). 
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and that “whatever punishment or justice was needed, has been rendered by 
the One who is above us all.”590 
Before attending the joint wreath-laying in Bitburg with Kohl, Reagan 
gave a memorable speech at the KZ Bergen-Belsen – notably in the absence 
of German rabbis, who had declined to be present because they opposed 
Reagan’s visit to Bitburg. The significance of this opposition lies in the un-
derlying idea that Reagan’s visit resulted in setting perpetrators and victims 
on an equal footing. Indeed, as historian Charles Maier has put it, “Bitburg 
history courts the danger that is reminiscent of Hegel’s remarkable discus-
sion of master and slave in The Phenomenology of the Spirit. It confuses the 
formal, logical dependence of victim and victimizer […] with a shared re-
sponsibility for the wrong committed.”591 However, most public statements at 
the time reflected the sensitivity around the issue and agreed that the past 
should be respected and lines for clear moral responsibility drawn. In short, 
Germany should ‘never forget’.592 Yet there were arguments that were less 
conforming. The political right was especially outspoken in this regard. Al-
fred Dregger, for instance, the leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group 
and a member of the so-called Stahlhelm-Fraktion (steel helm wing) within 
the party, wrote to the US senators who had signed a letter calling on Reagan 
to cancel the visit. Dregger argued that the letter was an insult to his brother, 
who had died on the Eastern Front fighting communism.593  
Also, the CDU representative of the Bitburg region, Alois Mertes, argued 
that the US Catholic clergy should openly support Reagan’s visit. Mertes said 
to Reagan that “(w)e Germans have provided mankind with great and splen-
did accomplishments, but we have also committed terrible acts. However, it 
is not in keeping with Jewish and Christian ethics to apportion blame collec-
tively. It is always the individual who bears responsibility.”594 This was the 
second major issue connected with Reagan’s visit. Who was to blame for the 
atrocities and the Holocaust - Germans as a people or Germans as individu-
als? The issue of guilt was not brought up the first time with Reagan’s visit 
but had been an underlying theme in the German political and societal con-
sciousness ever since WW II had ended, beginning with the famous Nurem-
berg Trials in 1945-6, where individuals of Hitler’s regime were accused and 
tried for committing crimes against humanity. Indeed, Reagan’s remark of 
590 Jensen, Richard J. 2007, Reagan at Bergen-Belsen and Bitburg, Texas A&M University Press 2007, 
p. 69.
591 Maier, Charles 1997, The Unmasterable Past. History, Holocaust, and German National Identity, 
Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 14. 
592 This was reflected e.g. in Chancellor Kohl’s speech at Bergen-Belsen and in Federal President von
Weizsäcker’s famous speech in the Bundestag to the 40th commemoration of the end of World War II,
8.5.1985. 
593 See e.g. ‚Auf Kohls Rat hören wir nicht wieder‘, Der Spiegel 18/1985, (29.4.1985); ‚Haudegen und
Überzeugungstäter‘, Die Zeit, Nr. 49, (29.11.1991). 
594 ‘Another 40 years’, The New York Times, 6.5.1985. 
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the ‘SS boys buried in Bitburg’ did not only mix the perpetrators and victims, 
it also seemed to relieve the Germans from a collective guilt. This was some-
thing which had been difficult to come to terms with ever since it was 
deemed early on after the end of World War II that the culprits were to be 
found in a clique of high level Nazis close to Hitler.595 In addition, the ques-
tion of victimhood was closely linked with the issue of guilt. This question 
was also raised by Reagan’s visit and echoed in Mertes’ claim that ‘also we 
Germans are victims’.  
Third, Bitburg raised the question whether the crimes committed by the 
Nazis were in a league of their own considering the history of mass murder 
and the belated question whether Holocaust was without historical compari-
son. As Maier has provocatively put it, “Auschwitz may have been horren-
dous, but consider the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the 
conventional bombings of Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo; the Stalinist mas-
sacres of the so-called kulaks, Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian farmers, blind 
folksingers and old Bolsheviks. Recall the Turkish genocide of the Armeni-
ans, the Khmer Rouge’s slaughter of fellow Cambodians. Are the Germans 
just getting worse remarks because they mechanized the process?”596    
Hence, the significance of Bitburg for the evolution of the ideational struc-
ture of German strategic culture could be interpreted as threefold: first, it 
underlined the German commitment to multilateralism, transatlanticism and 
Western values by an unconventional method: it directly addressed the ques-
tion of German suffering and victimhood instead of just highlighting German 
guilt. Second, it addressed the question of historical responsibility linked 
both to Germans as individuals and as a people, which finds its current stra-
tegic cultural expression in the specific code of conduct for the modern Ger-
man soldier (Innere Führung/Bürger in Uniform) and in the more general 
debate concerning German international responsibility. Third, Bitburg raised 
the question about historical comparability: was it at all possible to treat the 
Holocaust as primarily historical in nature, interpreting it as something other 
than the sum of all German evils without any existing historical precedent or 
typology? Hence, as Maier has put it, “it [Bitburg] revealed a change in atti-
tude – not a thinking about the unthinkable but a debate over the hitherto 
undebatable”.597 Hence, it can be argued that this change in the attitude func-
tioned as a catalyst in the process of attempting to come to terms not only 
with the troubled past but with the challenges of the future as well. In that 
sense, it connects directly with the German debates in the 1990s concerning 
the use of military force. Indeed, the breaking of this ‘historical deadlock’ (of 
having only one legitimate interpretation of the Nazi past and the Holocaust) 
was a necessary precondition for the shift in the normative structure of Ger-
595 See Niven 2006, p. 133. 
596 Maier 1997, p. 16. 
597 Ibid., p.12. 
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man strategic culture that took place in the mid-1990s – from ‘never again 
war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’. 
What is more, the debate on the comparability between the past and pre-
sent crimes seemed to have reached some sort of a conclusion in the wake of 
the Srebrenica massacre (discussed in Chapter 3), which is also highlighted 
well in this normative shift. This raises a couple of significant points in terms 
of German strategic behaviour. Firstly, it is difficult to see how the imperative 
for military action (or the shift in the normative structure of strategic culture) 
could have been justified in terms of Srebrenica if Auschwitz had not been 
considered sui generis in the political, historical and philosophical debates 
and controversies that took place in the mid-1980s before German unifica-
tion. Because of this prevailing view on Auschwitz as sui generis, the compar-
isons made between Srebrenica and Auschwitz were considered particularly 
delicate and often misplaced.598 However, the very fact that these two were 
directly compared with one another suggests that the sui generis nature re-
fers first and foremost to the historical – not political – categorization of 
Auschwitz as a singular event. Therefore, there was more than just one con-
clusion to be drawn as to what the actual lessons and political ramifications 
could entail, even though Auschwitz was regarded as historically unique. This 
was so because just as Auschwitz was considered to be a crime above all else 
in human history, it should never be allowed to happen again.  
Indeed, this became the prevalent interpretation of Auschwitz and its po-
litical consequence in Germany after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. 
Hence, the comparability of Auschwitz in the political sense enabled to 
stretch the limits of the possible and broaden the scope of the imaginable in 
German strategic culture. That being said, any comparisons made with 
Auschwitz are still quite delicate in Germany and there are many Germans 
for whom Auschwitz is in a sense beyond the realm of politics because it 
symbolizes something the existence of which cannot ever be denied. In es-
sence, the events and debates in and around Bitburg made the issue of Ger-
man guilt, responsibility and suffering political again. This was psychologi-
cally ‘ground-breaking’ for Germans, whose guilt had long been suppressed 
both internally and externally, since Germany was considered a crucial ally in 
the fight against Communism and the USSR during the Cold War. In this 
sense, Bitburg was the beginning of the politicization of the German past. 
This continued in what came to be known as the famous Historians’ Contro-
versy in Germany in 1986. 
598 Yet there were influential voices to the contrary. Elie Wiesel himself was a strong supporter of mili-
tary intervention in Bosnia, arguing that Clinton’s decision to finally intervene was “an act of morality” 
in the face of genocide. See Chmiel, Mark 2001, Elie Wiesel and the Politics of Moral Leadership, 
Temple University Press, Philadelphia 2001, p. 145.  
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Historians’ Controversy 
These developments, that have been labelled as ‘the Bitburg history’ by Maier 
and other historians, paved the way to the so-called Historikerstreit (Histo-
rians’ Controversy), which paradoxically, was not initiated by German histo-
rians but by one of the more prominent German philosophers of the post-
1945 era, Jürgen Habermas. There are many views on what the Historians’ 
Controversy was actually all about – whether it was about the singularity of 
Auschwitz and the Holocaust, the uniqueness of the Nazi crimes, German 
national identity, a substitute for a constitutional debate that did not take 
place in 1989/90, or rather just a political squabble between Habermas and 
the historians. However, while the debate took place at a highly politicized 
atmosphere, at its core was no less than the question of the role the remem-
brance of National Socialism should have in the reconstruction of German 
national identity. Importantly, especially since conservative German histori-
ans had long understood themselves as the custodians of German national 
identity, they also interpreted Habermas’ accusations as targeted against the 
German nation state and identity. Hence, as the whole concept of German 
national identity had been politically ambiguous and quite fragile throughout 
the long Cold War decades, some of the historians thought the time had come 
to defend it.  
The issues in the Controversy itself had been up in the air since Bitburg, 
but it was ignited through certain publications from two conservative Ger-
man historians.599 The first of these was Andreas Hillgruber’s volume called 
Zweierlei Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das En-
de des Europäischen Judentums (1986) (Two sorts of demise: The shattering 
of the German Reich and the end of the European Jewry). Hillgruber, once a 
soldier at the Eastern front himself, sought to defend the German Wehr-
macht’s resistance in face of the advancing Soviet armies against claims that 
by so doing the Wehrmacht would have contributed to the Holocaust. 
Hillgruber insisted that one had to take a stand, and in case of the tragic 
events during the winter 1944-45 the historian must “identify himself with 
the concrete fate of the German population”.600 However, as critics noted, the 
title of his book indicated that Hillgruber would also elaborate at length or 
otherwise illustrate the deportation and murder of the Jews in parallel to the 
German retreat but these events were mostly lacking in his volume.601 Ernst 
Nolte, another prominent conservative historian, wrote an essay called Ver-
gangenheit die nicht vergehen will (1986) (The past that does not want to 
become history). Nolte claimed that it was time to put Auschwitz and the leg-
599 In Germany, the study of history has traditionally been divided into right-wing and left-wing chairs 
depending on the university. 
600 Hillgruber, Andreas 1986,  Zweierlei Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das 
Ende des Europäischen Judentums. Siedler Verlag, Corso bei Siedler, Berlin 1986, p. 24. 
601 See Maier 1997, p. 23. 
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acy of Nazism into the same basket with normal history meaning that the 
continuing debate should not prevent Auschwitz and Nazism from becoming 
the past. Hence, one should put them into perspective and historical compar-
ison should be allowed in order really to understand what was going on at the 
time. He lamented the existing literature on National Socialism for the lack 
of either recognizing or admitting that all the acts of cruelty committed by 
the Nazis (with the exception of the technical process related to the gas 
chambers) were already recorded in the vast literature of the 1920s. Finally, 
by drawing a parallel between the mass murder of the Armenians at the 
hands of the Turks, the Russian Gulaks and the mass murder of the Jews, he 
asked: “Did the National Socialists, did Hitler commit an ‘Asiatic deed’ per-
haps only because they saw themselves and their sort as potential or actual 
victims of such an ‘Asiatic deed’? Was the Gulag Archipelago not more origi-
nal than Auschwitz? Was the ‘class murder’ of the Bolsheviks not the logical 
and factual precondition for the ‘race murder’ of the National Socialists?”602 
Nolte’s argument was pointed at establishing a historical context for Nazism 
and the crimes committed so that the assessment of that period would be less 
obsessive for Germans themselves. 
 Habermas replied to the claims of Hillgruber and Nolte in a long essay 
Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der Deut-
schen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung (1986) (A form of claims settlement. The 
apologetic tendencies in the writings of German contemporary history). Ha-
bermas targeted what he called the nationalist revisionism of Hillgruber and 
Nolte and linked their arguments to the German neo-conservative agenda. 
First, Habermas lamented that the conservatives’ attempt to historicize 
Auschwitz and the Third Reich in the spirit of Verstehen would prohibit any 
critical perspective from emerging; a perspective which could not be avoided 
since historians were also assessing history subjectively and therefore the 
hermeneutic production of knowledge, even if valid, was alone unsatisfactory 
because it lacked the critical component of self-reflection and was used in a 
‘revisionist’ fashion. Second, Habermas criticized Michael Stürmer’s inter-
vention in the debate.603 Historian Stürmer, political advisor to Chancellor 
Kohl at the time, had argued in an article Geschichte im geschichtslosen 
Land (1986) (History in a country without history) that Germans did not 
have a readily available historical identity, which could be witnessed for in-
stance in the growing interest among the German population towards histor-
ical museums and televised broadcasting of Holocaust. Stürmer claimed that 
“(t)he loss of orientation and the search for identity are brothers. But anyone 
who believes that this has no effect on politics and the future ignores the fact 
that in a land without history whoever supplies memory, shapes concepts, 
602 ?Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will‘, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9.6.1986. 
603 Habermas, Jürgen 1986, ‚Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der 
Deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung‘, Die Zeit, 11.7.1986. 
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and interprets the past will win the future.”604 Habermas criticized the quest 
for historical identity among the conservative historians because he claimed 
it mixed the endowment of spiritual meaning to historical events (innerwelt-
liche Sinnstiftung) with mythmaking and that this quest would lead to Ger-
many’s alienation from the West and to a new German Mitteleuropa, an age-
old longing among the German conservatives. For Habermas, the Western 
connection, which for Stürmer was primarily exemplified in the German 
membership in NATO and resulted in the accountability of German foreign 
policy, went far beyond the immediate political implications. For Habermas, 
the German Westernization was the most important achievement of post-
World War II Germany in the sense of finally embracing the values of Euro-
pean Enlightenment, which, as Habermas lamented, had only been possible 
as a result of Auschwitz. Therefore, according to the idea presented in his 
seminal work Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (The Theory of Com-
municative Action) 1981, Habermas argued that Germans did not owe loyalty 
to the nation but to the principles of Verfassungspatriotismus (constitution-
al patriotism) and that therefore “whoever wants to summon Germans back 
to a conventional form of national identity, destroys the only reliable basis 
of our Western loyalty?”605   
However, as we have witnessed, Habermas’ prediction has not come to 
pass, even though there have been times when Germany’s strategic behaviour 
has been interpreted as isolationist (as was the case with the unilateral 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and Germany’s abstention from 
the UNSC vote on Libya in 2008 for instance). Yet these deviations from the 
multilateral foreign policy orientation can hardly be explained by the aspects 
of German national identity, or a turn away from the alleged Habermasian 
Verfassungspatriotismus. As illustrated at length in the previous chapters 
they are better understood in the context of an evolving German strategic 
culture. In terms of strategic culture, the Historians’ Controversy, for its part, 
paved the way for the discussions concerning the legitimacy of military action 
in terms of collective historical responsibility after the end of the Cold War. 
The Controversy quite astutely revealed what was not only intellectually and 
politically at stake, but also what was societally at stake if and when Germans 
decided to debate these issues. It was also the most important German post-
World War II intellectual debate taking a stance on Auschwitz and the legacy 
of Nazism, therefore setting the initial ideational parameters for what could 
be considered ‘appropriate’ German strategic behaviour from the viewpoint 
of historical (re)interpretation. 
604 Stürmer, Michael 1986, ‚Geschichte in geschichtslosem Land‘, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
25.4.1986. 
605 Habermas 1986. 
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5.1.4.   THE MIXED LEGACY OF NAZISM: GERMANS AS 
PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS 
Firstly, it needs to be stressed that the take on Nazism illustrating Germans 
as victims is not new – it has persisted throughout the German post-World 
War II history, and it was particularly strong in the early days of the Federal 
Republic.606 However, as discussed above, the Bitburg history politicized the 
issue to an unprecedented scale by portraying SS men – the primary perpe-
trators of mass murder and atrocities of the Hitler regime – also as victims of 
the war and Hitler, ascribing to the perpetrators a victim status. Essentially, 
the argument here is that Hitler causes suffering not only to Jews, Sinti and 
Roma and the disabled as well as millions of people in the USSR and the rest 
of Europe, but also to his own people. This victimization is highlighted well, 
for instance in Hannah Arendt’s famous discussion on guilt and responsibil-
ity, concerning especially the tragedy of ordinary Germans made part of the 
Nazi murder machine.607 It is also reflected in the rather uncritical ac-
ceptance of Goebbels’ total war declaration in early 1943 after the German 6th 
Army had surrendered in Stalingrad at the end of 1942. In this sense, the 
German people victimized themselves, either knowingly and willingly or not. 
Besides the illustration of Germans as victims of Hitler, the roots of the con-
temporary discussion on German victimization lie in the wartime bombings 
of German cities, most notably Dresden, where more than 20,000 Germans 
vanished in the firestorm that swept through the city after the allied bomb-
ings in early 1945. Also, portrayals of the exodus and suffering of the Sudeten 
Germans from the Eastern territories of the Third Reich served the same 
purpose of German victimization.  
As Niven has argued, the brief period of depoliticization at the end of the 
Cold War when German suffering could be grasped as an existential German 
experience ended as Chancellor Kohl set out to re-politicize the issue: Kohl 
was determined to bring East and West Germans together by establishing an 
inner unity based on a common understanding of German history according 
to which Germans had suffered under two different but comparable forms of 
totalitarianism, National Socialism (1933-1945) and the Soviet-imported so-
cialism (1945-1990).608 However, as Niven writes, “(f)or all Kohl’s universal-
izing approach to victimhood […] the 1992-98 period was characterized by 
widespread historiographical, media and public interest in the issue of Ger-
man perpetration and guilt, and Jewish victimhood – as shown by the popu-
larity of the critical Crimes of the Wehrmacht exhibition.”609  Indeed, the 
Wehrmacht exhibition that took place between 1995 and 1999 (War of Anni-
606 See Wittlinger, Ruth 2006, ‘Taboo or Tradition? The ‘Germans as Victims’ Theme in the Federal 
Republic until the mid-1990s’, Niven, Bill (ed.) Germans as Victims, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 63. 
607 See Arendt 1994, pp. 121-132. 
608 Niven, Bill 2006, ?Introduction: The German Victimhood at the Turn of the Millennium’, (ed.) 
????n, Germans as Victims, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.5. 
609 Ibid., 7. 
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hilation. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941-1943) was visited by more than 1.2 
million people in Germany and Austria.610  
Yet importantly, Niven also posits that “(t)here is a noticeable correlation 
in the contemporary preoccupation with German suffering between construc-
tions of victimhood in the past”.611 This involves two strategies of transform-
ing Germans into absolute victims: “The first strategy is to exculpate Ger-
mans living at the time of the Third Reich. The first strategy relies on depict-
ing the Allied bombing of German cities as innocent collectives untouched by 
Nazism.”612 Needless to say, this strategy completely ignores the link between 
the Allied bombings and the fight against Nazism, ascribing Germans an 
equal victim status with the Jews. In contrast, “the second [strategy] empha-
sizes rather a commonality of perpetrator status linking Nazis and the Allies 
– while at the same time implying a corollary of this that the fate of Germans
at the hands of the Allies was every bit as terrible as that of the Jews at the
hands of the Nazis.”613 Niven’s conclusion is that establishing a corollary be-
tween the victim and perpetrator status of Germans and Jews amounts to
nothing less than “a complete reinterpretation of the Second World War”.614
Hence, the problem with these victimizing strategies is not that they portray
German suffering as such but that it is done in a fashion which does not do
justice to historical facts.
One peculiar trait of the discourse on the Nazi past in Germany is the 
common lack of identification for active perpetration, even though the collec-
tive guilt theory has long been rejected. Phrases such as ‘crimes committed in 
the name of the German people’ are very common in the speeches of German 
politicians across the whole party spectrum, almost as if it had become an 
idiomatic expression.  This is an interesting phenomenon, because it draws a 
clear distinction between Germans as active perpetrators (the Nazis) and 
Germans as victims (the rest) and deviates completely from Arendt’s view on 
ordinary Germans as perpetrators. Yet this ‘passive perpetrator status’ or to 
put it provocatively, ‘proxy perpetration’ is understandable from the view-
point of the younger and millennial generations of Germans who, by and 
large, do not consider themselves guilty whatsoever. Hence, it highlights the 
contemporary view in Germany that unlike responsibility, guilt should not 
pass over from the perpetrator generation to the next.    
Despite the fact that the theme of German suffering has not featured 
prominently in post-1998 German memory politics, echoes of German vic-
timization by the Allied bombings can be observed for instance in the exten-
sive media coverage of the bombing of Iraq (and in the mid-1990s during the 
610 The exhibition was controversial and politically contested from the start. ????CDU/CSU was?????? 
????????pposed to the exhibition while the SPD and the Greens endorsed it.  
611 Niven, 2006, p. 8. 
612 Ibid., p. 13. 
613 Ibid. 
614 Ibid., p. 15. 
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NATO air strikes against Serbia). Indeed, as Hyussen has observed, “media 
reports of events in the former Yugoslavia in particular tapped into a collec-
tive memory of what Germans had endured. Often, the parallels drawn were 
sentimental in the extreme. At the same time, however, German suffering 
was deployed in a more thoughtful manner during the heated debates sur-
rounding Germany’s participation in multilateral interventions in these con-
flicts.”615 This ‘thoughtful manner’ is exemplified by the fact that German 
feelings towards the NATO bombings were mixed, some were in favour while 
others were against.616 It is also well reflected in the ‘soul-searching’ period in 
the German Left during the mid-1990s highlighted in the shift from ‘never 
again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’– both were legitimate interpretations of 
the German past yet the latter seemed to be the only politically viable choice 
for the newly elected Red-Green government even though accepting interna-
tional responsibility in terms of military participation would also make one 
guilty in terms of ‘never again war’.  
Yet, as Hyussen has argued, only the prelude to the war in Iraq marked a 
significant shift in German memory politics:  “(f)or the first time, the peace 
movement bolstered its positions by referring to the experience of strategic 
bombings of German cities in the Second World War. It seemed that the 
memories of Hamburg and Dresden’s firestorms provided the unifying glue 
that brought Westerners and Easterners, old and young, Right and Left, out 
into the streets in larger numbers than ever before in protest against George 
W. Bush’s war in Iraq.”617 Crucially, as he argues, “(i)n 2003, sentiment re-
verted back to a radical no war line, but this time – and this was new – with
reference to German victimhood.”618
This is a further example of the resilience of the normative structure of 
German strategic culture. Even though the genocide committed against the 
Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 had essentially led to the reinterpre-
tation of the German past in favour of a military solution to the crisis in for-
mer Yugoslavia, the memory of Hamburg and Dresden served as a powerful 
reminder of the horrors of air war. The German government essentially con-
sidered US offensive military action against Iraq to be illegal in terms of in-
ternational law beyond any notion of the purported US ‘adventurism’ and it 
615 Hyussen, Andreas 2006, ‘Air War Legacies: From Dresden to Baghdad’, Niven, Bill (ed.), Germans 
as Victims, Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 176. 
616 However, the support for the Bundeswehr’s out-of-area operations has steadily declined among the 
German populace ever since the NATO air war against Serbia during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. In 
2007 for instance, only about every third German thought that German participation in KFOR is a 
good thing. See. Biehl, Heiko 2010, ‘Bürger und Sicherheitspolitik – Auf der Suche nach einem???????? 
heitspolitischen Konsens?, Dörfler-Dierken, Angelika & Portugall, Gerd (eds.), ?????????????? ???? ????
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften , Wiesbaden 2010, pp.169-184. 
617 Hyussen 2006, p. 183. 
618 Ibid. 
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supported Schröder in his ‘no war’ line. Although it could be argued that 
Schröder’s opposition to the war in Iraq was executed in a favourable domes-
tic atmosphere as the memory of Hamburg and Dresden led to a formulation 
of ‘never again Dresden’ amongst the slogans that were used against the war 
besides ‘no war for oil’ etc., it is worth noting that not all Germans were op-
posed to the war in Iraq.  For example, this was testified by Angela Merkel’s 
article in the Washington Post, where she famously argued that “Schröder 
doesn’t speak for all Germans”.619  
As shown above, the issue of Germans as perpetrators but also as victims 
can function as a powerful strategic cultural constraint in the deliberations 
over the issue of the use of military force. Even though the illustration of 
Germans as victims has been problematic in terms of historical reinterpreta-
tion (e.g. Niven’s example of a complete reinterpretation of World War II) 
and its vulnerability to the critique of apologetics and/or historical revision-
ism, it is difficult to deny its impact on the German political elite because the 
Germans as a people share a deep sympathy for the victims of any war as is 
detectable in general not only in the German Bundestag debates, but in the 
wider public discussion. However, while the role images of the victim and the 
perpetrator are mutually constitutive – i.e. without a reference to Jewish ‘vic-
timhood’, the role image of Germans as ‘perpetrators’ doesn’t make much 
sense – the discursively interesting aspect is the fact that same actors can 
simultaneously wield opposite subject positions, i.e. that the worst kind of 
perpetrators can still be considered victims – as was evident in president 
Reagan’s reference to ‘the SS boys in Bitburg’. In terms of German strategic 
culture, however, the issue of Germans as victims has not featured very 
prominently for the same reason that accusing Jews of ‘keeping Germans 
down’ is considered revisionist and anti-Semitic – yet the effect of a con-
struction (whether deliberate or not) of a ‘double’ identity of vic-
tim/perpetrator has linked guilt discursively not necessarily to a certain actor 
or group of actors but to ‘those who are willing to commit violence’ and that 
in war, everybody is a victim to a degree. In the following table I will sum up 
the discussion so far in this chapter by portraying the dimensions of the dis-
course on the Nazi past in Germany and their impact on German strategic 
culture: 
619 Merkel 2003, ‘Schröder doesn’t speak for all Germans’, The Washington Post, 20.3.2003, p. A39. 
224 
Table 4. Discourse on the Nazi Past in German Strategic Culture 
Dimensions of Discourse on the Nazi Past in German Strategic Culture 
Consequences 
Role Images/Subject positions Guilt Responsibility 
Victim 
Germans guilty of ‘self-
victimisation’ ? anyone      
resorting to violence can be 
regarded as guilty because 
violence produces victims 
Germans responsible for       
ensuring an ‘honest debate’ 
without politicizing the past in 
favour of German victimhood ?    
de-politizisation vs.     
re-politizisation of the role of the 
victim; responsibility for   
Auschwitz ? ‘never again 
Auschwitz’ 
Perpetrator 
Nazis guilty for the Holocaust 
and WW II,  Allies guilty of the 
bombing German cities,       
individual vs. collective guilt; 
active perpetration ? ‘never 
again war’ 
Germans responsible for main-
taining ‘never again war’ ? 
struggle for political legitimacy 
and appropriateness of     
reinterpretations of the past 
(never again war vs. never again 
Auschwitz);  Allies responsible 
for their own ‘perpetration of 
atrocities’ ?‘never again     
Dresden’; passive perpetration 
Taken as a whole, the view of Germans as victims has certainly a minority 
view. One of the more prominent post-Cold War examples testifying to the 
minority view is Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s famous book Hitler’s Willing Ex-
ecutioners (1996). Goldhagen suggested that anti-Semitism had been a typi-
cal characteristic of ordinary Germans under Hitler, and that these ordinary 
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Germans had killed Jews quite willingly, without restraint.620 It reflects Ar-
endt’s view on the issue – albeit with the crucial difference that there was 
nothing in the issue of ordinary men having turned into killers that made it a 
particularly German phenomenon for Arendt, who argued that it should be 
assessed in the international context.621 Also, Goldhagen’s thesis verges on 
the argument that Germans were ethnically predisposed to anti-Semitism – 
an argument for which Arendt would have had little sympathy. Moreover, 
whereas Jaspers had sought to distinguish between different dimensions of 
guilt, Goldhagen did not differentiate between singular and collective aspects 
of guilt. Therefore, Goldhagen’s thesis seemed to reinvigorate the collective 
guilt theory of the 1950s. Many German historians were highly critical of 
Goldhagen’s book, but the majority of Germans reacted to it with under-
standing.622  
5.2.  GERMAN STRATEGIC CULTURE, GUILT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 
5.2.1. CONSEQUENCES OF GERMAN GUILT 
For Jaspers, categorization of guilt was not enough; the consequences had to 
be clearly delineated. Hence, accordingly, Jaspers theorized consequences for 
each category of guilt: “Crime is met with punishment, political guilt with 
liability; moral guilt ends up in penance and renewal and metaphysical guilt 
will lead to a transformation of human self-consciousness before God.”623 
Nuremberg Trials were an example of the first consequence, as well as the 
‘Nazi hunts’ during the Cold War and beyond. German people also took the 
consequence of liability for political guilt that resulted in reparation and rec-
onciliation policies, especially towards Germany’s eastern neighbours and 
culminated withthe division of Germany and the erection of the Berlin Wall 
in 1961, and later in the form of Ostpolitik and the so-called Ostverträge, 
that were primary examples of policies based on the premise of German po-
litical liability for WW II. Perhaps most importantly, West Germany pledged 
to pay reparations to Israel in the Luxembourg Agreement in 1952, even 
though diplomatic ties between the two were not set up until 1965. In the ear-
ly 1950s, Israel did not want to convey a picture that German reparations 
equalled reconciliation, which became topical only after Germany’s signifi-
cance in NATO had considerably increased in the 1960s. Also, the high sym-
620 Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah 1996, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp. 375-
416. 
621 Arendt 1994. 
622 Niven 2006, p. 8. 
623 Jaspers 2000, p. 30? 
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bolic value of the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1962 helped towards the normal-
ization of relations.624  
As for the consequences of moral guilt, the ‘never again’ principles, which 
established the normative baseline for German strategic culture after the end 
of WW II, are the prime example of the repercussions of moral guilt in stra-
tegic terms. We also have the actions of individuals such as Willy Brandt, 
who was the first German politician to kneel before the victims of Nazism at 
the memorial in the Warsaw Ghetto in December 1970, which can be as-
sessed in terms of consequence of moral guilt (even though the ‘kneeling act’ 
could just as well be interpreted as a consequence of political liability because 
the purpose of Brandt’s visit to Poland was to sign the Warsaw Treaty, which 
acknowledged the Oder-Neisse river line as the final border between Germa-
ny and Poland). The aspect of moral guilt has also been prevalent in the stra-
tegic cultural context when Germany discussed the preconditions for its out-
of-area operations. For instance, during the Balkan crisis, it was not uncom-
mon to compare Milosevic to Hitler or later, during the Iraq War, make simi-
lar comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Hitler.625  This attribution of 
moral guilt to individuals goes hand in hand with the idea that the German 
people were morally not guilty of the crimes committed by the Nazis in the 
name of the German state and this has pertained to how contemporary Ger-
many views dictators on one hand, and those dictated by them, on the other. 
The consequence of metaphysical guilt – transcendence before God – can 
indeed only be detected at the level of individuals, if at all. However, it may 
also have other consequences that transcend the level of the individual, 
which can for instance be understood in terms of charity and solidarity: 
Germany’s asylum policy has been often deemed as the most liberal in the 
whole of Europe.626 This could also be interpreted in more strategic terms as 
the German populace is one of the fastest ageing peoples in Europe, which, in 
turn, can be regarded as a security threat. However, metaphysical guilt is the 
type of guilt the impact of which is omnipresent, and this pertains of course 
not only to Germans, but to humanity as a whole. Moreover, since formulat-
ing analytical arguments based on metaphysical conditions is not far from 
constructing tautologies, I will not attempt them here. Suffice it to mention a 
few instances when this type of guilt might be manifest. For Germans and 
their strategic culture, metaphysical guilt is perhaps best crystallized in the 
consequence of present day wars and conflicts – death, human suffering and 
misery, which were widely illustrated in the German media during the Bal-
624 See Olick, Jeffrey K. & Levy, Daniel 1997, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust 
Myth and Rationality in German Poltitics’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, No. 6 (Dec., 1997), 
p.926.
625 See Schwab-Trapp, Michael 2002, ???????????????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ??????????
?????????? Springer Verlag, Wiesbaden 2002, pp. 87-111; Hyussen 2006, p.188. 
626 See Klusmeyer, Douglas  & Papademetriou, Demetrious 2009, Immigration Policy in the Federal?
Republic of Germany. Negotiating membership and Remaking the Nation, Berghahn Books, 2009.
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kan conflict. This is why the public awareness of these issues plays a special 
role in the contemporary German strategic culture. The pure consequence of 
metaphysical guilt according to Jaspers, “a transformation of human self-
consciousness before God” that culminates in a life with an “indelible sense 
of guilt in that humility which grows modest before God and submerges all 
its doings in an atmosphere where arrogance becomes impossible”.627 In oth-
er words, that transformation implies a sense of impeccable altruism, a true 
form of selflessness.  In terms of German strategic culture, the consequence 
of metaphysical guilt could also be detected in Germany’s continued general 
preference for a broker- and mediator-role in international conflicts. Howev-
er, it can hardly be argued that Germans would not consider their own inter-
ests in implementing the role of an ‘honest broker’.  
In terms of strategy, the so-called Kohl Doctrine was still significantly 
shaped by the issue of German guilt. This was reflected in the debates that 
took place when the Bundestag contemplated the possible German military 
presence in the Balkans in 1993. Defence Minister Volker Rühe outlined 
German position as follows: “One thing must be clear … especially in view of 
the deployments in the former Yugoslavia: There must not under any cir-
cumstances be any deployment of German troops in the area of the former 
Yugoslavia – neither on the water, nor on the ground nor in the air. This is 
imperative if only for historical reasons. In any case, the FDP is fully con-
vinced of that. We know that we share this conviction with the Chancel-
lor.”628 Maja Zehfuss has noted that the reasoning behind the persistence of 
the Kohl Doctrine was “a fear of escalation and a concern for the well-being 
of German soldiers”.629 Yet it can be argued that after the 1994 Constitutional 
Court’s decision in favour of the German out-of-area operations, German 
politicians harboured as many if not more concerns for the well-being of 
their soldiers as before the Court’s ruling. A better explanation takes into ac-
count the fact that the German foreign and security policy consensus, which 
was one of the hallmarks of Cold War German strategic culture, backed the 
strategic thinking behind the Kohl Doctrine.  
The 1992 Defence Policy Guidelines (VPR) had already stressed the need 
for the Bundeswehr to be transformed into a force, which could be used in 
the prevention and containment of crises and small-scale conflicts.630 The 
1994 White Paper, which was released after the Court’s decision, reflected the 
need for Germany to bring to bear its international responsibility. Even 
though military risks for German security were not considered to be high and 
despite the fact that the 1994 White Paper called upon a plethora of measures 
627 Jaspers 2000, p. 30. 
628 Defense Minister Volker Rühe in Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 12/151, 21.4.1993. 
629 Zehfuss, Maja 2002, Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality, Cambridge 
University Press 2002, p.129. 
630 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Der Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 26.November 
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to tackle the crises of the post-Cold War world, it acknowledged the possibil-
ity of military action: “In a political framework that aims at solving crises and 
conflicts by tackling their roots and causes, it may also be necessary to em-
ploy military means to prevent, confine or terminate violence or war”.631 The 
1994 White Paper was still cautious in its overall strategic assessment, high-
lighting the traditional aspects of German strategic culture – conscription, 
territorial defence and NATO-led strategic command of German troops 
above all else but it also clearly acknowledged the need for a potential mili-
tary prevention (instead of intervention) which was clearly a novelty to an 
assessment on German responsibility and implied an international role for 
the Bundeswehr. The conservative-liberal Kohl government used so-called 
‘Salami-tactics’ in order to prepare Germany and the Bundeswehr incremen-
tally for international conflict management. The key idea was to initiate 
gradual change without jeopardizing the German consensus on territorial 
defence and conscription. Defence Minister Rühe, in particular, was a key 
agent of change in developing a crisis intervention role for the Bundeswehr 
by successfully legitimating his reform with reference to the maintenance of 
NATO’s credibility in the context of the new challenges in the security envi-
ronment, particularly referring to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and 
German participation in the IFOR/SFOR.632  
As a side note, a fair assessment of the development of German strategy 
or military doctrine after the end of the Cold War acknowledges the fact that, 
overall, German politicians had not been keen to evaluate defence and securi-
ty. This was mainly because German voters are usually not that interested in 
the topic and this pertains especially to the current post-Afghanistan situa-
tion in which the majority of the Germans are against new out-of-area opera-
tions.633 Also, it is worth noting that Germany has never produced a concise 
national security strategy like the UK, France and the US. The next White 
Paper took 12 years to see the light of day; the publication of the 2006 White 
Paper occurred approximately five years after the 2001 terrorist attacks in 
the US. Like its predecessor, the 2006 White Paper stressed German interna-
tional responsibility instead of German guilt. However, compared to the 1994 
paper, the 2006 one was much more detailed as to what the Germans were 
actually responsible for or the kind of responsibility they should prepare for 
in the future. The 2006 White Paper mentions German responsibility ‘for 
631 Weißbuch 1994 zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bun-
deswehr. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn 1994, p. 39. 
632 See Dyson 2007, pp. 59-60. 
633 According to a poll in the German newspaper Die Zeit, at the end of 2014 when German participa-
tion in ISAF ended, only every third German considered it important for the Bundeswehr to be more 
actively present in international crisis management. ?Mehrheit der Deutschen lehnt???????????????? 
ze ab?, ZEIT ONLINE, 28.Dezember 2014. Available at: (http://www.zeit.de/politik/???????????/?
????????umfrage-deutsche-ablehnung-internationale-bundeswehr-einsaetze). 
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Europe and the world’, ‘for global security’, ‘for peace and freedom’.634 The 
paper quite clearly acknowledges that the changes in global patterns of secu-
rity also affect Germany. This creates challenges that Germany is willing to 
meet as well as “shape the global changes in terms of its responsibility and 
interests”.635 Hence, the 2006 document quite clearly states the kind of in-
ternational actor Germany aspires to be in the future – an actor who has the 
desire to shape the process of global change based on its national interests 
and international responsibility. The 2016 White Paper takes a step further 
in that German leadership is now understood as part of German internation-
al responsibility. This is highlighted in the willingness to assume responsibil-
ity as a ‘framework nation’ in alliances and partnerships.636  
5.2.2.   FROM GUILT TO RESPONSIBILITY: GERMANY AND THE 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON SECURITY 
Furthermore, the current German proactive stance towards global security 
issues in the context of ‘new activism’ is well exemplified by the German con-
cept of Comprehensive Approach or Whole-of-Government Approach (Ver-
netzte Sicherheit). It was first officially introduced in the 2006 White Paper. 
Vernetzte Sicherheit underlines the importance of co-operation between se-
curity policy actors and a broad understanding of security threats, that con-
cern not only military threats, but also issues such climate change, global 
economic patterns and mass migration. The aim of this approach is to handle 
international crises effectively by coordinating the efforts of a plethora of ac-
tors and institutions at local, national and international levels. According to 
the concept, this necessitates both civilian and military means and resources 
are being put to work towards a common goal. This is exemplified in the dif-
ferent phases of the conflict: escalation, open conflict, post-conflict, peace 
consolidation. For instance, the role of diplomacy in these different phases is 
to prevent conflict escalation, achieve a cease-fire, secure the status quo and 
finally, normalize the situation. Accordingly, the role of the military is to pre-
vent conflict escalation and provide training, intervene in case of open con-
flict, stabilize the post-conflict situation and finally, provide transition as part 
of peace consolidation.637 
However, according to an inter-departmental Working Group on Com-
prehensive Approach (Die AG Vernetzte Sicherheit) the concept is problem-
atic because it is in effect neutral concerning the underlying aims of the secu-
634 Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, Berlin 2006, 
p.2; p.10-11.
635 Ibid., p. 9; p.18. 
636 White Paper 2016, p. 98. 
637 See Wittkowsky, Andreas & Meierjohann, Jens P. 2011‚‘Das Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit:?
Dimensionen, Herausforderungen, Grenzen?, Zentrum für internationale Friedenseinsätze (Die AG?
Vernetzte Sicherheit), Policy Briefing April 2011, p.2. 
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rity policy. Hence it can refer both to a traditional concept of security, the 
aim of which is to stabilize fragile states or to an understanding of security as 
‘human security’ which concentrates on human rights and highlights the 
equivalent responsibility of the state to protect these rights, exemplified for 
instance in the international norm Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Also, fac-
tors which impede the networking include cultural caveats of the participat-
ing actors as well as differing understanding about the use of military force 
and divergent interests.638  
Hence, German strategic culture plays a major role in how the Compre-
hensive Approach, which is based on a relatively broad understanding of se-
curity, can be implemented in practice. The German government established 
a Bundestag subcommittee in 2003 to provide yearly progress reports on 
how the Comprehensive Approach has been developing. In 2011, for instance, 
the progress report applauded the fact that the co-operation between differ-
ent government departments had considerably increased but that even here, 
differing organizational interests and jurisdictions still played a major im-
peding role. The report also noted that many German actors preferred a 
pragmatic approach rather than a strategic one but that these same actors 
paradoxically called for joint leadership and objectives in the target coun-
tries. Also, the German Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Management, that 
should be one of the central benchmarks for interdepartmental co-operation, 
is rarely mentioned or deemed operationally viable. According to the report, 
the Germans consider the British Conflict Prevention Pools to be a more suc-
cessful tool in implementing the Comprehensive Approach. 
 In terms of policy instruments, the report noted that the German debate 
circles around the issue of strategy and common goals. For instance, strategic 
questions include what the role a strategy should have in concerted action: 
what is the added value of strategy at different levels of implementation, and 
which elements of the strategy are essential. Also, Germans consider it vitally 
important that German strategies coincide with international ones and that 
there is a clear link between a strategy and its implementation. However, in 
retrospect, this was precisely the factor that was often missing not only from 
German but from NATO strategy as a whole. It was also deemed important 
that the Bundestag mandate should be complemented with concrete guide-
lines for networked co-operation.639 These status reports issued by the Ger-
man government underline the need for pragmatism, at least at the interde-
partmental level. However, pragmatism as such does not necessarily fit well 
with all the strategic aspects of the German deployment, because it signals 
the ability to change one’s stance according to the circumstances. This per-
638 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
639 ’Fortschrittsbericht Afghanistan zur Unterrichtung des Deutschen Bundestags‘, Presse? und Infor-
mationsamt der Bundesregierung, Dezember 2011. Available at: (http://www.auswaertiges-???????
????servlet/contentblob/604602/publicationFile/163001/111214-Fortschrittsbericht2011.pdf). 
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tains especially to the crucial issue of Rules of Engagement (RoE) for German 
soldiers (discussed in Chapter 5.3). 
Theoretically, it can be argued that the German understanding of Com-
prehensive Approach deviates from Karl Deutsch’s initial idea of a ‘pluralistic 
security community’640 in the sense that shared, common values are as im-
portant for the preservation of a security community as the issue of state sov-
ereignty. To give a contemporary example, this understanding of security is 
clearly visible in Germany’s policy towards Russia in the current Ukraine-
crisis. Germany, along with the rest of the EU, clearly condemned Russian 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as a violation of international law and 
Ukrainian sovereignty. However, it still maintains that the only way to reach 
lasting security in post-Cold War European neighbourhood has to be based 
on an understanding and acceptance of common values, even though Chan-
cellor Merkel argued in the context of the G7 meeting in Germany in Summer 
2015 that “Russia’s return to the G8 is not possible” and that in terms of val-
ues, “there is a barrier towards Russia which is very difficult to overcome 
quickly”.641   
Moreover, the Comprehensive Approach as a concept is also qualitatively 
different from Adler’s and Barnett’s conception of a security community.642 
While that concept acknowledges the importance of a common identity, it 
does not necessarily treat the construction of a common identity solely for 
the purpose of tackling a common security threat but to rather strengthen the 
foundations of the community itself. Hence, for Germany, a common security 
identity is something more than just a political tool to get troops to rally 
around the flag as seemed to be the case for the US during the run-up to the 
Iraq war, which ultimately led to the crisis of the transatlantic security com-
munity.643 Indeed, for Germany, underlining the common aspect of the 
Western security identity is important because it links directly with how 
Germans grasp their international responsibility.  
The issue of guilt is such a pervasive and complex topic in the German po-
litical, cultural and historical context that it is hardly something which can be 
declared as having been resolved. The most significant and concrete contem-
porary example of the interplay between the guilt of the past and contempo-
rary international responsibility is Germany’s stance towards Israel. In 2008, 
Chancellor Merkel was the first foreign premier ever to present a speech in 
the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. She famously argued that “Israel’s securi-
640 Deutsch, Karl W. et al. 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Or-
ganization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957. 
641 Interview with Chancellor Merkel, Bericht aus Berlin, Tagesschau, 7.6.2015. 
642 Adler, Emanuel & Barnett, Michael 1998, Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
643 See Risse, Thomas 2004, ‘Beyond Iraq: The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community’, Held, 
David & Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (eds.) American Power in the 21st Century, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, pp.214-240. 
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ty is our [Germany’s] raison d’être”.644 Germany has also paid more than lip 
service to this special relationship by delivering modern submarines to Israel 
over the years and covering a major proportion of the costs. This particular 
case, however, is problematic because the Israeli navy has the capability to 
equip the submarines with a nuclear arsenal – a thing which has not gone 
unnoticed in Germany.645  Moreover, vocal domestic criticism has been 
raised with reference to Germany’s arms export policies as a whole, which do 
not seem to fit very well with either the picture of Germany as a civilian pow-
er, or with the objective of German international responsibility for global se-
curity in the framework of Comprehensive Approach.646 Even though the 
German government considerably reduced the number of weapons export 
licenses in 2015, exports to developing countries remained approximately the 
same as in 2014. Also, Germany continues to export weapons to countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, which are continuously criticized for their human 
rights policies.647 
A strong sense of proactive German responsibility is also reflected in the 
German support of the norm Responsibility to Protect (R2P).648 This has 
been the case especially since the UN appointed a Special Advisor on R2P 
and the UN General Assembly discussed the norm for the first time, mostly 
due to the outbreak of crises in Myanmar and Georgia in 2008.  The 2006 
German White Paper on security policy referred to R2P as an “international 
law doctrine that would in the long term [...] affect the mandating of interna-
tional peace missions”.649 Between 2005 and 2008, the German Government 
644 Speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel to the Knesset in Jerusalem on 18 March 2008. Available at: 
(http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/doc/speech_merkel_2008_eng.pdf). 
645 ‚Geheim-Operation Samson. Wie Deutschland die Atommacht Israel aufrüstet‘, Der Spiegel, 
23/2012, 4.6.2012. 
646 See ‚Deutsche Rüstungsgüter: Opposition kritisiert ‚Hemmungslosigkeit‘ bei Waffenhandel‘, Spiegel 
Online, 19.11.2013. Available at: (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/deutsche-
ruestungsexporte-opposition-kritisiert-hemmungslosigkeit-a-934424.html); Friederichs, Hauke 2014, 
?Die Sünden der deutschen Rüstungsexporte‘, Zeit Online, 3.6.2014. Available at: (http://www.zeit.de/
politik/deutschland/2014-06/ruestung-waffen-export). 
647 See ‚Waffengeschäfte: Gabriel reduziert Genehmigungen für Rüstungsexporte‘, Spiegel Online, 
9.2.2015.?Available?at:??http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/sigmar-gabriel-genehmigt-
weniger-ruestungsexporte-a-1017399.html). 
648 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is based on the initiative of the former UN General Secretary Kofi 
Annan in 2000, who encouraged the international community to reconsider the norm of state sover-
eignty if that sovereignty was used to perpetrate mass murder, ethnic cleansing or genocide on?????
state’s population. The initiative arose out of the need to prevent genocide from ever happening again, 
based on the experience of Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur. R2P bears no legal obligations for states but it 
was designed to counter the trend of ‘humanitarian interventions’ and has gradually been institutional-
ized as part of the UN practices. 
649 Weißbuch 2006, p. 79. 
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and public had largely ignored the concept – it was viewed largely through 
the lens of multilateralism and international law.  
However, after increased internal and public debates on Libya, German 
leaders and officials started to accept that there were also practical implica-
tions to the concept. They have since focused on the aspect of prevention and 
the establishment of a focal point for R2P in the German Foreign Ministry.650 
Germans were slow to adopt the principle, firstly because the political impli-
cations were rather unclear at the time of R2P’s inception (it is not legally 
binding), and secondly, because of the similarities and differences of R2P to 
the notion of humanitarian intervention. At first, Germany approached R2P 
more as a ‘norm in the making’ in terms of international law and multilater-
alism and considered that discursive references to the norm are the best way 
to promote it. However, in the wake of the Libya crisis in 2011, and the UNSC 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973, which legitimized the NATO intervention in Lib-
ya with reference to R2P, the German government, as Brockmeier et al. have 
argued, began to “broaden its idea of the concept: it would now also interpret 
R2P as a moral principle that demanded practical concepts and policies.”651  
Indeed, it should be stressed that in the German discourse, R2P often re-
fers to instruments other than the military in conflict resolution – the em-
phasis is on prevention and the use of force is still considered ultima ratio as 
far as the implementation of R2P is concerned.652 German abstention in the 
UNSC vote on Libya in 2011 reflects this view. The overall narrative about 
Germany adopting the R2P framework needs to be put in the wider context 
of German strategic culture: a more forceful German endorsement of R2P 
followed only after external shocks (Myanmar, Georgia, Libya) were consid-
ered serious enough to warrant a more clearly defined governmental stance. 
And yet, even though Germans agreed with their allies on the principle, they 
differed on what action should be taken based on that. Hence, the question of 
state sovereignty vs. human rights as exemplified in R2P and specified in the 
UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya, was initiated by the epistemic community of 
the international society, spearheaded by the UN and the then Secretary 
General Kofi Annan. Germans principally supported R2P but it did not 
change German behaviour in the question of the use of military force. 
To summarize, the issue of guilt played a major role in how the lessons of 
history and the associated principles of ‘never again’ were forged as the fu-
ture guide for German postwar politicians. Yet the shift in focus from guilt to 
responsibility can be detected not only in the shift from ‘never again war’ to 
650 See Brockmeier, Sarah, Kurtz, Gerrit & Junk, Julian. 2014, ‘Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: 
Europe and the responsibility to protect?, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 14, Issue 4, 2014, 
p.?451.
651 Brockmeier, Sarah, Kurtz, Gerrit & Junk, Julian. 2014, ‘Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe
and the responsibility to protect?, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 14, Issue 4, 2014, p. 431. 
652 See Kiesewetter, Roderich 2015, ‘Die Bundeswehr als Instrument (neuer) deutscher Außenpolitik‘,?
Zeitschrift zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Vol. 8, pp.355-364. 
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‘never again Auschwitz’ but also in a re-appropriation of the ‘never again 
alone/Sonderweg’ principle. In effect, it enforces the Comprehensive Ap-
proach: no one state can be solely responsible for the security of other states 
but that all states are collectively responsible for the security of each state in 
the system. The method to arrive at a point where the security of all states in 
the system is guaranteed is based on mutual responsibility embedded in the 
German understanding of effective multilateralism, which is based on com-
mon values. Importantly, the way these principles were formulated suggests 
that the issues of moral and metaphysical guilt were not only matters for in-
dividuals, but for the German nation as a whole – not in the sense of feeling 
guilty as a nation, but rather in the sense of bearing the collective responsi-
bility and acknowledging the importance of the moral and political conse-
quence of these individual aspects of German guilt. It can be argued that 
German society took seriously the moral lessons of the war and in this sense 
indeed went through a process of renewal, as Jaspers had hoped.  
The shift from guilt to responsibility is echoed within the discourse of 
Germany’s partners and allies – Germany is encouraged to play a greater role 
and to take more responsibility in world affairs, not only by its European 
partners but notably by actors worldwide. Israel has long been advocating a 
more visible role for the Germans in the Middle East. This particularly came 
to the fore when former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert compelled Germany to 
reconsider its stance on UNIFIL and deploy its naval contingent in the Medi-
terranean in 2006.653 Former Polish President Lech Walesa caused public 
uproar in 2013 by arguing that Germany and Poland should abolish national 
borders and unite to expand economic and defence co-operation: “The Ger-
mans have done us a lot more evil, and the relationship we have now is much 
better than with Russia. Why?” he asked; “Because after the war, Germany 
fully confessed to all its dirty tricks. It’s necessary to say once and for all who 
did something evil, full stop. Until we do, the wound won’t heal”.654 
Despite the many pleas, on the whole, Germany has been rather reluctant 
to take on a leadership role in international security policy. As discussed ear-
lier, the arguments that attest to this reluctance often refer to a conception of 
Germany as a civilian power and, as argued, they often fall short in their ex-
planatory power simply because they rely almost exclusively on a normative 
conception of German foreign and security policy. A more compelling argu-
ment for German reluctance for leadership would begin with an understand-
ing of the guilt-responsibility relationship as described in this chapter. It 
653 See Belkin, Paul 2007, CRS Report for Congress. Germany’s Relations with Israel: Background and 
Implications for German Middle-East Policy, Congressional Research Service, 2007; ‚Olmert wün-
scht deutsche Soldaten?, Zeit Online, 28.7.2006. Available at: (http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/32/lib?
anon-olmert-merkel). 
654? Day, Matthew 2013, ?Poland and Germany should unite, says Lech Walesa’, The Telegraph, 
24.9.2013. Available at: (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/10330826/Pol?
and-and-Germany-should-unite-says-Lech-Walesa.html). 
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would acknowledge the fact that as long as there are grounds to argue that 
moral and metaphysical guilt remain pervasive psycho-social features in 
German strategic culture, Germany does not want to highlight its capacity to 
lead simply because it feels guilty about having led the world into chaos and 
hence this makes Germans reluctant to seek a prominent leadership role in 
military affairs. Indeed, unlike the concept of civilian power, the argument 
based on the assessment of guilt transformed into responsibility is better in 
line with the changes that took place in German strategic culture in the 1990s 
in the form of removing the military taboos that have witnessed in the shift 
from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’. However, the ‘new 
activism’ in German foreign and security policy discussed in the previous 
?hapter which is buttressed by the signs of willingness to lead (i.e. White 
Paper 2016) represent a novel thread in German strategic culture since 
the end of the Cold War.   
In summary, penance and renewal have not concerned only German indi-
viduals but the German society as a whole, since the German political elite 
and civil society have always considered it their responsibility to address the 
issue of the German past in ethical terms. Even though the process might 
happen at the level of the individual, it has certainly been guided by political 
authority. The German polity has offered public ways to initiate this individ-
ual process as can be seen in the countless memorial sites and remembrance 
dates that all more or less refer to a collectively experienced ‘German guilt’ 
transformed into collective responsibility. In conclusion, Jaspers’ existential-
ism and the idea of transformation all convey a picture of guilt which can 
never be totally overcome – the debts of the past cannot ever be paid in full 
in the metaphysical sense; yet for the progress of reason and the cause of 
humanity this can only be a good thing for as Jaspers has argued, “no man is 
ever complete or without blame”.655 In this particular sense, state actors are 
not that different from individuals.  
5.3? ????????????????????OMINANT HISTORICAL-
??STRATEGIC NARRATIVE FOR GERMANY 
One of the more crucial features of post-World War II German historiog-
raphy has been the debate on the so-called German ‘Sonderweg’ (spe-
cial/separate path). It has also been widely reflected upon in the scholarly 
debates concerning German foreign and security policy and the alleged Ger-
655 Jaspers 2000. 
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man ‘normalization?.656 This sub-chapter will briefly go over the history of the 
concept of ‘Sonderweg’ and then critically assess its meaning for the study of 
German strategic culture. At the same time, it is also necessary to discuss the 
‘normalization’ thesis of German foreign and security policy, which can also 
be depicted as either the German post- or contra- ‘Sonderweg’ narrative. This 
will also be reflected in the discussion concerning different dimensions of 
strategic culture as well as the Bundeswehr reform in its domestic and Euro-
pean context. 
5.3.1. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE APPROACHES ??? ????????????
Some historians place the origins of the ‘Sonderweg’ concept as early as in 
the ideas of the late 18th century German thinkers, who contemplated the 
German ?Geist? compared to the ?West? and hence contributed to the formu-
lation of a German national identity.657 Kondylis has argued that “(t)his posi-
tive view was backed by French and English protagonists of romantic-
counterrevolutionary ‘Geist’” and that “(t)he admiration for German accom-
plishments in the human but also natural sciences consorted later with such 
a German bias and the talk about Germans as ‘people of thinkers and poets’ 
became a phrase-like expression.”658 The shift towards the negative interpre-
tation culminated during the Kaiserreich period as the locus of German na-
tional identity shifted from that of ‘thinkers and poets’ to ‘poets and warri-
ors’, which was highlighted in the victories of the Prussian army and the po-
litical and economic strength of the German Reich.659 Hence, this trans-
formed German ‘Geist’ was not one to be admired but was one to be feared. 
Others have argued that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a 
number of German historians became convinced of a ‘positive German way’ 
which was rooted in “certain German specifics, consistent with the German 
geographical and historical pattern”.660 In any event, the ‘special German 
way’ was interpreted positively in contrast to the negative treatment of the 
656 See Berger, Stefan 1995, ‘No More Sonderweg: Germany’s Return to the ‘Normality’ of the Nation 
State’, Journal of Area Studies, Number 7 (Autumn 1995), pp. 86-99; Hampton, Mary N. 2000, ‘The 
Past, Present, and the Perhaps’ is Germany a Normal Power?’ Security Studies, 10 (2), pp. 179-202; 
Pulzer, Peter. 1994, ?Unified Germany: A normal state?’ German Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.1-17; Takle, 
Marianne 2002,?Towards a Normalisation of German Security and Defence Policy: German Participa-
tion in International Military Operations’. ARENA Working Paper Series: 10/2002? Available at:
(http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/arenax/p0073.html). 
657 Kondylis, Pejoratis 1993, ‘Der Deutsche „Sonderweg“ und die Deutschen Perspektiven‘, Zitelmann, 
Rainer, Weißmann, Karlheinz & Großheim, Michael (eds.), Westbindung. Chancen und Risiken für 
Deutschland, Propyläen, Frankfurt a.M, 1993, p.22  
658 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
659 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
660 See e.g. Kocka, Jürgen 1988, ?German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German 
Sonderweg’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, no.1 (Jan. 1988), p.3.  
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‘West’. As Kocka has observed, this positive interpretation pertained to Ger-
man ‘constitutional monarchy’, which was seen as an asset, not a liability. 
Moreover, this positive view admired the long statist tradition in contrast to 
the ‘laissez-faire’ and party governance. Importantly, “‘German ‘Kultur’ was 
considered to be different from and superior to western ‘civilization’, a view 
which reached its zenith at the beginning of the First World War and in the 
‘ideas of 1914’.”661 According to Kocka, this positive view became relativized 
in the interwar-period and after World War II it no longer sounded convinc-
ing.662  
The negative version of ‘Sonderweg’, in turn, was used to try to explain 
why Germany became fascist in contrast to other developed countries in the 
west and the north during the crisis of 1920s and 1930s. Importantly, as 
Kocka has argued, this meant that National Socialist experience became the 
focal point of historical understanding and reflection. This new negative in-
terpretation of ‘Sonderweg’ culminated in the idea of both explaining and 
overcoming it, hence linking the German past to both the present and the 
future.663 The reasons for this negative development were already located in 
the societal and political conditions, experiences and processes of the 18th 
and 19th century Germany compared to those of France, Britain, North-
America – the ‘West’.  Hence, the term ‘Sonderweg’ became a common de-
nominator of what went historically wrong or differently in Germany com-
pared to other Western nations.  
Consequently, the term ‘Sonderweg’ has been used in several ways but it 
always expresses the difference to some ‘normal state of affairs’. In the his-
torical accounts, the German ‘Sonderweg’ was seen in contrast to the ‘nor-
mality’ that was the way of liberal-democratic development of the Western 
states from which Germany deviated; a ‘Sonderweg’ that was seen as one of 
the main reasons why Germany succumbed to fascism. However, the end of 
World War II was not the end of German ‘Sonderweg’. In terms of German 
attitudes towards war, the Bonn Republic preserved some extremist traits 
that seemed to run counter to the developments in other countries. As Bau-
mann and Hellmann have observed, “(w)here Hitler and his associates 
pushed war to new extremes in theory and practice, post-war West Germans 
were, for the most part, willing recipients or even zealous proponents of the 
anti-militarist re-education favoured by the Western allies. Where Goebbels 
was declaring ‘total war’ to the world, West German ‘Genscherists’ were de-
claring ‘total peace’.”664  
In many accounts that attempted to sketch a future German foreign and 
security policy in the early to mid-1990s, ‘Sonderweg’ often refers to those 
aspects of German culture and politics that have been vindicated by a reap-
661 Ibid. 
662 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
663 Ibid. 
664 Baumann, Rainer & Hellmann 2001, p. 61. 
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pearance of a ‘German nation state’ after German reunification, a nation 
state which was seen to mark the endpoint of the long German ‘Sonderweg’. 
Hence, the dawn of an era of normalization in Germany’s foreign and securi-
ty policy was to be expected of the new Berlin Republic.665 However, the pro-
cess of coming to terms with the German past that received new impetus with 
Bitburg and the Historians’ Controversy neither ended with the German reu-
nification nor heralded a specific form of ‘normality’ – quite the contrary was 
the case if we think of the debates that ensued on the issue of the use of mili-
tary force already on the eve of the first Gulf War. Moreover, as there was no 
concrete substance for the concept of German ‘normality’ besides the factor 
of a reunited nation, the persistence of the Sonderweg-thesis in the post-Cold 
War context can also be understood as its criticism.  
Yet importantly, many contemporary accounts of German Sonderweg are 
not based on Germany’s foundational cultural or social differences from the 
Western nations but rather on the deviations from the alleged ‘normality’ or 
‘normalization of German foreign policy’.  For instance, the term Sonderweg 
has been often invoked to highlight Germany’s neglect of its ‘never again 
alone’ principle; or even to attest to a German unilateralism, as was claimed 
to be the case for instance during the early stages of the Balkan conflict as 
Germany recognized the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia with-
out prior definitive agreement with its allies.666 However, it can hardly be 
argued that these so-called unilateral moments formed a pattern of policy 
behaviour or even a meaningful deviation from the accepted policy of princi-
pal co-operation in the sense of presenting a truly viable strategic policy al-
ternative for Germany during the Balkan crisis. Moreover, it is especially de-
batable whether any so meaningful normality existed in German foreign and 
security policy in the next few years following German reunification, which 
makes the claims regarding a new Sonderweg understood as isolationism 
being rather nonsensical. 
In any case, the term ‘normality’ usually refers to the proclaimed end of 
Sonderweg - Germany becoming a ‘normal’ state after reunification and gain-
ing full national sovereignty. In particular, ‘becoming normal’ means a pref-
erence for multilateralism, respect for international law and human rights as 
well as a general embeddedness of German society and politics in democratic 
and constitutional principles, often expressed in the notion of Germany as a 
665 See Berger 1995. 
666 The unilateralist argument was particularly popular among realists. Most observers, however, took 
a more moderate view on the issue.  See Banchoff, Thomas 1999, The German Problem Transformed: 
Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy 1945-1995, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 
p.145; Le Gloannec, Ann-Marie, ‘The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe’, Stares,
Paul B. (ed.) The New Germany and the New Europe, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 251-257; Cog-
gins, Bridget 2014, Power Politics and State Formation in the 20th Century. The Dynamics of Recogni-
tion, Cambridge University Press, p.130.
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civilian power.667 Yet the term ‘normalization’ is often associated with an in-
creased willingness to use military force to solve international conflicts or the 
other way around as a decreased threshold to participate militarily in the in-
ternational conflict management.668 In general, however, all but the most 
devoted realists agree that the view juxtaposing normalization with ‘a remili-
tarization of German foreign policy’ or declared as ‘the end of antimilitarism’ 
is either misleading or strictly false. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the end of World War II and the 
defeat of Nazi Germany were marked by Germany’s turn towards the West. 
The narrative of the German ‘Special Path’ was contrasted with the cultural, 
political and military Westernization of German society and the political elite 
during the Cold War. However, for Germany, the Cold War ‘Westernization’ 
did not lead to ‘normality’ after the end of the Cold War understood in realist 
terms, but rather to a strategic culture which had yet to discover the meaning 
of ‘normality’ for itself. It can be argued in a realist fashion that the German 
reunification and the idea of German normality were the necessary precondi-
tions for any imaginable leadership position for Germany in Europe but un-
like the realists predicted, this did not manifest itself in Germany claiming a 
dominant military position in Europe.  
Furthermore, the post-Cold War development in the 1990s highlighted 
just how far Germany had actually deviated from its proclaimed negative 
special path. It is important to note that the question of the Enttabuisierung 
des Militärischen (removal of military taboos), which effectively meant that 
Germany gradually began to take part in the military management of inter-
national conflicts with its allies, has to be seen as another important devia-
tion from the negative Sonderweg theory and not against the backdrop of any 
objective ‘normalization’ or ‘militarization’ of German security and defence 
policy. In short, German security and defence policy and its strategic culture 
have become normal only in a way which makes sense to Germans them-
selves. This, in turn, has to be understood as the concrete effects of the in-
creased pressure towards the German foreign policy consensus and the civil-
ian power –role, which had their origins in the heritage of World War II and 
the developments during the Cold War. Indeed, if we think about the norma-
tive shift in the mid-1990s German strategic culture, then this shift is the ac-
667 See Tewes, Henning 1997, ‘The emergence of a civilian power: Germany and central Europe’, Ger-
man Politics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 95-116; Maull 2000; Cooper, Alice H 1997, ‘When Just Causes Conflict 
with Accepted Means: The German Peace Movement and Military Intervention in Bosnia’, German 
Politics & Society, Vol. 15, No. 3 (44) (Fall 1997), pp. 99-118; Wagener, Martin 2004, ‘Auf dem Weg zu 
einer „normalen Macht”? Die Entsendung deutscher Streitkräfte in der Ära Schröder’,  Harnisch, Se-
bastian, Katsioulis, Christos and Overhaus, Marco (eds.), Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Eine Bilanz der 
Regierung Schröder, Baden-Baden, 2004, pp. 89–118. 
668 As discussed in Chapter 1, this seems to be compatible with the proponents of Germany as a Civilian 
Power, which, as argued, seems to further inflate the explanatory power of the concept. 
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tual normality we should be talking about. As we have witnessed, this did not 
translate into any military automatisms.  
5.3.2? NORMALITY AND THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF
?STRATEGIC CULTURE 
There is nothing that makes a state’s use of military power somehow more 
‘normal’ than the non-use of force. However, even if we do not endorse the 
realist view of international relations as ruled primarily by anarchy and the 
logic of military power, the normalization thesis can still be effectively em-
ployed analytically. Here, it is worthwhile to grasp ‘normality’ as that of the 
other Western nations (Germany’s allies), not as some objectively articulated 
‘normality’ concerning the use of military force that is necessitated by sys-
temic forces.  
Firstly, from the viewpoint of strategic culture, comparison with Germa-
ny’s closest allies makes sense as Germany remains firmly committed to both 
the EU and NATO. Secondly, as argued, the question of the present, alleged 
‘normality’ cannot be properly understood without referring to the historical, 
negative accounts of German ‘Sonderweg’ that rest on the assumption that 
Germany deviated from the liberal-democratic development of the ‘West’ in 
one way or the other. 
In this context, we can utilize analytical distinctions between different 
dimensions of strategic culture which can be coined as follows: 1) the level of 
ambition in international security policy; 2) the scope for action for the exec-
utive in decision-making; 3) foreign policy orientation; 4) the willingness to 
use military force.  These dimensions were used in a recent study which ex-
amined the existing conditions in EU member states (and Turkey) for the 
development of a common, European strategic culture.669  The differences 
and similarities within these dimensions across the strategic cultures in Eu-
rope are summarized in Table 5.670 
In spite of the general conclusion made by Biehl et al. that there is no sin-
gle European strategic culture they also posit that based on the 28 case stud-
ies on European strategic cultures, patterns of strategic culture indeed do 
emerge. These patterns are based on a threefold categorization: “[c]ountries 
whose security and defence policy is driven by the attempt to manifest their 
own presence in the international system [security policy as manifestation of 
statehood], countries whose strategic cultures lead them to attempt to shape 
their multilateral security through international bargaining [security policy 
as international bargaining], and countries who focus their security and de-
fence policy on the protection and projection of state power [security policy 
as protecting and projecting state power].671 
669 Giegerich et. al. 2013. 
670 Ibid., p. 394. 
671 Ibid., p. 391. 
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As we can see, countries belonging to the first category are small, lacking 
powerful military forces or resources and often have a tendency towards neu-
trality in security and defence policy. According to Biehl et al., “their limited 
resources are paradoxically a driver of their engagement because elites feel 
the need to show that their country is capable of playing a constructive secu-
rity and defence role. In practice, such countries are reluctant to use military 
force and show a preference for civilian means of crisis management and 
conflict prevention, which seems to be a reflection of their structural inability 
to provide for their own defence. Countries in this group tend to channel 
their engagement through the EU rather than NATO, in part because the lat-
ter, despite formal equality, is perceived to be dominated by the influence of 
the primus inter pares, the United States.”672 In any case, the ambition of 
?punching beyond its weight? with a preference for civilian crisis manage-
ment in this group need not be explained by elite preferences of structural 
deficiencies only, but also with regard to the lessons drawn from historical 
strategic experience.673  
According to Biehl et al., the second category covers countries which con-
duct security and defence policy primarily through and for alliances and or-
ganizations. Two types of countries belong to this group: countries whose 
main purpose of multilateral engagement in NATO is to make sure they have 
credible security guarantees. This is also often used as a reason for participat-
ing in NATO operations, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. These 
countries also stress the traditional collective defence of NATO (mostly in 
fear of Russia) more than they do the new security challenges, such as terror-
ism. The other type includes countries whose main objective is to be per-
ceived as reliable partners within NATO and the EU, partners who can be 
counted upon to make a contribution even if these countries did not have a 
particular national interest at stake in the context of particular operations. 
These countries [Germany included] do not have a clearly defined strategic 
purpose for their armed forces, which “seems to fluctuate among the political 
elites in these countries between the more traditional collective defence to a 
more expeditionary mindset.”674  
The third category involves countries who are convinced that military 
power can be used to protect and project state power. These countries believe 
it is their responsibility to engage beyond Europe in order to manage the con-
flicts that may arise and have repercussions for their own and European se-
curity. These countries are often willing to make resources available relative 
to their size and capacity in order to tackle these crises. If the organiza-
tions/institutions designated to manage these conflicts are lacking, these 
672 Ibid., p. 392. 
673 See Seppo, Antti & Forsberg, Tuomas 2013, ?Finland’, Biehl, Heiko, Giegerich, Bastian & Jonas, 
Alexandra (eds.), Strategic Cultures in Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent? 
Springer VS, 2013, pp. 113-125. 
674 Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas 2013, p. 392? 
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countries are likely to resort to coalition building beyond these organizations, 
as was the case during the cases of Iraq and Libya. Biehl et al. refer to the UK 
and France especially, but also mention that smaller countries such as Den-
mark and Sweden share some of these traits.675  
Table 5. European Strategic Cultures 
 European Strategic Cultures 
Security policy as 
manifestation of   
statehood 
Security policy as 
international   
bargaining 
Protecting and       
projecting state power 
Relatively high (often 
‘punching above its 
weight’) 
Low to medium     
(activities are expected 
to lead to indirect  
effects) 
Strong legislative rights 
Dimension 1: The level 
of ambition in       
international security 
policy 
Dimension 2: The 
scope of action for the 
executive in 
decision-making 
Dimension 3: Foreign 
policy orientation 
Dimension 4: The 
willingness to use  
military force 
Countries 
There are a couple of remarks to be made based on the findings of this study 
because its conclusions are illuminative in terms of the debate on normaliza-
675 Ibid., p. 393. 
Strong legislative rights 
????
???????????? ????????
????????????????????
????????????
?????????????????????
????????????? ????
???????????????????????
???????????????????????
?????????????????????????
???????????????????
????????????????????
????????? ????????
???????????????
????????????????????
????????????????????
?????
?????????????????????
???????????????????
??????? ?????????
????
?????????????????
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tion of German strategic culture. First, as we can see, EU member states do 
not oscillate towards a specific strategic cultural equilibrium understood as 
the combination of certain ideas and practices because there is no single, 
overarching concept of European security which would ultimately distinguish 
‘normal’ ideas and practices from ‘non-normal’ ones. For instance, the Euro-
pean Security Strategy (ESS) has remained largely a declaratory political 
document without facilitating tangible convergence among European strate-
gic cultures. EU declarations and strategies tend to be rather general in na-
ture without any formal strategic obligations for the member states. Indeed, 
as often noted, security and defence are still mainly conducted by member 
states themselves, regardless of the new capacities that the Constitutional 
Treaty has endowed the European Parliament and the European Commission 
in these matters. In this rather general sense, there is no such thing as Euro-
pean normality in security and defence policy. 
Second, and more importantly, the talk about ‘normality’ understood as 
the normal, traditional way of the state to deploy military power would only 
make sense if the realist maxims were omnipotent and the sole purpose of 
states’ defence and security policy was to maximize their military power. Al-
ternatively, it would make sense if we were able to posit that one of these 
purposes is in some way more ‘normal’ than the other – in other words, if 
one of the purposes represented a collectively accepted norm in all strategic 
cultures.  However, the different purposes of security policy, here depicted as 
either a manifestation of statehood, international bargaining or the protec-
tion/projection of state power are all roughly equally represented among the 
EU member states. 
Third, regarding the fourth dimension, it is difficult to pin Germany down 
to just one category in terms of the purpose for defence and security policy 
(even though Biehl et al. have done so for the sake of analytical clarity here). 
It can equally be argued that security and defence policy is a manifestation of 
statehood for Germany, even though it does not depend on others for its se-
curity to the degree that smaller states do and even though there are clear 
structural deficiencies in its armed forces compared to many other European 
armies. Germany’s preferred mode of international co-operation is still mul-
tilateral in its core, even in its ‘modified’ form (see e.g. Chapter 4.4). Lastly, it 
is questionable whether Germany’s threshold to use force for defence pur-
poses is considerably lower than it is in the case of crisis management, par-
ticularly as the focus of NATO and EU has been on crisis management, not 
collective defence – notwithstanding the recent crisis in Ukraine. For in-
stance, in the case of deploying Patriot missiles in Turkey in the NATO con-
text, due to Turkish fears of Iraqi aggression, Germany was conceived of as a 
rather reluctant partner. After US pressure, the German government decided 
to deliver 46 Patriot missiles, which had to be fitted to Dutch batteries. Ac-
cording to Harnisch, this had to be done “in order to avoid any participation 
of German personnel, which would have required a mandate of the Bundes-
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tag”.676 In late 2015, Germany decided to withdraw its Patriot-missiles from 
Turkey. Germany’s NATO allies reacted reservedly to Germany’s decision, 
because it was clearly based on a political evaluation of Turkey’s conduct as 
an ally in the Syria question, even though the future of the NATO mission in 
Turkey was still open.677 In a similar vein, even though German security (and 
hence the security of Germany’s partners in NATO) has been defended at the 
Hindukush for years, Berlin has retained its skeptical attitude towards NATO 
becoming a global intervention force and remains what Noetzel and Schreer 
have called a ‘status-quo’ ally.678  As an overall critique one can also posit that 
strategic cultures do not only operate via military power but that other forms 
of state power, such as economic power, soft power or, indeed, cultural pow-
er can and do play a role in the evolution of strategic concepts and practices. 
As discussed above, this can be witnessed for instance in the German concept 
of Comprehensive Approach on security the means of which rely strongly on 
other forms of power than military power. 
I posit that the argument about German ‘normalization’ has to be rejected 
in the sense of ‘remilitarization’ as well as in the sense of ‘becoming more 
willing to use military force’ on the grounds of the nature of German strategic 
culture described above and in the previous chapters. However, it is more 
tempting to accept the normalization thesis understood as Germany ‘coming 
to terms with the use of the military in addition (but never exclusively prior 
to) the use of civilian means and measures’. Moreover, as discussed in Chap-
ter 3, the normative shift from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’ 
did not generate any automatic patterns regarding the use of force. Rather 
than pointing out any final state of affairs for German strategic culture re-
garding normalization, this shift was characteristic of the process of coming 
to terms with the use of military power.  For instance, compared to the UK, 
Germany remains considerably more skeptical about NATO becoming a 
global intervention force, and in comparison to France, the more principal 
understanding of the use of military force as ultima ratio seems to persist. 
Indeed, the fact that the use of military force as ultima ratio seems to have 
solidified itself further as the first-order strategic practice in terms of military 
deployments does, in effect, offer a powerful critique of the arguments about 
normalization understood as remilitarization or increased willingness to use 
force. What is more, mandates that regulate the rules for the use of force in 
Bundeswehr operations are thoroughly scrutinized in the German Bundes-
tag, even though the hallmark Constitutional Court’s ruling changed the ma-
jority needed for mandate approval from a two-thirds majority to a simple 
majority in 1994. 
676 Harnisch, Sebastian 2004, ‘German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict’, German Poli-
tics, Vol 13. No.1, p. 16. 
677 ?Warum die Bundeswehr die Türkei verlässt‘, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.8.2015? 
678 Noetzel, Timo & Schreer, Benjamin 2009, ‘Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance 
and the process of strategic change’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No.2 (Mar., 2009), p.216? 
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5.3.3.  ‘BUNDESWEHR’ IM WANDEL – HAS THE GERMAN ARMY 
??????????????? ? 
The understanding of normalization as ‘coming to terms with the use of mili-
tary force’ is linked with the contemporary understandings of Germany’s in-
ternational responsibility. This can be seen in the process of Bundeswehr re-
form, which had already been initiated by Defence Minister Volker Rühe and 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the beginning of the 1990s – the aim of which was 
gradually to accommodate the German populace to the idea of deploying the 
Bundeswehr outside Germany.679 The structural changes after the end of the 
Cold War, the end of bipolarity and hence the disappearance of the common 
enemy gradually eroded the support for general conscription in Germany, 
one of the cornerstones of German strategic culture during the Cold War. 
However, it was clear that the abolition of conscription would not happen 
overnight. For instance, in 1995 Federal President Roman Herzog still argued 
in favour of conscription because it 
 “makes all citizens responsible for their body politic and it makes pol-
iticians more sensible towards military deployments, because it in-
volves the sons of all German families and layers of society, even 
their own. Conscription ensures that the army stays in the middle of 
society and lives as part of the society” yet he continued that “the var-
ious benefits of conscription for the state are not enough for the justi-
fication for the existence of conscription […] Conscription involves so 
deeply the individual freedom of the young citizen, that a constitu-
tional democracy can only demand it if the external security of the 
state dictates it. Conscription is, hence, no universal, eternal princi-
ple, but dependent on the concrete security situation. Its preservation, 
suspension or abolition as well as its length have to be justified in 
terms of security policy. Societal, historical, financial and army-
intern arguments can be used as further justifications. But they will 
never form the basis of consensus in the dialogue with the citizens. In 
other words, to maintain a credible conscription means to explain 
why we still need it despite the disappearance of the direct external 
threat.”680  
However, when the final decision to abolish conscription was made in 2010, 
the reasoning was, paradoxically, first and foremost economic – even though 
there was cross-party consensus on the fact that a conscript army had out-
lived its strategic usefulness for Germany. The issue of Bundeswehr reform – 
in essence, the abolition of conscription and the preference for crisis man-
agement tasks instead of traditional territorial defence due to the evolution of 
679 See Niven 2007; Longhurst 2004. 
680 Speech by Federal President Roman Herzog at the Bundeswehr Commander Summit, 15.11.1995. 
Available at: (http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Roman-Herzog/Reden/1995/ 
11/19951115_Rede.html).  
246 
NATO strategy681 – is also important in terms of the normalization debate. 
Dyson, for instance, has argued that despite the appearance of a major re-
form as a streamlined German military (from a post-unification force of 
370,000 troops and 170,000 conscripts to 252,000 troops to 50,000 con-
scripts) during 1990-2005, the reality of German defence reform was that of 
“partial and gradual adaptation” compared to Germany’s closest allies in EU 
and NATO.682 Dyson argues in favour of an explanatory framework for policy 
change that highlights the different leadership roles of three German defence 
ministers, Rühe, Scharping and Struck in managing the reform. He posits 
that the approach on strategic culture “suggests that the persistence of con-
scription and territorial defence is the consequence of Defence Ministry and 
macropolitical system characterized by institutionally embedded ‘logic of ap-
propriateness’ about Bundeswehr policy, and of a policy process that reflects 
a highly path-dependent form of historical conditioning. Ministers act from a 
cognitive script; they follow historically informed ideas about what can and 
should be done.”683 Indeed, as suggested by Kerry Longhurst, the persistence 
of conscription in Germany in the early 2000s relied strongly on the path-
dependent structural embeddedness of German political actorness: “political 
‘actors’ or ‘agents’ certainly appear to be ‘hemmed in’ by existing structures 
and practices, which have served to preclude the likelihood of change or even 
the discussion of it, despite clear imperatives for this to happen, especially 
since 1989.”684 In contrast, Dyson suggests that policy leaders were not “just 
hostages to their ideational contexts” but “were able to reproduce and sustain 
strategic culture selectively, as a resource with which to control the scope, 
timing, and pace of policy change, particularly within the Defence Minis-
try”.685 
Dyson’s approach is similar to the second generation strategic culture lit-
erature, which treats strategic culture as primarily an object of political agen-
cy in an instrumental fashion. His argument has merit in criticizing strategic 
culture for not paying enough attention to policy agency. Quite convincingly, 
he shows how the policy change in Bundeswehr reform was brought about by 
the agency of German defence ministers who applied a range of leadership 
models in its implementation. However, this actor-specific approach down-
681 NATO’s strategy has basically developed from the organization’s enlargement in Eastern Europe to 
out-of-area operations on a global scale. Yet the latest developments and the Wales Summit in 2014 
suggest that NATO is returning ?back to the roots? in the sense of highlighting collective defense as its 
most important core tasks in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. This development is also reflected in 
the general combat fatigue of the Western nation in the context of military out-of-area deployments. 
682 Dyson, Tom 2007, The Politics of German Defence and Security. Policy Leadership and Military 
Reform in the Post-Cold War Era. Berghahn Books 2007, p.183. 
683 Ibid., 191? 
684 Longhurst, Kerry 2003, ?Why aren’t Germans debating the draft? Path Dependency and the Persis-
tence of Conscription’, German Politics, Vol 12., No.2 (August 2003), p.151. 
685 Dyson 2007, p. 191. 
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plays the structural significance of strategic culture in empowering political 
actors and agency in the first place. Even though it is certainly true that poli-
cy actors are not ‘hostages to their ideational contexts’, they cannot act en-
tirely outside of these contexts either if they want to present the public with 
credible and legitimate policy options. Hence, in this sense, strategic culture 
is not only the object of policy but also the structure that forms the realm of 
the different possibilities and determines how agency is empowered by offer-
ing ideational frames of reference - hence strategic culture can be understood 
as a social structure which generates action but which is also (re)generated 
by action. 
Von Bredow’s assessment of the Bundeswehr reform is similar to that of 
Dyson. He argues that the core structural problem concerning German de-
fence and security policy did not vanish after the landmark Constitutional 
Court decision in 1994: because the formulation of Article 87a of the German 
Constitution clearly states that the purpose of the Bundeswehr is defence, 
every international Bundeswehr mission and deployment have to be some-
how understood as acts of defence. Hence, according to von Brydow, this 
formulation can be considered to pertain to deployments that contribute to 
the preservation of peace and the restoration of a lasting peaceful order in 
Europe and between the peoples of the world can only in very general and 
abstract sense.686 Von Bredow also argues that the steps taken in the Bun-
deswehr reform have been too small compared to the distance that should 
have been covered. He posits that there are three explanations for this: 1) 
Germany’s security policy has been slow and overly cautious in adjusting to 
the post-Cold War structural changes; 2) the Bundeswehr’s military leader-
ship has been unable to develop a recipe for surmounting the inner-
organizational inertia and the difficulties with the bureaucracy within the 
Bundeswehr and finally, 3) Germany has been unsuccessful in bringing about 
a public debate on the future of the Bundeswehr and its new military tasks as 
well as a discussion on the associated complications with the military occupa-
tion in German society.687   
However, in the context of global and European economic decline, major 
structural reforms were undertaken under the leadership of Defence Minister 
zu Guttenberg in 2010 and implemented by his successor de Maiziere. The 
German conservative-liberal government had already agreed in their coali-
tion agreement in 2009 that the defence minister would appoint a commis-
sion to prepare a report on the strengths and weaknesses of the Bundeswehr. 
The most important change was the abolition of conscription and the intro-
duction of voluntary military service in 2010. The troops were cut from 
245,000 to around 185,000 military and 50,000 civilian personnel and ma-
jor structural changes were initiated in the organization of the Bundeswehr. 
686 Von Bredow, Wilfried 2010,? ?Bundeswehr-Reform: kleine Schritte und ein großer Sprung??? 
Zeit???????? ???? ???????? ???? ????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ???? 
687 Ibid., 395. 
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The tasks and purpose of the Bundeswehr during and after these structural 
changes that were referred to as Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (reorien-
tation of Bundeswehr), were clarified in the defence political guidelines in 
2011 (VPR). According to this document, Germany’s strategic environment 
had changed fundamentally in the sense that territorial threats caused by 
conventional armed forces were seen as minor compared to the threats 
caused by failing and failed states, international terrorism, regimes under 
terrorist influence and dictatorship, criminal networks, climate and envi-
ronmental catastrophes, migration as well as shortages in supply of natural 
resources and raw materials as well as possible endangerment of critical in-
frastructure such as information technology.688   
Moreover, the 2011 VPR highlight the importance of a value-oriented for-
eign and security policy that is based on a feeling of responsibility that stems 
from Germany’s strong, central position in Europe. Germany will support the 
liberal-democratic constitutional order and the fundaments of international 
law as well as aiming towards a better and more secure world in a more ab-
stract sense. Germany’s security political objectives include the securing of 
the safety and security of German citizens, Germany’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty and that of its allies as well as awareness of Germany’s interna-
tional responsibility. The Guidelines argue that Germany’s security interests 
emerge from Germany’s history, its central geographical position in Europe 
as well as from Germany’s participation in the international political and 
economic networks and Germany’s dependence on resources as a site of 
high-technology and as an export nation with poor natural resources. Ac-
cording to the VPR, these interests can be further defined in terms of preven-
tion and containment of those crises and conflicts that threaten Germany’s 
and its allies’ security as well as the credible and long-term representation of 
Germany’s foreign- and security political positions. Moreover, these interests 
also include the strengthening of transatlantic and European security and 
partnership, bolstering the international legitimacy of human rights and 
democratic principles, global respect for international law as well as decreas-
ing the gap between rich and poor countries as well as securing free access to 
world economy, high seas and natural resources.689 
The 2011 Guidelines also stress the importance of the Comprehensive Ap-
proach on security. This means that the securing of all the security political 
interests includes political, diplomatic, economic, developmental, police, 
humanitarian, social as well as military measures. The guidelines also reaf-
firm Germany’s stance towards multilateralism especially in the context of 
the UN, NATO and the EU. Foreign deployments should principally be con-
ducted multilaterally except for deployments which directly concern the safe-
688 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2011. Nationale Interessen wahren – Internationale Verantwor-
tung übernehmen – Sicherheit gemeinsam gestalten. Der Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin, 
18.5.2011. 
689 Ibid. 
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ty of German citizens abroad. Despite the major changes to the structure of 
the Bundeswehr, the 2011 VPR underlines the importance of the existence of 
national armed forces as an indispensable instrument of German foreign and 
security policy and as a fundament of self-assertion and defence-
preparedness in terms of its core tasks and capabilities. Finally, the VPR 
states that the Bundeswehr is to be steered towards a range of international 
deployments of all intensity levels and that the Bundeswehr should enable 
Germany to make a politically and militarily appropriate contribution 
equivalent to Germany’s size.690 
However, despite the evident need for the German foreign and security 
policy to adapt to the post-Cold War international order, which the VPR 2011 
clearly brings into expression, the Bundeswehr reform has been criticized 
throughout its existence. A recent critique posits that Chancellor Merkel has 
displayed “a significant lack of interest in German defence policy during the 
2009-2013 period” and that “(t)he fundamental task of defence ministers 
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2009-2011) and Thomas de Mazière (2011-
2013) under her second chancellorship has been to keep the policy area off 
the news agenda and avoid causing electoral damage to the CDU/CSU in 
both regional elections the 2013 federal election.”691 Furthermore, it has been 
argued that Germany’s general reluctance to take leadership in defence and 
security policy is reflected in the laggard reforms of the Bundeswehr and it 
seriously hampers the overall development of European security in the con-
text of US’ “Asia Pivot” policy of rebalancing its relations with South-Eastern 
Asia as well as the rise of BRIC states as significant actors in global security 
policy.692 Hence, the argument is that while the US turns more and more 
away from Europe, Germany should take more and more responsibility.  
A part of the explanation for Germany’s contemporary rather slow and 
cautious movement in the area of defence and security policy can also be 
found in the global and European context of the financial crisis. Mölling, for 
instance, has argued that the economic and financial crisis has made inter-
ests and values less important as determinants of defence policy, which is 
reflected in the stagnant state of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). Significantly, this has had the effect that the strategic dimension has 
been almost completely overshadowed by economic constraints in terms of 
defence planning and procurement.693 As a response, the so-called German-
690 Ibid. 
691 Dyson, Tom 2014, ‘German Defense Policy under the Second Merkel Chancellorship’, German Poli-
tics, vol. 23, No. 4, p. 460. 
692 See Ratner, Ely 2013, ‘Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
36, No.2, pp. 21-38; Ling, Wei 2013, ‘Rebalancing or De-Balancing: US Pivot and East Asian Order, 
American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol.35, pp. 148-154. 
693 Mölling, Christian 2013, ?Europäische Verteidigung in der Krise’, in Kempin, Ronja & Overhaus, 
Marc, EU-Außenpolitik zu Zeiten der Finanz- und Schuldenkrise, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
pp. 84-95. 
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Swedish initiative (Ghent Initiative, 2010) of pooling and sharing EU mem-
ber states’ military capabilities and capacities the aim of which was to ease 
the financial burden of procurement and crisis management deployments of 
individual member states has also suffered from the lack of concrete imple-
mentation and the fact that it is not a politically binding agreement. Yet a 
more compelling answer is provided if we link the economic downturn with 
the state of German strategic culture: budgetary constraints favour change 
and pragmatism instead of continuity and dogmatism in the area of defence 
policy, as can be seen in the examples of Pooling and Sharing as well as 
Smart Defence.694 Moreover, these economic constraints may also change the 
pattern of defence and security political preferences in the sense of altering 
the tension between military effectiveness on one hand and national capaci-
ties and capabilities on the other. This can especially be detected in the ac-
quisition of new defence equipment and material as the procurement cycles 
are lengthened or can even be disrupted by the lack of finances.  
However, as the Ukrainian conflict has shown, in times of crisis it is more 
probable to find a common denominator in terms of defence and security 
than in times of stability despite the economic constraints. Indeed, resurgent 
Russia represents the former common enemy of all NATO member states 
unlike the case with the war in Iraq, when opinions differed as to whether 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq posed a common threat to the West or not. The pre-
siding German Defence Minister von der Leyen, for instance, decided in early 
2015 to repurchase decommissioned Leopard tanks to reform one German 
tank battalion as a response to the rising tensions between NATO and Russia, 
without having a clear view on how the purchase would be financed.695   
However, despite the denomination of Germany as a “laggard” in defence 
and security policy reforms696, normalization understood as the process of 
coming to terms with the use of military force is well reflected in the notion 
of ‘Bundeswehr im Einsatz’697, which, in turn, is quite astutely exemplified by 
the end of the 13-year long German participation in the OEF/ISAF missions 
in Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Hence, Afghanistan has been by far the 
most demanding out-of-area mission the Bundeswehr has ever participated 
694 See Faleg, Giovanni & Giovannini, Allessandro 2012, ?The EU Between Pooling & Sharing and Smart 
Defense. Making a Virtue out of Necessity?’ Centre For European Policy Studies (CEPS) Special Report, 
May 2012. 
695 ‚Von der Leyen will Panzerbataillon aktivieren‘.?Available at: (http://www.welt.de/politik/deutsch-
land/article137887818/Von-der-Leyen-will-Panzerbataillon-aktivieren.html); ‚Ursula von der ??????
reaktiviert Panzerbataillon‘. Available at: (http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ukraine-konflikt-ursula-
von-der-leyen-reaktiviert-panzerbataillon/11436432.html). 
696 Wagner, Wolfgang 2005, ‘From Vanguard to Laggard: Germany in European Security and Defense 
Policy’, German Politics, Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2005, pp. 455-469. 
697 Description used in Germany to describe the transformation of Bundeswehr to an army ‘in???????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw). 
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in, and its scope and depth goes far beyond the German participation in the 
crisis management of the Balkans and Kosovo considering the tasks and du-
ties required of the Bundeswehr. 
German participation in ground combat seems to be the last military ta-
boo to be removed during the course of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. And 
yet, the involvement of Bundeswehr soldiers in ground combat does not pre-
sent a clear-cut case for change in German strategic culture in this respect. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, as discussed, this can be seen 
in the conceptual discrepancy between the strategic policy concepts on the 
level of German political elite (or lack thereof) and the operational reality on 
the ground. As has been criticized in many instances698, NATO did not have a 
clear strategy for the implementation of the ISAF mission because the 26 
NATO member states had diverging interests concerning Afghanistan. The 
same pertained to successive German governments during the course of the 
Bundeswehr’s longest out-of-area operation as part of ISAF – the aims and 
purpose of German policy in Afghanistan were only vaguely or abstractly de-
termined, if at all – and this pertains particularly to the use of the military.699 
The discrepancy between political beliefs and the reality in the theatre of op-
erations was also reflected in the German political elites’ view of the German 
soldier as a ‘well-digger’ long after German troops had actually participated 
in the counterinsurgency operations of ISAF. It can also be argued that this 
discrepancy impeded the smooth functioning of the Comprehensive Ap-
proach, as a report from a German aid-worker in Afghanistan quite astutely 
testifies: she was confused about the inability of the Bundeswehr to provide 
safety and argued that there was a drastic deficit of Bundeswehr soldiers ac-
tually operating outside of the protected camps (who actually were in a posi-
tion to provide security for the civilian workers).700 It wasn’t until the first 
German casualty in combat operations in April 2009 when the then Defence 
Minister zu Guttenberg admitted that the Bundeswehr was operating under 
“warlike” circumstances in Afghanistan; the German domestic discourse be-
fore this had concentrated on depicting a picture of German troops undertak-
ing a “stabilizing” mission in Afghanistan.701  
Secondly, the Bundestag ISAF mandates were ambivalent on the issue of 
Bundeswehr’s use of force in terms of Rules of Engagement (RoE). On the 
one hand, the consecutive German ISAF mandates acknowledged the right of 
698 See e.g. Noetzel, Timo & Scheer, Benjamin 2009, p.217.  
699 See Hilpert 2014. 
700 Lipovac, Susana 2015,? ‘Zwei Welten, ein Ziel?! Erfahrungen einer deutschen Hilfsorganisation im 
Rahmen der zivil-militärischen Zusammenarbeit?,Glatz, Rainer R. & Tophoven, Rolf (eds.), Am? ??? 
dukusch – und weiter? Die Bundeswehr im Auslandseinsatz: Erfahrungen, Bilanzen, Ausblicke,????? 
deszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2015, pp. 203-217. 
701 See ‚Tabu-Bruch: Guttenberg spricht von Krieg in Afghanistan‘, Spiegel Online, 4.4.2010; Lohse, 
Eckardt 2009, ‚Kriegsähnliche Zustände in Kundus und Berlin‘, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
16.12.2009. 
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the Bundeswehr to take all necessary steps in the implementation of UNSC 
mandate 1384 on Afghanistan, but, as Münch has convincingly argued, the 
caveats made by the German Defence Ministry to the RoE in 2006 were con-
fusing.702 The pocket manual (Taschenkarte) distributed by the Defence 
Ministry to Bundeswehr soldiers covered the NATO RoE including national 
caveats – Bundeswehr soldiers were granted the authority to ‘exercise pro-
portionate violence’ in anticipation of the actions of hostile persons – hence 
the use of violence was allowed in terms of fulfilling the mission. Yet as the 
guidelines of the pocket manual argued, the use of violence was allowed for 
self-defence and as emergency-relief, it also implicitly meant that the use of 
violence was allowed only in those circumstances, and this was the prevailing 
view among the soldiers of the Bundeswehr. Münch has argued that the am-
bivalence created by the German Defence Ministry was purposeful: in the 
event of a scandal involving civilian casualties one could refer to the general 
nature of the RoE allowing the use of force for self-defence and emergency-
relief and in case Germans were accused by their NATO partners of exercis-
ing restraint in terms of the NATO RoE, one could always fall back on the 
national caveats.703  Similarly to the shifting domestic view from a ‘stabiliza-
tion mission’ to an engagement in ‘warlike’ circumstances, these caveats to 
the RoE were withdrawn by the Defence Ministry only after the first German 
casualty in ground combat in April 2009. Also, the ‘Kunduz affair’ in 2009, 
when the German commander of Regional Command North, Colonel Klein, 
gave the order to bomb two fuel tankers in the possession of the Taliban in 
fear of insurgent attacks against German troops, led to a number of civilian 
casualties and functioned as a sort of shock therapy in Germany, considering 
the nature of the Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan.704 
Thirdly, the use of, or the decision to deploy military force is still strongly 
considered to be ultima ratio, and German politicians tend to repeat it like a 
mantra whenever possible. However, despite the existing conceptual gaps 
between the political level and the reality as experienced by German soldiers 
on the ground, the lack of a clear strategy, confusion in the implementation 
of NATO RoE, or even the principal restraint in the use of military force, Af-
ghanistan still represents a scenario in which the use of force did become the 
norm rather than the exception for those German soldiers operating beyond 
the boundaries of fortified camps when things took a turn for the worse in 
the German controlled northern part of Afghanistan sometime from 2007 
onwards.  This can also be witnessed in the introduction of the new highest 
702 Münch, Philipp 2011, ‘Strategielos in Afghanistan. Die Operationsführung der Bundeswehr im 
Rahmen der International Security Assistance Force?, SWP-Studie (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), 
Berlin, 2011, p.16.  
703 Ibid., p.18. 
704 See Geis, Mathias & Lau, Jörg 2009, ?Das Wahre Gesicht des Krieges. Der Angriff von Kundus und 
die Nachrichtenpolitik der Regierung stellen den Afghanistan-Einsatz in Frage?, Die Zeit, Nr. 52, 
17.12.2009. 
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military decoration for armed service, the Bundeswehr Cross of Honour for 
Valour (Ehrenkreuz der Bundeswehr für Tapferkeit) since 2008. The re-
introduction of a medal of honour reflects the need to decorate for heroism 
soldiers who are deployed in increasingly dangerous missions involving 
ground combat, the long-time taboo in German strategic culture. For in-
stance, Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) (German Special Forces) had al-
ready participated in the hunt for Serb war criminals in the Balkans in 1997 
and later in numerous combat operations throughout the history of the En-
during Freedom/ISAF missions in Afghanistan. Even though the significance 
of symbolic acts such as the bestowal of medals or the erection of memorial 
sites for fallen soldiers should not be exaggerated, they still testify to the fact 
that Germany has officially acknowledged the value of heroism of German 
soldiers in ground combat – a peculiar feat in a society which has often been 
deemed ‘post-heroic’.705 
5.4.  THE ASPECT OF CHANGE FROM A 
COUNTERFACTUAL PERSPECTIVE: WHAT IF 
SREBRENICA HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE? 
One way to argue for the importance of the process of ‘coming to terms with 
the German past’ in terms of the evolution of German strategic culture is 
to provide a counterfactual account of the events in which this process 
is claimed to be causally significant. In the following, I will provide a 
counterfactual account of possible worlds in which the massacre of 
Srebrenica did not take place. As was discussed in Chapter 3, this event, 
which took place in the summer of 1995 in Bosnia was considered pivotal in 
the German military engagement later in Kosovo, because it unravelled the 
ideational structure of German strategic culture and brought about the shift 
from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’.
Possible worlds, alternate futures? 
In contrast to realists who claim that war is a systemic feature of the 
international system706, proponents of strategic culture argue that wars, 
conflicts, crises or traumatic events appear as external shocks, which 
makes them rather contingent. Even though it can be argued that one of 
the primary purposes of strategic culture is precisely to reduce this 
contingency by providing ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
705 See Schüßler, Konstantin & Heng, Yee-Kuang  2013, ‘The Bundeswehr and the Kunduz air-strike 4 
September 2009: Germany’s post-heroic moment??, European Security, Vol.22, Issue 3, 2013, pp.????? 
375. 
706 See e.g. Waltz 1979 & 1988. 
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le. The end of the Cold War and the German reunification were prerequisites 
for a German strategic actorness without external strings attached, and in 
this sense they fundamentally changed German strategic culture. But it 
was the actual experience of warfare after the end of the Cold War, 
combined with the re-interpretations of the German past that actually 
changed the strategic practices in terms of the use of military force. 
Hence, while systemic shifts may radically change the way strategic 
cultures are able to operate; it is the contingent nature of external shocks 
that makes them a powerful source of change in strategic cultures.  
For instance, it can be argued that this was the case with the end of 
the Cold War and German strategic culture – unlike the aftermath of the 
World War II, the end of the Cold War and German re-unification 
considerably reduced the military threat posed to Germany. Moreover, the 
culture of military restraint that was at the heart of the security and 
defence policy of the Bonner Republik, only changed when German 
historical lessons were confronted with experiences of warfare after the end 
of the Cold War. The argument put forward is that at least two instances 
that I have deemed fundamental in terms of German strategic cultural 
change (normative shift from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again 
Auschwitz’ and the socio-cognitive shift from guilt to responsibility) 
would not have occurred the way they did without the impact of contingent 
factors. In the former case, which I will address in detail below, two 
contingent and interrelated factors seem to have been critical in bringing 
about change: the massacre at Srebrenica and the political leadership of the 
then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. In the latter case, 
contingency relates to the many unexpected turns that took place in the 
context of US president Reagan’s visit to Bitburg, which set the frame-
work for later elaboration of the question of guilt and responsibility. Howev-
er, from this we cannot deduce that the more contingent the external shock 
the more likely a change in strategic culture; the argument here is merely to 
pinpoint that contingency matters but it does not increase the likelihood of 
change per se.     
Lebow categorizes counterfactuals used in the study of history and IR to 
‘plausible world’ and ‘miracle’ counterfactuals. Plausible world counterfactu-
als portray an alternate world that could have very well come to pass if we 
were allowed a ‘small rewrite of history’, as Lebow calls it.707 However, what 
makes plausible world counterfactuals good counterfactuals according to Le-
bow, is not that they could have happened given this small historical rewrite, 
but rather that they must possess a significant probability of leading to an 
alternate outcome.708 However, as Lebow notes, this is not the only criterion 
of a good counterfactual. He goes on to list a number of things that make it 
so: 1) realism, 2) clarity, 3) logical consistency or cotenability, 4) enabling 
707 Lebow 2010, p. 44. 
708 Ibid. 
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counterfactuals should not undercut the antecedent, 5) historical consisten-
cy, 6) theoretical consistency, 7) avoidance of conjunction fallacy, 8) recogni-
tion of the interconnectedness of causes and outcomes and 9) consideration 
of second-order counterfactuals.709  
In addition, counterfactuals should “arise from the context”, “specify 
the conditions that would have to be present for the antecedent to occur”, 
“not undercut any of the principles linking it to consequent” as well as 
“specify, within reason, what else is likely to change as a result of a 
hypothesized antecedent, and consider how the change that appears the 
most important might influence the probability of the consequent.”710 
Also, counterfactual arguments should avoid the ‘conjunction fallacy’, 
which, according to Lebow, means that, statistically, “the probability of a 
consequent is the multiple of the probability of each counterfactual step 
linking it to the antecedent”.711 Hence, what this means is that if bringing 
about a counterfactual outcome requires many subsequent counterfactual 
steps, the likelihood of that outcome occurring becomes exceedingly low, 
because the subsequent counterfactual steps needed to reach the desired 
consequent are hardly causally linear but interact with each other in 
different ways, decreasing the probability of the desired world and 
increasing the probability of further alternate worlds, desirable or not. 
As I argued in detail in Chapter 3, the massacre of around 8?000 
Muslim men and boys during the Bosnian war, committed by Serb forces in 
the safe enclave of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, was key in triggering 
the shifts in the normative structure of German strategic culture (from 
‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’), which eventually resulted in 
German military participation in NATO’s air war against Serbia in the 
Kosovo conflict in 1999. In the following, I will depict two plausible alternate 
worlds that resulted because the massacre of Srebrenica need not have 
taken place. I will also briefly elaborate on Lebow’s assertion, that “(e)ven 
when there is good reason to believe that the antecedent will produce the 
desired consequent the possibility remains that subsequent developments 
will return history more or less to the course from which it was initially 
diverted by the antecedent.”712   
There are at least a couple of good reasons to argue why the massacre in 
Srebrenica need not have taken place. The first relates to the role of UN 
peacekeepers in Bosnia, specifically to the DutchBat III – the Dutch battalion 
of 370 men and women tasked by the UN with protecting the safe enclave of 
Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia. The inability of the DutchBat III to prevent the 
worst atrocity in Europe since the end of World War II has resulted in the 
resignation of a government, thousands of pages of official reports and mul-
709 Ibid., pp. 54-57. 
710 Ibid. 
711 Ibid., p. 57. 
712 Ibid.  
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tiple criminal and civil lawsuits.713 But perhaps more importantly, it has 
traumatized a generation of Dutch peacekeepers, who still bear the scars of 
Srebrenica. Another argument which has circulated ever since it was voiced 
by the Dutch veterans themselves: had the US, UK and France not blocked 
airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions, it could have saved the enclave or 
at least reduced the number of deaths.714 This argument reflects the overall 
neglect or inability of the Western allies to counter the Serb threat: the UNSC 
mandate on UNPROFOR was practically null and void, because, while it 
clearly stated that UNPROFOR was mandated to ‘deter attacks against safe 
areas’715 it severely lacked the manpower to do so. According to the UN esti-
mates around 34,000 troops were needed in order to guarantee the security 
of the safe zones, but fewer than 8,000 troops were initially available for this 
task.716 Hence, in terms of numbers, the small Dutch contingent was far 
overwhelmed by the vastly superior Serb forces, and this may be one of the 
reasons why the UN mandate was so restrictive to begin with even with the 
principal restraint in the use of force: without committing more forces to the 
enclave, there was no plausible way to resist the Serbs with force.  
And yet, it seems plausible to argue that the opposite could just as likely 
have happened. The UN and NATO could have worked better together by 
detecting the threat that the Serb forces posed to the safe enclave and acting 
accordingly, because it was no secret that the Serb General Ratko Mladic was 
amassing large forces near Srebrenica as he was harried by the NATO air-
strikes intended to force compliance with a UN ultimatum to remove heavy 
weapons from the Sarajevo area. Hence, the Western coalition could have 
acted more decisively and have been more timely in the matter by either 
blocking passage of Serb forces to Srebrenica with further air strikes (which 
were ultimately blocked by UN) or concentrated enough forces in the enclave 
to deter and repel the Serb aggression (this in particular would have required 
early detection and reaction). Moreover, Sarajevo suffered the longest siege 
in modern warfare, from April 1992 to February 1996, and this could have 
been taken as an indication of the relentlessness of the Serb forces. After the 
war, General Mladic was one the main culprits to be indicted by the Interna-
713 See Robinson, Duncan 2015, ?The Dutch still grapple with the shame of Srebrenica’, Financial 
Times, 10.5.2015. Available at: (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93a5c67a-26d2-11e5-
9c4ea775d2b173ca.html#axzz48jVdw4LN). 
714 See Seybolt, Taylor M. 2007, Humanitarian Military Intervention. The Conditions for Success and 
Failure, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 202-3. 
715 UN Security Council, Resolution 836 on UNPROFOR mandate enlarged to protect ?safe areas? incl. 
?air power.?  June 4, 1993. Available at: (http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm). 
716 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 844 (1993)’, May 
9.1994, (S/1994/555). Available at: (http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/45185/S_1994_?
555-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y).
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tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes.717    
Now, let us turn to the counterfactual situation in Germany, given that the 
Western coalition was able to prevent Srebrenica from happening. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, in Germany, the debate regarding the issue of out-of-
area operations was legally disclosed with the July 1994 Constitutional Court 
decision, which maintained that every Bundeswehr out-of-area operation 
was to be approved by simple majority of the members of the Bundestag. 
However, in our alternate world (call it world ‘B’) Germany did not partici-
pate in IFOR/SFOR because the SPD and the Greens regarded the Kohl-
Kinkel government’s stance on alliance solidarity as not a plausible enough 
reason to participate, even though the nature of IFOR and, later SFOR, was 
to facilitate the conditions for peace and ensure that the requirements of the 
Dayton Peace Accords were met.718 In the factual vote on IFOR in December 
1995, two-thirds of Social Democrats and half of the Greens voted in favour, 
and of those who did, the vast majority were compelled to do so by the lesson 
of Srebrenica. As illustrated at length in Chapter 3, the then foreign minister 
Joschka Fischer’s leadership was pivotal not only in turning the tide within 
the Green Party, but also as the most vocal ‘leftist’ politician in Germany to 
vote for German participation in IFOR given the developments that had tak-
en place during the Green Party special summit in the summer of that year 
and Fischer’s famous reinterpretation of ‘never again Auschwitz’. Hence, it is 
plausible to assume that without this contextual framework, the normative 
shift from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’ would not have taken 
place and hence the required majority in the Bundestag could not have been 
amassed. 
Now, considering the plausibility of our alternate world ’B’, even if Ger-
many would have participated in IFOR/SFOR due to external pressure and 
the government’s stance on alliance solidarity as well as Germany’s prior 
commitment to the UNPROFOR, the debate within the German left on the 
lessons of the German past would surely not have occurred. This is a logical 
conclusion given how prominently Srebrenica was featured in the heated de-
bates that took place in the German Bundestag in the course of the latter part 
of 1995 over IFOR and how the massacre was used in the legitimation of 
‘never again Auschwitz’ instead of ‘never again war’. However, it is important 
to note that the alternate world, had Germany participated in IFOR/SFOR 
(call it world ‘C’) would have been quite different than in case of world ‘B’ 
717 For more information on the proceedings in the Mladic trial, see the website of ICTY:  
(http://www.icty.org/en/cases/ratko-mladic-case-key-information-timeline). The trial judgment is 
expected in November 2017.  
718 See UN Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995) on the mandate of IFOR, 15.12.1995. Available at: 
(http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u951215a.htm). 
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where Germany did not participate and this can be portrayed by contemplat-
ing Germany’s position as part of the Western alliance.    
In the event that Germany had not participated in IFOR/SFOR, world ‘B’ 
would have come to pass. In this world, the Germans would have isolated 
themselves from their allies, and suffered harsher criticism than being 
blamed for ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy, as was the case during the first Gulf 
War. Most importantly, Germany would have deviated from the principle 
‘never again alone’ and this would have led to scrutiny over Germany’s al-
leged multilateralism. Moreover, Germany’s position and respect in NATO 
would have drastically declined and Germany’s commitment to the European 
integration and its ability to take responsibility would have suffered a serious 
blow. It would also have undermined the German conservative-liberal coali-
tion and perhaps led to new elections earlier than anticipated. In any case, it 
is plausible to assume that the red-green government would have won the 
1998 elections with a considerably wider margin. Moreover, in world ‘B’, it is 
likely that the Bundeswehr reform would have progressed even more slowly 
than it actually did. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that, in world ‘B’, 
Germany would have put primacy on the aspect of NATO territorial defence 
instead of out-of-area operations given the established nature of ‘never again 
war’ and would have adhered strictly to the tenets of the UN above those of 
NATO. Most likely, Germany’s reluctance to engage in out-of-area operations 
would also have had repercussions on the debate regarding the role of con-
scription in Germany.  
In the event that Germany had participated in IFOR/SFOR, world ‘C’ 
would have come to pass. In this world, Germans would have dutifully partic-
ipated in the international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans, but its allies 
would have continued to doubt Germany’s resolve considering the military 
aspects of crisis management and the capability of its conservative-liberal 
government to implement the requirements as a partner in NATO. Moreover, 
there would have been serious political clashes in the Bundestag over Ger-
man Balkan policy as a whole, because according to the political left, there 
was no compelling reason for Germany to deploy military force in the region. 
However, in world ‘C’, German participation in IFOR/SFOR would have had 
the consequence that the debate on the means and ends of the use of military 
force would have been discussed more intensively, even though there was 
nothing that would have ‘tipped the scales’ in terms of a major shift from 
‘never again war’ to something else. In contrast to world ‘B’, however, the 
position of ‘ethical pacifists’ in world ‘C’ would have been more contested 
politically. In world ‘C’, the German government would have had to put con-
siderable effort into reassuring its allies that Germany was committed to 
maintaining peace in Europe, but that Germany would not be ready to cross 
the threshold in participating in the NATO bombing campaign. In world ‘B’, 
Germany would have had to do the same, but the implications for German 
strategic culture would have been different since in this world it was clear 
from the outset that Germany would not participate militarily. 
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The critical point here, however, is that in both worlds, the normative 
shift from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’ did not take place. 
However, the consequences of this would have had drastically different ef-
fects in both worlds in terms of the war in Kosovo. In world ‘B’, the principal 
orientation of German foreign and security policy would have been at stake. 
Germany had now been considered a nuisance for years and an obstacle to 
decision-making and consensus-building in NATO. German political constel-
lations had firmly moved towards the left because of deep societal dissatisfac-
tion with Kohl’s policies domestically. However, after the red-green victory in 
the Bundestag elections in 1998, the Kohl Doctrine remained largely intact, 
because it was strongly bound to the principle ‘never again war’. Even though 
Germany’s future as an integral part of the West was at stake, Germany re-
mained firm in its Balkan policy and refused to partake in NATO air war in 
Kosovo, orchestrated with loud criticism of the fact that the UN had not sanc-
tioned NATO actions. However, after the war, under the leadership of For-
eign Minister Fischer, Germany was able to regain some of its lost credibility 
by introducing the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in the summer of 
1999. 
In world ‘C’, in turn, it would seem logical to assume that Germany would 
have been at even greater pains with the decision to participate in the NATO 
air war in Kosovo, because Germany had not properly discussed the issue of 
the use of military force politically during the 1990s. Given this context, it 
seems highly unlikely that Germany would have participated militarily, be-
cause there was no external shock forceful enough that would have rein-
forced the credence of military option over civilian and diplomatic measures, 
even though Schröder and Fischer had given indications that they would be 
inclined to abandon the Kohl -doctrine if it was deemed absolutely necessary. 
In world ‘C’, the principle ‘never again war’ was still considered superior to 
‘never again alone’, even though it was under considerable more pressure 
than in world ‘B’. 
It is useful to briefly elaborate the differences of world ‘B’ and world ‘C’ af-
ter the war in Kosovo in order to highlight the probable impact of alternate 
realities on the further evolution of German strategic culture compared to 
what actually took place. After the war in Kosovo, in world ‘B’, Germany was 
now considered an untrustworthy ally. It had not only proved to be an unre-
liable partner in NATO, but it had severely questioned the NATO bombings 
in Kosovo and strongly lamented the loss of life in the bombings. Germany 
had attempted to compensate for the loss of its credibility within NATO by 
crafting closer ties to Russia. This could be facilitated on the basis of the 
seemingly close relationship between Chancellor Schröder and Russian Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin. After the 9/11 terrorist strikes in 2001, while Germany 
was sympathetic to the plight of the Americans, Germany’s show of solidarity 
was not expressed in ‘unconditional’ terms, because of the deep skepticism 
that the German government had to the use of force referring to the NATO 
bombings in Kosovo. It is hence reasonable to assume that in world ‘B’, Ger-
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many would not have participated in OEF/ISAF. This, in turn, would have 
most likely caused a deep rift in transatlantic relations that would have gone 
beyond the impact that the crisis had actually had. The clear opposition to 
the US would have led to an even more serious political contestation between 
the conservative-liberal opposition and the governing red-green than the one 
that actually took place, with a focus on the repercussions of the continuous 
breaches with the ‘never again alone’ –principle in terms of Germany’s NATO 
membership. Hence, in world ‘B’, the future of NATO would have already 
been severely undermined before the Iraq crisis by Germany’s actions and 
this would have most likely caused irreparable damage to the bilateral rela-
tions between the US and Germany.  
In world ‘C’, in turn, the war in Kosovo was seen in Germany as a ‘neces-
sary evil’ to oust Milosevic and to deter the threat of the escalation of the con-
flict. Even though Germany had not participated in the actual bombings, the 
German red-green government was principally in favour of military action 
since it acknowledged that it was necessary to remove Milosevic from power. 
This development seems plausible given how difficult the decision to partici-
pate was for the red-green government. However, Germany’s non-
participation in Kosovo was met with skepticism regarding the future orien-
tation of German policy, especially as Germany had principally shown readi-
ness to participate militarily in conflict management, as was the case in 
IFOR/SFOR. Hence, it would seem reasonable to assume that in world ‘C’, 
the issue of ‘never again war’ would have surfaced in different light after the 
war in Kosovo than how it did in world ‘B’. This is because in world ‘C’, the 
US had more reason to expect Germany’s support, even militarily, given 
Germany’s principal support of NATO in Kosovo and its participation in 
IFOR/SFOR. However, it is unclear whether Germany would have participat-
ed in OEF/ISAF under these premises. The impact of 9/11 as an external 
shock would have perhaps had slightly different implications on German 
strategic culture in world ‘C’ than what it had, because the Germans might 
have felt more compelled to participate militarily, given that they did not do 
so in Kosovo. However, there is no strong argument to be made that this 
would have been consequential in terms of the use of military force, given 
that there had not been an external shock forceful enough to shake the nor-
mative foundations of German strategic culture. 
Several things can be concluded from this limited counterfactual thought 
experiment. Firstly, it might seem radical and even controversial to think 
that had the DutchBat III or the Western coalition been able to prevent the 
Srebrenica massacre, Germany would not have participated in the NATO air 
war in Kosovo. However, if we follow the lines of argumentation presented 
above, and while the depiction of the cosmos of events that took place during 
1995-1999 is presented in a very condensed form, it is enough to show that 
Germany’s abstinence in Kosovo could have been a plausible consequence 
had the Srebrenica massacre (the antecedent event) not taken place. Second-
ly, however, this experiment also confirms Lebow’s argument regarding the 
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‘conjunction fallacy’ in an interesting way, because while alternate world ‘B’ 
might seem more plausible up until the point right after the IFOR/SFOR, it 
loses credibility because it takes more subsequent counterfactual steps than 
world ‘C’ before the point of Kosovo is reached.This becomes even more evi-
dent when we assess the likely developments in these worlds after the war in 
Kosovo. Hence, alternate world ‘C’ seems more consistent overall with what 
actually happened. The point is, however, that both worlds are plausible, 
with one being just more likely than the other. Thirdly, it goes without saying 
that these two alternate worlds do not exhaust the realm of counterfactual 
arguments regarding the impact of Srebrenica. But it does go to show how 
important Srebrenica, as an external shock, actually was for the evolution of 
German strategic culture.     
Finally, regarding the question of whether subsequent developments are 
able to return history more or less to the course from which it was initially 
diverted by the antecedent event or occurrence, we can attempt a twofold 
answer. First, it seems plausible to assume that the debate over the issue on 
the use of military force would have surfaced due to external pressure on 
German strategic culture at some point, given that Germany’s alliance pat-
terns have remained relatively constant. But the more important question 
regarding strategic cultural change is would this have altered the ideational-
normative framework and the strategic practices of the Federal Republic to 
the degree that Srebrenica did? Because our alternate worlds did not actually 
come to pass, no definite answer can be given. Moreover, and second, it 
needs to be noted that to date, the massacre at Srebrenica remains in a class 
of its own in the sense of being the worst atrocity and crime against humanity 
committed in Europe since the end of World War II, and once again, it seems 
plausible to assume that had Srebrenica not taken place, it would have re-
quired an external shock of similar gravity and magnitude within a similar 
context that could have returned history to its actual course. 
5.5. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have argued that German strategic culture is still strongly 
affected by reinterpretations of the German past. This has direct consequenc-
es for how we should understand and explain continuity and change in Ger-
man strategic culture. The core point this chapter has attempted to convey is 
that we need to understand not only the broad strokes of ‘the brush of the 
past’ but also the issues ‘under the surface’ which affect the whole psyche of a 
nation: guilt and responsibility. In terms of continuity and change in German 
strategic culture, the evolving relationship between these two has been key in 
the unfolding change in German strategic culture.  In general, the direction 
has been from guilt to responsibility, as can be seen in the expansion of the 
Bundeswehr’s remit and in the German concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit, but, 
as Jaspers has argued, the metaphysical aspect of German guilt is there to 
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stay. Therefore, the guilt of the past remains as a restricting feature in Ger-
man strategic culture, even though the roles of both the perpetrator and vic-
tim can also enable and legitimize pro-military solutions. Some have argued 
that Germany has moved from Vergangenheitsbewältigung to Erin-
nerungskultur (from ‘coming to terms with the past to a ‘culture of remem-
brance’), thereby implying that the problems and issues that the German past 
has posed have somehow transpired and that the past has become ‘business 
as usual’. Nothing could be further from the truth in terms of strategic cul-
ture. As argued in this chapter, ‘normalization’ does not equate with coming 
to terms with the German past in the sense of ‘unburdening’ even though it 
indeed equates with coming to terms with the use of military force, as has 
been shown in the case of German deployment in Afghanistan.  
At the end of this chapter, I conducted a counterfactual thought experi-
ment in order to illustrate the causal significance of the massacre at Srebren-
ica for the further evolution of German strategic culture. This showed at least 
two things: first and foremost, to contemplate the likelihood and plausibility 
of alternate worlds is to reveal how complex the ‘world out there’ actually is 
and secondly, the fact is that the actualization of observable outcomes may 
depend on a multitude of factors which makes them rather contingent. None-
theless, by contemplating the plausibility of a reality which did not take 
place, we are in a position to provide better arguments on the causal signifi-
cance of events that did in fact take place.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
“Germany's path to greater military assertiveness has not been line-
ar, and it never will be. Germans do not believe that talking at 
roundtables solves every problem, but neither do they think that 
shooting does. The mixed track record of foreign military interven-
tions over the past 20 years is only one reason for caution. Above all, 
Germans share a deeply held, historically rooted conviction that their 
country should use its political energy and resources to strengthen 
the rule of law in international affairs. Our historical experience has 
destroyed any belief in national exceptionalism-for any nation.”719 
(Frank-Walter Steinmeier) 
In this thesis, I have studied the question of strategic cultural change in 
Germany after the end of the Cold War. In particular, by questioning some of 
the key arguments made about German security and defence policy and stra-
tegic culture that culminate in the premise of cultural continuity, I’ve argued 
at length that the incorporation of the notion of strategic cultural change to 
our theories and analyses of strategic culture will not only enable us to tell 
better stories about strategic cultures but will urge us to move beyond the 
surface of directly observable reality – into the ‘deep’. However, as I have 
attempted to argue, this is not a ‘leap of scholarly faith’ but rather a refined 
methodological posture that enables us to grasp the socio-cognitive aspects 
of strategic culture as meaningful and causally significant. Subsequently, one 
of the key findings of this thesis is that we need to acknowledge the fact that 
while strategic cultural continuity and change are often simultaneous pro-
cesses that can be both complementary and contradictory, it is imperative 
that we make an analytical distinction between change and continuity be-
cause it adds to the explanatory power of the concept of strategic culture. 
In particular, this thesis has argued that critical realist metatheory is use-
ful in providing conceptual tools for an analytical framework through which 
we can analyse strategic cultural change as a social and political process and 
capture this deeper layer of reality. Indeed, the critical realist notion of a 
‘stratified reality’ which includes the observable outcomes as well as the deep 
structure of reality – i.e. what lies beyond the empirically directly observable 
– has proven valuable in assessing strategic culture as an entity the socio-
cognitive qualities of which play an important role in ‘what there is to know’
about strategic culture and its evolution. While it might seem self-
explanatory that these factors are important and ‘real’, critical realism allows
us to pinpoint the instances in which these become causally relevant in terms
of strategic cultural change.
719 Steinmeier 2016, p. 110. 
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First, as a general conclusion, based on the theoretical premises for this 
study, this thesis has aimed to paint a picture which portrays the dynamic, 
not static, nature of German strategic culture. An understanding of culture as 
a principally dynamic social and political entity reinforces the idea that cul-
tures can and do change, even though the very fact that we can talk about 
‘culture’ initially necessitates some form of continuity both in the ideation-
al/normative framework as well as in the related practices.      
Second, this thesis has focused in detail in explicating the question of how 
the German past matters in contemporary German strategic culture and how 
it links with the question of strategic cultural change. Previous studies on 
German strategic culture have functioned on the theoretical premise that 
‘German past matters’ or condensed that idea into discussing the impact or 
relevance of the ‘never again framework’ on German strategic culture. This 
thesis has gone far beyond that in describing and analysing the socio-
cognitive processes and historical events that substantiated this framework 
in the first place. The key argument of this analysis is that the socio-cognitive 
shift from ‘guilt of the past’ to ‘international responsibility’ is integral to an 
explanatory account of German strategic cultural change. This shift has been 
detectable throughout the major changes in German strategic culture since 
the end of the Cold War, which include, as argued, changes on the level of 
ideas and norms as well as practices.  
Third, regarding the empirical case studies, it can be concluded in general 
that fundamental change has not been a very common phenomenon in the 
case of German strategic culture since the end of the Cold War and that 
change has mostly occurred in terms of incremental adaptation. However, 
shifts in the experience of warfare, of which the reinterpretations of the past 
are an integral part, (caused mostly by emerging external challenges, threats 
and shocks), best explain these fundamental changes that can be observed in 
ideational/normative change (e.g. from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again 
Auschwitz’) or the introduction and institutionalization of new strategic prac-
tices (e.g. regarding Bundeswehr out-of-area operations).  
Fourth, the case studies have provided a comprehensive picture of a Ger-
many whose strategic culture has been constantly evolving since the end of 
the Cold War. In particular, the notion of Germany as a civilian power does 
not seem to fit the Germany of 2016 as well as it fitted the Germany of 1990. 
This is particularly detectable in the erosion of the ‘culture of antimilitarism’ 
(not cultural restraint) after the end of the Cold War which is ultimately due 
to the fact that ‘unconditional’ or ‘ethical’ pacifism is not a viable policy for 
German governments to pursue because the external challenges (emerging 
threats, pressure towards German leadership, systemic shifts) as well as do-
mestic structural and institutional changes (e.g. changes in the Bundeswehr 
structure, capability and operational remit) have all pulled Germany towards 
a reality in which a categorical rejection to use military force is no longer 
possible. 
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Fifth, there is a notable shift in the overall discourse in terms of the Ger-
man out-of-area operations from the ‘never again’ framework to ‘business as 
usual’ if one compares the 1990s to the more recent debates. This stems part-
ly from the new German activism in the field of defence and security but one 
can also attribute it to the process of Enttabuisierung (removal of military 
taboos) as well as to the fact that Germany has deployed over 380,000 troops 
in over 39 crisis- and conflict -management operations since the first Bun-
deswehr participation in the UN operation in Cambodia 1992/1993. In es-
sence, the focus of the debate has shifted from whether or not Germany can 
use military force in international affairs to a discussion of what German in-
ternational responsibility entails if and when it deploys military force. How-
ever, in practice Germany continues to exercise military restraint in terms of 
the use of military force (ultima ratio) and favour policies that highlight the 
civilian aspect of international crisis and conflict management. Moreover, the 
case studies have shown that the criticism levelled at the ability of the politi-
cal decision makers to ‘cherry-pick’ missions or strategy (i.e. mission ex-
plains strategy) is based on an instrumental understanding of how strategic 
culture functions. As I have shown in this thesis, this is an overly simplistic 
view of the workings of strategic culture, because it falsely assumes that stra-
tegic actors have perfect control over their strategic environment. If this in-
deed was the case, then we would be better to find something else to do, ra-
ther than to study strategic culture. 
Sixth, it needs to be noted that the question of the use of military force has 
largely surfaced in terms of the ‘out-of-area’ debate in post-Cold War Ger-
many. This is reflected e.g. in the shift of strategic focus from territorial de-
fence to international crisis management, the abolition of conscription and 
the Bundeswehr reform. However, this thesis found no empirical evidence to 
suggest that the Germans would have been particularly reluctant to defend 
German territory militarily after German reunification. Indeed, the ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of geopolitical factors in 
German security and defence policy by stressing the aspects of territorial de-
fence and alliance solidarity in NATO. Moreover, the White Paper of 2016 
clearly defines NATO as the most important factor in maintaining German 
security, and as long as NATO’s commitment to Europe remains intact, there 
is nothing to suggest a major change in terms of Germany’s alliance patterns. 
In addition, realists could argue that the fact that German security has been 
defended ‘at the Hindukush’ does not diminish the importance of geopolitical 
factors in terms of German security and defence policy, but rather reinforces 
them because it is in the national interests of Germany to defend its security 
wherever it might be most threatened. However, while geopolitical factors 
might provide rational, interest-driven explanations of German security and 
defence policy, they alone do not provide sufficient explanations for the 
changes in German strategic culture in terms of the use of military force after 
the end of the Cold War.        
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Seventh, I’ve also shown with a discussion regarding Wendt’s account of 
the cultures of anarchy how the system level affects strategic culture and how 
it might provide either contrasting or complementary arguments to the ana-
lytical model I presented. While a comprehensive view of the workings of the 
system level goes far beyond Wendt’s rather generic take on international 
interaction based on enmity, rivalry or friendship, it proved to be quite useful 
in highlighting aspects that go beyond the notion of experience of warfare. As 
a conclusion, one could posit that the prevailing logic of Lockean anarchy has 
proved to be a major challenge and that the changes that have occurred in 
German strategic culture after the end of the Cold War can be seen as a Ger-
man response in trying to accommodate the Lockean culture (periodic war) 
with the Kantian tenets of German strategic culture (‘never again war’). In-
terestingly, however, there is no linearity to be detected in that the more the 
system has resembled a Lockean one where rivals occasionally interact in 
terms of limited warfare, the more Germany has attempted to stress the 
Kantian traits of its strategic culture. There are cases in which this has hap-
pened (Iraq for instance) but there are also cases which indicate that Germa-
ny has more or less adapted to the systemic logic (i.e. Kosovo, Ukraine). 
Hence, in terms of the hypotheses presented, the results are mixed if mir-
rored against the long-term track record of German strategic culture. Anoth-
er way to address this issue is to argue that after the end of the Cold War, the 
systemic level as such (regardless whether we argue that it is Lockean or 
Kantian or something else) has not been very stable in terms of its ability to 
generate processes of collective identity formation (i.e. structural change), 
given the premise that the process of identifying with the belief-systems at 
the macro-level (i.e. what Wendt calls ‘internalization’) is supposed to cause 
identical behaviour among the units and hence contribute to the stability of 
given anarchy. If this were the case, then we should have witnessed a much 
more ‘adaptive’ German strategic culture after the end of the Cold War. In-
deed, while these systemic logics as presented by Wendt offer another way of 
looking at the evolution of strategic cultures, they do not offer a complete 
picture of the evolution of German strategic culture, because they mostly 
side-line the socio-cognitive specifics of strategic cultures of the units that 
are an integral part of an explanation of strategic culture and its continui-
ty/change.  
Moreover, the inclusion of the Wendtian account of cultures of anarchy to 
the study of strategic culture raises a further question about the general ap-
plicability of system-level approaches to the study of unit-level phenomena. 
Specifically, in terms of explaining strategic cultural change, it raises a ques-
tion about ‘the extent phenomena at the level of the ‘system-structure’ ex-
plain changes in the entities at the unit-level’. The point here is that system-
level approaches function according to ‘methodological structuralism’, which 
attempts to account for the causal effect of structure on state behaviour by 
appealing to a systemic logic that operates as a whole under the assumption 
that states are unitary, rational actors. As argued, critical realism is helpful in 
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this regard since it shifts the attention from the causal impact of holistic sys-
temic structures to the causal impact of a variety of factors that may or may 
not be ‘structurally’ defined. Hence, even if there was a consensus among the 
IR scholarship beyond the realist camp that ‘war is a systemic feature of the 
international system’, it would not help us much in determining how this sys-
temic feature affects any given strategic culture without a clearly articulated 
analytical framework. This framework needs to differentiate between the 
varying impact that this systemic feature, combined with other factors, might 
have on the process of strategic cultural change. 
Eighth, ‘normality’ is a category which can only be applied in the study of 
German strategic cultural change with caution, in order to avoid tautological 
arguments regarding a ‘militarization’ of German strategic culture. Caution is 
also warranted because the term usually either refers to a realist understand-
ing of normality in a Hobbesian world where it is ‘normal’ for the sovereigns 
to fight over power or to an understanding that normality is the opposite of 
the alleged German Sonderweg. However, as was argued and analysed, 
‘normality’ is not some objectively articulated ‘normality’ concerning the use 
of military force or one that is necessitated by systemic forces. It is best un-
derstood as a benchmark of the strategic practices of Germany’s peers, allies 
and strategic partners, and that is the most plausible way to argue for any 
degree of German normality, given the condition that German strategic cul-
tural premises have not been left out of the equation. Hence, in the final 
analysis German normality would seem to coincide rather well with the idea 
of ‘coming to terms with the use of military force’ rather than referring to any 
arguably qualitative state of mind, e.g. ‘more willing to use military force’, 
that give rise to tautological arguments regarding the German stance on the 
use of force. Similarly, normality is not to be juxtaposed with the notion of 
increased responsibility, because the latter refers to a much broader spec-
trum of issues than just the question of the use of military force – and most 
importantly, it entails normative and moral aspects to the use of military 
force which is largely missing from the debate concerning ‘normality’. 
Finally, if the purpose of strategic culture is to establish clarity regarding 
the possible outcomes of questions and choices related to the issue of peace 
and war in general and the use of military force in particular, what can we say 
about how German strategic culture has fared in this task since the end of the 
Cold War? Firstly, it needs to be stressed that the process of coming to terms 
with the German past is not to be treated as some finite, clearly definable or 
even always empirically observable social and political process, but that there 
are ‘echoes’ of the need to come terms with the questions related to the issue 
of German guilt and responsibility that have steered the process ever since 
the end of World War II and become often manifest during times of tension. 
The events at Bitburg and the Historians’ Controversy were examples of 
manifestations of these echoes. Secondly, because the nature of the existing 
normative framework of German strategic culture is inherently conflictual, it 
continues to be a source of tension within German strategic culture, even 
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though the process of Enttabuisierung is considered to be concluded now 
that Bundeswehr soldiers have participated in ground combat in Afghani-
stan. Hence, the process of the ‘removal of military taboos’ does not exhaust 
the impact that the process of coming to terms with the German past has had 
and continues to have, on the evolution of German strategic culture, because 
the tension between the guilt of the past and the responsibility for the future 
remains, despite the overall shift from guilt to responsibility. The functionali-
ty of German strategic culture, that is, its ability to provide clarity depends on 
how well the Germans are able to manage these tensions in the future. As 
Jaspers put it, “(h)ere we Germans face an alternative. Either acceptance of 
the guilt not meant by the rest of the world but constantly repeated by our 
conscience comes to be a fundamental trait of our German self-consciousness 
– in which case our soul goes the way of transformation – or we subside into
average triviality of indifferent, mere living.”720
Moreover, a number of conclusions could be made, the repercussions of 
which go beyond the immediate findings of this thesis. Firstly, the study of 
strategic culture does make a difference to how we study the fundamental 
issue of peace and war. It is not so much the fact that strategic culture focus-
es on the multitude of issues regarding the use of military force that makes it 
useful, but rather the fact that a cultural view of peace and war is likely to 
provide answers that go beyond the immediate and explicit findings related 
to the use of military force which, in turn, makes it a valuable analytical tool. 
Subsequently, the usefulness of the approach is partly connected to the scope 
and depth of the empirical analysis, because a single case-study can rarely 
provide us with evidence that transcends the immediately observable; the 
tendency lies on empirically verifiable outcomes. As has been argued in this 
thesis, it is not adequate for an in-depth explanatory analysis on strategic 
cultural change. Therefore, a more comprehensive strategic cultural analysis 
could be argued to be one that highlights the underlying social and political 
processes over time and how they connect with the evolution of strategic cul-
ture.  
Secondly, while it may seem from the outset that the German case ap-
pears as if it were ‘tailor-made’ for a strategic cultural analysis given the im-
portance attributed to the strong normative claims and the significance of the 
German past, the arguments and findings in this study indicate that there are 
clear limits to the explanatory power of the approach. As was discussed early 
in the thesis with regard to causality, the study of strategic culture should not 
be taken as an approach that is ultimately capable of providing waterproof 
explanations for defence and security policy behaviour but rather as one that 
offers a culturally constructed explanatory account focusing on the cultural 
premises for these policies. Moreover, by laying out these premises, strategic 
culture has the potential to provide clarity regarding the potential policy out-
comes of questions and choices related to the issue of peace and war and the 
720 Jaspers 2000, p. 111.  
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use of military force, hence functioning as an indispensable framework for 
political decision-making. 
Thirdly, the analytical framework presented in this study is useful but ra-
ther rudimentary and needs to be developed further in order to provide even 
more nuanced assessments regarding strategic cultural change. In particular, 
there are a number of important questions that the analytical framework in 
its current iteration is not able to directly address. For instance, it does not 
further categorize ‘external shocks’ in terms of their explanatory power and 
in particular the question of what makes them such powerful sources of 
change in the first place. The answer that can be given based on the findings 
in this study is that the more directly and forcefully an external shock affects 
the ‘experience of warfare’ of any given strategic culture, the more likely it is 
to bring about change in strategic culture. Furthermore, we could try to in-
corporate system-level variables directly into the analytical framework with-
out making it redundant in terms of its explanatory power. This could reduce 
the perplexity regarding the level of complementarity vs. contrast in unit vs. 
system level analyses. Finally, a more refined analysis is needed that elabo-
rates more closely the impact of ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ mechanisms of 
change. Importantly, while the findings in this study confirm the primacy of 
‘experience of warfare’ there are several contexts in which the other mecha-
nisms might be even more important, in particular given that fundamental 
change is a less common of a phenomenon in strategic cultures in general. 
Fourthly, it is necessary to discuss the general applicability of the pro-
posed analytical framework, in particular with regard to the argument that 
‘experience of warfare’ is the key mechanism of strategic cultural change. 
Hence, the question is whether ‘experience of warfare’ constitutes the most 
important mechanism in explaining strategic cultural change in any given 
strategic culture. First, the argument made in this study that the process of 
coming to terms with the past is an integral part of the ‘experience of warfare’ 
in Germany, may not be generally applicable as such. This is because if we 
follow the premises of critical realism, it can hardly be argued that the impact 
of the past would always manifest itself in experience (of warfare) the way it 
often does in case of Germany. This is conceivable even without much theo-
retical elaboration – it is evident that strategic cultures differ in what lessons 
they draw from the past. However, this does not mean that the past would 
not possess causal properties in any given strategic culture. Indeed, the part 
of this argument that is generally applicable would be to posit that the past 
has the potential power to shape strategic cultures and their experience of 
war and warfare, whether it becomes empirically manifest or not the way we 
expect it to. Hence, the question of general applicability becomes somewhat 
different if we approach it with the critical realist premises in mind. Second, 
if we accept the notion that the core of any strategic culture revolves around 
the question of the use of military force (this could be argued to be the lowest 
common denominator of the plethora of definitions for strategic culture), it is 
difficult to imagine a strategic culture in which the experiences of warfare 
270 
would not be highly relevant in terms of the use of military force. However, it 
does not follow from this that the second order mechanisms could not in 
some instances cause fundamental change in strategic culture. Moreover, as 
argued, fundamental change in strategic culture is not an every-day phenom-
enon, and therefore the second and tertiary mechanisms might actually play 
a more significant role in the long-term (consider the long-term effects of 
‘socialization’ for instance) by fine-tuning and incremental adaptation. In-
deed, the point of arguing for the primacy of ‘experience of warfare’ was not 
to depict it as some sort of ‘ultimate causal mechanism’ in bringing about 
strategic cultural change. The part which is generally applicable in terms of 
the analytical framework, I would argue, is that ‘experience of warfare’ is 
more likely to cause fundamental change in any given strategic culture than 
the second and tertiary mechanisms, because it directly involves the ques-
tions pertaining to the use of military force.   
Finally, the study of strategic cultural change in particular shows that 
there is still room for analyses of strategic culture within the field of IR. The 
added value of the strategic culture approach is highlighted in particular 
when we shift the focus of research from epistemology to ontology, from the 
surface to the deeper layers of reality and from a composition of strategic cul-
ture as a static to dynamic entity, because then we are better situated to take 
the aspect of change in strategic culture seriously. What is more, the phe-
nomenon of ‘change’ as such is something that is never totally complete, or 
locked temporally or spatially to a certain context ad infinitum. Rather, as 
this study has shown, as a process, it is constantly evolving into something 
new that goes beyond any particular instantiation of ‘change’ at any given 
time, place or context. While the transcendental nature of change (meaning 
that it goes beyond our direct experience of phenomena) makes it difficult to 
capture, it also makes it worth studying because it lies within the reach of 
potential knowledge. 
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